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Scribes and the Vocation of Politics in the Maratha Empire, 1708-1818 
Dominic Vendell 
This dissertation investigates the vocation of politics in the Maratha Empire from the release and 
restoration of Chhatrapati Shahu Bhonsle in 1708 to the British East India Company’s final 
victory against the Marathas in 1818. Founded in the mid-seventeenth century by the ambitious 
general and first Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhonsle, the Maratha Empire encompassed a decentralized 
web of allied governments stretching from the western Deccan into far-flung parts of the Indian 
subcontinent. While the Company’s pejorative moniker of “confederacy” has cast a long shadow 
over historical understanding of the politics of the Maratha state, this dissertation argues that the 
ascendancy of scribal-bureaucratic networks and their practices of communication enabled 
Maratha governments to foster a modern diplomatic framework of deliberation, adjudication, and 
collaboration. 
The creation of a flexible language and practice of communication transcending linguistic, 
cultural, religious, and political divisions was the signal achievement of the scribal-bureaucratic 
networks that increasingly came to dominate politics and government in the eighteenth-century 
Maratha Empire. Through a case study of individuals and households of the Chandraseniya 
Kayastha Prabhu sub-caste, this dissertation demonstrates that both non-Brahman and Brahman 
officials skilled in the arts of verbal and written communication rose from the lower ranks of the 
Maratha bureaucracy to the highest circles of political decision-making. They not only advanced 
their socioeconomic claims to wealth, title, and property, but also shaped government agendas, 
resolved disputes, and forged alliances through the dialogic exchange of oaths, treaties, objects, 
and sentimental words. Moreover, scribal-bureaucrats drew on this mode of communication to 
 
build strategic multilateral coalitions and to pen novel reflections on the meaning and purpose of 
politics once the dominance of the British East India Company was impossible to ignore.   
Communicative politics comes into vivid focus through a critical examination of the records and 
manuscripts that described, evaluated, and enacted relationships between Maratha governments. 
While the focus is on the critically important governments of Satara, Nagpur, and Pune, close 
attention is paid to conduits of power, persuasion, and affiliation between them and their rivals 
and allies in the eighteenth-century Deccan. Over the course of six chapters, this dissertation 
traces a chronological arc from the re-constitution to the dissolution of Maratha sovereignty as 
well as a thematic one from the structures and practices, to the personnel, and finally to the 
shifting meanings of politics. Chapters 1 and 2 explore how the delicate frameworks and 
practices preserving relationships between governments were made and unmade in the context of 
Maratha expansion in the Deccan. Turning to the personnel of politics, Chapters 3 and 4 follow 
the careers of Kayastha Prabhu scribal officials who attained influence at the courts of Satara, 
Kolhapur, Nagpur, and Baroda. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 highlight the ways in which the 
meaning of politics shifted in response to the emergence of Company power. The story of 
Maratha politics is thus the story of a concatenation of deliberative, pragmatic compromises 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
Any transliteration scheme, but especially one that aims to render multiple languages at different 
periods of their historical evolution, is necessarily imperfect. I have elected to employ the 
standard Library of Congress Romanization tables for the transliteration of Marathi and Persian 
words. It should be noted that these tables dictate that certain letters with similar sounds are 
transliterated differently. In the case of certain colloquial Marathi words borrowed from Persian, 
I favor a conventional Persian-derived transliteration, rather than one based on the LOC Marathi 
table, so as to avoid unwarranted perplexity. Readers should expect to encounter different 
transliterations of the same words, depending on context and usage (e.g. the ṣūbah of Berar and 
the title senā sāheb subhā). For the sake of simplicity, I do not include diacritics in rendering 
person and place names as well as well-known titles e.g. Peshwa. Variations in spelling and 













INTRODUCTION: In Search of the House of the Scribe 
For those in search of the old palace of the former Maratha rulers of Nagpur, the third 
largest city in today’s state of Maharashtra in west-central India, a good place to start is the 
intersection called Shivaji Chowk just east of Shukrawari Lake. It is popularly believed that 
Chand Sultan, the son of the Gond ruler and Nagpur’s founder Bakht Buland, built this urban 
reservoir to supply water to the city’s inhabitants. He is also said to have sponsored the 
construction of the Jama Darwaza whence you may enter the old city, commonly known as 
Mahal. In the late eighteenth century, you might have had to win over a couple of watchmen, but 
now all you have to do is dodge the two- and four-wheelers zipping in and out of the gate. Then 
simply follow the road to the next intersection and turn right. What appears to be just another 
non-descript lane will lead you straight to the Senior Rajwada, a gleaming, stately two-story 
residence (vāḍā) fronted by a dusty courtyard. A saffron flag atop the vāḍā and a statue of the 
first Maratha Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhonsle will immediately remind you of the pride with which 
its postcolonial denizens view their history.     
Suppose you are not a casual visitor or an earnest researcher of the modern era, but 
instead one of several ubiquitous figures who passed in and out of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century Nagpur: a decommissioned Afghan mercenary from Hyderabad desperate for 
a steady wage; a Jain cloth-merchant from Burhanpur hoping to peddle an array of silk sarees to 
the women of the royal household; or a Brahman envoy sent by a Calcutta-based British East 
India Company lieutenant to secure safe passage through uncertain territory. However legitimate 
your business, you might be hard-pressed to obtain an audience with the ruler if you lacked a 
formal petition or at least an introduction from a friend of the court. In this situation, your best 
option might be to make contact with one of the members of the king’s inner circle. Fortunately, 
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your associate employs an amaneusis – primarily for correspondence in the local language of 
Marathi – who is distantly related to the king’s chief scribe (ciṭnavīs). Rather than pressing for 
entry into the Rajwada, you – like this modern researcher – might instead return to the main road 
and make your way to the vāḍā of the Chitnavis family. Today, the Chitnavis Wada is located in 
a neighorhood appropriately named Chitnavispura, just down the road from the Rajwada. When I 
visited the Chitnavis Wada one afternooon in May 2016, I was struck by how unreservedly its 
caretakers escorted me around the premises.1 The ground floor’s inner courtyard, so 
characteristic of the Maharashtrian vāḍā, was flooded with natural light, while its outer 
perimeters were shady and cool. I was struck by how peaceful it was then, and how busy it must 
have been in former times, when it was the residence of one of the most prominent political 
families of Nagpur. 
The vāḍā is not the only landmark in Nagpur to bear the name of Chitnavis. There is a 
Chitnis Park just north of Shivaji Chowk, and the Chitnavis Centre in Civil Lines, the city’s 
government enclave in both the colonial period and today, is a cultural venue maintained by the 
Sir Gangadharrao Chitnavis Trust set up in honor of the family’s most well-known patriarch. It 
was through a connection to the Chitnavis family that Vinayakrao Anandrao Aurangabadkar, 
assistant to the British resident Richard Jenkins (1785-1853), discovered a mass of documentary 
sources for his composition of several important histories of Nagpur after the Company’s 
assumption of paramount authority in western and central India in 1817-8. But despite the 
evident legacy of this scribal family, the historical significance of their participation in the 
politics of the Maratha Empire is poorly understood today. In the popular historical imagination, 
the Marathas are primarily known as formidable warriors who struck terror in the hearts of some 
                                                
1 I am extremely grateful to Awantika Chitnavis for granting me permission to view the Chitnavis Wada 
and providing several useful books about her family’s history. 
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and valor in the hearts of others as they established an empire stretching from Attock to Cuttack. 
Even their Brahman chief minister, or Peshwa, who resided in the now-dilapidated (and, some 
say, haunted) Shaniwar Wada in Pune is imagined as a warrior in the manner of Ranveer Singh’s 
Bajirao in the 2015 Bollywood film Bajirao Mastani. Yet, it would have been impossible for a 
state as expansive and multicentered as the Maratha Empire to be built by the power of the sword 
alone. On what political basis then did it survive for the roughly one hundred and fifty years of 
its existence?  
This dissertation begins with the assumption that the integrity of the eighteenth-century 
Maratha Empire could only have consisted in the integrity of the political bonds between its 
several individual governments. But if these governments often acted independently and 
occasionally at cross purposes with the nominal sovereign Chhatrapati and his chief minister, 
then why maintain these bonds at all? For the British colonial official, the answer was love of 
plunder. For the anticolonial nationalist of twentieth-century Maharashtra, it was pride in being 
Maratha, often conflated with pride in being Hindu. Instead, I argue that Maratha governments 
remained bonded to one another because of their investment in a shared communicative 
framework for political action that they had built through a decades-long process of conflict and 
resolution. This dissertation shows that this framework was not primarily the achievement of 
rulers and generals, but rather of the administrators, counselors, diplomats, and especially scribes 
who staffed Maratha governments. Thus, politics was a vocation in which skilled, enterprising 
individuals could build a career, extend opportunities to their relatives and associates, and 
contribute to a cause that transcended the particularities of background and experience. In doing 
so, they fostered a language and practice of politics that enabled Maratha governments to mount 
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a coordinated, if ultimately unsuccessful response to the enroachments of a nascent British East 
India Company state.  
Eighteenth-Century South Asia and the Maratha Political 
In seventeenth-century western India, Shivaji Bhonsle (1630-1680), a leading general 
under the Adil Shahi sulṭān of Bijapur, roused his fellow Maratha landed gentry and peasant 
cultivators into a rebellion against Deccan Sultanate rule. While Shivaji’s military prowess led to 
the consolidation of an independent Maratha kingdom in the shadow of the Western Ghat 
Mountains, his ingenious engineering of his own coronation as chatrapati mahārājā in 1674 
marked the founding of Maratha sovereignty. After a hard-fought war against the Mughal 
emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618-1707), his eldest son and successor Sambhaji (1657-1689) 
was captured and executed; his younger son Rajaram (1670-1700) was forced to flee to Gingee 
in the Karnatak; and his grandson Shahu (1682-1749) was placed in captivity. In subsequent 
years, Rajaram and his extremely able senior queen Tarabai (1675-1761) recaptured significant 
parts of Shivaji’s kingdom. Most crucially, Shahu following his release and restoration reached 
an agreement with the Mughal emperor in 1719 whereby he retained the Maratha core domains 
and gained partial authority over the Deccan through the collection of one quarter of Mughal 
revenues, a much-contested claim known as cauth. This agreement would not have been possible 
without the assistance of Shahu’s Peshwa Balaji Viswanath (1662-1720), whose successors 
Bajirao I (1700-40) and Balaji Bajirao (1720-61) gradually eclipsed Shahu in power by 
partnering with Maratha generals to conquer new territories in central and northern India. After 
Shahu’s death in 1749, the Peshwas, now based in Pune, sought to exercise sovereign authority 
in the name of the Chhatrapati; however, Maratha ruling households, such as the Bhonsles of 
Nagpur and the Dabhades and Gaekwads of Baroda, ruled over semi-independent kingdoms and 
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frequently subverted the Peshwas’ authority. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the 
Marathas imposed their dominance over the Mughal throne, provoking an epic and disastrous 
battle with the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shahi Abdali at Panipat in 1761. Though Maratha 
expansionist ambitions survived their loss at Panipat, it is an important assumption of this 
dissertation that innovation in the field of Maratha politics in the eighteenth century was a 
product of relations between Maratha governments. 
The foundational historiography of eighteenth-century South Asia tended to be 
preoccupied with the question of the extent to which Maratha power was a parasite of Mughal 
decline. Historians in the colonial and immediate postcolonial periods believed that the predatory 
establishment of an arriviste Maratha state hastened the decline of the Mughals. Even Jadunath 
Sarkar, a pioneer in the field of Maratha history, asserted, “The decline of the Mughal Empire 
presented an opportunity by which the Marathas profited more than any other people of India.”2 
Historians of the Aligarh School located the causes of the decline of Mughal decline in a more 
general crisis of political economy. Whereas Irfan Habib pointed to explosive tensions between 
renter and rentier classes caused by a swelling tax burden, M. Athar Ali argued that the dramatic 
acceleration of grants of manṣabs to new nobility in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries exacerbated a shortage of fertile revenue-free lands.3 Subsequent studies by M.N. 
Pearson and J.F. Richards supplemented Ali’s thesis with an emphasis on the challenges to 
imperial authority posed by protracted war and conflict. In particular, they demonstrated that the 
Mughal state was increasingly unable to retain the loyalties of not only its highest-ranking 
                                                
2 Jadunath Sarkar, The Fall of the Mughal Empire, volume 1 (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar, 1949), 38. 
 
3 Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707 (New York: Asia Publishing House, 
1963); M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966). 
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manṣabdār nobility, but also the zamīndār elites, including the Marathas, who wielded power at 
the local and regional levels.4   
Debates about the integrity of Mughal imperial authority were predictive of a more 
general re-assessment of the suitability of decline as a paradigm of historical change in 
eighteenth-century South Asia. Responding to Pearson and Richards, Karen Leonard argued that 
the weakness of the Mughal center created opportunities for the enrichment and empowerment of 
Hindu banking households.5 Even more sweepingly, C.A. Bayly suggested that decentralization 
produced new, more local arenas for social, economic, and political flourishing. Though Bayly’s 
focus was on the petty nawābs, merchants and townsmen of north India, scholars working across 
the subcontinent found similar patterns of localization.6 In the case of western India, Frank Perlin 
in a series of extraordinarily insightful studies illustrated the ways in which elite Maratha 
households aggregated government offices with rights to surplus revenue across villages to form 
dispersed organizations whose influence penetrated multifarious relationships of social and 
economic interdependence.7 Perlin understood such state-society linkages to be characteristic of 
                                                
4 M.N. Pearson, “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” The Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 
(February 1976): 221-35; J.F. Richards, “Imperial Crisis in the Deccan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 35, 
no. 2 (February 1976): 237-56. 
 
5 Karen Leonard, “The ‘Great Firm’ Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 21, no. 2 (1979): 151-167. 
 
6 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 
1770-1870, 3rd edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); also see Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis 
of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-1748, 2nd edition (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Seema Alavi, ed., The Eighteenth Century in India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
 
7 Frank Perlin, “Of White Whale and Countrymen in the Eighteenth-century Maratha Deccan: Extended 
Class Relations, Rights, and the Problem of Rural Autonomy Under the Old Regime,” The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 5, no. 2 (1978): 172-237; Perlin, “Proto-Industrusialization and Pre-Colonial South 
Asia,” Past and Present 98 (February 1983): 30-95. 
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the dense interconnectivity of the “invisible city” of paper, currencies, and commodities 
underlying the polities of early modern Eurasia.8 
The formulation of a post-declinist narrative of historical transformation in the eighteenth 
century inspired new insights about the dynamics of Maratha state-formation. Stewart Gordon in 
several essays on Maratha rule in Malwa and Khandesh revealed that conquest was a gradual 
process of subordination, incorporation, and very often preservation of pre-existing local rights 
and privileges.9 But perhaps the most influential post-declinist interpretation of the Maratha state 
has been André Wink’s seminal Land and Sovereignty in India (1986). Wink seconded Bayly’s 
and Gordon’s intimation that the Maratha state represented an instance of the appropriation of 
Mughal power by the regional intermediate zamīndār classes, but he also propounded a 
transhistorical theory of sovereignty in South Asia. In contradistinction to what he took to be the 
absolute and unitary character of post-Grotian sovereignty in the West, he understood 
sovereignty in South Asia to be governed by a logic of antagonism between the ideal of universal 
dominion shared by Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic traditions of kingship and the reality of 
betrayal, sedition and rebellion, the latter of which he conceptualized with the Arabic term fitna 
(and the corresponding Marathi term, phitvā).10 However vivid their dreams of world conquest, 
South Asian rulers in Wink’s view could never “transcend fitna, since in actual political life fitna 
                                                
8 Perlin, The Invisible City: Monetary, Administrative and Popular Infrastructures in Asia and Europe, 
1500-1900 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), 1-14. 
 
9 Stewart Gordon, Marathas, Marauders, and State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); “Maratha Patronage of Muslim Institutions in Burhanpur and Khandesh,” 
in Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia, ed. David Gilmartin 
and Bruce B. Lawrence (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 327-38; many of the ideas from 
his earlier work are re-presented for a wider autidence in The Marathas, 1600-1818 (New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
10 André Wink, Land and Sovereignty in South Asia: Agrarian Society and Politics Under the Eighteenth-
century Maratha Svarājya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1-34, 153-5.  
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had no end.”11 He presented his most compelling evidence for the fitna theory of sovereignty in 
two case-studies of the Jagdale and Jedhe warrior clans, demonstrating that the Deccan sulṭāns, 
the Mughals, and the Marathas all reinforced these clans’ vested rights to land to secure their 
overlordship.12  
Wink’s provocative thesis generated a critical conversation in the field of South Asian 
history that helps distinguish the very different aims of this dissertation.13 Perhaps most troubling 
for critics like Irfan Habib has been the way in which Wink applies the framework of fitna 
without regard for the nuances of any particular political tradition. As such, he does not 
adequately demonstrate the relationship between the category of fitna and the extant textual and 
documentary apparatus of political practice. Of course, Wink’s argument is that fitna ran against 
hegemonic statements on sovereignty (e.g. the Ā’īn-i Akbarī of Mughal emperor Akbar’s 
celebrated minister Abu al-Fazl Allami). Wink was more concerned with how fitna “worked in 
practice,” yet as Habib astutely notes, his structural application of fitna works “to exclude every 
other possible concept or device in the practice of sovereignty in India.”14 To these historicist 
critiques, I would add a conceptual one. Because fitna conceives of politics in terms of a 
diametric opposition between sovereignty and rebellion within the field of political economy, it 
                                                
11 Wink, Land and Sovereignty, 29. 
 
12 Wink, Land and Sovereignty, 157-83. 
 
13 Irfan Habib, “Review of Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics under the 
Eighteenth-century Maratha Svarājya,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 25, no. 4 
(1988): 527-31; André Wink, “A Rejoinder to Irfan Habib,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 
26, no. 3 (1989): 363-7; Habib, “Reply,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 26, no. 3 
(1989): 368-72. 
 
14 Wink, “Rejoinder,” 367; Habib, “Review of Land and Sovereignty,” 530. 
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occludes the ways in which skilled individuals within multiple fields of political practice 
negotiated sovereign authority to attain a degree of freedom and responsibility.  
The latest scholarship has addressed the question of the negotiation of sovereign authority 
by drawing attention to the longue dureé of the social and cultural history of western India. 
Important early studies by V.T. Gune, A.R. Kulkarni, Hiroshi Fukazawa, and Hiroyuki Kotani 
have illuminated village- and district-level socioeconomic and judicial institutions.15 Building on 
the work of these scholars, Sumit Guha’s wide-ranging scholarship has shed light on many 
topics, including the Deccan agrarian economy; the penal and enumerative functions of the 
Maratha state; historical narrative; and the interface between caste, village society, and the 
margins of the agrarian order.16 Especially useful is his 2010 article on early modern scribal 
groups, wherein he illustrates how Brahman scribes negotiated the perceived degradations of 
Muslim rule by sacralizing the office of recordkeeping.17 Rosalind O’Hanlon has extended this 
line of inquiry to argue that Marathi-speaking Brahmans fostered expansive intellectual circuits 
                                                
15 V.T. Gune, The Judicial System of the Marathas (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research 
Institute, 1953); A.R. Kulkarni, Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji (Poona, 1969); Marathas and the 
Maratha Country, 3 volumes (New Delhi: Books and Books, 1996); Hiroshi Fukazawa, The Medieval 
Deccan: Peasants, Social Systems and States, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Hiroyuki Kotani, Western India in Historical Transition: Seventeenth to 
Eighteenth Centuries (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002).  
 
16 Sumit Guha, The Agrarian Economy of the Bombay Deccan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985); 
“An Indian Penal Regime: Maharashtra in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 147 (May 1995): 
101-26; “The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India, c. 1600-1990,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 45, no. 1 (January 2003): 148-67; “Speaking Historically: The Changing Voices of 
Historical Narration in Western India, 1400-1900,” The American Historical Review 109, no. 4 (October 
2004): 1084-103; “The Frontiers of Memory: What the Marathas Remembered of Vijayanagara,” Modern 
Asian Studies 43, no. 1 (January 2009): 269-88; Environment and Ethnicity in India, 1200-1991 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Beyond Caste: Identity and Power in South Asia, Past 
and Present (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
 
17 Sumit Guha, “Serving the Barbarian to Preserve the Dharma: The Ideology and Training of a Clerical 




of Sanskrit knowledge to shore up their claims to status and privilege.18 Foundational to these 
arguments is Susan Bayly’s earlier thesis that in the eighteenth century, traditional kingly power 
was eclipsed by a “Brahman rāj” of skilled, literate Brahman service elites who shared an 
ideology of caste purity.19 Yet at the same time, as Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam 
have shown, Kayastha and Khatri litterateurs in Mughal north India combined scribal work, 
history-writing, and political service. In different ways, all of these authors foreground the 
“missing middle” of early modern South Asia, emphasizing the ways in which the socially, 
culturally, and linguistically diverse middle classes became “witnesses” to sovereign power.20 
 Notwithstanding the many benefits it has yielded, the turn away from a post-declinist 
analysis of the political economic foundations of sovereignty to a focus on sociocultural issues in 
the historiography of early modern South Asia has circumvented the question of politics. This 
question concerns not merely how sovereign power was negotiated between rulers and rent-
paying subjects, but more fundamentally how skilled individuals acted in concert to achieve 
common goals and to establish and reproduce the parameters within which sovereignty could be 
exercised. Addressing the question of politics is important to understanding eighteenth-century 
South Asia precisely because the decentralization of Mughal authority enabled the formation of 
new forms of polity and the entrance of new groups into political life. It is important to 
understanding the Maratha Empire in particular because this political formation in fact never 
                                                
18 Rosalind O’Hanlon, At the Edges of Empire: Essays in the Social and Intellectual History of India 
(Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2014); for an accessible presentation of her core ideas, see Rosalind 
O’Hanlon, “Contested Conjunctures: Brahman Communities and ‘Early Modernity’ in India,” The 
American Historical Review 118.3 (2013): 765-87. 
 
19 Susan Bayly, Caste, Society, and Politics in India From the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 64-96. 
 
20 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Witnesses and Agents of Empire: Eighteenth-Century 
Historiography and the World of the Mughal Munshi,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 53.1, no. 2 (2010): 393-423. 
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resembled a traditional centralized and cohesive empire but instead took the form of a web of 
semi-independent governments whose allegiances were constantly in flux. If neither the Maratha 
Chhatrapati nor the Brahman Peshwa could hope to achieve universal dominion, what was the 
purpose and structure of politics in the Maratha Empire? What were the concepts, devices, and 
tools used to do politics? How did middling groups gain access to the political realm, and what 
sort of skills and competencies did they have to demonstrate? Finally, what were the discourses 
around Maratha politics that prevailed in the eighteenth-century and how did its skilled 
practitioners intervene in them? To what extent did they draw on their own experiences to 
produce a distinct political ethics? These questions are at the heart of this dissertation. First, 
however, I must clarify what I mean by politics, and what politics meant in the Maratha Empire.  
Towards a History of Politics  
Scholars of South Asia have tended to frame the political in terms of a Weberian model 
of the ideological legitimation of the state. For Weber, the state represents “a relationship in 
which people rule over other people.” 21 That is, the dominance of the state cannot be build on 
brute force alone, but also requires legitimacy, or the consent of the dominated. His interest in 
the legitimation of domination was linked to a conviction that the vocation of politics was replete 
with ethical ambiguity. “Professional politicians” often feel that they are in pursuit of the just 
ends of a higher cause, or calling, yet they must also be willing to employ unjust means to 
achieve those ends. It has not been these nuances in Weber’s analysis of politics, but a more 
narrowly instrumentalist version of his legitimation model that has garnered critique. Sheldon 
Pollock has argued that whereas this model presupposes the instrumental, functionalist logic of 
capitalist modernity, the cosmopolitan language of Sanskrit in premodern South and Southeast 
                                                
21 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, 
trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 34. 
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Asia formed an essentially non-instrumental cognitive framework within which power was 
aestheticized.22 From the different perspective of ethnohistory, Nicholas B. Dirks has argued that 
discourses about kingship in the south Indian “little kingdom” of Pudukottai constructed a 
ritualistic ethical order in which subjects shared in the king’s sovereignty through political 
actions, such as gift-giving, that were only partly instrumental.23 Pollock’s and Dirks’ critiques 
of the legitimation model deploy an anti-instrumentalist hermeneutics attentive to the ways in 
which texts create and transmit meaning, specifically the meaning of premodern power and 
authority. At the same time, they do not accede to the notion that the premodern state was merely 
a “theater state” concerned with the ritualized performance of purely symbolic actions. Rather, 
they insist that political action had both instrumental and symbolic dimensions.  
In this dissertation, I build on these critiques by returning to the organizing principle of 
Weber’s sociology of politics: action. Weber insisted that an interpretive understanding 
(verstehen) of action requires an understanding of the meaning that an individual attaches to his 
or her action in relation to the actions of others.24 Action is purposive, or end-driven, but because 
action is indissolubly linked to certain prior intentions and to certain posterior effects, it must 
also be meaningful both for its agent and other agents who have their own intended actions. For 
historians of politics, perhaps the most influential engagement with the concept of action has 
been that of Quentin Skinner and his followers associated with the Cambridge school of the 
                                                
22 For his critique of legitimation, see Sheldon Pollock, The Language of Gods in the World of Men: 
Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 511-
24. 
 
23 Nicholas B. Dirks, The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 55-138. 
 
24 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 4-5. 
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history of political thought. Skinner focused in particular on the context in which the meaning 
and purpose of a communicative action takes shape.25 Enlisting J.L. Austin’s distinctions 
between the locutionary meanings, illocutionary forces, and perlocutionary effects of utterances, 
Skinner suggested that to understand a particular text – say a political treatise like Machiavelli’s 
Il Principe (1532) – one must understand what a particular author intended to do in uttering a 
particular statement. The author’s intended act of communication would only become clear 
against the backdrop of practical conventions governing similar communicative scenarios arising 
more or less routinely in the society in question.26 For Skinner, analysis of texts would bear out 
Weber’s contention that the world becomes meaningful in and through the communicative 
actions of those who inhabit it.27  
Historians of South Asia in recent years have examined prescriptive texts dealing with 
the question of politics. Muzaffar Alam has illustrated that Persian ādāb and akhlāq “mirror for 
princes” treatises employed Greco-Islamic ethical ideals to construct a conventional language of 
political conduct for diverse groups within the Mughal Empire.28 More broadly, C.A. Bayly has 
argued that such texts formed part of the moral and affective framework within which political 
                                                
25 Here I am aware of but do not invoke Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which is 
grounded in the application of shared rational criteria for reaching understanding. As has been pointed out 
in many critiques, Habermas’ theory presumes a public sphere of rational equals abstracted from the 
realities of non-public social, or private, life. Such a presumption of course contradicts Weber’s original 
conception of action as a thoroughly social phenomenon. For the classic statement of the theory, see 
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, volume 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).   
 
26 The classic statement is Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” in 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988), 29-67. 
 
27 For his view of the relationship of his approach to Weber’s verstehen, see Skinner, “‘Social Meaning’ 
and the Explanation of Social Action,” in Meaning and Context, 79-96. 
 
28 Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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knowledge and practice took shape.29 The classic “mirrors for princes” text in Maratha 
historiography is the Ājñāpatra (1715-16) of Ramchandra Nilkanth Amatya, the close advisor of 
Chhatrapati Rajaram. Though Amatya frames the Ājñāpatra as a specific order (ājñāpatra) to 
Rajaram’s young son Shambhu, he also makes it clear that it is a work of rājnīti, or political 
ethics, partaking in the Sanskrit arthaśāstra and dharmaśāstra traditions and centrally concerned 
with elaborating the code of conduct that a king ought to exemplify for his subjects.30 Amatya 
identifies this code with maryādā, a Sanskrit-derived term that variously means “end,” “limit,” 
“code,” “morality,” and “propriety.” Maryādā in the Ājñāpatra challenged the conventionally 
high status of vatan, or patrimony, among the warrior-aristocratic class of the Maratha state. 
Alluding to the defections of Maratha nobility during the Mughal-Maratha wars of the last two 
decades, Amatya argues that this class was willing to resort to any means necessary to eke out 
their subsistence and to protect their vatan in times of uncertainty. Their actions caused the 
maryādā of the kingdom to fall into disorder, but at the same time, the kingdom’s growth 
(abhivṛddhī) was a certainty given by god (iśvaradatta). Reflection on this contradiction leads 
Amatya to the insight that the ruler must rectify the state of the kingdom by re-instating its 
maryādā through the application of his refined intelligence (sūkṣmabuddhi).31  
 Though such reflection on the Ājñāpatra sheds light on the ethical stakes of the actions of 
the ruler, it is less helpful in illuminating the actions of the quotidian political actors who moved 
within the extended orbits of Maratha rulers in the eighteenth century. Instead, this dissertation 
makes the case that the “invisible city” of paper that so fascinated Perlin – letters, orders, grants, 
                                                
29 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 
1750-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14-30. 
 
30 Ājñāpatra, edited by P.N. Joshi (Pune: Venus Prakashan, 1997), 11. For a further exploration of the 
genre of nīti, see Chapter 6.  
 
31 Ājñāpatra, ed. Joshi, 1-2. 
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agreements, revenue accounts, and family histories – constitutes the record of the mode of 
communicative action employed by practitioners of politics in the Maratha Empire. As I 
demonstrate through a case study of the political ascendancy of Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu 
officials, the primary criterion for entry into the political domain was not caste, class, religion, 
ethnicity, or any other ascriptive status. Rather, to become a practitioner of politics was to 
become fluent in the forms, idioms, and conventions of a specific mode of communicative 
action.            
Jawāb-Suwāl: Politics as Communicative Action 
As I have attempted to justify in the previous section, my approach to the study of 
politics in the Maratha Empire will be to consider politics not in terms of sovereignty or political 
economy, but in terms of action, and specifically communicative action. Within the Maratha 
Empire, the specific mode of communicative action that predominated in the political domain 
was known by the Marathi compound phrase jāb-sāl. Jāb-sāl is a shortened form of the Persian 
phrase jawāb-suwāl, which is composed of the words jawāb (answer) and suwāl (question). 
When translated literally as “answer-question,” or more colloquially for the English speaker as 
“question-answer,” the phrase already connotes the sense of communication involving two or 
more parties. Given that the verbal compound jawāb-suwāl kardan means “to converse,” jawāb-
suwāl may be more colloquially translated as an abstract noun such as “talk,” “conversation,” or 
“dialogue.”32 But I propose that rather than a fixed, determinate entity, jawāb-suwāl in the 
context of eighteenth-century South Asia connoted a mode of action wherein the intended 
meaning, force, and end of one’s communicative act was realized in and through the intended 
meaning, force, and end of another’s. In an ideal jawāb-suwāl scenario, an actor not only 
                                                
32 Francis Joseph Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English dictionary, including the Arabic words 
and phrases to be met with in Persian literature (London: Routledge, & K. Paul, 1892), 375. 
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comprehends the meaning of another’s utterance, but also takes up its force and performs its 
effect. In historical reality, of course, jawāb-suwāl did not always materalize in a substantive 
agreement; however, if both actors entered into this process in good faith, there was a basic 
shared understanding of the formal conventions whereby an agreement might be realized.     
Historically, jawāb-suwāl or jāb-sāl has been an important term for several different 
literary and artistic genres, including north Indian classical music,33 Marathi tamāśā folk plays,34 
and Christian and Islamic dialogues oriented towards conversion.35 But in the political circuits of 
eighteenth-century South Asia, jawāb-suwāl was the preferred term to describe processes of 
diplomatic negotiation. Hence when the chronicler Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai in his 
monumental Siyar al-Mutaʿakhkhirīn (1781) sought to describe Bengal nawāb Mahabat Jang 
Alivardi Khan’s decision to pursue peace with Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur, he wrote that the 
nawāb “opened the road of negotiation of reconciliation with the Marathas (rāh-i jawāb wa 
suwāl-i muṣālaḥat bā marhata kushūda).”36 The vernacularization of jawāb-suwāl in the Marathi 
short-form jāb-sāl is an example of the ways in which skilled elites at Maratha courts creatively 
adapted Persian language and knowledge. It is well known that many of the key terms employed 
in politics and government in the eighteenth-century Maratha country were derived from 
Sultanate and Mughal Persian usages. Though the late seventeenth-century Rājyavyavahārakośa 
                                                
33 John Napier, “The Distribution of Authority in the Performance of North Indian Vocal Music,” 
Ethnomusicology Forum 16.2 (2007): 275-77. 
 
34 Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009), 96-7; Sharmila Rege, “Conceptualising Popular Culture: ‘Lavani’ and ‘Powada’ 
in Maharashtra,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 1 (2002): 1038-47. 
 
35 For example, see H.U. Weitbrecht, A Descriptive Catalogue and Review of Urdu Christian Literature: 
1886-1901 (Lahore: Panjab Religious Book Society, 1902), 17. 
 
36 Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai, Siyar al-Mutaʿakhkhirīn (Lucknow, 1866), 509. 
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of Raghunath Pandit attempted to replace Persianate terms with Sanskritic synonyms, a Persian-
inflected Marathi, committed to paper in the cursive script Modi, continued to be the lingua 
franca of Maratha politics and administration through the early nineteenth century.37  
Much more than a simple descriptor, jāb-sāl encompassed a whole domain of 
communicative devices, including oaths, sacred objects, sentimental words, performative 
statements, and binding agreements. Most prominently, the outcome of a successful process of 
jāb-sāl was a written agreement representing the past, present, and future of a relationship 
between two or more governments. Such an agreement was typically called yād or yādī 
(memorandum) and, to a greater extent in the early nineteenth century, kalambandī. The Persian 
word qalam-bandī is related to qalam-band, which is composed of the words qalam (pen) and 
band (bound) and colloquially means “written down” or “committed to writing.”38 But another 
meaning of qalam is “section” or “paragraph.”39 Thus, yād/yadī and kalambandī denoted a genre 
of agreement structured around a set of articles that specify the terms and conditions of a 
relationship between two or more parties. Typically, each article in any such agreement 
concludes with the word kalam or the phrase kalam ek (one article). The content of a kalambandī 
was not necessarily diplomatic – a grant (sanad) or a judgement in a property dispute (mahzar) 
                                                
37 On the Rājyavyavahārakośa, see Sumit Guha, “Bad Language and Good Language: Lexical Awareness 
in the Cultural Politics of Peninsular India, ca. 1300-1800,” Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: 
Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500-1800, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 49-68. 
 
38 Steingass, 986. 
 
39 Steingass, 985. 
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could include kalam stating the conditions of ownership or transfer of rights to property.40 To 
adapt the kalambandī to the communicative context of jāb-sāl, practitioners of politics employed 
the term karār (Persian qarār). Karār can simply mean “agreement,” and in its reduplicated form 
karār-madār, it conveys the general sense of a set of agreements.41 But in the context of an 
agreement drafted during the process of jāb-sāl, the term takes on the force of an 
acknowledgement or approval. The word karār or the phrase yeṇepramāṇe karār often appears 
after each kalam in a conventional agreement to express the recipient’s acknowledgement of a 
set of terms and conditions. Kalam and karār thus form a pair reflective of a dialogic speech 
encounter.42  
The oath (śapath) was another tool within the communicative repertoire of jāb-sāl, one 
that was closely linked to the experience of a face-to-face speech encounter.43 The Marathi 
dictionarian J.T. Molesworth observed in 1857 that “numerous are the forms of Oath-taking or 
swearing, all instructive concerning the moral state and the sense of moral obligation of the 
                                                
40 For example, see Selections From the Satara Rajas’ and the Peshwas’ Diaries (hereafter SSRPD), 
edited by G.C. Vad and K.N. Sane, volume 9 (Poona, 1911), nos. 11-2, pgs. 7-9; Marāthyāncyā Itihāsācī 
Sādhane (herafter MIS), eds. V.K. Rajwade and P.N. Deshpande, volume 8 (Dhule: Rajwade Sanshodhan 
Mandal, 2009), no. 58, pg. 52. For a more wide-ranging discussion of the genre of the mahzar, or mahzar-
nāmā, see Nandini Chatterjee, “Mahzar-nāmās in the Mughal and British Empires: The Uses of an Indo-
Islamic Legal Form,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 58, no. 2 (2016): 379-406. 
 
41 J.T. Molesworth, A dictionary, Marathi and English, 2nd edition (Bombay: Bombay Education Society 
Press, 1857), 78. 
 
42 It is in this sense that with respect to the power of the Peshwa’s administrators Sakharam Bapu Bokil 
and Baburao Bhanu Phadnavis to issue grants, it was stated in a July 6, 1761 letter that “Sakharampant 
says karār. Dada [Phadnavis] says dyāve [the formal imperative ‘should be given’]. Giving is still closed. 
Much ‘give, give!’ is happening.” See MIS, eds. Rajwade and Deshpande, vol. 6, no 292, pg. 327. 
 
43 For oath taking in Chinggisid and Safavid contexts, see Maria E. Subtelny, “The Binding Pledge 
(möchälgä): a Chinggisid Practice and Its Survival in Safavid Iran,” in New Perspectives on Safavid Iran, 
ed. Colin P. Mitchell (London: Routledge, 2011), 9-29; for legal oaths in the Atlantic world, see Miles 
Ogborn, “The Power of Speech: Orality, Oaths and Evidence in the British Atlantic World, 1650-1800,” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36, no. 1 (January 2011): 109-125. 
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Maráṭhá people.”44 But many of the forms that he enumerates, which typically involve Hindu 
sacred objects such as the combination of bel leaves and turmeric powder (bel-bhanḍār), Ganges 
water (gaṅgā-jaḷa), the cow’s tail (gāīce śepūṭ), and the black seashell of Vishnu (śāligrāma), 
have been attested by folklorists and anthropologists to be prevalent in various regions of South 
Asia, though the bel-bhanḍār oath was held in special esteem in the Maratha country.45 
Procedures of adjudication and punishment within local majālas assemblies and caste pañcāyats 
routinely included the administration of oaths and ordeals for both Hindu and Muslim subjects.46 
In this context, the oath very often assumed the form of a curse that foretold evil effects should 
an individual take certain proscribed actions.47 The application of oath-taking rituals in 
diplomatic situations was an important stage of communication often preceding the finalization 
of an agreement within the total process of jāb-sāl.  
 Finally, sentimental words and performatives were the most fundamental elements of the 
communicative repertoire of the practitioner of politics in the Maratha Empire. Certain words, 
including, most commonly, khātrī or khātarjamā, conveyed the most potent sentiments of 
confidence and certainty of mind, while others, such as mamatā, conveyed somewhat less potent 
ones of affection and attachment. Just as sentiments of trust were most conducive to political 
                                                
44 Molesworth, 459. 
 
45 William Crooke, Things India: Being Discursive Notes on Various Subjects Connected With India 
(London: J. Murray, 1906), 347-50; H.A. Rose, A Glossary of the Castees and Tribes of the Punjab and 
North-west Frontier Provinces, volume 3 (Lahore, 1914), 367, 377, 480; J.H. Hutton, Caste in India: Its 
Nature, Function, and Origins (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1963), 105-6; George Abraham 
Grierson, Bihār Peasant Life, being a discursive catalogue of the surroundings of the people of that 
province, with many illustrations from photographs taken by the author (Calcutta, 1885), 401-2. 
46 A.R. Kulkarni, Medieval Maharashtra (New Delhi: Books & Books, 1996), 117. 
 
47 The curse in particular is a very old communicative form in the Marathi-speaking regions of western 
India that is probably linked to the transcultural, transhistorical “evil eye” prophylaxis. On this question in 
connection with the donkey curse of Yadava-period inscriptions, see Christian Lee Novetzke, The 
Quotidian Revolution: Vernacularization, Religion, and the Premodern Public Sphere (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), 78-86.   
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relations, words that expressed doubt and uncertainty, particularly saṃśaya and sandeha, were 
most corrosive. The performative or (in Austinian terms) illocutionary force of such sentiments 
is indicated by the fact that in the ordinary language of the period, it was acceptable to both 
speak (bolne) and to do (karne) them.48 Along these lines, individuals regularly alternated 
between declarative statements and imperative commands, exposing the degree to which even 
the former carried the force of a communicative action. Consider two successive statements in an 
April 29, 1803 letter composed for Raghuji Bhonsle: “It is very good that there is no concern 
(upasarga nāhī he phār cāngale āhe)” and “It is proper that there ought not to be concern 
(upasarga nasāve he ucita āhe).”49 Here the switch from the declarative to the imperative in the 
dependent clause makes explicit the force of the re-descriptive statements “It is very good” and 
“It is appropriate.” Not just sentimental words, but even seemingly mundane statements of fact 
could become powerful tools in the hands of a political practitioner. 
 Understanding the agents, structures, and tools of the vocation of politics in the 
eighteenth-century Maratha Empire entails the application of novel intepretative strategies to an 
eclectic array of sources, both central and peripheral to the existing field of Maratha history. The 
sources that I employ in this dissertation can be classified into three types. First, unpublished 
Marathi- and, to a lesser extent, Persian- and English-language government documents, 
particularly grants, orders, and revenue accounts, as well as official and personal 
correspondence, anchor my argument. The Marathi-language sources were handwritten in Modi, 
a cursive script that was the preferred medium of secular writing in the pre-colonial era. As 
artifacts of of scribal-administrative expertise, these sources not only record, but also encode 
                                                
48 See letter from Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal to Janoji Bhonsle regarding visit of Chimaji Rakhmagad 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
49 British Library (hereafter BL), Mss Marathi, D37, ff. 72b-73a. 
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political action in a linguistically hybrid, but conceptually specific register that I have begun to 
describe in this Introduction. Supplementing these materials are sources of a second type, namely 
Marathi- and English-language published documents. Because gathering, editing, and publishing 
documents was the central preoccupation of V.K. Rajwade, T.S. Shejwalkar, D.B. Parasnis, K.N. 
Sane, Y.M. Kale, Y.R. Gupte, G.S. Sardesai, and other doyens of Maratha history, published 
source collections are a staple of the field; however, these sources must be used with some 
caution, as very often their provenance is unknown. As a general rule, I corroborate major 
empirical and analytical claims with unpublished sources or note when those claims are purely 
speculative. A similar caveat applies to the third major source type found in this study: 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Marathi- and Persian-language historical narratives. 
Instead of merely adhering to a skeptical attitude towards their “facticity,” I read such narratives, 
and especially scribal-authored Marathi bakhars, as records of the social history of politics. 
While their apparent subject is usually dynastic history, their real subject is the often 
unremarked, though not unremarkable doings of the scribal-bureaucratic individuals, households, 
and networks that made politics happen. Of course, scribal authors sometimes exaggerated the 
accomplishments of their forebears. Such exaggerations should not be taken as signs of duplicity 
or prejudice, as I argue in Chapter 6 with respect to the works of Malhar Ramrao Chitnis, but 
rather as deliberate rhetorical strategies with specific aims and intentions.     
 The tumultuous relationships between the Maratha ruler of Nagpur, and his allies and 
rivals, including the Maratha sovereign Chhatrapati Maharaja of Satara, the Peshwa of Pune, and 
the Nizam of Hyderabad, constitute the principal site for this dissertation’s exploration of the 
communicative politics of jāb-sāl within the Maratha Empire. The first section of the dissertation 
outlines the formation, evolution, and transformation of this set of relationships from the re-
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establishment of Maratha sovereignty under Shahu to the final resolution of the civil wars 
between Nagpur and Pune in 1769. Chapter 1 offers an account of how a junior branch of the 
Bhonsle Maratha clan led by Raghuji Bhonsle (1695-1755) employed alternating strategies of 
conquest, compromise, and conciliation to consolidate an autonomous kingdom in the much-
contested Mughal province of Berar in central India. The Bhonsles’ long-standing claim to cauth 
revenues in Berar did not sit well with the Deccan governorship of the Mughal nobleman Nizam 
ul-Mulk (1671-1748); however, by means of jāb-sāl, Janoji Bhonsle (d. 1772) struck a set of 
agreements with Nizam ul-Mulk’s successor Nizam Ali Khan (1734-1803) in 1757 to settle the 
terms of Maratha-Nizam joint rule of Berar. But it was the Bhonsles’ intimate friendship with the 
Nizam’s feudatories – the Afghan rulers of Ellichpur (Achalpur) – that enabled lasting peace. 
Mudhoji Bhonsle (d. 1788) helped to permanently etch their friendship in stone by providing the 
funds for the construction of a new outer court surrounding the burial shrine of the warrior-saint 
Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah outside Ellichpur city after the death and in memory of the late ruler 
Ismail Khan Panni (d. 1775). By re-affirming both the sacral power of the saint and the secular 
power of the ruler, Bhonsle’s gesture, I argue, revealed that their friendship exceeded the 
parameters of the purely instrumental, strategic relation encoded by the 1757 agreement. 
 The Bhonsles’ friendliness with the Nizam of Hyderabad and his feudatories existed 
uncomfortably alongside their commitments to the Peshwa’s government at Pune. Chapter 2 
traces the origins and aftermath of the Pune-Nagpur civil wars of the 1760s. It explains why 
these governments were unable to manage a panoply of unresolved points of contention: unpaid 
debts, contested jurisdictions, non-performance of military service, and outright treachery as well 
as more subterranean anxieties borne of the sudden rise to political supremacy of the Chitpavan 
Brahman sub-caste. Most fundamentally, Maratha governments were unable to reach a workable 
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consensus because of declining trust in the actions of their administrators (kārbhārī). Criticisms 
of the aberrant cunning of kārbhārī, including most notably Devaji Chorghode (d. 1782), the 
Bhonsles’ lead advisor at Nagpur, revealed the critical importance of these skilled political 
practitioners in preserving relations of trust and amicability. The process of jāb-sāl that followed 
the cessation of hostilities in 1769 built the foundations of a peaceful and cooperative 
relationship between the Pune and Nagpur governments, allowing them in subsequent decades to 
coordinate their policies with respect to the British East India Company.       
Though the several kārbhārī who fell into disgrace in the 1760s were Brahmans, their 
much-overlooked predecessor, as I argue in Chapter 4, was the Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu 
chief scribe and intimate advisor to Chhatrapati Shahu, Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis (d. 1785). 
In a last ditch effort to restore confidence in the Bhonsles’ loyalty to the Peshwa, Devaji 
Chorghode sent a relative of Govindrao Khanderao’s, the Kayastha Prabhu scribe Chimaji 
Rakhmagad (d. 1780), to negotiate with Peshwa Madhavrao I (1745-1772). Chimaji and Govind 
were both members of a prominent Kayastha Prabhu extended household with branches at 
Satara, Nagpur, and Pune that along with members of several other Kayastha households 
acquired a foothold in Maratha politics in the mid-to-late eighteenth century. The second section 
of the dissertation examines the ascendancy of Kayastha Prabhu service households as a case 
study of the ways in which the vocation of politics facilitated social mobility. In Chapter 3, I 
profile the functional niche of Kayastha Prabhu officials within the Maratha bureaucracy and 
hone in on the socioeconomic and professional trajectory of the Chitnis household of Satara from 
the early to the late eighteenth century. I emphasize that junior relations were able to make use of 
their extended family networks to obtain new positions and to establish connections with 
potential patrons. Chapter 4 illustrates how Kayastha service households transitioned from 
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administrative and military service to politics by following the careers of prominent members of 
the Chitnis and Chitnavis households of Satara and Nagpur and associated Kayastha households 
at Kolhapur, Pune, and Baroda. Though subject to the changing whims of fickle rulers and the 
resentments of orthodox Brahman priests, Kayastha scribes and soldiers like Govindrao 
Khanderao of Satara and Mahitpatrao Dinkar and Krishnarao Madhav (d. 1803) of Nagpur were 
able to advance themselves into roles of diplomatic influence. Mastering the formal rituals and 
routines of the Maratha court, they cultivated working relationships with their peers across 
divides of caste, community, and political affiliation. I draw attention to the promise of these 
relationships with special reference to the profit-sharing agreement (karārnāmā) struck by the 
Nagpur scribal-diplomats Sridhar Laxman and Krishnarao Madhav and the Peshwa’s envoy 
Baburao Viswanath Vaidya prior to the battle of Kharda of 1795. 
 At Kharda, Maratha governments won one last battle in their long-running feud with 
Nizam Ali Khan over control of the Deccan before the political tides began to shift in favor of 
the increasingly powerful British East India Company. The final section of the dissertation asks 
two questions: How did the Company interpret and intervene in Maratha politics, and how did 
the purpose and meaning of Maratha politics change in an emerging epistemic world in which 
Company knowledge played a decisive role? Chapter 5 argues that Company officials 
understood politics in the Maratha Empire primarily through the category of predation. The 
Governors-General Warren Hastings (1732-1818) and Richard Wellesley (1760-1842) pursued 
increasingly aggressive policies against what they understood to be a predatory system of 
“confederate” states sparing no expense to maximize their booty. In formulating this conception, 
they were abetted by historical and geographical research, represented foremost by the work of 
the Pune resident Charles Warre Malet (1752-1815). At the same time, the ministers Nana 
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Phadnavis (1742-1800) and the aforementioned Devaji Chorghode in 1779-80 and the scribal-
diplomats Krishnarao Madhav and Sridhar Laxman in 1803 enacted processes of jāb-sāl to 
devise anti-British coalitions that the Company deemed to be an illegitimate  “confederacy.” 
“Confederacy” has persisted into the present as the preferred term for describing the eighteenth-
century Maratha state, obscuring the sophisticated forms of communicative action that I argue 
were central to sustaining the bonds of a decentralized and dispersed imperial formation. 
 Finally, in Chapter 6, I re-introduce the question of political ethics by reviewing the 
writings of scribal historians at Satara and Nagpur. I analyze how a treatise on rājnīti authored 
by Malhar Ramrao Chitnis (d. 1823) informed the composition of historical narratives (bakhar) 
about the lives of Shivaji and his successors. Though Company historians like James Grant Duff 
(1789-1858) set the tone for how these works would be received by post-colonial readers by 
evaluating them on narrow empirical grounds, Chitnis’ aim was primarily commemorative and 
didactic. That is, he viewed not only the Bhonsle rulers, but also his scribal forebears as 
exemplars of good conduct, positioning the scribal classes as the caretakers of a living tradition 
of political ethics. In a very different fashion, the Nagpur resident Richard Jenkins’ assistant 
Vinayakrao Aurangabadkar worked in and outside the empiricist parameters of Company 
research by assembling an extremely diverse archive of letters, documents, personal testimony, 
and his own narratives on the history of the Nagpur Bhonsles. The research labors of skilled, 
literate scribal officials like Aurangabadkar would go unnoticed even as their employers’ 
histories of the Maratha state became guidebooks to colonial governance. Having lost the right to 
exercise their communicative expertise to shape the fortunes and destinies of governments, all 
that was left for the old practitioners of politics to do was to protect their hard-won patrimony 
from the miserliness of the early colonial state. A new colonial politics of vatan, as I suggest in 
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the Conclusion, was the ultimate outcome of the Company’s depoliticization of the Maratha 
Empire.  
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CHAPTER 1: Expansion and Affiliation in the Eighteenth-Century Deccan 
 In early December 1785, Mudhoji Bhonsle, the frail and battle-worn Maratha ruler of 
Nagpur, visited the burial shrine of the warrior-saint Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah on the banks of 
the Bichan River just northeast of the city of Ellichpur (today’s Achalpur) in central India (see 
Figure 1). This was not Mudhoji’s first visit. He had financed the construction of the shrine’s 
outer walls after the death of his friend and co-ruler Ismail Khan Panni, the nawāb of Ellichpur, 
in 1775. Before returning to his camp at Daryapur about fifty kilometers to the southwest, 
Mudhoji visited Salabat Khan, Ismail Khan’s son and the new nawāb, at his home. They sat 
together and chatted for a few hours. Just as the nawāb was about to make a customary gift of a 
set of robes in honor of his visit, Mudhoji declared, “You are my son (cirañjīva). I do not wish to 
take your robes.” Having dispensed with the usual formalities, they instead enjoyed a refreshing 
digestif of pān, and Mudhoji was on his way. He lingered at Daryapur for a few more days to 
finalize some negotations with the nawāb and his brother Bahlol Khan, eventually setting out for 
Nagpur on December 26, 1785.50 His health deteriorated in the next couple years, and in May 
1788, he contracted a bad fever and died. Salabat and Bahlol Khan visited Nagpur on June 12, 
1788 to offer their condolences to Mudhoji’s son Raghuji. But when they tried to present him 
with a shawl and a vessel of holy water, he stated, “You and I are brothers (bandhu). There is no 
need for this.” Though they pressed him to accept, he refused. The brothers grieved with the 
Bhonsles for another week or so before taking their leave.51  
                                                
50 Nagpur Affairs: Selections from the Menavli Daftar (hereafter NA), edited by T.S. Shejwalkar, volume 
2 (Pune: Deccan College, 1959), no. 121, pg. 59. 
 
51 NA, ed. Shejwalkar, vol. 2, no. 194, pg. 100. 
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Figure 1: Main Entrance of the Dargah of Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah 
Considering the principal political and religious affiliations of these two dynastic lineages, this 
set of interactions may seem peculiar. Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur was a Hindu Maratha rājā 
who ruled at the pleasure of the Maratha Chhatrapati at Satara, while Salabat and Bahlol Khan 
were Muslim Panni Afghan nawābs who paid obeisance to the Nizam of Hyderabad. Historians 
have long known that the Marathas and the Nizam pursued both war and diplomacy to manage 
relations that were by turns friendly and antagonistic, but fundamentally strategic.52 Being the 
two main competitors for dominance in the vast trunk of the Indian subcontinent known as the 
                                                
52 For T.S. Shejwalkar, the strategic character of Nizam-Maratha relations reflected the fundamental 
hypocrisy and ideological bankruptcy of the Maratha state under the Peshwas. By comprosing with the 
Mughals, and with their proxies in the Deccan, the Peshwas had ceded Shivaji’s dream of independence. 
See his Nizām-Peśve Sambandha (Pune, 1963); also see Setumadhavrao Pagadi, Eighteenth Century 
Deccan (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1963). 
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Deccan, the Maratha and Nizamate states clashed in six major battles and countless minor 
scuffles over the course of the eighteenth century.53 Within the interstices of their antagonism, 
however, a friendship blossomed between the individuals who co-ruled the Deccan province of 
Berar on their behalf. In fact, the Maratha rājās of Nagpur and the Panni nawābs of Ellichpur, 
and especially Mudhoji Bhonsle and Ismail Khan Panni, were something more than friends. As 
the statements of familial affection adduced earlier suggest, their friendship entailed a degree of 
heartfelt regard and affection that exceeded the protocols of diplomatic etiquette.       
 This chapter traces a particular instantiation of Hindu-Muslim encounter in pre-colonial 
South Asia, a subject that has received much attention in recent scholarship.54 Rejecting a 
“communalist” view of the past, this scholarship has revealed the ways in which Hindu and 
Muslim elites evinced interest in each other’s literary, artistic, and religious practices. The 
formation of elite political and cultural capital was often marked by a high degree of cultural 
exchange and experimentation. This insight should not lead to the conclusion that pre-colonial 
South Asia was free from strident rhetoric and spectacular violence between Hindus and 
Muslims. Rather, as Sanjay Subrahmanyam has articulated with respect to the days leading up to 
                                                
53 By “major,” I refer to battles in which large swathes of territory changed hands. These were the battles 
of Palkhed (1728), Bhopal (1737), Udgir (1760), Alegaon (1761) Rakshasbhuwan (1763), and Kharda 
(1795). 
 
54 For a sample of this work, see Cynthia Talbot, The Last Hindu Emperor: Prithviraj Chauhan and the 
Indian Past, 1200-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Audrey Truschke, Culture of 
Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Shahid Amin, 
Conquest and Community: The Afterlife of Warrior Saint Ghazi Miyan (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 
2015); Richard Eaton and Phillip Wagoner, Power, Memory, Architecture: Contested Sites on India’s 
Deccan Plateau, 1300-1600 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014); Sushil Mittal, ed., Surprising 
Bedfellows: Hindus and Muslims in Medieval and Early Modern India (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2003); David Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence, ed., Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious 
Identities in Islamicate South Asia (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000); Wagoner, “‘Sultan 
among Hindu Kings’: Dress, Titles, and the Islamicization of Hindu Culture at Vijayanagara,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996): 851-880; Talbot, “Inscribing the Other, Insribing the Self: 
Hindu-Muslim Identities in Pre-colonial India,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 4 
(1995): 692-722. 
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the momentous 1565 battle between the Vijayanagara Empire and the Deccan Sultanates, 
intimacy could lead to instances of insult, invective, and outright violence.55 Similarly, Cynthia 
Talbot argues that violence occurred within “a tense but mutually comprehensible system of 
political relations.”56 The “system of relations” that subsisted between two or several powers, as 
well as the prevailing languages and practices that political actors used to called it into being, 
varied based on the political, economic, and cultural configuration of the historical moment in 
question. Yet, scholars still resort to a static Weberian concept of legitimation – that is, rulers 
and elites sought to establish their fitness to rule over diverse populations by exhibiting a desire 
to incorporate diverse ways of life into the polity.57 The goal of this chapter is to offer a more 
dynamic model of how a particular “system of relations” between Hindu and Muslim polities 
evolved in response to the realities of shared governance of the eighteenth-century Deccan.   
 In this chapter, I argue that rulers and their followers within the expanding Maratha and 
Nizamate orbits primarily organized their relations under the rubric of friendship. Insofar as it 
existed neither in a state of absolute alienness or absolute identification, friendship provided a 
language to articulate the multiple potentialities of a relationship in flux. In particular, I examine 
the evolution of the friendship between the Maratha and Afghan feudatory co-rulers of Berar. By 
the time of the events described above, they considered themselves to be almost brothers. But 
this degree of affection was not natural or pre-ordained; rather, it was the contingent outcome of 
                                                
55 Through a careful reading of the chronicle record, Subrahmanyam shows that the conventional name 
for this battle – the battle of Talikota – is not entirely reflective of where it actually took place. See Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 34-102. 
 
56 Talbot, The Last Hindu Emperor, 30. 
 
57 For a recent engagement with this concept – one that claims that the Mughals in particular were 
interested in Indic ways of life primarily as a form of self-fashioning, rather than legitimation – see 
Truschke, Culture of Encounters, 2-3, 18. 
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an extended process of political transformation. I show that the friendship between the co-rulers 
of Berar emerged out of a crucible of recurring conflict between the Marathas and the Nizam. In 
this first section, I introduce the Deccan, and especially the Mughal province of Berar, and 
outline Maratha expansion into this region through the delegation of authority to a junior 
Bhonsle household. The Bhonsles cultivated affiliations not only with the Peshwa, the Maratha 
sovereign’s chief minister, but also with the Peshwa’s primary opponent, Nizam ul-Mulk of 
Hyderabad. As I elaborate in the second section, the Bhonsles established control in Berar by 
deploying strategies of conquest, compromise, and counter-affiliation with local rulers, including 
the Nizam’s Ellichpur-based governor of Berar. While joint rule (do-amalī) of Berar took on a 
more formal and negotiable form through the sāt-cāḷīs diplomatic arrangement of 1757, the 
success of this agreement depended on the actions and sentiments of those deputed to execute it. 
Particularly after the appointment of Ismail Khan Panni to the provincial governorship in 1763, 
the Maratha rājās of Nagpur and the Afghan nawābs of Ellichpur fostered a sincere friendship 
that transcended strategic necessity. Mudhoji Bhonsle’s patronage of the construction of the 
outer court of the dargah of Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah after the death of Ismail Khan was the 
ultimate gesture of affection for and remembrance of a dearly departed friend.   
Berar, the Bhonsles, and the Problem of Affiliation  
The Deccan is a region of historic geophysical and geopolitical significance. In 
geophysical terms, the Deccan consists of the downward-pointing triangular plateau bounded by 
the Eastern and Western Ghats and the Vindhya and Satpura ranges. It is predominantly 
composed of fertile black soil produced by the solidification and disintegration of prehistoric 
lava flows (known as the Deccan Trap), though hillier parts of the plateau also feature less fertile 
red soils. Its fertility made it viable for settlement and conquest since at least the Mauryan 
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period. The name “Deccan” likely derives from the use of the Sanskrit designations dakṣiṇa and 
dakṣiṇapatha in the Puranic and epic literature to refer to the area south of the Narmada River.58 
In his political geneaology of the region, the early seventeenth century chronicler Muhammad 
Qasim Hindu Shah Astarabadi, better known as Firishtah, stated that Dakan was the son of Hind 
and had three sons, Marhat, Kanhar, and Tiling. As Richard Eaton has argued, these offspring 
referred to three major linguistic zones – Marathi, Kannada, and Telugu – that roughly 
corresponded with the three major post-Chalukya regional kingdoms: the Yadavas, the Hoysalas, 
and the Kakatiyas. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Khilji and Tughluq 
sultans of Delhi mounted repeated campaigns against these kingdoms. The conquest of the 
Deccan and consequent migration of large numbers of people from the north accelerated the 
formation of an “Indo-Persian axis” stretching from the Deccan to north India and central and 
west Asia. In 1347, the breakaway Bahmani Sultanate was founded by Muhammad bin 
Tughluq’s general Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah in 1347. Bahmani politics was divided 
between factions of Deccanis, those descended from the original north Indian settlers who 
identified with the Dakhni language, and Foreigner (also known as Westerner) migrants from the 
Persian, Turkic, and Arab lands who identified with Persian language and culture. By the late 
medieval period, the Deccan had become a crossroads between north and south, a battleground 
between “transregional sultanates” and “regional kingdoms,” and a laboratory of linguistic and 
cultural interaction.59  
                                                
58 P.M. Joshi, “Historical Geography of the Medieval Deccan,” in History of Medieval Deccan, eds. H.K. 
Sherwani and P.M. Joshi, vol. 1 (Hyderabad: Andhra Pradesh Government Press, 1973), 1-29. 
 
59 Richard M. Eaton, A Social History of the Deccan, 1300-1761: Eight Indian Lives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2, 9-11; for a deeper exploration of the early history of cultural and 
political interaction in this region, see Eaton and Wagoner, Power, Memory, Architecture, 4-70. 
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Berar, or Vidarbha as it is known today, is the northeasternmost sub-region of the 
Deccan. Though its boundaries shifted under succeeding regimes, its core is the fertile basin 
lying between the Wardha and Wainganga rivers. Under the Bahmanis, Berar was a frontier 
province fortified on the north by the forts of Gawelgadh and Narnala in the Satpura Mountains 
and on the south by the fort of Mahur. Narsingh Rai, the Gond ruler of Kherla across the Tapi 
River to the northeast, challenged Bahmani control over the province until Firoz Shah Bahmani 
forced him to pay tribute in 1399.60 Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Bahmanis 
began to cede control over the province to their general Fathullah Imad ul-Mulk. During the 
reign of Mahmud Shah Bahmani, he founded a breakaway sultanate, inscribing his independence 
in stone by erecting the outermost Mahakali gate of Narnala in 1487 and the south gate of 
Gawelgadh, known as the Fath Darwaza, in 1488.61 Along with the Nizam Shahs of 
Ahmadnagar, the Adil Shahs of Bjiapur, the Qutb Shahs of Golconda, and the Barid Shahs of 
Bidar, the Imad Shahs became successors to Bahmani rule in the Deccan. 
Fathullah’s successors held Berar for almost a century despite facing repeated Nizam 
Shahi assaults from the south. In the early 1560s, the adolescent Burhan Imad Shah was confined 
by his minister Tufal Khan, who soon after was chased out of the country by a combined Nizam 
Shahi and Adil Shahi force. In 1572, Berar was absorbed into the Nizam Shahi sultanate, only to 
be taken by the Mughal emperor Akbar’s son Murad in 1596. With the exception of a brief 
period of Nizam Shahi control imposed by the general and kingmaker Malik Ambar, Berar 
would remain under Mughal rule until it was seized by Nizam ul-Mulk in 1724. Before he died, 
                                                
60 Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah Astarabadi (Firishtah), History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in 
India, translated by John Briggs, volume 2 (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1981), 232-3.  
 
61 George Michell and Mark Zebrowski, Art and Architecture of the Deccan Sultanates (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Universiy Press, 2008), 38; T.W. Haig, Historic Landmarks of the Deccan (Allahabad: 
Pioneer Press, 1907), 148, 154-5. 
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supposedly of successive drinking, in 1599, Prince Murad built himself a residence at Shahpur 
near Balapur. Abu al-Fazl, who himself had led the conquest of Gawelgadh and Narnala, 
mentioned this residence in the entry on Berar in his encyclopedic Ā’īn-i Akbarī (c.1595). The 
Ā’īn-i Akbarī,62 and the Sawāniḥ-i Dakan (1783) of Mu’nim Khan al-Hamdani al-Aurangabadi63 
(who cites al-Fazl) include detailed descriptions of Berar as one of the six regularly administered 
Mughal provinces (ṣūbah) of the Deccan.  
Al-Fazl and al-Hamdani claim that the name “Berar” derived from “Varda-tat,” an 
amalgam of the name of the neighboring Wardha River and the word for bank or shore.64 Both 
emphasize the excellent quality of its climate and soil, though al-Hamdani’s estimate of the total 
revenue assessment (Rs 12,268,727) show that it was one of the poorer Deccan ṣūbahs.65 By the 
time of their writing, Berar had acquired more or less stable boundaries. Al-Hamdani states that 
its neighbor to the east was Chanda; to the west the provinces of Khandesh and Aurangabad; to 
the north the district of Hindiah; and to the south the province of Muhammadabad-Bidar. He 
includes a further territorial division, established under Shah Jahan, between the Balaghat and 
the Payanghat falling on the southern and northern sides of the Ajanta mountain pass, 
                                                
62 Abu al-Fazl, Aín I Akbari, translated by H.S. Jarrett, volume 2 (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
1891), 228-38. 
 
63 British Library, Persian Manuscripts, Add 23885, ff. 21b-22a. 
 
64 Jarrett, trans., 228; BL, Persian Manuscripts, Add 23885, ff. 21b. 
 
65 For a slightly different figure from another manuscript of the Sawāniḥ, see History of the Medieval 
Deccan, vol. 1, 625; for the figure recorded by Grant Duff after his review of the Satara daftar, see James 
Grant Duff, A History of the Mahrattas, volume 1 (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 
1826), 450. 
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respectively.66 Borrowing from al-Fazl, al-Hamdani highlights local sights such as a well near 
the fort of Kherla; a spring near Melgadh with the power to petrify plants or wood; and the 
violent and sweet-smelling ginger flower as well as several high-quality local goods, including 
grain, rice, ghee, cotton, millet, cattle, teak, and bamboo. Finally, he offers a snapshot of its 
changing political landscape: 
The seat of power (hākim-nishīn) of Berar is the city of Ellichpur. In the center are two 
rivers named the Sapan and the Bichan, and both of these rivers join the Purna. The 
shrine (dargah) of Rahman Shah Quds Allah north of the eminent city of Ellichpur on the 
Sapan River is venerable. The ‘urs lamps of that elder are famous…When Qutb al-Mulk 
arrived as the governor of Berar, the district of Pathri was incorporated. In the time of 
Akbar, the imperial domains were augmented. The length of this province was 200 
kurohs from the forts of Batiala to Biragarh, and its width was 180 kurohs from Bidar to 
Hindiah. When the country of the Deccan was conquered, the district of Nandir with the 
sub-districts of Telangana were incorporated into the province of Muhammadabad-Bidar. 
The width of Berar was finally fixed, running from the district of Nandir to Hindiah as 
well as the length from Batiala to Chanda. Through the exertions of the late nawāb 
[Nizam ul-Mulk], the fort Manikdurg-Sirpur and other territories were incorporated into 
this province. Because the Maratha Bhonsles in recent years became co-conquerors 
(sharīk-i ghālib) of the province, its affairs fell into disorder (kārish az nasq bar uftād).67  
As I will explore later in this chapter, the capital, the shrine, and the opportunities and challenges 
of shared governance were closely intertwined in Berar in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century.  
 Northeast of the Berar flatlands, Bahmani and Mughal imperial authority was more 
limited in the hilly and densely forested region of Gondwana. The Gonds, an Adivasi people 
spread across central India, established the kingdoms of Kherla, Deogadh, Gadha-Mandla, and 
                                                
66 Hamdani calls this range the sabhāchal. See BL, Persian Manuscripts, Add 23885, ff. 21b. On the 
division between the Balaghat and the Payanghat, see C. Brown, Central Provinces and Berar District 
Gazetteers, volume 1A (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1910), 43; A.C. Lyall, Gazetteer for the 
Haidarábád Assigned Districts, Commonly Called Berar (Bombay: Education Society’s Press, 1870), 1-
2. 
 
67 BL, Persian Manuscripts, Add 23885, ff. 22a. 
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Chanda in the Satpuda hills.68 Claiming descent from an earlier line of Gaoli rulers, including 
one Tulobaji,69 the Deogadh Gond rājās emerged by the seventeenth century as the wealthiest, 
most powerful, and therefore most enticing to the world-conquerors of Delhi. According to the 
Ā’īn, their forebear, a zamīndār named Jatba, was in possession of 2,000 cavalry, 50,000 foot 
soldiers, and more than 100 elephants, far exceeding the resources of the rival chieftains in his 
vicinity.70 Jatba’s successors Koka Shah and Kesari Shah narrowly avoided Mughal conquest by 
acceding to successive demands for tribute. Bakht Buland, the most famous of the Deogadh 
rulers, converted to Islam and paid his respects to Aurangzeb at Delhi. The latter awarded him 
the title buland-bakht (fortunate) but later changed it to nigūn-bakht (unfortunate) when his new 
vassal began to augment his domain with Mughal territory.71 Bakht Buland was said to have 
founded the city of Nagpur by joining a series of hamlets called Rajapur Barsa and initiated a 
more intensive process of deforestation for settlement and cultivation.72 When the Nagpur 
resident Richard Jenkins’ assistant Vinayakrao Aurangabadkar toured the region in the 1820s, 
residents continued to credit him with creating prosperity by guaranteeing the rights to land of 
local proprietors.73 When the Bhonsles sought to consolidate their authority in Berar and 
                                                
68 For a broader assessment of Gond political history, see Guha, Environment and Ethnicity, 122-9.  
 
69 For example, an account solicited by Vinayakrao Aurangbadkar in 1821-2 relayed that the first 
Deogadh Gond rājā Jatba acquired the kingdom from the Gaolis. See BL, Mss Marathi, D44, ff. 34b. 
Also see Y.K. Deshpande, “Fresh Light on the History of the Gond Rajas of Deogarh,” Proceedings of 
the Indian History Congress 13 (1950): 231-3.  
 
70 Aín I Akbari, trans. Jarrett, 229. 
 
71 Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, volume 1 (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar & Sons, 1919), 205-9. 
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Press, 1827), 104. 
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Gondwana, they developed functional relationships with the successors of Mughal and Gond 
rulers, a process that will be discussed in detail below. 
The accepted founder of the Bhonsle lineage that came to rule in the northeastern Deccan 
was Mudhoji Bhonsle, who, along with his kinsman Rupaji, was said to have held the office of 
village headman (pāṭīl) of Hingani.74 However, later generations also claimed an ancestral right 
to the district headmanship (deśmukhī) of Kadewalit near Ahmadnagar. An order (farmān) from 
the dynastic archive at Nagpur relays the story of how the Bhonsle clan of Kadewalit paid 
obeisance to Ahmad Nizam Shah I in the early 1490s after he marched from Bidar to Bhingar, 
which became the foundation of his new residence, the Bagh-i Nizam, and the city of 
Ahmadnagar: 
All of the affairs of the kingdom (umūrāt-i mulk) were taken into hand. All of the 
proprietors and officials and traders of the blessed city presented themselves at the front 
of the fort. Suryaji, son of Shahji Bhonsle, who possessed the dīsā’ī [desāī] of Kadewalit 
and six other territories, paid a sum of 3,000 hons and was distinguished with the full 
robes of the dīsā’ī of Kadewalit and appointed to the service of the fort.75 With regard to 
his own business, the dīsā’ī on behalf of Haidar Nayak, son of Bom Nayak, the headman 
(muqaddam) of the town of Bhingar, requested that since that town is near Junnar, and 
since a new city and fort have been founded here, he should be appointed to the 
command of the fort of Sarnar76 and to construct new fortifications. He will handle both 
appointments.77  
In addition to Suryaji’s confirmation in the desāī post, Haidar Nayak’s request to augment the 
fortifications near Bhingar was granted with financial support to be provided from the town of 
                                                
74 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 36a-39. I would like to thank Sumit Guha for making a scanned microfilm 
copy of this manuscript available to me. Also see G.S. Sardesai, Aitihāsika Gharāṇyāñcyā Vaṃśāvaḷī 
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by Y.M. Kale (Nagpur: Madhyaprant Sanshodhak Mandal, 1936), 5-6. 
 
75 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 22a. 
 
76 The Marathi translation of the Persian text, which itself is a transcription of a now-lost original farmān, 
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BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 24a. 
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Narayangaon in Kadewalit. The Bhonsles’ rights in this district continued to be linked to control 
of Ahmadnagar. According to an account of the Mughal prince Daniyal’s conquest of the Nizam 
Shahi capital in 1599, the “proprietors and officials and cultivators were brought to court. Gifts 
were taken, and deeds were issued for their territories. Thus, Sharafji Bhonsle [later noted as son 
of Suryaji], the proprietor of the province Kadewalit paid his respects, gave a gift of 500 hons, 
and received a turban.”78 Sharafji also received two new districts and some additional lands in 
different villages, thereby re-affirming and augmenting his deśmukhī rights in Kadewalit.79  
What kind of a family relationship existed between Mudhoji and Rupaji Bhonsle of 
Hingani and Shahaji, Suryaji, and Sharafji Bhonsle of Kadewalit is unclear. Nevertheless, the 
Kadewalit deśmukhī was an important part of the package of “nested rights” claimed by the 
Bhonsles from at least the early eighteenth century onwards.80 Such rights, as Stewart Gordon 
has argued, were multifariously tied to existing allocations of property within a particular 
locality; however, they also conferred new powers on the recipient.81 The above descriptions of 
local landowners – the Bhonsles of Kadewalit among them – arrayed before succeeding imperial 
regimes bears out Gordon’s conclusion that the deśmukh was a “hinge” figure between 
centralizing imperial authorities and village-based officials like the headman Haidar Nayak.82 
Bahmani, Mughal, and eventually Maratha rulers with expansionist ambitions had to win the 
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loyalty of desāīs and deśmukhs and corresponding leaders at the village level to consolidate their 
authority in newly conquered territories. In turn, for the Bhonsles of Nagpur, possession of the 
Kadewalit deśmukhī seat was a source of prestige, especially because of its longevity and 
independence from any specific conditions of service. 
While certain accounts claim that the Hinganikar Bhonsles served under Shivaji,83 the 
relationship between this branch and the Bhonsle Chhatrapatis can be more assuredly dated to 
the critical period of political re-consolidation under Chhatrapati Rajaram and his queen Tarabai 
(1675-1761). In addition to the re-conquest of core Maratha forts, this process included new raids 
into Mughal territory, starting with the Karnatak near Rajaram’s refuge at Ginjee and moving 
northwards into Khandesh, Malwa, and Berar. In 1699, after fleeing from Ginjee, Rajaram 
planned an expedition into Berar and Gondwana at the invitation of the aforementioned Bakht 
Buland of Deogadh.84 Parsoji Bhonsle (d. 1711), the son of Mudhoji Bhonsle, was one of several 
sardārs who joined this expedition,85 which – with the exception of one division that 
successfully crossed the Narmada – was cut short by Mughal forces.86 After Rajaram’s death in 
1700, Tarabai ordered more northern raids under the leadership of Nemaji Shinde, Keshavpant 
Pingle, and Parsoji Bhonsle. Accompanied by fifty thousand cavalry, they made it as far as 
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Kalabag in February 1704.87 Among the Mughal commanders who countered these raids was 
Rustam Khan, the Mughal deputy governor of Berar based at Ellichpur.88  
When the Maratha prince Shahu left Mughal captivity in 1707, he passed through Berar 
and Khandesh; along the way, he met Parsoji Bhonsle. By mid-1708, Parsoji had declared his 
support for the prodigal prince in open defiance of the solicitations of Tarabai and many of the 
Maratha mobility.89 In return, he was named senā sāheb subhā, a title of martial prowess akin to 
the title of senāpati, and authorized to collect tribute in Berar and Gondwana. When Parsoji died 
in October 1711, his son Kanhoji (d. 1737) asked Shahu for land to support the maintenance of a 
flower garden and oil lamps at his father’s final resting-place (śmaśāna-sthaḷa) in the village of 
Khed at the confluence of the Krishna and Venna Rivers. 90 Shahu granted his request and 
recognized him to be the rightful heir of the senā sāheb subhā title. In April 1715, Kanhoji and 
Khanderao Dabhade at the head of force of three thousand soldiers raided Malwa, though they 
lost much of their plunder in battle with Sawai Jai Singh, the Mughal-appointed Rajput governor 
of Malwa.91  
Meanwhile, both Shahu and Tarabai were continually petitioning Delhi for rights to 
collect cauth and sardeśmukhī (usually 10 or 12 1/2 % of total land revenue) in the six ṣūbahs of 
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the Deccan.92 These rights, as I explained in the Introduction, were central to the delegation of 
imperial sovereignty in the Deccan. Emperor Bahadur Shah entertained requests from Shahu and 
Tarabai without issuing any formal decision in either party’s favor. During Zulfiqar Khan’s stint 
as governor of the Deccan from 1708 to 1713, he and his deputy Daud Khan Panni came to an 
informal agreement that the cauth could be collected through imperial officers. In 1718-9, 
Peshwa Balaji Viswanath made a successful bid for these rights in exchange for furnishing the 
kingmaker Saiyid Husain Ali Khan Barha with an army to seize Delhi from the wayward 
emperor Farrukhsiyar. Kanhoji’s cousins Santaji and Ranoji Bhonsle were part of the army that 
occupied the Mughal capital for a month or so while the Barha brothers initiated a bloody coup. 
While Santaji lost his life in a street melee,93 the Peshwa managed to extract formal sanads with 
the imperial seal for rights to svarājya, cauth and sardeśmukhī, including in the ṣūbah of Berar.94 
Sanads notwithstanding, Kanhoji Bhonsle was one of many Maratha generals whose 
loyalties were tested by the emergence of an alternate source of patronage in the person of Chin 
Qilich Khan Nizam ul-Mulk, a Mughal statesman and founder of the “successor state” of 
Hyderabad. First appointed to the governorship of the Deccan in 1713, Nizam ul-Mulk in 1722 
                                                
92 As early as 1700, Tarabai offered submission to Aurangzeb in exchange for recognition of her son 
Shivaji II and the grant of sardeśmukhī. For the various claims and counter-claims, see Satish Chandra, 
Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27-8, 84-
8, 114-5. 
 
93 According to testimony offered in the late 1810s, a tomb (thaḍaga) was erected on the spot where he 
died. See BL, Mss Marathi, B26, ff. 123b; J.F. Blumhardt and S.G. Kanhere, eds., Catalogue of the 
Marathi Manuscripts in the India Office Library (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 73; NBB, ed. Kale, 37. 
 
94 The original sanads issued to Balaji’s delegation no longer exist. Some were probably issued during the 
brief reign of Rafi ud-Darjat and some after the ascension of Muhammad Shah. These would have been 
retroactively dated to the date of Farrukhsiyar’s deposition, which was considered Muhammad Shah’s 
first regnal year. Grant Duff contested the assertion that Berar was included in these grants. See A.G. 
Pawar, “Some Documents Bearing on Imperial Mughal Grants to Raja Shahu (1717-24),” Proceedings of 
the Indian Historical Records Commission 17 (1940): 204-15; Chandra, Parties and Politics, 187, ft. 26; 
Grant Duff, A History of the Mahrattas, vol. 1, 450-2. 
 
 42 
finally achieved his long-held ambition of acquiring the post of wazir at Delhi only to give it up 
for a more independent course. Munis D. Faruqui has pointed out that a principal obstacle to the 
consolidation of the Nizam’s authority in the Deccan was the strength of the Marathas.95 The 
relationship between the Nizam and the Marathas varied over the course of the 1720s. Peshwa 
Bajirao I fielded troops on behalf of Alam Ali Khan in a losing battle with the Nizam near 
Balapur in 1720. When the Nizam returned to the Deccan four years later, Bajirao prepared for 
another confrontation. Ultimately, he supported the Nizam against the upstart deputy governor 
Mubariz Khan at Sakharkhed in September 1724, earning a manṣab rank of 7,000.96 But Nizam 
threw his weight behind Shahu’s rival Sambhaji II of Kolhapur (1692-1760), and they clashed 
again at Palkhed in 1728. This battle resulted in a decisive Maratha victory and the Nizam’s 
recognition of their claims to cauth and sardeśmukhī. Extending a pattern established during the 
Mughal-Maratha wars of the late seventeenth century, conflict between the Nizam and the 
Marathas opened up a field of opportunity for defection, ambivalence, neutrality, delay and 
various other forms of counter-affiliation. As I will explore in subsequent sections, counter-
affiliation from the perspective of imperial authority was treachery, or fitna; however, from the 
perspective of provincial governance, it was an expedient approach to the realities of power on 
the ground. 
Kanhoji Bhonsle’s intentions were sufficiently uncertain in the months leading up to the 
battle of Sakharkhed to prompt an order from Shahu to remain neutral in the brewing struggle 
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between the Nizam and Mubariz Khan, who had been actively seeking Kanhoji’s assistance.97 In 
February 1726, Kanhoji unsuccessfully clashed with the Nizam’s general Aiwaz Khan and 
chased the Maratha defector Chandrasen Jadhav before proceeding towards Golkonda to join the 
Peshwa’s Karnatak campaign.98 At the same time, however, he must have been considering his 
own chances on the other side of the battlefield. As early as mid-1727, the Peshwa’s partisan 
Ambaji Purandare received word that “if Kanhoji Bhonsle and Sripatrao Pratinidhi were to do 
the work of Bhaganagar [Hyderabad], the nawāb [Nizam ul-Mulk] would give Kanhoji the 
kingdom of Chanda and designate him as a separate king.”99 By 1730, it was well known that 
Kanhoji was subsisting on a grant of tax-free land revenue (jāgīr) made by the Nizam.100 An 
extant farmān indicates that this jāgīr included an assignment of 74,000 dāms from the pargaṇa 
of Kurha (Kurhad) in the district of Kalamb in Berar, which the Nizam had removed from its 
previous owner Saiyid Haji Khan.101 Around this time, Kanhoji was also indiscriminately 
extorting ghāsdāṇā, an irregular grain levy for feeding horses. As I will explore in this and the 
following chapter, the levying of ghāsdāṇā, like dodging a summons to fight or neglecting to pay 
off arrears, was an oblique challenge to the delegated sovereignty of the Peshwa that was 
redressed by non-violent diplomatic means, or at the last extremity, by war.102  
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The Maratha central government considered defection to be a grave breach of trust in 
relations with both its subjects and external powers.103 Included in a set of negotiating terms 
(kalam) exchanged with Delhi in the early 1720s were the statements that “our people should not 
take service with the Mughals” and that “those of our Maratha nobility who serve with the 
Mughals should be given back to us.”104 In a letter to the Peshwa’s representative with the 
Nizam, Purandare, the official mentioned earlier, re-iterated, “There is an agreement (karār) that 
the nawāb should not take on our [people], and we should not take on the nawāb’s [people]. 
Now that Kanhoji has been taken on after he absconded, how will this provision be 
implemented?”105 In addition to castigating the Nizam for violating the terms of their agreement, 
the Maratha central government sought to remedy the situation by mandating reconciliation. 
Having earlier sent an agent to Satara to “make promises (āṇ-śapath) of loyalty at the feet of the 
mahārājā [Shahu],” Kanhoji made a personal visit to Shahu sometime between 1733 and 
1734.106 But before their relationship could be repaired, he hastened back to Berar, prompting 
Shahu to depute his nephew Raghuji to imprison him. Kanhoji was eventually caught and 
imprisoned in Nandir in Vani pargaṇa just east of the Wardha River; several of his followers 
were captured; and his entire household was escorted to Satara in the summer of 1734.107 Later 
accounts suggest that it was Kanhoji’s haughty and violent behavior – including refusing to dine 
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with Shahu, addressing himself as mahārājā, and even forcibly demanding women’s breast milk 
for his consumption – that finally drove Shahu to turn Raghuji against his own uncle.108 While 
these charges cannot be verified, it is clear that Kanhoji’s transgressions were serious enough to 
tarnish his reputation and inspire a re-distribution of patronage within the Bhonsle clan. 
Back in 1727, the Maratha central government had re-distributed one third of Kanhoji’s 
service assignment (saranjām) to his cousin Ranoji109 and nephew Raghuji.110 After Kanhoji fell 
out of favor, Raghuji became Shahu’s new favorite and a member of his extended royal 
household. In this regard, he was almost the equal of Shahu’s adopted son Fattesingh Bhonsle, 
who became Raghuji’s co-parcenary in Berar and military companion in the Karnatak later in the 
1730s. By dint of a grant (ināmpatra) dated November 22, 1733, Shahu awarded Raghuji with a 
vatan for the permanent maintenance of his line (vaṃśa paramparene cālavne) in the village of 
Deur, located about twenty-five kilometers northeast of Satara.111 Because the Deur vatan, like 
the Kadewalit deśmukhī, was not technically dependent on the contingencies of a service 
relationship, it conferred significant prestige on Raghuji’s line. At the same time, its physical 
proximity to the Maratha capital allowed for swift punitive action, should his political activities 
violate the commands of central authority.    
Between Kanhoji’s fall from favor in 1733 and his death in 1737, the Maratha central 
government began to implement a fresh division of the Berar revenues. As was customary in all 
of the Mughal provinces of the Deccan conquered by the Marathas, the sardeśmukhī share, or ten 
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percent of the total revenue yield, was reserved for the Chhatrapati. In theory, the cauth share, or 
twenty-five percent collected on the remainder (ain-tankhā), would be split into the bābtī share 
for the Chhatrapati and the mokāsā share for further re-distribution. After certain special cesses, 
including six percent in sāhotrā and three percent in nāḍgauṇdā, were levied for Shahu’s 
favorites, the remainder (ain-mokāsā) would then be available for military service 
assignments.112 In practice, each province had its own particular set of flexible arrangments. In 
the case of Berar, the bulk of the mokāsā was transferred from Kanhoji to other members of the 
Bhonsle clan with Raghuji as the primary recipient.113 Central government records for individual 
pargaṇas in Berar reflect this division. For example, records for Nandgaon Peth, Pale, and other 
pargaṇas in the district (sarkār) of Gawel display an entry for Kanhoji Bhonsle for the year 1732 
and a separate entry for Raghoji Bhonsle for the period running from August 29, 1733 to the year 
1738 under the revenue heading mokāsā va nime jakāt.114 Other named recipients of mokāsā 
include Fattesingh Bhonsle, Ranoji Bhonsle, Kanhoji’s son Rayaji,115 and even Kayastha Prabhu 
scribal officials employed by the Bhonsles.116 
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By 1739, Raghuji Bhonsle possessed extensive rights to mokāsā in Berar and 
Gondwana117 as well as the title of senā sāheb subhā. In addition, Shahu issued a sanad in 
Raghuji’s name for rights to collect cauth in the northeastern provinces of Bundelkhand, 
Allahabad, Lucknow, Maksudabad (Murshidabad), and Dhaka.118 Even more so than previous 
grants, this sanad gave Raghuji license to establish a distinct sphere of authority in central and 
northeastern India. Nevertheless, this authority still existed within the parameters of Raghuji’s 
vassalage to Shahu, which entailed participation in centrally planned military expeditions, 
regular attendance at court in Satara, and forfeiture of a significant portion of the Berar yield. To 
buttress his sphere of authority, Raghuji employed a repertoire of strategies of counter-affiliation 
that created friction with Peshwa Bajirao I, the leading representative of the Maratha Chhatrapati 
in Raghuji’s lifetime. Conversely, counter-affiliation fostered a degree of political amity and 
cooperation with non-Maratha local rulers. It was through these promiscuous counter-affiliations 
that Mughal-Maratha shared governance in the Deccan was realized.  
Conquest and Counter-Affiliation in Berar and Gondwana 
In popular historical memory, Raghuji Bhonsle is best remembered for mounting several 
Maratha campaigns in Orissa and Bengal. These campaigns, which took place in 1742-3, 1744-5, 
and 1747-8, followed from the 1738 sanad extending Raghuji’s authority and resulted in 
significant financial and political gains for his nascent dynasty. In addition, for many twentieth-
century Maharashtrian Brahman historians, they embellished the story of the growth and 
expansion of Maratha rule across the Indian subcontinent, particularly under the leadership of 
                                                
117 See BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 56b-57a, 63b-67b. Raghuji was entitled to a third portion of the 
Kanhoji’s half of the revenues of Devgarh and Chanda as well as half of the customs duties (jakāt), while 
Fattesingh Bhonsle retained the other half. In the next section, I explore how Raghuji expanded his 
holdings in Gondwana. 
 
118 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 85a-89b; G33, ff. 16a-b. 
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Raghuji’s rival Peshwa Bajirao I.119 This narrative usually highlights the heroism of Raghuji’s 
Brahman general Bhaskarram Kolhatkar and his martyrdom at the hands of the forces of the 
Bengal nawāb Alivardi Khan. Outside Maharashtra, the memory of these campaigns has been 
very different. Sharply critical eighteenth-century Persian tārīkh accounts such as Ghulam 
Hussain Tabatabai’s Siyar al-Mutaʿakhkhirīn dwelled on the violence and chaos of the Maratha 
raids. They also reinforced a pre-existing stereotype of the Maratha as bārgīr or bārgī, a term 
used to denote a Maratha cavalry soldier employed in the Deccan.120 Most famously, the Bengali 
verse narrative Mahārāshtra-purāṇa (1751) of Gangaram Dev, who probably experienced the 
Maratha raids first-hand, asserted that the goddess Durga commanded the bārgīs to invade in 
order to punish the sins of the Bengal nawābs.121 Similarly frightful references to Maratha 
invasion endure in Bengali lullabies to this day. But falling between these poles of valor and 
terror was a broad spectrum of political strategies, ranging from direct conquest to overlordship 
to counter-affiliative friendship, employed in the service of Maratha expansion and 
                                                
119 See G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, volume 2 (Bombay: Phoenix Publications, 1946), 
207-229; for this narrative more generally, see V.G. Dighe, Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion 
(Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House, 1944).    
 
120 For example, the Maratha cavalrymen serving under Malik Ambari were called bārgī-ān. The other 
term often used was qazzāq, which connoted an armed figure closer to a robber or, in the language of 
Company officials, a brigand. See, The Maāthir-ul-Umarā: Being Biographies of the Muḥammadan and 
Hindu Officers of the Timurid Sovereigns of India From 1500 to About 1780 A.D. By Nawwāb Samṣām-
ud-Daula Shāh Nawāz Ḵẖān and His Son ‘Abdul Ḥayy, translated by Henry Beveridge and Baini Prashad, 
2nd edition, volume 1 (Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1979), 58, 185, 451, 536; also see Beveridge, 
“Derivation of the Words Bargī and Sabaio,” The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain and 
Ireland (July 1906): 704-6. For a further discussion of the characterization of the Maratas in eighteenth-
century Indo-Persian writing, see Chapter 5. 
 
121 Edward C. Dimock Jr. and Pratul Chandra Gupta, trans., The Mahārāshtra Purāṇa: An Eighteenth 
Century Bengali Text (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); Kumkum Chatterjee, “The 
Persianization of ‘Itihasa’: Performance Narratives and Mughal Political Culture in Eighteenth-Century 
Bengal,” The Journal of Asian Studies 67, no. 2 (2008): 513-543. 
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governance.122 These strategies were most preponderant in Berar and Gondwana across the 
primary frontier of Raghuji Bhonsle’s expansion into the Deccan. 
 In Gondwana, Raghuji’s primary strategy was to bring his military might to bear on the 
succession disputes of local rulers. As most spectacularly revealed by Maratha interventions in 
the Rajput kingdoms in the later eighteenth century, this strategy could lead to bloody and 
grievous consequences.123 The outcome in the case of the Gond kingdoms was less harmful in 
the long term, though it was not without its costs. When Chand Sultan, Bakht Buland’s successor 
at Deogadh, died in 1739, his four sons struggled for the throne. Wali Shah killed his eldest 
brother Mir Bahadar, prompting the senior queen Ratan Kuwar to summon Maratha aid through 
her minister Raghunath Singh. The minister stumbled across Raghuji Bhonsle’s army near the 
town of Shirasghat on the banks of the Wainganga River and agreed to broker an agreement 
between Raghuji and the two Deogadh heirs, Akbar Shah and Burhan Shah.124 In a 1739 letter to 
Raghuji, they referred to themselves with the titles of mahārājādhirājā and mahipati devarājā 
gosāī, stating, “Despite not having the right, Wali Shah was tyrannically ruling so we summoned 
you and your forces to help us free the kingdom and agreed with you to the following articles.” 
These articles included a payment of ten lākh rupees for the maintenance of Raghuji’s cavalry; a 
third of the domains of the Deogadh kingdom, including the fort of Pavani and the sub-districts 
                                                
122 For a penetrating analysis of the case of direct conquest, see Stewart Gordon, “The Slow Conquest: 
Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720-60,” Marathas, Marauders, and 
State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23-63. 
 
123 See, for example, the interventions in Mewar described in R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations With the 
Major States of Rajputana (1761-1818 A.D.) (New Delhi: S. Chanda & Co., 1973), 59-85. 
 
124 The accounts of the succession in the Nagpur bakhars differ. We may surmise that Akbar Shah and 
Burhan Shah were the official heirs of Chand Sultan, while Wali Shah and Mir Bahadar were the sons of 
concubines. The latter and his brother Badal Shah were alloted a junior kingdom at Bagheda. See BL, 
Mss Marathi, D33, 14a-18a; NBB, ed. Kale, 47-8. 
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of Multapi and Marud; and a promise to consult him before making any movements or entering 
into any engagements.125 As they had done with the Mughals a hundred years earlier, these Gond 
rājās preserved their symbolic authority by ceding effective sovereignty to a more powerful 
ruler. 
 It was at the time of Raghuji’s subjugation of Deogadh that he first became associated 
with an elite Rohilla Afghan household that would come to rule the towns of Seoni and 
Chhapara, and in so doing, fortify the Bhonsles’ authority in Gondwana. According to an 
account of the Afghan Seoni-Chhapara jāgīrdārs commissioned in 1831 by the Company agent 
of the Saugor and Narbudda Territories, their ancestor was an obscure Afghan cavalryman 
named Raj Khan (d. 1734)126 who had served under the Hada Rajput kings of Kota-Bundi before 
migrating to central India. Eventually, Raj Khan won a jāgīr at Dongertal by paying fealty to 
none other than Bakht Buland, and he took the fort of Sangarhi (also known as Sahangarh) on 
behalf of the Deogadh ruler.127 Coming to the notice of Raghuji Bhonsle, his son Muhammad 
Khan (d. 1761) in exchange for his loyalty received Seoni and Chhapara in jāgīr.128 Muhammad 
Khan’s successors Majid Khan (d. 1774) and Muhammad Amin Khan (d.1798) continued to rule 
at Seoni and Chhapara and came to the aid of the Bhonsles on several occasions, most 
prominently during their campaigns in Gadha-Mandla in the late 1790s.129  
                                                
125 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 75a-77b. 
 
126 Referred to as Taj Khan in Charles Grant, The Gazetteer of the Central Provinces of India (Bombay: 
Education Society’s Press, 1870), 473. 
 
127 Grant also alleges that Raj Khan impressed Bakht Buland by killing a bear single-handedly with his 
sword! See Grant, Gazetteer, 473. 
 
128 Madhya Pradesh State Archives (MPSA), District Office Records, Incomplete Records Related to 
Seoni District, “Musulmaun Jagheerdars of Seonee,” ff. 124-133.  
 
129 For example, see NBB, ed. Kale, 84, 92, 109, 142, 150, 178, 191.  
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While I will briefly touch on this later history of Seoni-Chhapara in Chapter 5, here I 
want to emphasize that the Bhonsles’ relationship with the Afghan rulers of Seoni-Chhapara was 
emblematic of the way in which the Maratha conquest of Gondwana and Berar entailed the 
cultivation of friendly affiliations with local Afghan martial elites. The most remarkable instance 
of this process – their friendship with the Panni nawābs of Ellichpur – will be discussed in detail 
in the following section. The Bhonsles’ promotion of new Afghan nawābī states at Seoni-
Chhapara and Ellichpur echoes the rise of the Rohilkhand and Farrukhabad nawābs in the Doab. 
C.A. Bayly emphasizes how these north Indian Afghan nawābs sought political respectability by 
seeking relationships with the Mughal successor state at Awadh; similarly, I show that the 
Afghan nawābs of central India shored up their newfound status and authority by pursuing 
friendships with the Maratha rājās of Nagpur.130  
 The Bhonsles consolidated their control over Gondwana by applying pressure to other 
local rulers to cede key territories and ratify permanent alliances with them. Badal Shah, another 
son of Chand Sultan and the ruler of the far eastern territory of Bagheda, in a February 23, 1738 
letter expressed his friendship (ishṭatva) with Raghuji Bhonsle by handing over the fort 
Bhowargarh and the pargaṇa Dhamb.131 In the early 1740s, Akbar Shah avoided a brewing 
conflict with his brother by taking refuge with the Nizam, which allowed Raghuji to take 
possession of additional territories in Deogadh, including the capital city of Nagpur.132 
Collaborating with a disgruntled former minister, Raghuji forced the Chanda ruler Nilkanth Shah 
to give up Chandrapur fort and retire to Balapur. The ensuing plan for joint collection of the 
                                                
130 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 30-2, 141-7. 
 
131 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 77b-78b. 
 
132 Raghuji seems to have had some involvement in the assassination of Akbar Shah of Deogadh after his 
defection to the Nizam. See NBB, ed. Kale, 53-4. 
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revenue of the kingdom conveyed the delicate balance between dominance and friendship 
structuring the relationship between the two rulers. Out of every 110 rupees, 37.5 were alloted to 
both the Maratha senā sāheb subhā and the Gond ruler in a category termed bhāī vāṭanī, or 
fraternal distribution, while an extra 10 rupees in sardeśmukhī and twenty-five in cauth were 
alloted to the former.133 In lieu of this collection, Nilkanth Shah would receive a fixed payment 
of 1,500 rupees, thereby reliquishing powers of revenue administration to his new Maratha 
overlord.134 In addition, he made a special grant of the pargaṇa of Amgaon as restitution for the 
injury of Raghuji’s hand committed by his cavalry-soldier, one Rahim Dad Khan.135 Similar 
arrangements for joint rule existed with rulers north of the Narmada in Bundelkhand. For 
example, by means of a 1739 agreement (tahanāmā), a prince named Harid Singhji accepted 
Raghuji Bhonsle’s service (naukarī); granted him the pargaṇas of Sihora, Katangi, and Amoda; 
vowed to provide military assistance for future conquests (mulukgirī); and promised to pay the 
cauth and sardeśmukhī.136 Thus, the implementation of Maratha claims to cauth and sardeśmukhī 
in the Deccan led to the re-distribution of authority at the local level and the gradual creation of 
new ruling partnerships through a combination of violent and diplomatic means. 
 Just as in Gondwana, initial Maratha encounters with entrenched government in Berar 
featured their fair share of conflict. As I outlined in the previous section, Berar was a Mughal 
province with a centrally appointed governor. After Nizam ul-Mulk returned to the Deccan in the 
1720s, he continued the Mughal government in Berar, appointing Aiwaz Khan Azad ud-Daulah 
                                                
133 Strangely, Jenkins records the fraternal share as Rs 37.8. See Jenkins, Report, 107. 
 
134 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 104b-106b. 
 
135 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 107a-b. 
 
136 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 80b-81a. 
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to the governorship after the battle of Sakharkhed in 1720. But given that Berar was a major 
source of his mokāsā revenues, Raghuji Bhonsle also sought to control the government of the 
province. Al-Hamdani records in the Sawāniḥ-i Dakan that in 1731, Raghuji killed Isa Khan, a 
jāgīrdār in the district of Kherla, and seized the villages in his jāgīr as well as the fort of 
Salbardi; however, three years later, Nizam ul-Mulk re-took the fort and restored Babu, son of 
Isa Khan, to his father’s jāgīr.137 In December 1737, Raghuji once again tried to secure his 
access to the Berar mokāsā by punishing Shuja’at Khan, who had become ṣūbahdār after the 
death of Aiwaz Khan Azad ud-Daulah in 1729. In retaliation for Shuja’at Khan’s withholding of 
cauth payments and refusal to enter into negotiations, Raghuji marched on Ellichpur. The 
ṣūbahdār lost his life in the ensuing battle. 
The early nineteenth-century Nagpur minister Yashwantrao Ramchandra and son of 
Ramchandra Dado, the Bhonsles’ envoy at Ellichpur and Hyderabad, told a very different tale 
regarding Raghuji’s killing of Shuja’at Khan: 
Raghoji Bhonsle maintained a friendship (dostī) with the governor of Alajpur [Ellichpur] 
Sujyayet Khan [Shuja’at Khan] as if he was his kin (culat). Appajipant worked for the 
Khan as a revenue collector. Based on a landlord’s complaint, Sujyayet Khan sat him on 
a donkey, shaved his head, and sent him out of the city. Appajipant went to Raghoji 
Bhonsle. Realizing that the dishonor of Brahmans was taking place in his Hindu 
kingdom, Raghoji Bhonsle mustered his cavalry and traveled to Alajpur. He fought 
Sujyayet Khan two kos from the village of Bhugaon and cut off his head. Taking 
possession of his kettledrum, he surrounded Alajpur with the intention of looting the city. 
There was no ruler there. This imperial city and dwelling-place would come to ruin. The 
Pathan [Ismail Khan Panni] sent Ramchandra Dado to conduct negotiations (suwāl-
jawāb) and settle the amount of a tribute. Raghoji Bhonsle laid siege on a subsequent 
occasion when he came to know about a precious diamond owned by the merchant 
Narayan Nayak. Ramchandrapant paid a price of seven thousand rupees to the merchant 
and delivered the jewel to Raghoji. He was satisfied. The Mughal governor died.138 
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This testimony is replete with the creative distortions of memory. Collapsing several successive 
events into one frame, it suggests that Raghuji was motivated by both simple greed and a Hindu 
dharmic imperative to protect Brahmans from harm.139 There is no indication of such a 
motivation in other accounts of the event.140 Leaving aside its distortions, what is useful about 
the testimony is its starting assumption, which is that a quasi-familial friendship subsisted 
between the Bhonsles of Nagpur and the Berar governor of Ellichpur. As I will show throughout 
the remainder of this chapter and in the following chapter, quasi-familial intimate friendship was 
the conceptual framework within which Maratha and non-Maratha governments in the Deccan 
organized their interactions. Of course, such a friendship was a strategic partnership. Because it 
was premised on self-interest, or put more crudely, on profit sharing, it could break down into 
antagonism if one party failed to meet its terms – for example, by withholding revenue. Though 
unsentimental, friendship was not devoid of sentiment. Rather, preserving friendships required 
the constant exchange of friendly sentiments through diplomatic negotiation (jawāb-suwāl) as 
practiced by go-betweens like Ramchandra Dado. The border between friendship and 
antagonism, and between violence and diplomacy, was thin. 
After Shuja’at Khan was killed in battle, Nasir Jang, the second eldest son of Nizam ul-
Mulk, appointed Saiyid Sharif Khan (d. 1751) to the post of deputy governor of Berar,141 
                                                
139 The idea that a core mission of Maratha kingship was to protect Brahmans (and cows) stems from the 
nineteenth-century idea of Shivaji as a gava-brāhmaṇa prati-pālak. See Chapter 2.   
 
140 SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 15, no. 82, pg. 79; vol. 22, no. 365, pg. 182; Saiyid Muhammad Ali al-
Husseini, Tārīkh-i Rāḥat Afzā, ed. Saiyid Khurshid Ali (Hyderabad, 1947), 127; The Maāthir-ul-Umarā, 
ed. Beveridge and Prasad, vol. 2, 854. 
 
141 According to his entry in the Maʿās̤ir al-Umarā’, Saiyid Sharif Khan was the grandson of Mir Saiyid 
Muhammad Qannauji, a noted scholar and spiritual guide to the Mughal emperors Shah Jahan and 
Aurangzeb. At the end of Muhammad Shah’s reign, he migrated to the Deccan with Nizam ul-Mulk. He 
was stationed in Berar with the title of bakṣī and eventually became the leading authority in the province. 
See The Maāthir-ul-Umarā, ed. Beveridge and Prasad, vol. 2, 821-3. 
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imploring Raghuji to estalish regular communications with him.142 At the time, the prince was 
administering the Deccan while his father was in Delhi preparing for an imminent battle against 
the Persian ruler Nadir Shah, who crossed into India and plundered and occupied the Mughal 
capital in 1739. Bhonsle seems to have spent much of that year entangled in petty fights with 
Maratha generals in the Nizam’s service, though he too had been summoned to the north to halt 
Nadir Shah’s invasion.143 In subsequent years, Raghuji and Nasir Jang met with very different 
ends. Over the course of 1740-1, the former obtained significant profits in a successful campaign 
to depose Chanda Saheb, an upstart minister of the nawāb of Arcot,144 while the latter conceded 
several territories to the Marathas and mounted an unsuccessful rebellion against his father. After 
the death of Nizam-ul Mulk in 1748, Nasir Jang ascended to power and briefly ruled until a 
rebellion mounted by his nephew Muzaffar Jang led to his assassination in 1750. The letters that 
Nasir Jang sent to Raghuji in this period, which were transcribed as part of Vinayakrao 
Aurangabadkar’s research into the history of Nagpur, reveal some of the possibilities and 
tensions of the political relation of friendship.145 
 Several of Nasir Jang’s letters concerned humdrum matters of local administration that 
required cooperation between the two rulers. For example, he requested in a 1748 letter that 
Raghuji provide assistance to an official named Khwaja Abdal Hazi Khan, who had been 
despatched to Karanja to inquire with the village headmen of the area about affairs of state (ba-
                                                
142 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 120b. 
 
143 SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 15, nos. 82, 85, 93, pgs. 78-9, 81-2, 104. 
 
144 Bhonsle ransomed Chanda Saheb for a handsome price. See Chapter 4.  
 
145 BL, Mss Marathi, D35, ff. 69a, 79a, 120a-125a. 
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jahat-i tanqīḥ-i muqadammāt wa intiẓām-i umūr ba ṭaraf-i kāranja mī āyand).146 Several letters 
relayed reports of Raghuji’s collectors making undue exactions of revenue. The same Khan had 
notified Nasir Jang that “some people of the strong and powerful one [Raghuji Bhonsle] were 
demanding excessive amounts of cauth from the pargaṇa Mahur and others since last year. They 
were becoming the source of the cultivators’ confusion and damage (maṣdar-i barkhāsh wa 
aẕīyat). So it should be written to them that they should refrain from countless molestations, and 
they should be warned not to engage in extortion of any kind (hīch waja-yi ziyādat-i talabī 
nakardah).”147 Jang voiced similar objections to collections in the pargaṇas of Akot and Adgaon 
and in territories in the pargaṇa Mandgaon composing the jāgīr of a judge (qāz̤ī) named Saiyid 
Muhammad Qasam Khan.148 Complaints of improper collection, and the stern orders issued to 
redress them, were endemic to revenue administration, but their swift resolution was especially 
important in the jointly ruled province of Berar.  
 The fair and efficient operation of revenue administration depended upon maintaining 
friendly relations between co-rulers, which in turn was predicated upon a healthy degree of trust. 
In one missive, Nasir Jang expounds: 
In the exemplars of ethics (nuskhhā-yi akhlāq) it has been written that the test of a friend 
(imtiḥān-i dost) is that whenever a rough and arduous event occurs (har gāh namwar ṣaʿb 
wa shadīd itifāq uftad), full and complete trust [in him] comes to hand (iʿtimād-i kullī mī 
rasad). In fact, the rule for gold is that it emerges unsullied out of the test of a crucible. 
Although the greatness appearing in this court was fortuitous and not connected with an 
ethical design, still it is a fact that the accidents of goodness have resulted from the trust 
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(iʿtiqād) and sincerity (ṣidq) and purity (ṣafā’ī) of the refuge of courage [Raghuji 
Bhonsle].149    
 This letter’s expression of confidence in Raghuji’s sincerity co-existed with and ideally 
counteracted suspicions of unfaithfulness. Whispers of disloyalty could easily tarnish the delicate 
purity of friendship:  
We have trusted the refuge of courage [Raghuji Bhonsle] in these matters, but as it has 
been scrupulously written, should any accident occur, he should take care in these matters 
and chastise those who show signs of audacity (iqdām bā harkāt). It is inevitable that the 
arrival of such news to the ears of the sworn allies (ba gosh-i muḥalifān) of that refuge of 
courage will be the cause of crimes and certainly will be borne by those dog-headed ones 
(sag-sarīhā) who are the opposite of this ruler (khilāf-i īn sar-dārīst). It has been simply 
stated that one should not allow the weak opinions of whisperers that needlessly vitiate 
faith to enter into one’s affairs and dealings (ba auhām-i z̤aʿīf-i wushāt bī-aṣl zinhār-i 
taghaiyur ba-aḥwāl wa aṭwār-i khūd rāh nadādah). With absolute firmness (ba kamāl-i 
ustuwārī), one should be vigilant of one’s favors, staying on the steady path of sincerity 
and resolute trust (bar jadat-i rusūkh ikhlāṣ wa iʿtiqād-i s̤ābit-qadam buda mutaraṣid-i 
ʿināyāt bāshand). What more is there to say? Good rulers do not agitate, and by logical 
inference, rule that cannot bear up is not secure (sar-dārī ki taḥamul nadāshtah bāshad 
nazd-i aqla-an sar-dārī-yi wa musalam nīst).150    
In keeping with these admonitions, Nasir Jang enjoined Raghuji in several instances to attend to 
the instructions of his trusted followers Samsam-ud Daulah Shah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad 
Qazi Dayam, both of whom supported him in his fatal succession struggle with Muzaffar Jang in 
1749-50.151 In addition, Raghuji was expected to cooperate with the Berar governor Saiyid Sharif 
Khan. In future years, the friendship between the Nizam’s representative at Ellichpur and the 
Nagpur rājā would continue to be critical to joint rule of Berar. 
 Over the course of the 1750s, the friendship between the Bhonsles of Nagpur and the 
followers of the Nizam of Hyderabad evolved through intermittent conflict and mediation, 
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eventually assuming a more formal and stable character through the sāt-cāḷīs agreement of 1757. 
In early 1754, Salabat Jang, the son of Nizam ul-Mulk who had succeeded to the Nizamate in 
1751, and his diwān, the aforementioned Shah Nawaz Khan, planned an expedition to check 
Raghuji’s extractive activities in Berar. In this endeavor, they had the tacit support of Peshwa 
Balaji Bajirao. In the early 1740s, Raghuji and Peshwa Bajirao I had fought for control over the 
northeastern frontier of Maratha expansion. With the blessing of the Mughal emperor 
Muhammad Shah, Bajirao even allied with Nawab Alivardi Khan in repelling Bhonsle’s invasion 
of Orissa and Bengal.152 Although the Bhonsles’ and the Peshwas’ separate spheres of influence 
had been settled in 1743-4, and although this settlement had been re-affirmed after Shahu’s death 
in 1749, there continued to be tension between the two powers.153 In a compilation of Shah 
Nawaz Khan’s letters called the Ruqʿāt-i Ṣamṣām al-Daulah, a letter to Bajirao conveys 
sentiments similar to those expressed earlier in Nasir Jang’s letters in order to make a subtle 
critique of Raghuji’s willful conduct. “Truth and justice are precious everywhere,” he asserted, 
and further on exclaimed,  “Praise God that [your] unshakeable integrity and truthful conduct 
and constancy of words and agreements are known to the world. All of these are what greatness 
and leadership require. There is no other discernment of the nuances of truth and falsehood 
besides the sight of those blessed with divine favors.” Though he went on to suggest that an 
                                                
152 In addition, Bajirao on several occasions despatched his generals to raid Gardha-Mandla, a thickly 
forested tract on the banks of the Narmada, despite its proximity to the core domains of the Bhonsles. See 
Vaidya Daptarāntūn Nivaḍalele Kāgad (hereafter VDNK), edited by S.L. Vaidya, volume 4 (Pune: BISM, 
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Rajasthan. A kalambandī of 1750 between Raghuji Bhonsle and Balaji Bajirao re-affirmed the Bhonsles’ 
sphere of influence. See, Aitihāsika Patravyavahāra (hereafter AP), edited by G.S. Sardesai, Y.M. Kale, 
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undertaking against Raghuji may be desirable, he re-iterated terms for a potential mediation that 
had already been circulated. These terms included desisting from inciting rebellions around 
Hyderabad and extorting excess revenue from Berar, repaying a sum of five lākhs, handing over 
Gawelgadh fort, and sending troops into Bengal.154 
 Evidently, Raghuji did not agree to these terms. Salabat Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan 
authorized the Nizam-affiliated Maratha commander Sultanji Nimbalkar to lead a force into 
Berar. Among the cavalrymen posted on the right-hand side of this battalion were two Panni 
Afghan officers, Sultan Khan and his cousin and son-in-law Sarmast Khan Panni.155 As I will 
discuss in the next section, Sultan Khan’s son Ismail Khan became the ṣūbahdār of Berar under 
Nizam Ali Khan, founded a nawāb ruling household at Ellichpur and established an 
extraordinarly robust camraderie with Raghuji’s heirs Janoji and Mudhoji Bhonsle. But, at this 
juncture, the Nizam’s forces quickly bested Bhonsle’s. Sarmast and Sultan Khan, along with 
Nimbalkar, served as diplomatic intermediaries to settle terms for reconciliation, which, in 
accordance with Shah Nawaz Khan’s letter to Bajirao, included the forfeiture of five lākhs worth 
of cash.156 In exchange, Raghuji demanded that the Nizam assign a permanent jāgīr to his son, 
which materialized in the assignment of a manṣab at the rank of 5,000 ẕāt/5,000 suwār157 to his 
eldest son Janoji Bhonsle. As described in the Tārīkh-i Rāḥat Afzā (1760) of Saiyid Muhammad 
Ali al-Husseini, Shah Nawaz Khan assented and invited Raghuji to his camp to finalize the deal, 
but not everyone on the victor’s side was prone to reconcile. The high-ranking general Mir Najaf 
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Ali Khan, who not incidentally was al-Husseini’s patron, signaled his disapprobation by refusing 
to alight from his elephant to greet him.158 This relatively minor conflict would not be the last 
between the Bhonsles and the Nizam, but its resolution would also not be the last to yield new 
incentives for preserving their friendship. 
 About a year after this scuffle, Raghuji Bhonsle died. Through a settlement made at Pune, 
the succession struggle between his sons was resolved in favor of the eldest Janoji, while his 
brothers Mudhoji, Vyankoji, and Sabaji received separate, semi-autonomous domains.159 In a 
similar attempt to forestall fraternal conflict through territorial division, Salabat Jang on the 
advice of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao appointed his brothers Mir Mughal, Basalat Jang, and Nizam Ali 
Khan to the Aurangabad, Bijapur and Berar ṣūbahs, respectively, in 1756.160 Nizam Ali Khan’s 
appointment provoked tensions with the Bhonsles that manifested in at least two discrete military 
engagements between 1756 and 1759.161 In early February 1757, Nizam Ali Khan came into 
conflict with Janoji’s top general Raghuji Karande near the town of Akola.162 In mid-1758, these 
two forces clashed for a second time at Washim. Again, Nizam Ali Khan relied on a conduit of 
supplies and reinforcements originating in the entrepot of Burhanpur, and near the time of this 
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conflict, he extorted its wealthiest merchants for cash.163 The Marathas aimed to cut off this 
supply chain by surrounding the Nizam’s army; however, it seems that they ultimately lost. 
Extant accounts suggest that the seed of these conflicts lay in Nizam Ali Khan’s efforts to 
mobilize an army in support of his new station in Berar. His mobilization of military force 
disrupted the regular state of affairs between the two powers by breeding an intolerable degree of 
suspicion and uncertainty. Regardless of who fired the first shot, the rather ad hoc conditions of 
joint provincial rule combined with the unpredictability of individual political actors produced a 
powderkeg of potentially fatal misunderstandings. Mutual trust – and a more enduring peace – 
demanded the regularity of a more formal diplomatic arrangement.  
 The sāt-cāḷīs, or sixty-forty, arrangement for the distribution of revenues in Berar 
between the Nizam and the Bhonsles, respectively, evolved out of the peace established at the 
end of the 1750s. 164 This arrangement replaced the more informal one operating since the initial 
Maratha expansion into Berar in the 1730s whereby the Bhonsles’ mokāsā was to amount to one-
half of the yield.165 Insofar as the Bhonsles were now entitled to a smaller share, the agreement 
represented a short-term financial loss – after all, it took several clashes of arms for them to 
come to the bargaining table. But overall this agreement represented a reasonable determination 
of the delegation of Mughal sovereignty at the provincial level, offering a potential respite from 
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an almost thirty-year contest between the Nizam and the Marathas. This determination was the 
fruit of the diplomatic efforts of representatives of the Nizam and the Bhonsles, including the 
previously mentioned Afghan kinsmen-in-arms Sultan and Sarmast Khan Panni. Nizam Ali 
Khan, Sarmast Khan, and one Wajid Ali Khan and various members of the Karande and Bhonsle 
clans met on several occasions over the course of February 1757 to swap gifts of cloth, horses, 
and robes and to discuss previous settlements of cauth and ghāsdāṇā revenue. Sarmast Khan 
even invited Raghuji Karande to his home in Ellichpur and gifted several lengths of cloth.166 On 
March 25 of the following year, Janoji Bhonsle hosted the Nizam in his tent in the field, greeting 
him with an ostentatious display worthy of a person of stature.167 Prior to this formal meeting, 
the terms and conditions of peace had been established concretely in the form of fifteen articles 
of agreement. Based on the dates applied to extant transcriptions, and the overall lexicon of the 
text, it is likely that the articles were first committed to paper at Ellichpur in Marathi (Modi) and 
then transcribed and partially translated into Persian in June 1757.168   
 The articles of the 1757 agreement fell into two relatively distinct categories: the 
political-economic and the political-existential. The first eight articles concerned issues of 
revenue. In certain named pargaṇas and in territories designated jāgīr-i sarkār, or the territories 
assigned in jāgīr to Nizam ul-Mulk as ṣūbahdār of the Deccan,169 the Nizam’s government 
would be entitled to fifty-five percent of the yield and the Bhonsles’ to forty-five percent after 
the deduction of village expenses (kharca) and the sardeśmukhī. The older fifty-fifty split would 
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remain in the parts of the districts of Kalamb, Kherla, and Pavnar lying on the eastern side of the 
Wardha River. The second category of terms and conditions concerned fundamental issues 
bearing on the present and future existence of shared sovereignty in Berar. Both governments 
would be responsible for securing cultivation of land, protecting officials, punishing rebels, and 
refraining from intervening in internal politics or giving shelter to disaffected individuals. In 
addition, the Maratha prince Sabaji Bhonsle was to be admitted into the service of Nizam Ali 
Khan.170 Finally, the two governments committed to not deviating from the agreement on pain of 
incurring divine displeasure. This particular stipulation in both Marathi and Persian read: “A 
promise has been made on both sides. They should act in accordance with it and should not 
deviate from it. God is in the middle of both sides.”171 Syntactically, the promise or agreement 
and God are identical mediating terms between two opposing poles, creating reciprocity out of 
division and compromise out of conflict through the force of mutual fidelity. The power of the 
agreement depended upon the power of the faith of those who entered into it.      
Though the sāt-cāḷīs arrangement strengthened the battered friendship between the 
Bhonsles and the Nizam, it posed a threat to the Bhonsle’s other major political relationship, 
namely that with the Peshwa’s government at Pune. Janoji Bhonsle in a letter to the Peshwa’s 
cousin and leading general Sadashivrao Bhau on January 1, 1759 fretted that reconciliation 
would come with a steep price: 
To preserve a friendship (sneha) with Salabat Jang, we should not disturb his 
government. Similarly, a friendship on both sides will endure only if we establish a 
friendship with Nizam Ali Khan and act according to his wishes. If damage is caused to 
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the territory of Hyderabad, how will the Nizam remain content? You have told us this 
again and again. The Nizam has definitively become the master here. If we become 
friends with him, it will become our responsibility to effect his will. Then we will have to 
find some [new] revenues to acquire. How are we to mollify twenty thousand troops? 
How are we to send the money due to the [Peshwa’s] government? Berar is utterly sunk, 
and there is no money to be seen anywhere.172       
Here Janoji intimates another potential cost aside from the financial, which is that a permanent 
settlement of terms could alter the Nagpur government’s orientation within the Nizam’s and the 
Peshwa’s dogged competition for dominance. Hitherto the Bhonsles had thrown their weight 
behind the Peshwa despite their disputes over Bengal and Garda-Mandla; however, as I discuss 
in the next chapter, only two years later they would join a group of Maratha leaders in defecting 
to the service of Nizam Ali Khan. While this turn of events was of course not discernible at this 
juncture, the friendship between the Bhonsles and the Nizam took shape within a broader web of 
political relationships in the Deccan. Foremost among those relationships, as I have emphasized 
in this section, was the friendship between the Bhonsles and the ṣūbahdār of Berar based at 
Ellichpur. In the next section, I hone in on this this friendship, examining facets of their regard 
for one another that exceeded the pragmatic concerns of revenue administration. The affection 
between Ismail Khan Panni and Janoji and Mudhoji Bhonsle was so personal and tangible as to 
leave an enduring mark on Ellichpur’s most famous and sacred monument, the dargah of the 
warrior-saint Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah.  
The Politics of Friendship 
Compared to the more famous Rohilla chieftaincies of the north or even the Panni and 
Miyana states of Arcot, Kurnool, Cuddapah, and Savnur in the southern Deccan, there is 
relatively sparse documentation of the history of the Panni Afghan nawābs of Ellichpur. The first 
nawāb Ismail Khan earned a short entry in the Maʿās̤ir al-Umarā’ (1780) of Shah Nawaz Khan, 
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which al-Hamdani later roughly copied into the Sawāniḥ-i Dakan.173 Two colonial-period texts 
provide fuller accounts of Ismail Khan and his lineage: the Tārīkh-i Amjadiyah (1869) of Saiyid 
Amjad Hussain and the Sawāniḥ-i ʿUmrī (1906) of Saiyid Abdul Razaq.174 Composed by a 
prayer leader (khaṭīb) of the Jama Masjid of Ellichpur and dedicated to Nizam Afzal ud-Daulah 
Asaf Jah V of Hyderabad, the Tārīkh is of particular interest because of its connection to the cult 
of the warrior-saint (ghāzī) Ghazi Miyan. The historian Shahid Amin via Wolseley Haig’s 
English summary describes the Tārīkh’s colorful account of the battle between an imagined 
Berar king called Eil and Abdul Rahman, also called Dulha Shah, a local iteration of the 
legendary warrior-saint Ghazi Miyan, a nephew of Mahmud of Ghazni (d. 1030) who supposedly 
abandoned his nuptials to pursue the glory of martyrdom on the battlefields of India.175 Hundreds 
of years after the time of these events, the Bhonsle rājās of Nagpur joined the diverse 
community of Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah’s celebrants by aiding in the reconstruction of his 
dargah just north of the city of Ellichpur. 
 The Bhonsles’ patronage of the memory of the ghāzī was a concrete expression of their 
friendship with the nawābs of Ellichpur, and Ismail Khan Panni in particular. As I mentioned 
earlier, Ismail Khan was the son of Sultan Khan, who along with his son-in-law Sarmast Khan 
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were officers in the army of Nizam Ali Khan.176 According to the Tārīkh-i Amjadiyah, Sultan 
Khan’s grandfather Hindal Khan migrated from Afghanistan to Delhi and then found 
employment with the Rajput rulers of Jaipur. Traveling further south to Alipur in Berar, they 
entered the service of Bakht Buland, and in 1696-7, they joined the cavalry of Ali Mardan Khan, 
the governor of Berar under Aurangzeb.177 They continued to serve in the provincial cavalry 
through Farrukhsiyar’s appointment of Azad al-Daulah Aiwaz Khan to the governorship, 
eventually seconding their employer in backing Nizam ul-Mulk against the Barha brothers. 
During the battle between the Nizam and the Barha brothers’ general Dilawar Ali Khan in 1720, 
Sarmast Khan’s father Azmat Khan “alighted in front of the elephant of Azad al-Daulah Aiwaz 
Khan and gave his life (piyādah shudah jān nis̤ār gardīd).”178 The status and prestige of Sarmast 
Khan and Sultan Khan, and the latter’s sons Ismail Khan and Umar Khan, within Berar affairs 
continued to grow over the years, as attested by the above references to their important military 
and diplomatic roles during the Berar governorship of Nizam Ali Khan.  
 Even prior to the significant architectural works of Ismail Khan Panni and his successor 
Salabat Khan, this Afghan martial clan made its mark on the local landscape of Ellichpur. 
Sarmast Khan obtained a jāgīr west of Ellichpur, which evolved into the neighborhood 
(maḥallat) of the city known as Sarmastpura, while the area of Sultan Khan’s jāgīr towards the 
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south near the Sapan River was called Sultanpura.179 Taking care not to disturb the tombs of the 
local holy men (darwish) Ishaq Shah and Mahboob Shah, the Mughal-period fort defending the 
city was re-furbished with brick and plaster, and a new residence for the Panni household was 
built near the fort in the neighborhood Farmanpura. Another maḥallat, Anwarpura, was under the 
protection of Inayat Khan, the son of Sarmast Khan. In addition, he held Daryapur and several 
other pargaṇas in Berar in jāgīr; when he died in 1760, these were transferred to Bahlol Khan, 
son of Ismail Khan, along with a manṣab of 3000/1000. Several years later, these holdings were 
transferred to Bahlol Khan’s son-in-law Jiwan Khan, the grandson of Sultan Khan by his 
daughter Himmat Khatun.180 Through typical elite patrimonial strategies of marriage and land 
ownership, this family established roots in Ellichpur and the surrounding rural areas.     
 In the early 1760s, Ismail Khan distinguished himself in several battles between the 
Peshwa and the Nizam. As an example of his courage in battle, Saiyid Amjad Hussain describes 
one engagement in which Ismail Khan and about five hundred cavalrymen while escorting a 
foraging party clashed with four or five thousand enemy cavalry. He extolls, “An equal barrage 
of bullets ensued on both sides. The thieves were so many that by the force of their brute 
strength, they matched the expert claws of the lions of Islam. Coming to their aid, [Ismail] Khan 
in the same manner showed courage and manliness and was ready to give his life to crush the 
enemy.”181 While Hussain does not specify at which battle these events took place, they may 
refer to the battle of Udgir, in which Ismail Khan fought under the leadership of Ibrahim Khan 
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Gardi from December 1759 to January 1760.182 Girdhari La’l’s account in the Tārīkh-i Z̤afrah 
(1771) indicates that he was among several leaders who “were injured and fell on the 
battlefield.”183 But it was his bravery at the battle of Rakshasbhuwan of August 1763 that 
catapulted him to the highest ranks of the Deccani Afghan nobility. Following the battle, he 
received a high manṣab of 7,000/5,000 as well as a jāgīr at Balapur worth over five lākh 
rupees.184 Most importantly, Nizam Ali Khan awarded him with the governorship of Berar,185 
with the wholehearted approval and possibly at the instigation of the Bhonsles of Nagpur.186  
 Inasmuch as it was a device for managing the tensions of shared governance, the 
friendship between the Bhonsles and Ismail Khan at first glance appears to be one of 
convenience. The Bhonsles desired a governor who would abide by the terms of the sāt-cāḷīs 
revenue-sharing agreement and perhaps even look the other way if their collectors occasionally 
returned an excessive amount. The authors of the Maʿās̤ir al-Umarā’ remarked, “Because Janoji 
Bhonsle, who at the time was the proprietor (taʿalluq-dār) of the aforementioned province 
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[Berar] on the part of the Marathas, knew him from long back (az sābiq maʿrifat dāsht), he put 
off correcting the design of the administration…Because of his addiction to intoxicants, he 
became distracted from work, and signs of his pride became evident.”187 From the perspective of 
the Nizam’s government as captured in the Maʿās̤ir, Ismail Khan’s unusual degree of affection 
towards his Maratha co-rulers was apparently one of several deviations from the standards of 
good administration and good conduct. In this way, they resemble the previously discussed 
Sawāniḥ-i Dakan’s insinuation that after the Maratha penetration of Berar, affairs fell into 
disorder. Like the consumption of intoxicating substances, a friendship that crossed political 
boundaries could be interpreted as a sign of distraction and ultimately of unseemly self-regard. 
To understand the nuances and possibilities of a counter-affiliation, apart from its distortion in 
the eyes of centralized power, it is necessary to examine the social and symbolic life of politics 
undergirding the pragmatic concerns of revenue administration.188 
The socio-symbolic dimension of the Bhonsle-Panni friendship materialized in the 
performance of gestures of care, hospitality, and generosity without immediate expectation of 
reward or profit. Occasions for hospitality arose frequently between the death of Janoji Bhonsle 
in 1772 and that of Ismail Khan Panni in 1775. In fact, Janoji’s senior queen Daryabai Bhonsle 
was in Ellichpur for the wedding of Ismail Khan’s son Salabat Khan when she received word of 
his death.189 In the three chaotic years following this event, members of the Bhonsle royal family 
and their followers frequently visited Ellichpur to plead their cases in a painful succession 
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dispute between Mudhoji Bhonsle on one side and Sabaji and Daryabai Bhonsle on the other.190 
It was after one such visit that Mudhoji found himself in need of Ismail Khan’s brotherly love: 
[At the time when] the long-standing familiarity and friendship (az sābiq irtibāṭ wa dil 
bastagī) between Raja Mudhoji Bhonsle and Muhammad Ismail Khan was perfect, 
Mudhoji out of unhappiness with his brother Sabhaji [Sabaji] came to Ellichpur. With a 
pure heart and full faith, he paid a visit to Hazrat Shah Abdal Rahman Ghazi and asked 
assistance from the spirit of victory to obtain the throne of Nagpur. For several days, he 
was happily occupied in riding and hunting. Then one day, sitting side by side on a horse-
drawn palanquin in full regalia, they set out from the dargah of Shah Rahman Ghazi. In 
the middle of an intersection, two armed individuals sent by Sabaji approached the 
palanquin, stabbed Mudhoji with their swords, and took flight. Being wounded, Mudhoji 
was conveyed to the court inside the small fort as befitted a respectable man in a fearful 
state. Every doctor was too afraid to dress his wounds until Muhammad Rostam, the 
attending physician of Ismail Khan, on the order of his master bravely applied sixteen 
stitches to his limbs and one stitch to his lip, earning a reward of seventeen gold coins.191     
Other accounts of this episode indicate that the would-be assassins were not followers of Sabaji, 
but rather Afghan mercenaries in Mudhoji’s employ who were fed up with not receiving their 
wages; however, like the above description, they affirm that Ismail Khan saw to it that his 
wounds received swift medical attention.192 By providing safe refuge from the hazards endemic 
to politics, Ismail Khan treated Mudhoji like an honored guest, a true friend, and as evoked both 
by this description and the letter quoted at the beginning of this chapter, a fellow devotee of 
Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah.  
 Before Mudhoji made his ultimate gesture of attachment to both the nawāb and the ghāzī, 
his friendship with Ismail Khan was severely tested. Responding to tensions caused by the 
dispute between him and his brother, and perhaps to Ismail Khan’s unstable mental state, several 
of the Bhonsles’ officials, including their envoy Ramchandra Dado, fled Ellichpur, fearing that 
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they might be imprisoned or killed.193 The situation was not made any better by the fact that both 
Bhonsle brothers were exploring the possibility of an alliance with Ismail Khan’s rival Ibrahim 
Beg Dhaunsa Zafar ud-Daulah, a general of Nizam Ali Khan who had recently conquered the 
small Telugu nāyaka principality of Nirmal.194 After fighting an inconclusive battle at 
Kumbhargaon in 1773, Sabaji joined Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa and Rukn ud-Daulah Mir Musi 
Khan, another follower of the Nizam, in laying siege to Ellichpur. In collusion with this faction, 
Mudhoji’s minister Devaji Chorghode had arranged for his master to vacate the city; however, 
when Mudhoji caught wind of their plans, he rushed back to aid his friend. Together, they 
repulsed the siege and brought its leaders to the bargaining table by the beginning of 1774.195  
Though his bond with Mudhoji Bhonsle weathered the storm of dynastic politics, Ismail 
Khan did not survive his fierce rivalry with Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa. In 1775, he lost his life in 
battle with Dhaunsa. After his death, Mudhoji played an important role in ensuring that his sons 
inherited his estates at Balapur and elsewhere.196 In addition, he ordered the construction of a 
sandstone wall around the existing dargah of Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah, creating an enormous 
outer courtyard that today features winding pathways, trees, rocks, and gravestones. Its 
construction took place from 1776-79 under the supervision of one Shaikh ‘Iza al-Din, an 
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194 The Sawāniḥ-i Dakan features a sketch of Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa’s biography. He was the son of Fazil 
Beg, whose forefathers were Turks of the Barlas clan who had immigrated to the Deccan. After 
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relays that it was said that that the common people gave him the unusual title of “Dhaunsa” because of all 
the drums that used to play on the battlefields on which he fought. After obtaining the favor of Nizam Ali 
Khan through the minister Rukn ud-Daulah, he took the fort of Yellabkonda – renaming it Zaffargadh – 
and eventually made Nirmal his seat. See BL, Persian Manuscripts, Add 23885, ff. 81b-82a. 
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associate of Ismail Khan’s fort superintendent Jham Singh. Raghuji Bhonsle II added a fifth gate 
on the north side in 1780-1.197 Though these inscriptions do not name Ismail Khan, the fact that 
Mudhoji executed this project in the years immediately following his death suggests that it was a 
gesture in memory of his friend, with whom he shared a regard for the ghāzī’s power. 
Three gates on the western, southern, and eastern sides of the dargah were built on the 
orders of Mudhoji Bhonsle between 1190 and 1192 AH (1776-9 CE). Each featured a large 
entranceway arch topped by a small rectangular pavilion (bārahdarī) with six arches and four 
rectangular minarets. Mudhoji’s builders also constructed a second western gate (see Figure 1) 
with only two minarets and no bārahdarī. While this gate currently serves as the main entrance 
to the shrine, its inscription merely records the date of construction. By contrast, the inscriptions 
of the more elaborate gates are more richly commemorative. The inscription of the western gate 
(see Figures 2-4) clearly credits Mudhoji for its construction: 
The burial garden (rauz̤at) of Rahman Ghazi,  
the ornament (raunaq) of the kingdom of Berar 
Was fortified with its courtyard by Raja Mudhaji 
Hence its construction, when Jham Singh conveyed the order to ‘Iza al-Din, 
Was manifestly in one thousand and one hundred and ninety of the hijrī [1190 AH] 
With regard to its date that I wrote out of the tablet of my own spirit 






                                                
197 G.S. Gai, Archaelogical Survey Report on Indian Epigraphy For 1964-65 (New Delhi: Government of 
India Press, 1968), 149; James Burgess, Lists of the Antiquarian Remains in the Bombay Presidency 
(Bombay: Government Central Press, 1885), 229-232. 
 
198 Burgess, 231. A comparison of Burgess’ transcription and the original inscription reveals several 
errors on his part. For example, he has written jihab instead of jihat (direction, mode, reason), jūd instead 
of khūd (self, one’s own), and shā instead of shod (occurred, happened). In addition, my translations of 
the second hemistich of the final couplet are significantly different. Whereas he has read ‘arz in the sense 
of breadth or width, I have read it in the sense of request or petition, though both senses may be intended 
by the writer.    
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Figures 3 and 4: Western Gate Dated 1190 AH (1776-7 CE) and Detail of Inscription 
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The inscriptions adorning the southern and eastern gates (Figures 5-8), built in 1191 AH (1777-
8) and 1192 AH (1778-9) respectively, mention these same names; however, they also more 
vividly illustrate Mudhoji’s regard for the power and majesty of Abdul Rahman. The first 
hemistich of the southern gate’s inscription reads, “Through the favor of Shah Rahman, the pearl 
in the crown of kings / King Mudhoji achieved his propitious desires (maqṣad-i bahrawar) in 
this world.”199 Similarly, the first two couplets of the southern gate’s inscription recognize the 
supremacy of the ghāzī over the rulers of the secular world: 
Higher than the sky, and in truth (ṣidq) and certainty (yaqīn), 
The pinnacle of this court of the governor of religion (ḥākim-i dīn) 
Shah Rahman, a martyr (shahīd) and also a warrior (ghāzī), 
At whose door kings lay their foreheads200 
In addition to affirming his conventional appellations of ghāzī and shahīd, these inscriptions 
refigure Abdul Rahman as a powerful, but compassionate overlord. Both the use of the word 
ḥākim (governor, judge) and the image of kings laying their foreheads at his door suggest that 
Mudhoji’s fortification of the shrine with an outer court was a gesture of obeisance and even 
submission to his this-worldly power. As the narratives discussed earlier implied, Mudhoji 
believed to a degree that this power manifested in tangible actions in favor of his political goals 
and desires.201 What is noteworthy in this case is the way in which Abdul Rahman’s blessing 
implicitly underwrote the friendship between the Maratha and Afghan co-rulers of Berar.   
                                                
199 Burgess, 230. Again, Burgess’ transcription is problematic. His translation of the Persian word ṭafīl as 
“favor” does not correspond to any dictionary meaning of this word. While this part of the inscription is 
difficult to parse, the intended Persian word is much more likely to be faiz or faz̤l, both of which give the 
sense of favor, grace, and bounty. 
 
200 Burgess, 230. 
 
201 Granting favors to kings had been the prerogative of Islamic saints and holy men since at least the 
period of the Delhi Sultanate. See Simon Digby, “The Sufi Shaikh as a Source of Authority in Mediaeval 





Figures 5 and 6: Southern Gate Dated 1191 AH 
(1777-8 CE) and Detail of Inscription 
 
  
Figures 7 and 8: Eastern Gate Dated 1192 AH 








Conclusion: Affiliations, Old and New 
 In the beginning of this chapter, I described a trip that Mudhoji Bhonsle made to 
Ellichpur in 1785 to visit the dargah of Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah and to chat with his late 
friend’s sons Salabat Khan and Bahlol Khan Panni. Though they may have reminisced about old 
times, they were no doubt equally preoccupied by new uncertainties about Berar’s governance. 
In 1781, Ismail Khan’s rival Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa died, leaving his son Farrukh Mirza 
Ehtesham Jang to assume his seat at Nirmal. But the Peshwa’s news-writers at Nagpur reported 
that because Ehtesham Jang could not seem to recruit capable administrators and fought with his 
brother Sabit Jang and nephew Shah Mirza and his paymaster Wali Muhammad, Nizam Ali 
Khan considered simply absorbing Nirmal.202 Perhaps to preempt him, Ehtesham Jang rebelled 
in early 1783; they briefly came to blows; and Nizam Ali Khan eventually made peace and 
transferred him to the ṣūbahdār post at Ellichpur. At the same time, Salabat Khan and Bahlol 
Khan received new jāgīrs in recognition of their role in mediating a settlement. The peace was 
made even happier by the celebration of the birth of Salabat Khan’s son, to whom Mudhoji 
Bhonsle made customary gifts of robes and jewelry.203   
 But Salabat Khan’s contentment was short-lived. Soon after Ehtesham Jang took up his 
ṣūbahdār post at Ellichpur, his nephew Shah Mirza, who had been released from captivity in 
Nirmal by Nizam Ali Khan, began indiscriminately raiding Umarkhed, Karanja, and other places 
held by both the Nizam and the Peshwa, perhaps in hopes of amassing sufficient resources to 
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challenge his uncle.204 To discuss this and additional issues, Mudhoji Bhonsle deputed 
Mahipatrao Dinkar, an experienced Kayastha Prabhu soldier-administrator whose career will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Salabat Khan arranged a meeting between the latter and 
Ehtesham Jang at Ellichpur, which initiated a process of negotiation that on January 13, 1784 
culminated in an eleven-article agreement on the future governance of Berar.205 As Ehtesham 
Jang ordered his nephew’s arrest, Salabat Khan himself traveled to Nagpur to talk with Mudhoji 
Bhonsle. After about a month and a half, they began to grow suspicious of Ehtesham Jang’s 
intentions, having received reports that he was assembling a new and varied force in violation of 
the terms of his ṣūbahdār appointment.206 As described by the Peshwa’s envoy Sadashiv Ram 
Gune, Salabat Khan was especially galled, saying, “Jang and I had an agreement, and assembling 
new troops was not part of it. He sent me [here] me to make assurances and behave amicably. He 
told me to mediate and obtained the Nawab’s [Nizam Ali Khan’s] permission to do so. So I have 
come to talk. But when I write to him that there has been no opposition between us, and that we 
have come to a united determination, he does not reply and instead collects new troops.”207  
Finding that Ehtesham Jang’s letters did not allay his fears, Salabat Khan decided to return to 
Ellichpur.  
 Whatever may have motivated Ehtesham Jang to break the terms of his appointment is 
unclear, but he, Salabhat Khan, and several members of the Bhonsle family gathered near 
Amravati in December 1784 to pursue further discussions towards an agreement for the 
                                                
204 NA, ed. Shejwalkar, vol. 2, nos. 45, 48, pgs. 18, 20. 
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governance of Berar.208 Their ongoing openness to dialogue is a testament to the power and 
durability of the framework for joint provincial rule established by the sāt-cāḷīs agreement of 
1757-9 and substantiated by the friendship between the Bhonsles and Ismail Khan Panni. In this 
chapter, I have sought to argue that the need for such a framework of political understanding 
emerged out of the very dynamics of Maratha imperial expansion. When Maratha military 
potentates like the Hinganikar Bhonsles arrived in distant and unfamiliar regions, they did not 
simply demolish pre-existing systems of governance, or merely overlay them with their own, but 
formed partnerships with local rulers and fief-holders that over time accrued not only strategic, 
but also affective and symbolic value. But at the same time that the Bhonsles consolidated new 
affiliations, they had to manage older ones, particularly with the ascendant Peshwa of Pune. This 
affiliation, and the peril that its deterioration could mean for the prospect of peace within the 
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CHAPTER 2: Crisis and Reconciliation in the Maratha State, c. 1761-1769 
 
“हे गडबडीच ेिदवस. 
These are tumultuous days.” 
-Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal to Ramchandra Narayan Gore, Tuljapur, April 8, 1763209 
 
Devrao Bhivaji, the chief revenue collector (kamāvīsdār) of the sub-district of Songir in 
Khandesh in northwest Maharashtra, replied on April 5, 1769 to an order issued by Peshwa 
Madhavrao Ballal (1745-1772). The order directed Bhivaji to sequester the property of any 
cavalry soldier (śiledār) employed by the errant Nagpur ruler Janoji Bhonsle, whose conduct 
since defecting to the Nizam six years earlier had been less than compliant. As punishment, the 
Peshwa instructed that the lands of anyone who took up service with him were to be confiscated. 
His possessions were to be seized. His entire family was to be imprisoned. In reply to these 
orders, Bhivaji explained that he had searched every village in the district but failed to locate 
anyone who had joined Janoji.210 In the nearby town of Dhule, the kamāvīsdār Naro Hari gave a 
similar answer and promised to notify the Peshwa if he found any trace of a defector.211 By the 
time their messages reached Pune, Janoji’s armies, which had been wreaking havoc on eastern 
Khandesh for several months, had been defeated. After nearly a decade of civil war, Janoji was 
suing for peace. 
Similar orders of sequestration that circulated throughout the Khandesh, Marathwada, 
and western Maharashtra regions indicate the extent to which a crisis of authority within the 
Maratha state had engulfed the livelihoods of rulers, counselors, and soldiers alike. This crisis 
was symptomatic of the evolution of Maratha politics between the death of the Maratha 
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sovereign Chhatrapati Shahu Bhonsle in 1749 and the disastrous Third Battle of Panipat of 1761. 
As sovereign authority within the Maratha Empire became increasingly fragmented between the 
Chhatrapati, the Peshwa, and semi-independent Maratha rājās who sometimes maintained 
controversial affiliations – as I explored in the last chapter – skilled administrators, or kārbhārī, 
became responsible for the preservation and restoration of confidence in the collective political 
bonds that constituted the Empire. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will trace the social origins of the 
kārbhārī, focusing on Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu households that climbed the ranks of the 
Maratha secretariat to take part in politics and diplomacy. In this chapter, I explore the moment 
when kārbhārīs came under fire for transgressing ethical boundaries in their political dealings 
between Maratha courts. This administrative class enabled the maintenance of a domain of 
communicative action in which disputes between governments could be resolved nonviolently; 
however they also precipitated acute tensions surrounding the ethics of political service. 
Administrators who rapidly rose to prominence by applying their skills in the management of 
communication were just as rapidly denounced when relations between Maratha governments 
soured. 
This chapter begins at the height of the crisis in 1769. I diagnose the depth and severity of 
the conflict between the Pune and Nagpur courts by examining its ramifying effects on the 
military labor market and on relationships between Maratha governments and the landed families 
who served them. Next, I turn to the politics underlying the crisis. I show that the transformation 
of Maratha politics in the years leading up to and following the historic battle of Panipat of 1761 
was rooted in repeated devolutions of sovereign authority resulting in the unprecedented 
empowerment of kārbhārī. The following three sections shed light on the tensions surrounding 
the rise of the skilled administrator in Maratha politics in the 1760s by delving into transitional 
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moments in the fluctuating lives and careers of three prominent administrators, highlighting in 
particular the failed efforts of the Nagpur Bhonsles’ Kayastha scribe Chimaji Rakhmagad to 
regain the trust of the Peshwa in the years immediately preceding the 1769 war. In the final 
section, I discuss the 1769 peace settlement between Pune and Nagpur within the communicative 
framework of jāb-sāl that was outlined in the Introduction. Paradoxically, the initial failure to 
resolve the conflict by non-violent means revealed the importance of trustworthy communication 
in maintaining fragile bonds between Maratha governments. During the post-war process of 
negotiation, the dialogic mode of jāb-sāl communication allowed the Pune and Nagpur 
governments to address long-standing disagreements on questions of jurisdiction and obligation. 
The resulting settlement, finalized by two treaties in the conventional form of the articles of 
agreement (yādī), laid the foundations for more than thirty years of sustained peace and 
cooperation between the two governments.    
Patterns of Crisis and Response, c. 1769 
In March 1763, Bhavanrao Kulkarni, the leading member of a distinguished, but 
relatively powerless family holding the title of pant pratinidhi, allied with Nizam Ali Khan of 
Hyderabad in a campaign against Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal. The most prominent fief-holders 
who joined them were Janoji and Mudhoji Bhonsle and Gopalrao and Govind Hari Patwardhan 
of Miraj in southern Maharashtra. While the defectors had different relations and grievances, 
which I will detail below, they all shared a perceived loss of political status and financial 
security. Between March and August 1763, the Peshwa’s and the Nizam’s forces pursued a series 
of attacks and counterattacks, including an assault on Pune carried out by Janoji’s commander 
Raghuji Karande. This conflict ended in an uneasy ceasefire after the battle of Rakshasbhuvan on 
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August 10, 1763.212 Because the Bhonsles had returned to the side of the Peshwa in the final 
days before battle, they were assigned new territory worth 32 lākh rupees, yet relations between 
the Nagpur and Pune governments did not remain tranquil for long.213 At the beginning of 1766, 
they skirmished until the Bhonsles were forced into a punitive settlement at Daryapur near 
Amravati. They came to blows again in 1769. Reaching Berar in mid-January, the Peshwa 
marched on and burned the city of Nagpur as the Bhonsle brothers frantically scrambled towards 
Pune in an attempt to distract his attention. While the Bhonsles had safely installed their families 
in the distant mountaintop fortress of Gawelgarh, the people of Nagpur, as it was remembered 
around fifty years later, fled to more immediate refuge in Ambagad and Pratabgad with anything 
that they could carry.214 
At the peak of the second campaign against Nagpur, the Peshwa took the drastic measure 
on March 11, 1769 of issuing almost 60 orders of sequestration (zapt), mostly to kamāvīsdārs 
stationed in pargaṇas across western Maharashtra, Marathwada and Khandesh (see Figure 9).215 
While the punishment of sequestration could be applied to a variety of major crimes such as 
conspiracy, dacoity, and murder, it became the preferred punishment for defection in this 
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period.216 During the 1762-3 rebellion, the property of many individuals who defected to the 
Nizam, including Janoji Bhonsle, had been attached.217  
 
 
Figure 9: Pargaṇas Receiving the Peshwa’s Orders of Sequestration, 1769 
Similarly, in 1769, kamāvīsdārs were ordered to seize the property, household, and lands of 
anyone who was known to have taken up service with Bhonsle. The orders targeted cavalrymen 
resident in the stretches of contested territory across which Bhonsle and his armies under Raghuji 
Karande and Narhar Ballal were marching on their way to Pune. Thus, in addition to punishing 
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those who defected, the intended effect of the sequestration orders was to arrest the functioning 
of the Maratha military-fiscal economy, in which generals sustained and augmented their armies 
by extracting, often forcibly, men, money, and goods from the small district towns where they 
halted over the course of prolonged campaigns. This intensification of the operations of the 
military-fiscal economy could be destructive to rural areas. Reports from the campaigns of the 
1760s regularly decried the spoliation of cultivators’ fields, theft of livestock, and depopulation 
of villages that followed the movements of large armies. The Peshwa’s uncle and rival 
Raghunathrao (1734-83) in a December 27, 1762 letter to Janoji Bhonsle decried the deleterious 
effects of these operations. He stated, “Cavalrymen seek money and means of support according 
to their desire. By this means, the enemy becomes powerful. Campaigns in Hindustan and 
elsewhere are halted and everyone looks to his own affairs. Money dries up so cavalrymen turn 
to the enemy, and when the enemy becomes strong, it is your house that becomes extinct.”218 
The Peshwa’s 1769 orders were intended to suppress this process and in so doing force Bhonsle 
to submit to his authority. Both sides, not just the Peshwa, deployed sequestration to cut off the 
enemy’s access to military resources. For example, Govind Hari Patwardhan in 1763 instructed 
his son Gopalrao to caution the Nizam against directly attacking Pune and instead to pursue the 
sequestration of Khandesh, Gangathadi, and the country around Junnar.219 The punishment of 
sequestration had become fully weaponized. 
While the weaponization of sequestration indicates the way in which the Peshwa’s 1769 
assault against Bhonsle was a war of attrition, its extreme character also suggests that it was a 
civil war expressing the collapse of the delicate bonds linking Maratha governments. As I 
described in the last chapter, the Bhonsles’ cultivation of separate affiliations with both the 
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Chhatrapati at Satara and the Nizam and his proxies in Berar as well as their pursuit of territorial 
ambitions in central and eastern India did not sit easily with the rising power of the Peshwa. The 
conflicts of the 1760s demonstrate how this rivalry became linked with anxieties about not only 
the Peshwa’s authority, but also about the integrity of political mediation and political mediators 
in general. When such anxieties occluded the potential for diplomacy, the results were evasion, 
disobedience, defection, rebellion, and war, yet the restoration of peace also required the 
revivification of time-honored practices of political mediation, including the exchange of oaths, 
agreements, and sentiments of trust and affection. In succeeding sections of this chapter, I will 
chart the complex origins and aftermath of the civils wars of the 1760s with particular attention 
to their impact on the status of the practice of politics. But, first, it will be helpful to consider 
how the conflict itself produced effects within the operations of the Maratha state on the ground. 
These effects are perhaps clearest when we consider the role of the kamāvīsdār, the 
official directly answerable to the Peshwa’s orders of sequestration. Stewart Gordon has 
painstakingly demonstrated that the kamāvīsdār was the key figure in the implementation of the 
Maratha system of revenue administration in newly acquired territories.220 While the purchase of 
a kamāvīs only required the advance of the amount of the district’s estimated revenue, the 
Peshwa’s government regulated the actual administration of the kamāvīs by checking accounts, 
recruiting subsidiary staff, and even removing exploitative kamāvīsdārs from their offices. The 
terms of the appointment could be quite specific. For example, Govindrao Sadashiv, one of the 
kamāvīsdārs who received the Peshwa’s sequestration orders in 1769, purchased his office in 
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pargaṇa Bhose in 1763/4 for five years for an estimated revenue of over two lākh rupees. The 
conditions of this appointment were the following: criminal fines should not exceed five hundred 
rupees; amounts for interest on the advanced amount and any alienated villages as well as losses 
from any uprising or other unexpected calamity should be deducted from the collection; any loss 
or profit from the annual tax increase should accrue to the kamāvīsdār; five thousand rupees each 
year should defray previous excess advances made by him for the pargaṇa of Ambejogai; and 
his advance should be paid back before any villages are alienated from the pargaṇa.221 
Kamāvīsdārs constituted a closely monitored arm of the Peshwa’s government. 
In addition to collecting revenue, kamāvīsdārs were responsible for administering justice 
and gathering intelligence on the doings of people in their jurisdictions. They supervised a small 
staff and a garrison of infantry and cavalry to execute these duties. Because they carried out most 
of the functions of central government at the local level, they tended to act as the Peshwa’s eyes 
and ears on the ground. Providing up-to-date information on the positions, movements, and 
activities of rival armies, kamāvīsdārs allowed the Peshwa to more swiftly contain the local 
political effects of military recruitment and conflict. For example, in February 1769, Viswasrao 
Ramchandra, the kamāvīsdār of Bodwad, informed another official Chintaman Hari that 
Bhonsle’s army was in the vicinity of Jalgaon in Khandesh, prompting Hari to bring a force of 
three hundred soldiers to challenge them.222 Another recipient of these orders, the Solapur 
kamāvīsdār Ganesh Trimbak, reported on February 26, 1769 that the Bhonsles were on their way 
to Pune and that he would take the necessary precautions to guard a political prisoner who had 
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been committed to his care.223 Given their substantial responsibilities, the Peshwa’s decision to 
assign specific powers of confiscation and punishment to kamāvīsdārs represented both a re-
assertion of the supreme authority of his government and an extension of the conflict with 
Nagpur into local society. 
A closer examination of the variation in responses of different kamāvīsdārs to the 
Peshwa’s orders of sequestration reveals how local society interfaced with the conflict between 
Pune and Nagpur. Very few officials reported having identified anyone who had defected. While 
it is possible that the Bhonsles’ armies enjoyed limited support during their march from Berar, it 
is far more likely that investigations were fruitless because village headmen (pāṭīl) and other 
village-level officials with whom they interacted were reluctant to turn in their neighbors to the 
district authorities. Several letters indicate the extent to which kamāvīsdārs relied on the 
information and discretion of these officials. For example, Mahadji Narayan, the kamāvīsdār at 
Indapur pargaṇa, reported, “I summoned the pāṭīls of each village of the aforementioned 
pargaṇa and conducted an inquiry, but no one has left for the service of the Bhonsles. The pāṭīls 
of each village wrote that no one from their villages left for the Bhonsles’ service. I am 
investigating. If I find anyone, I will confiscate [their possessions] as ordered.”224 Other replies 
betrayed a similar inability to account for the movements of small bands of armed men who may 
have joined the Bhonsles’ armies at different points during the war. Laxman Mahadev, the 
kamāvīsdār of Pathode, stated on March 26, 1769 that he found no noteworthy individuals in his 
search but that there may be some trifling men in the Bhonsles’ employ that he promised to 
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locate.225 Later on April 5, Balaji Laxman, an official reporting to Tukoji Holkar’s kamāvīsdārs, 
wrote from Hade near Nasik that there were no soldiers in the area, only Bhil and Gond peoples, 
but that some cavalrymen had gone to Gawelgadh and perished with the Bhonsles’ commander 
Narhar Ballal, probably sometime in late February.226 Such ambivalent responses to the orders of 
sequestration demonstrate the limitations of the Peshwa’s central authority in regulating a highly 
flexible and politically sensitive military labor market. 
Powerful Maratha clans who affiliated with rival governments were especially difficult to 
restrain. One such clan was the Jadhavs of Sindkhed.227 In 1762, Ramchandra Jadhav was 
enticed to defect from the service of Nizam Ali Khan by means of a hefty revenue assignment, 
including the fort of Kopal, and the prestigious title of head general (senāpati).228 
Within a year, he had revived his relationship with the Nizam, looted Maratha-held territories, 
and ordered the assassination of Raghunathrao. The assassins ingeniously ambushed 
Raghunathrao in the privy, but he escaped with a minor cut. Jadhav was captured and locked up 
in Daulatabad fort.229 In 1769, similarly independent-minded Maratha families defied the efforts 
of the Peshwa’s kamāvisdārs to control their movements. Mahadji Hari, stationed in Karad in 
Satara district, noted that while no one from Karad had defected, he could not vouch for the 
Patankars of nearby Patan. He stated that Appajirao Patankar remained with the Peshwa’s 
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government, but his brother Balojirao had gone over to the Bhonsles with two hundred people.230 
Earlier in the 1760s, the Patankar returned to the Peshwa’s side after their kinsman Raulojirao 
supported the Nizam.231 Being a landed deśmukhī family with control over the small hill-fort of 
Dategad, the Patankars had the resources to continue to hedge their bets as the civil wars 
developed.232 Subhanji Athavle, who inherited a saranjām in several districts in Marathwada and 
Berar and the title of dhurandhar samśer bahādar from his father Santaji in 1764/5,233 explained 
that there were many people with his name. Some were not his kin, and a couple Athavles 
employed by the Bhonsles had caused trouble in his district.234 The Naik Nimbalkars of Phaltan 
present a similar case. Piraji Naik Nimbalkar’s assignment in pargaṇa Alande was attached in 
1765/6 for supporting the Bhonsles’ defection.235 In 1769, his kinsman Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar 
was ordered to cooperate with the government clerk Govind Anant in searching house by house 
for defectors.236 
The Athavles and the Naik Nimbalkars were clans with long histories of service with the 
Nagpur Bhonsles. Malharji and Bhavanji Athavle, Piraji Naik Nimbalkar, Tuljoram Konher, and 
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Surat Singh Hazari are all mentioned as part of the army of Janoji Bhonsle in January 1766.237 
Surat Singh Hazari was one of eight brothers hailing from Sangamner who served in the cavalry 
of Khanderao Dabhade, a prominent Maratha general who controlled much of Gujarat in the 
early eighteenth century. Later he entered the service of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao with a company 
of twelve hundred men. After the battle of Rakshasbhuvan, Janoji induced him to join his forces 
by conferring an assignment of twenty-two tracts of land near Warghat in the thickly forested 
northeastern part of his kingdom.238 Hence, by the time the Peshwa’s orders of confiscation 
reached Trimbak Krishna, the kamāvīsdār at Sangamner, Surat Singh and his immediate family 
had relocated to Berar. Krishna admitted that there were a couple of his relations still living at 
Sangamner, but they had long been mere landless laborers with no connection to any kind of 
rebellion against the Peshwa.239 
Neither able to control the fluctuations of the military labor market nor the loyalties of 
local landed families, the Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal’s administration struggled to mitigate the 
harmful effects of the war, especially in those areas that were exposed to the depredations of 
prodigious armies. The official Dhondo Mahadev, who was tasked with carrying out 
sequestration orders in the subdistrict of Waluj,240 complained on December 7, 1768 that the 
Peshwa’s army had caused extensive damage while marching from Daulatabad fort towards 
Berar. He wrote, “They grazed their horses on the sorghum fields. They destroyed the sugarcane 
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plantations. In each village, they took two to four hundred rupees worth of crops and sugarcane 
and grass and then left, causing roughly five thousand rupees in damages. Given this kind of 
extravagance, how is cultivation to be sustained? How are monies to be realized?”241 By early 
February, the Bhonsles were on the run. Conditions in the buffer zone between Daulatabad and 
the western parts of Berar near Buldana and Akola became so chaotic that, as Mahadev stated, 
Khanderao Barge, a load-carrier who had been dispatched with treasure for the Peshwa’s army, 
was unable to move beyond the Ajanta pass and had to return the treasure to Daulatabad. The 
second front of the war – running from the eastern stronghold of Chandrapur, which was the 
Bhonsles’ refuge after fleeing from Gawelgadh, to Nanded – fared no better. Krishnaji Anant, an 
official with control over several districts falling in this area, carped that although Bhonsle’s 
armies left his territories untouched, the Peshwa’s made off with cattle, burned villages, and 
unleashed general havoc. In response to his complaints, he was told that during a campaign, such 
collateral damage was inevitable.242 
Government officials in the countryside watched helplessly as rival armies passed 
through their jurisdictions, forcibly taking whatever grain and cattle they could find, while 
resident cavalrymen and landed notables bypassed their remit to take up arms with whichever 
side would pay. The representatives of the Peshwa’s authority were largely unable to maintain 
their hold on the reactions of local society to the war. Loyalties were divided and difficult to pin 
down. The Pune government had taken the desperate measure of circulating a blanket injunction 
against the Nagpur Bhonsles. Not only was this injunction of limited practical effect, but also, it 
reflected a deeper sclerosis in the political tissue of the Maratha state, which depended upon the 
recognition of a determinate hierarchy of authority. To better understand the nature of this 
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sclerosis, we must examine how tensions surrounding the Peshwa’s authority in the years 
following the momentous battle of Panipat of 1761 corroded relations between the Pune and 
Nagpur governments. 
Panipat and the Transformation of Maratha Politics 
According to the prevailing view, the civil wars of the 1760s were symptomatic of the 
decline of Maratha political fortunes following the Third Battle of Panipat of 1761. Panipat was 
part of a conjuncture of events that led to political transformation in north India, Bengal, and the 
Punjab. Falling between the battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1765), it represented a deeply 
contingent stage in the British East India Company’s gradual assumption of dominance in the 
Mughal Empire’s eastern provinces. Upon the assassination of the Mughal emperor Alamgir II in 
1759, his successor Ali Gauhar fled eastwards, where he mounted several campaigns until the 
Company forced him into a treaty of protection in 1765 in exchange for control over the tax 
revenue of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, conventionally known as the diwānī. Having been 
recognized as emperor Shah Alam II in 1760, he spent many years at Allahabad before returning 
to Delhi in 1772 under the protection of the Maratha leader Mahadji Shinde. Henceforth the 
Mughal emperor ruled at the pleasure of not just his ministers, which had been the case since the 
early eighteenth century, but also of rival subsidiary powers that imposed exploitative 
arrangements of protective alliance. 
While the Company was the Mughal Empire’s primary underwriter in the eastern 
provinces, the Afghans and the Marathas vied for dominance over the Upper Doab and Punjab. 
The Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani marched on Delhi in 1757. In 1758, Maratha forces 
invaded the Punjab, marching as far as Attock. The following year, Durrani returned to Punjab to 
stop these encroachments and continued towards Delhi. Peshwa Balaji Bajirao’s cousin 
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Sadashivrao Bhau and son Vishvasrao marched northwards to meet Durrani in battle and re-
captured Delhi in August 1760. Both sides spent the following months competing for alliances 
with various north Indian powers, which resulted in Durrani securing the key support of the 
Rohilla Afghan chief Najib ud-Daulah and the Nawab of Awadh Shuja ud-Daulah. The Marathas 
were less successful in building a coalition and faced persistent shortages in their food and water 
supply. The battle began on the plain of Panipat about eighty kilometers north of Delhi on 
January 4, 1761 and lasted for ten days until the Marathas were finally routed.243 
The human cost of Panipat was extreme – an estimated 75,000 people were killed and 
22,000 were captured and ransomed.244 Contemporaneous narratives emphasized that a failure of 
leadership magnified the chaos of the battle and its aftermath. For example, Kashiraj Pandit, an 
envoy of Shuja ud-Daulah, in his eyewitness account of the battle criticized the arrogance with 
which Sadashivrao Bhau conducted himself among more experienced generals in the Maratha 
army. For example, Kashiraj writes that he dismissed the Jat ruler Suraj Mal’s proposal that the 
Maratha army leave some of its weight behind before proceeding onwards against Durrani. He 
believed Suraj Mal’s counsel to be unworthy of consideration because he was a mere zamīndār 
without sufficient knowledge to be offering advice; worse still, he referred to Malhar Rao 
Holkar, who supported Suraj Mal’s position, as an “old man deprived of his reason (pīr-i salab-i 
al-ʿaql).”245 He also evokes some of the difficulties faced by the intermediaries who represented 
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Sadashivrao Bhau and Shuja ud-Daulah in prosecuting a successful process of jawāb-suwāl 
diplomacy:    
Raja Debi Dutt, an inhabitant of Delhi and the son of Lalji Sitaram who was in the 
service of the government, along with Bhavani Shankar Pandit were sent for the sake of 
negotiation (barāy-i jawāb-suwāl farastādand). Bhavani Shankar Pandit was told that I, 
Rao Kashi Ram – having waited on the late nawāb [Safdar Jung, Shuja ud-Daulah’s 
father] – was also from the Deccan. In his presence, Pandit and I met and realized that we 
were were of the same community and the same homeland. Pandit informed Bhau 
[Sadashivrao Bhau] that I was in the service of the nawāb. Bhau sent a note written for 
me in the Hindi of the Deccan [Marathi]. Because the form of address did not meet my 
standards, I did not write a reply. Bhau asked Bhavani Shankar why I did not reply. He 
said that the scribe had written contrary to the rules. Bhau was so angry with his scribe 
that next time he would write with understanding. When Raja Debi Dutt reached Bhau 
[Sadashivrao Bhau], he negotiated (suwāl-jawāb kard). Bhau was not satisifed by the 
points that he made. He sent Bhavani Shankar back [to Shuja ud-Daulah] to convey that 
this man is a broker by trade and not suitable for keeping a secret. [He said] send 
someone you trust by whose tongue I will send word of what is advisable for me. Malhar 
Rao and Raja Suraj Mal were coming on a different matter. Nawab Shuja ud-Daulah 
provided a blow-by-blow report to Najib al-Daulah and the nobles and ministers of state. 
In keeping with their counsel, they were conducting negotiations with the leaders of the 
Marathas (suwāl wa jawāb bā sar-dārān-i marhata mī kardand).246 
Though commonalities of identity and experience, such as the fact that both Kashiraj and 
Bhavani Shankar were Maharashtrian Brahmans, could massage the process of jawāb-suwāl, a 
slight hiccup in communication, such as a poorly written letter or a smarmy demeanor, could just 
as easily disrupt it. Thus it was critical to recruit practitioners of jawāb-suwāl who were 
trustworthy and fluent in the verbal and written conventions of political discourse. 
 Later historiography on the Marathas extrapolated from such assessments of Maratha 
leadership at Panipat to make more general judgments about Maratha politics in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century. Major figures in this historiography, such as Jadunath Sarkar, V.K. 
Rajwade, and T.S. Shejwalkar, equated Maratha political achievement with the success or failure 
of Maratha conquest of territory. For Rajwade and Shejwalkar, such expansion further 
represented a project of nation building against Mughal and British imperial domination. In this 
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narrative, Panipat serves as a kind of climax, up to which the Marathas were unstoppable in their 
drive to conquer India from Attock to Cuttack and after which they struggled to re-establish their 
supremacy on the Indian political stage. Despite the acknowledged fact that the outcome of the 
battle was overdetermined by a range of variables – unsuccessful negotiations with potential 
allies, deficiency of supplies and information, and the superior artillery and organization of 
Durrani’s army – the consensus among historians has been that the Marathas’ defeat reflected a 
basic moral failing in their politics. Sarkar in the Fall of the Mughal Empire stated:   
The Maratha failure to oppose the foreign invader in 1757 and even more, with the 
Bhau’s vast resources in 1760-61, convinced the Indian world that Maratha friendship 
was a very weak reed to lean upon in any real danger…Maratha protection was not worth 
purchasing by the least sacrifice, because the Marathas had clearly demonstrated in the 
last four years that they could not protect their dependents any more than they had been 
able to protect their own selves in 1761.247 
Sarkar found a “lack of statesmanship, and even of intelligent self-interest” among Maratha 
generals posted to the north. He believed that these deficiencies disqualified them from 
becoming heirs to the Mughal imperium.248   
 In contrast to Sarkar, Rajwade and Shejwalkar developed a more sympathetic 
interpretation of the Maratha politico-ethical project and its transformation in the eighteenth 
century. Their critique was premised on an assumed ideal of political achievement as defined by 
the unifying leadership of the first Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhonsle. Rajwade argued that the core of 
the Maratha project was mahārāshṭradharma. This term has a complex history rooted in the idea 
that Shivaji Bhonsle united the leading Maratha families of the western Deccan to protect a 
shared Hindu ethics and way of life, or dharma. This project is most succinctly and famously 
encapsulated in the seventeenth-century sant poet Ramdas’ injunction: “Bring all the Marathas 
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together and spread the Maharashtra dharma.”249 Rajwade’s own definition of 
mahārāshṭradharma included several key components: the advancement of Hindu religious 
practice, the sustenance of cows and Brahmans, the establishment of self-rule, and the unification 
and leadership of the Marathas.250 He claimed that these components remained in place despite 
major shifts in the locus of sovereign authority that took place over the course of the eighteenth 
century. Thus, he referred to the period of rule under Chhatrapati Shahu as the period of Hindu 
rule (hindupadpādśāhī) and that of the rule of the Peshwas as the period of Brahman rule 
(brāhmaṇpadpādshāhī) with the implication that the latter was the culmination of the project 
initiated by Shivaji.251 He argued that this project continued to develop through the celebrated 
Maratha victory at Kharda in 1795. With regard to Panipat, he blamed the choices of individual 
leaders such as Malharrao Holkar and Govind Ballal Kher, the Peshwa’s chief officer in 
Bundelkhand, but avoided a general critique of Maratha political leadership.252 While the 
privilege that he reserved for Brahman power, and Chitpavan Brahman power in particular, was 
rejected from both non- and para-Brahman perspectives, his overall understanding of the virtues 
of unifying leadership remained intact. 
 T.S. Shejwalkar moved beyond Rajwade’s criticisms of individual leaders at Panipat on 
the basis of a more extensive Marathi archive. He shared Rajwade’s belief that Maratha 
“protection” of north Indian rulers was rooted in a “constitutional” ideal of preserving cultural 
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and political autonomy.253 But unlike Rajwade, he did not believe this ideal was realized in the 
leadership of the Chitpavan Brahman Peshwa.254 Such a view is consistent with the overarching 
argument that Shejwalkar makes in many of his works on Maratha history: that the polity 
established by Shivaji in the late seventeenth century could have become the vehicle for a 
cohesive, pan-Indian nationalist politics had it not been corrupted by the temptations of Mughal 
patronage. Thus, in his discussions of post-Shahu Maratha politics, he duplicates Sarkar’s claim 
that Maratha leaders were too blinded by self-interest to pursue a unified political agenda. He 
reserves special ire for the high-level administrators who shaped the overall direction of Maratha 
expansion. For example, Shejwalkar disparages “wily” Sakharam Bapu’s failure to organize a 
permanent Maratha garrison in the northwestern regions of Lahore, Multan, and Kabul. He 
elaborates, “He seems to have developed a faculty for easily disposing of the twenty-two subahs 
of the Mughal Empire by his parlour calculations…There seems to have been some brain-wave 
set in motion at the court of Poona whereby all such problems of high imperial policy were 
settled at one sitting on the basis of theoretical or oral information supplied by Munshis!”255 
Shejwalkar set the trend for the subsequent historiography of the Marathas in blaming the 
Marathas’ failure to fulfill their empire-building ambitions on the “parlour calculations” of the 
skilled bureaucrats who dominated political life at late Maratha courts. 
Thus, Panipat has come to signify the beginning of a general and permanent state of 
disorder in the Maratha state that endured up to the British conquest in 1818. Yet Panipat was 
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merely one of several concrete issues that shaped relations between Maratha governments in the 
1760s. As I discussed in the last chapter, Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur competed with Peshwa 
Bajirao I for territory and influence during the 1740s. In addition, Raghuji and his successors 
established an enduring friendship with the feudatories of the Nizam of Hyderabad in Berar, the 
Panni Afghan nawābs of Ellichpur. The relative independence that such competing affiliations 
allowed the Bhonsles was an important political condition structuring the relationship between 
Pune and Nagpur. Another major issue was the entanglement of their dynastic successions. Upon 
the death of Raghuji in 1755, his sons Janoji and Mudhoji Bhonsle each made claims to the senā 
sāheb subhā title, which resulted in the factionalization of both the Pune and Nagpur elite.256 
This situation was compounded when the death of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao immediately after 
Panipat produced a second succession dispute. Balaji Bajirao’s son Madhavrao Ballal was 
invested with the robes of the peśvā office on July 20, 1761; however, Madhavrao’s uncle 
Raghunathrao cultivated a separate faction within the nobility and maintained a secret 
correspondence with Mudhoji. Moreover, the Bhonsles’ succession dispute made it difficult for 
them to meet their feudatory obligations to the Peshwa. They reneged on promises to provide 
military assistance in confrontations with the Nizam and Ahmad Shah Durrani at Udgir and 
Panipat.257 While the Bhonsles grumbled that non-realization of revenues due to them in Bengal 
and other territories made it impossible for them to pay off their creditors and maintain an army, 
their failure to participate in military campaigns was understood by the Peshwa’s government to 
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be a major slight to the terms of their feudatory relationship.258 So did the fact that the Bhonsles 
owed the Peshwa’s government some twenty lākh rupees.259 
Competing loyalties, entangled succession disputes, and the non-fulfillment of financial 
and military obligations all required careful management to avoid the escalation of conflict 
between governments. Ruling families in the latter half of the eighteenth century increasingly 
turned to skilled agents, or kārbhārī, to manage such situations. The historian V.S. 
Kadam has called attention to the empowerment of the kārbhārī after the death of Balaji Bajirao, 
yet the devolution, delegation, and decentralization of authority within the Maratha polity was 
far more pervasive and deeply rooted than he acknowledges.260 In the late seventeenth century, 
the term kārbhārī referred to an administrator, usually Brahman or Kayastha, who handled the 
local revenue business of a Maratha nobleman’s fiefdom. But certain notable kārbhārī, such as 
Shivaji’s Deshastha Brahman assistant Dadaji Kondev, took on greater responsibility. The 
scribe-turned-kārbhārī Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis (d. 1785) under Chhatrapati Shahu 
Bhonsle became something of an all-purpose fixer in the Satara government’s dealings with 
feudatory and external powers. Moreover, as I will show in Chapter 4, he was the key figure in 
facilitating the transfer of executive power to Balaji Bajirao after the death of Shahu in 1749. 
This process of devolution only intensified during the settlement of Balaji Bajirao’s succession. 
Sakharam Bapu Bokil (1716-1775) and Baburao Ram Bhanu alias Baburao Phadnavis (d. 1772) 
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were the kārbhārīs charged with dispensing the main business of the Peshwa’s government.261 
Their power was described in a July 6, 1761 letter in terms of the performativity of a kalambandī 
or a sanad that I analyzed in the Introduction: “Sakharampant says karār. Dada [Baburao 
Phadnavis] says it should be given (dyāve). Giving is still closed. But much “give, give!” is 
happening.” 262 Whereas the Peshwa had earlier reduced the Chhatrapati to the status of a 
figurehead, now the Peshwa himself was reduced to a figurehead. In his stead, kārbhārī executed 
the business of politics and administration. 
Similar figures came to prominence in this period. Sakharam Bapu, whose career will be 
discussed below; Vitthal Sundar Parshurami (d. 1763), a minister of Nizam Ali Khan; Devaji 
Chorghode alias Divakarpant Purushottam (d. 1781), the Nagpur Bhonsles’ minister whose 
involvement in the Nagpur succession will be discussed later in this chapter; and Baburao 
Phadnavis’ nephew Balaji Janardan Bhanu alias Nana Phadnavis (1742-1800) were designated 
in popular historical memory as the sāḍe tīn śahāṇe, or “three and a half wise men.”263 All of 
these “wise men” were Brahman administrators who rose to high office around the same time, 
though Nana Phadnavis, being the youngest, would not reach the peak of his influence until the 
1790s. Other named kārbhārī – like Govindrao Khanderao and the Nagpur scribe Krishnarao 
Madhav (d. 1803) – were non-Brahman Kayastha Prabhus. Elective affinities, rather than 
ascriptive ones like caste, were what defined kārbhārī as a political class. Their shared vocation 
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demanded exceptional skill and intelligence in the art of political communication. Rulers trusted 
kārbhārī to carry out sensitive communications with rival governments in a careful and 
trustworthy manner. But negotiations between governments were unpredictable. It was not 
uncommon for a kārbhārī to lose the trust of a patron as a result of a deal gone wrong. If the line 
between loyalty and disloyalty was porous in the case of Maratha rulers, the line between 
intelligence and guile was equally so in the case of the “wise men.” Though the term shahāṇa – 
meaning wise, shrewd or clever – was used quite straightforwardly in eighteenth-century letters, 
it could also bear the wry sense of a potentially conniving or deceptive intelligence, one that 
would not be hemmed in by the agenda of a particular government or ruler. The three main 
śahāṇe – Bapu, Parshurami, and Chorghode – received more than their just deserts for their 
intelligent machinations in the seditious politics of the 1760s. 
Two Wise Men Down 
The politics underlying the civil wars of the 1760s arose out of a competition for 
influence between Madhavrao and Raghunathrao after the latter struck a deal with the Nizam to 
dissuade him from carrying out an attack on Pune in late 1761.264 This competition culminated in 
an armed standoff between their factions at Alegaon just outside Pune in late November 1762. 
When Madhavrao surrendered, his uncle overturned earlier distributions of state patronage to 
benefit his followers. He conferred the title of pant pratinidhi on his infant son Bhaskarrao with 
Naro Shankar as his assistant, thereby depriving Bhavanrao Kulkarni and his family of their 
long-held patrimony. Baburao Phadnavis lost his place to Chinto Vitthal Rairikar, while 
Sakharam Bapu was made sole kārbhārī and granted the fort of Sinhagad for his residence. 
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Bapu’s family had a considerable history of service, and Bapu himself had penetrated the inner 
circle of the Peshwa and acquired an equal share with Phadnavis in handling his 
administration.265 But it was his relationship with Raghunathrao that led to his rapid promotion. 
So rapid, in fact, that he became a magnet for deeper anxieties about the nature of politics under 
conditions of delegated authority. 
In another reversal of patronage, the stronghold of Miraj in southern Maharashtra was 
removed from the possession of the Patwardhan family and conferred in jāgīr on one of 
Raghunathrao’s partisans. In early February 1763, Govind Hari Patwardhan was forced to 
surrender the fort and take refuge in Mangalwedh, while his son Gopalrao joined the Nizam and 
Bhonsles’ insurrection. Govind Hari continued to report on the political situation from 
Mangalwedh. He maintained that his family was a loyal servant of the Peshwa who had no 
recourse but to seek out the Nizam’s patronage to meet the pecutionary demands of their army 
and their creditors. A couple months prior to leaving Miraj, he declared to his son in a December 
1 letter: “We have not committed any treachery. We have loyally served those whose food we 
have eaten since birth.”266 For the Patwardhans, the defection was a desperate measure to 
maintain their status, not a rejection of the Peshwa’s authority as such.267 The Bhonsles also had 
significant financial incentive to defect. According to their April 11, 1763 agreement with 
Bhavanrao Kulkarni brokered by his agent Gamaji Yamaji Shivdev, the Bhonsles were to 
provide 25,000 troops in exchange for which they would receive territory worth a whopping 
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seventy-five lākh rupees should the scheme to unseat the Peshwa prove to be successful. The 
Nizam by means of a July 5, 1763 agreement granted revenue totaling over five lākh rupees from 
the tracts near Pavnar in Wardha district to Janoji Bhonsle.268 He also issued an order assigning 
the fort of Amner with an annual collection of 1,500 rupees to Janoji for the safe residence of his 
family.269 
Financial considerations aside, the terms of these agreements suggest that the defectors 
harbored some intention of overturning the Peshwa regime. Additional internal correspondence 
shows that there were significant doubts about the rights of the Peshwa family with respect to the 
Chhatrapati, who continued to serve as the symbol and fount of Maratha sovereignty.270 In an 
April 22, 1762 letter to Janoji Bhonsle reaffirming his agreement with the Nizam, Bhavanrao 
Kulkarni asserted that the Peshwa had become a transgressor (amaryāda) and had discarded the 
established customs (rīt) of service (sevā) by placing Chhatrapati Ramraja in confinement at the 
time of Shahu’s death thirteen years ago.271 The later testimony of the Nagpur Bhonsles’ head 
scribe, recorded in the margins of an 1822 chronicle, corroborates this insinuation of a widely 
shared conviction that the Peshwa had treated the Chhatrapati with disrespect (be-adabī).272 
Thus, the Bhonsles’ support of the Nizam was in part a repudiation of the Peshwa’s right to 
execute the will of the Chhatrapati. Gopalrao Patwardhan conveyed as much in a July 17, 1763 
letter in which he proclaimed that the Bhonsles were unlikely to join him in conciliating with the 
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Peshwa and instead planned to assume the burden of government (rājyābhār).273 While it is 
difficult to know the specific end game of the Bhonsles, it is likely that they sought to establish a 
new hierarchy of authority in which the Peshwa’s position would be considerably diminished. 
Complaints against the Peshwa’s supersession of the rights of the Chhatrapati dovetailed 
with a second critique: that the Peshwa’s government was partial to the interests of the Chitpavan 
Brahman sub-caste, which had come to new prominence in the western Deccan following the 
rise of Balaji Viswanath under Shahu.274 Especially illustrative in this regard is a letter sent to 
Raghunathrao in December 1762 by a group of Brahmans, probably Chitpavan, resident in Pune. 
Bemoaning the destruction of the government at the hands of those who defected to the Nizam, 
they offered a vivid picture of the anxieties of this political moment: 
Your agent (kāryabhāgī) [Sakharam Bapu] has taught you every sort of trick and led you 
beyond the pale. He has split the entire circle [of nobility] and performed chicanery to 
present you with success. He has destroyed a government of three generations. He has 
given away the government’s forts. He has divided and given away all of the saranjām 
lands. He has given away the rest of the territories to the enemy. He has made loyal 
servants, commanders, and clerks destitute. Some are in hiding; some are in prison. He 
has made you a profit but ruined your house, which you do not realize. You will 
understand the consequences. He brought you to Satara and acquired the robes of the 
pratinidhi in your name. He made your commander [Naro Shankar] into your equal. The 
people of the Satara fort descended, and the guards were attached. The fort and the 
kingdom were lost. A prabhu [Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu] effected this business.275 
In an instant, everything was destroyed.276 
The letter-writers went on to declare that Sakharam Bapu’s original intention was to obliterate 
the name of the Chitpavan Brahman sub-caste. 
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Govind Hari Patwardhan echoed the Pune Brahmans’ sentiments about Bapu in his 
dispatches to his son in the field. He made him into a scapegoat for the disastrous measures taken 
by Raghunathrao’s faction. In particular, he focused on what he believed to be a deep-seated 
prejudice against Chitpavan Brahmans. His view was that Bapu had provoked the Maratha 
defection to the Nizam in order to aid the latter in his plans of carrying out an assault on Pune, 
which would result in the demolition of Shaniwar Wada, the palace of the Peshwas, and the 
surrounding vāḍās owned by various Chitpavan families, including the Patwardhans. Bapu’s 
ultimate aim was to bring about the demise of the Peshwa regime and thereby to displace the 
Chitpavans into a state of nomadic beggary (deśadhī) in which they would be physically and 
politically destitute.277 In several letters, he also claimed that Bapu had provoked Sadashivrao 
Bhau into rushing into war at Panipat so as to bring about the ruin of the Chitpavans. He even 
referred to him as Shakuni, the uncle of Duryodhana in the Māhabhārata often portrayed to be 
the mastermind of the war between the Pandavas and the Kauravas.278  
Whether or not Bapu desired the political ruin of the Chitpavans, his sudden rise to power 
became a flashpoint for tensions between competing elite groups because of the ethical 
ambiguities of his role as a political intermediary. For Patwardhan, these ambiguities were 
closely tied to his functional role within the Peshwa’s government. In his letters, he variously 
refers to Bapu as a kārbhārī and a kāryabhāgī, both of which roughly mean “agent,” “manager,” 
or “administrator.” While these terms could have been straightforward designations, they took on 
a more sinister valence when paired with qualitative characterizations of the kinds of measures 
Bapu took to realize his goals. For example, in a letter from April 1763, Patwardhan fumes, “The 
person [Bapu] who makes this much mischief with Miraj is one who destroys established things 
                                                
277 ALS, ed. Khare, vol. 1, nos. 232, 279, pgs. 392, 473. 
 
278 Ibid., no. 72, pg. 106. 
 
 106 
(kṛtaghna). That one does not fail to delude everyone to accomplish his schemes…He is a 
trickster (kuceshṭakhora).”279 Elsewhere, he notes that Bapu had become kṛtkarme, or skillful.280 
He compares Bapu’s schemes to the act of taking on an incarnation (avatārkṛtya), and in another 
letter dated June 10, 1763, he sardonically proclaims that Bapu had attained spiritual power 
through the practice of physical and mental austerity (tapascārya).281 Playing on his status as a 
Brahman, Patwardhan mocked Bapu for his pride in believing that a mere administrator can 
arrogate to himself the authority reserved for a sovereign ruler or a deity. In his view, Bapu had 
offered illusory, misleading counsel to Raghunathrao to achieve his personal apotheosis rather 
than to serve the needs of the state. 
Bapu survived the fallout from his participation in the 1762-3 revolt, but not without 
serious consequences. After the Peshwa’s victory at the battle of Rakshasbhuvan, Madhavrao put 
Raghunathrao under house arrest and forbid his followers from meeting with him. He seems to 
have applied this same punishment to Bapu. According to the account in the Peshvyāñcī Bakhar 
(1818), Bapu was ordered to remain at home under the watch of two guards. His work was re-
assigned to Moroba Phadnavis, while Moroba’s nephew Nana began to do the work of the 
phaḍnavīs in earnest. Nevertheless, the Peshwa continued to summon Bapu every evening after 
the breakup of the formal court assembly to seek his advice on the day’s business.282 
The vicissitudes of Sakharam Bapu’s career were replicated in that of the Nagpur 
Bhonsles’ minister Devaji Chorghode. Both Bapu and Chorghode recovered from precipitous 
falls from grace to take part in the later politics of the Pune and Nagpur courts. Their fellow 
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Deshastha Brahman śahāṇā Vitthal Sundar would presumably have weathered the political 
consequences of the civil wars of the 1760s had he survived the battle of Rakshasbhuvan. Given 
these three administrators’ shared Deshastha Brahman caste background, and the anger 
expressed in Gopal Hari Patwardhan’s correspondence, it may be tempting to interpret the 1762-
3 revolt as a reactionary political expression of the resentments of Deshastha Brahmans against 
the Chitpavans, who were relative newcomers to high administrative and political office. But 
these resentments, like those of Maratha families against the Peshwa’s reduction of the 
Chhatrapati, have limited purchase in explaining the political significance of the revolt because 
they were limited in their appeal. Moreover, as we outlined earlier, cruder, but no less deeply felt 
issues of money, territory, and succession were also at stake. Instead, these resentments are 
indicative of a more widely shared anxiety about the ways in which a segmentary, or partial, 
interest, whether of a caste, a faction, or of one’s own career, could lead a skilled administrator 
to overlook the interests of the political whole. It is on this stake that ruling families like the 
Bhonsles and the Patwardhans impaled their kārbhārīs when their political plans went awry; in 
turn, their responses reveal the stakes of kārbhārī management of loyalty and affiliation within 
the post-Panipat Maratha order. 
The fall of the Bhonsles’ chief minister Devaji Chorghode is one of the strangest and 
most fascinating episodes in the civil wars of the 1760s. It also exemplifies the weight lent to 
political negotiations between Maratha governments and the unavoidable material risks of the 
vocation of politics. While Devaji’s origins remain somewhat obscure, it seems that he was a 
low-level clerk in the delegation deputed to Pune to secure the senā sāheb subhā title for Janoji 
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Bhonsle in 1755.283 Without the knowledge of his senior, he inserted himself into the 
negotiations and thereby attained the favor of both rulers.284 From that point onwards, he was a 
leading counselor in the Nagpur government who closely managed its relationship with Pune. 
But his fortunes began to decline even prior to the commencement of the wars. Several members 
of the court, including Raghuji Karande, blamed him for the prolongation of the succession 
dispute between Janoji and Mudhoji. Towards the end of 1759, he feared that he would be 
thrown into prison and desperately wrote to Peshwa Balaji Bajirao to save him. The Peshwa’s 
support seems to have been adequate to prevent his confinement.285 The Peshwa’s 
correspondents at Nagpur had described him as one of the only persons at court capable of 
paying the government’s arrears to its army and to the Peshwa because of his strong relationships 
with local merchants and revenue-collectors. He also held tremendous influence with the 
Bhonsles themselves. In the words of one correspondent, if someone else said something true, it 
was considered a lie, but if Devaji told a lie, it was considered to be true.286 
For the next several years, as the conflict between Pune and Nagpur intensified, Devaji 
seems to have been able to mollify his masters at both courts, despite almost certainly being 
integral to the 1762 alliance between the Bhonsles and the Nizam. His luck ran out, however, in 
1769 when he traveled to Madhavrao’s camp to make one final attempt to avert war. As one 
                                                
283 According to the Gupte bakhar, he was a śāgird, which was a kind of student (often under an ustad). 
His mentor was a clerk named Konherram Umredkar in the employ of the Bhonsles. See BL, Mss 
Marathi, B26, ff. 114; NBB, ed. Kale, 68-9.  
 
284 Gupte further specifies Devaji’s intervention into the negotiations. After it had been agreed that 
Bhonsle would gift the Pune government one and a half lākh rupees to obtain the senā sāheb subhā title, 
the leaders of the delegation tricked Bhonsle into believing that the ante was upped to seven lakhs 
(presumably to their own pecuniary benefit). Devaji then surreptitiously told both Bhonsle and the 
Peshwa that the amount had been altered to two and a half lākhs, which made it seem to each party that it 
had gotten the better end of the deal. 
 
285 SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 20, nos. 102, 104, pgs. 108-110. 
 
286 SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 20, no. 110, pgs. 113-4. 
 
 109 
official reported on January 7, 1769, he supplicated the Peshwa to offer some money to the 
perennially cash-strapped Nagpur government, perhaps in exchange for the Bhonsles’ future 
cooperation. The Peshwa refused.287 Instead, Devaji was arrested and installed with the sundry 
laborers and followers of the army.288 Towards the end of the war, he was released and sent to 
the Bhonsles’ camp to initiate negotiations.289 Despite having worked to establish a peace 
settlement, the Bhonsles promptly put him under house arrest in Nagpur, sequestered his 
possessions, and imposed heavy fines on his relations and partisans, including Chimaji 
Rakhmagad, who, as we will see, Devaji had recruited to effect a reconciliation between the two 
governments.290 
The Bhonsles placed blame for their troubles squarely on Devaji’s shoulders. In 
particular, they accused him of fostering the treasonous friendships with rival states that had 
been at the center of their misunderstanding with Pune. The Peshwa’s correspondent Vitthal 
Shamraj in a September 26, 1769 despatch relayed Janoji Bhonsle’s frustrations with 
Devaji. Janoji had stated, “I am not able to speak of the earlier interconnections that resulted 
everywhere. But this action at least was not mine; rather it was Divakarpant [Devaji] who pulled 
the strings (sutre) in all directions. Whatever I used to tell him, his understanding exceeded [that] 
– God is not attained through irregular service, but rather through loyalty.”291 In pursuing a self-
interested, albeit pragmatic politics of flexible affiliation, Devajipant had transgressed the norms 
of loyalty and obedience structuring traditional relationships of elite servitude. Janoji further said 
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that he considered his scheming to have been a calamity for the state and confined him to his 
house. He sought to reassure the Peshwa that by removing Devaji from political affairs, and by 
cutting him off from all of his former associates at court, he was putting the Nagpur government 
back on track. Seven years earlier, Madhavrao used a similar metaphor of pulling strings to 
describe the role of Sakharam Bapu in fomenting revolt: “Because of the perplexities caused by 
the administrator (kārbhārī), the wires (taṇava) of our kingdom have snapped.”292 Like Bapu, 
Devaji was made into a political scapegoat. 
But stranger things were afoot. Earlier that month on September 7, the Nagpur court had 
assembled to bid farewell to Janoji’s younger brother Sabaji, who, as part of the peace 
agreement, was departing for a term of service in Pune.293 Just as everyone was gathering outside 
– one or two hundred in the news-writer’s estimation – an ascetic (gosāvī) who had been 
wandering from place to place approached Janoji and told him that he would not stay in Nagpur 
but instead would proceed northwards. When Janoji asked what was troubling him, the ascetic 
replied that there was no justice in his kingdom. People simply did whatever came into their 
minds. He then accused Devaji along with another Brahman by the name of Mahadev Bhat 
Patwardhan of practicing witchcraft on the Bhonsles’ head general, who had recently died of a 
fever. The doctors attending him had declared that he had been the victim of a spell. Stranger 
still, fried lentil and wheat cakes were found in the ashes left over from his funeral pyre. Other 
reported unnatural occurrences, including a cow in the village of Ralegaon eating her own calf 
and the appearance of an earthen water jar stuffed with a black cat, thickened the air of the court 
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with suspicion of malevolent activity.294 Finally, a person by the name of Janardan Vaidya, 
perhaps a Brahman physician, who frequented Devaji’s company had recently been spotted 
performing a fire sacrifice over the course of several days, corroborating his involvement in a 
fiendish plan to disrupt the natural order of things. 
Whether or not Devaji, in addition to politics, was expert in witchcraft is beyond our 
scope; however, what we can glean from this set of accusations is that his name and reputation 
had been so sullied by the recent political catastrophe that it became either necessary or desirable 
to bury him for good. For the Bhonsles, his counsel, especially his willingness to fraternize with 
rivals of the Peshwa, led them to stray from the straight and narrow path of devoted vassalage. 
By analogy, his mysterious influence lay behind the recent deviations from nature’s proper 
course. The case of Devaji is exemplary of the ways in which a conflict between allied Maratha 
governments, which was also fundamentally a conflict about the expectations and norms of 
political conduct, became concretized in the life of an individual practitioner. Practicing 
pragmatic politics – by surveying the field for strategic opportunities, offering advice in tricky 
situations, and massaging relationships with flattering words and gestures - could be lucrative, as 
it was for Devaji, but precisely because political work was so consequential, it was also risky. 
Maratha rulers were keen to recruit individuals who were not only intelligent and skillful, but 
also trustworthy. 
The Terms and Sentiments of Peace  
In the final months of 1768, the ruling circle at Nagpur realized that it was in desperate 
need of someone who could build trust with the Pune government. Although it had escaped a 
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serious confrontation two years earlier, it was widely known that the Peshwa was planning a 
second campaign in Berar. In a last-ditch attempt to effect a reconciliation, Janoji Bhonsle, 
following the advice of Devaji Chorghode, enlisted his head scribe Chimaji Rakhmagad, to meet 
with Madhavrao. Based on available documentation, we can infer that this meeting occurred 
sometime between September and December 1768, just a couple months before the beginning of 
the war. The mission failed, which probably led to Devaji’s unfortunate decision to travel to the 
Peshwa’s camp, where he was promptly placed under arrest. Its significance, however, has less 
to do with whether or not it made a difference in the state of affairs between the Pune and 
Nagpur governments and more with what it indicates about the sort of qualities associated with a 
good political intermediary. Indeed, the choice to assign Chimaji to this job reflects the 
trustworthiness of his lineage, and, concomitantly, the enduring value of his family’s relationship 
with the Maratha Chhatrapati. 
Chimaji Rakhmagad was the son of Rakhmaji Ganesh, a Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu 
scribe who was assigned to Raghuji Bhonsle by Chhatrapati Shahu during the period of his 
investment with the senā sāheb subhā title.295 Chimaji, like his father before him, held the title of 
ciṭnavīs, which designated him as the scribe in charge of the composition of Marathi 
correspondence.296 He does not seem to have had much involvement in politics prior to the 1768 
mission.297 Yet he was perceived to hold a considerable degree of credibility not just because his 
father had been appointed to Raghuji’s circle by Shahu, but also because he was the cousin of 
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Shahu’s head scribe and intimate confidante, Govindrao Khanderao.298 Given that Govindrao 
Khanderao had been the key intermediary between Balaji Bajirao and Shahu during the latter’s 
final days, this family connection was integral to Chimaji’s political value at this particular 
juncture.299 Govindrao Khanderao and his successors were viewed as members of the 
Chhatrapati’s inner circle who were willing to cooperate with the Peshwa. Chimaji was able to 
draw on this good faith when attempting to broker an agreement between the Pune and Nagpur 
governments. 
Although Chimaji was ultimately not able to prevent the outbreak of war, his efforts to 
re-establish trust seem to have been appreciated. He was accorded the full honors and respect of 
a person of significance during his visit. In a letter to Janoji Bhonsle dated October 21, 1768, 
Madhavrao reflected on this visit: 
The honorable Chimaji Rakhmagad came and explained everything. Based on what he 
said, any doubts that came with him left. It is a promise that there are no doubts 
remaining here (yethe śapathpuraskar sandeha rāhilā nāhī). However, your assurance 
(khātarjamā) is necessary. You must faithfully send the honorable Diwakar Purushottam 
[Devaji Chorghode]. Just as various issues were discussed with Chimappa, so he will 
provide assurance on your behalf once he arrives.300 
Another bakhar account of this visit echoes the Peshwa’s impressions. It states that as the equal 
of his cousin Govindrao Khanderao, Chimaji was accorded the honor and respect due to a 
member of his lineage. In addition, several villages that had been granted to his family were 
reassigned in his name.301 An original sanad dated November 18, 1768 confirms that at least the 
village of Varne in the pargaṇa Got Mathargaon, which is located in today’s Buldhana district, 
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was removed from the management of Govindrao Khanderao and granted in mokāsā to Chimaji 
with the provision that anything over the base collection of 335 rupees was to be handed over to 
the Peshwa’s government.302 
While Chimaji was ultimately not able to prevent the outbreak of war, and while he may 
have felt some of the impact of Devaji’s fall from grace, his efforts to re-establish trust between 
the Nagpur Bhonsles and the Peshwa redounded to his own credit. He established himself as a 
worthy member of a reputable line of state servants, one that would continue to be trusted in 
political matters. In his letter, the Peshwa invokes the phrase “with an oath” (śapathpuraskar) to 
characterize the new understanding between the two governments, implying that his oath as well 
as Chimaji’s imbued this relationship with integrity and sincerity. As I argued in the 
Introduction, oaths and promises were critical to negotiation between parties with independent 
and sometimes conflicting agendas. The commendation of being able to trust one’s word, and as 
we have seen with Devaji, the corresponding condemnation of believing one’s word to be 
dishonest or disloyal, were integral to the fortunes of those who pursued the vocation of politics 
in the Maratha Empire. The value placed on trust in political communication indicates the extent 
to which competing Maratha governments understood that the resolution of conflict depended 
upon a non-violent arena for reconciliation and re-negotiation of the terms by which sovereign 
authority was distributed. 
After his father’s death in 1771, Chimaji was re-confirmed in the office of ciṭnavīs and 
admitted into the inner circle of Mudhoji Bhonsle. According to one story that is recounted in 
several chronicles, Chimaji was accompanying Mudhoji when the latter was violently accosted 
for funds by a group of Pathan servicemen. Mudhoji fled into the circular ditch of an oil-mill but 
was overtaken by one of his attackers and wounded on his thumb while trying to hold back the 
                                                
302 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 405, unnumbered sanad document dated 7 Razab 1169. 
 
 115 
attacker’s knife blade. Finally, as one account suggests, it was Chimaji’s servant Shahji Podar 
who saved Mudhoji by killing the Pathan.303 Later, Chimaji’s fortunes took a turn for the worse. 
For reasons left unstated, Mudhoji began to think badly of him and put him under close watch 
until, through the intercession of another Kayastha Prabhu official Mahipatrao Dinkar Gupte,304 
he was released and allowed to live peacefully until his death in 1780 in the vicinity of the 
villages of Nimbgaon-Nandura in Buldana district, where he had earlier received his mokāsā 
privileges from Madhavrao.305 His work in politics was extended by his nephew and adopted son 
Krishna Madhavrao, who inherited his forebears’ ciṭnavīs title but took a far more significant 
role in state affairs, serving in substance, if not in name as diwān alongside the chief munshī, 
Shridhar Laxman. Krishna Madhavrao’s career and those of other Kayastha Prabhu families 
employed by eighteenth-century Maratha governments will be explored in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chimaji Rakhmagad’s visit to the Peshwa was not the first time that parties at Nagpur 
and Pune made an effort to reassure each other of their good intentions. Sometime after learning 
that the Bhonsles had joined the Nizam, Madhavrao reached out to Janoji in an effort to put their 
relationship on the right track. He stated, “During the time of my dear departed father 
[Peshwa Balaji Bajirao], you acted assuredly and straightforwardly (nikhālas) in all things, but in 
the course of time, things that should not happen have happened. As such, you should now act 
assuredly in all things and wish for the wellbeing of this state.” Madhavrao elaborates on these 
sentiments in accordance with those expressed in a promise-bearing letter, or pledge 
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(śapathpūrvaka patra) Janoji had sent. In conclusion, he refers again to the former Peshwa: 
“There is the promise (śapath) of the dear departed Nana Saheb and the promise of Shri Gajanan 
[Ganesh]. Just as you act loyally, so will your state expand.”306 Madhavrao’s letter and the 
pledge that Janoji had earlier sent are exemplary of way in which invocations of oaths, often to a 
deity, were embedded in political communication and even associated with physical letters. Such 
letters were affective instruments designed to convey sentiments of assurance and confidence in 
periods of political uncertainty. 
To do so, letter-writers often invoked oaths that had been taken in the past, usually by 
specific individuals at specific times and places, to repair ties of mutual trust that had been 
broken and to establish a precedent for amity in the future. They also referred to familial bonds, 
both real and fictive. Hence Madhavrao’s reference to his father, whose confidence in Janoji 
Bhonsle, as we have seen, was won by Devaji Chorghode at the time of the Nagpur succession. 
Raghunathrao made similar references to existing oaths and family ties in his previously 
referenced December 27, 1762 letter to Janoji. Having acknowledged the elder (vadil) status of 
the Bhonsles, and the fact that the Peshwas were tied to them in a junior relation of filiality 
(leṅkurapaṇā), he offers his interpretation of the recent course of events: 
Your chieftainship has been yours from the beginning. After the dear departed Shahu 
Maharaj, Raghuji died. At that time, the dear departed Nana Saheb [Peshwa Balaji 
Bajirao] sent the robes of the senā sāheb subhā with due honor to your house. You were 
borne along with affection. When we looked upon you with such affection, an 
extraordinary time ensued in which the pratinidhi and others went over to the enemy. 
You also went. Because of this, the kingdom was damaged. Pune was burned. After that, 
you understood and came [to our side]. Harmony between us was restored, and by means 
of speech (bol) and holy basil (tuḷsī), oaths were taken (imān pramāṇ jhāhale). Not a 
shred of doubt remained. But the doubt in your minds would not leave. An oath of god 
(iśvarācī śapath) by words and holy basil had taken place. There should have been no 
uncertainty after that, but still, you insisted that the promise that you made should also be 
                                                
306 “Nāgpūrkar Bhõslyāñcī Saṃbandhāce Kāgadpatre,” ed. Sane and Oak, no. 6, pgs. 18-9. 
 
 117 
made from this side.307 
Raghunathrao’s missive testifies to the power invested in the ritual of oath-taking through the 
exchange of words and objects. These rituals rejuvenated sentiments of filial affection. But the 
letter itself was also a vehicle for Raghunathrao’s promise to meet the Bhonsles in person and 
assuage any doubts that they still harbored. Later accounts record that Raghunathrao did meet 
Devaji Chorghode sometime before the second war between Pune and Nagpur. This visit and the 
subsequent mediations of Devaji and Chimaji were not successful in resolving the conflict 
between the two governments. But the deployment of oaths and sentiments would continue to be 
a feature of communication between Maratha governments. 
By mid-March 1769, the Bhonsles capitulated to the Peshwa. They had spent weeks on 
the run. Having fled to the dense jungles of Chandrapur, they moved southeastwards and came to 
a halt somewhere between Dharmapuri and Nirmal. Meanwhile, Devaji had been made to march 
with the camp followers of the Peshwa’s army but was also charged with negotiating a peace 
settlement between the two parties. Once he reached the Peshwa’s camp at Kankagiri- 
Brahmeshwar on the banks of the Godavari, he formally submitted on behalf of the Bhonsles. 
According to a March 17 report, he pleaded with the Peshwa to be merciful to the Bhonsles 
given the state of their dominion. Their lands had been looted and burned to such an extent that it 
would take five years to restore them. Their cattle had been carried off. Their armies were 
clamored for pay. The effects of the military-fiscal dimension of the conflict were keenly felt but 
difficult to describe. As one news-writer pensively put it, “I cannot put into words how many 
shocks have been dealt in this affair.”308 The peace was not formally settled until the two sides 
met in person in late April at Mehkar near Washim; however, the terms were probably more or 
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less fixed prior to this meeting.309 Memoranda (yādī) documenting negotiations (jāb-sāl) in the 
form of a series of linked propositions (kalam) and resolutions (karār) were drawn up on March 
13 and March 23, 1769, respectively (see Appendix B for the text of the latter memorandum).310 
In the Introduction, I considered the linguistic and performative aspects of political 
communication as encapsulated by the diplomatic practice of jawāb-suwāl. Here I want to call 
attention to how the peace settlement addressed some of the grievances that precipitated the 
conflict between Pune and Nagpur and to outline some of the issues that would continue to 
preoccupy these governments. 
Some of the demands in these agreements concerned outstanding claims to territory and 
revenue. The Peshwa’s government asked that certain tracts that been granted in jāgīr as well as 
Fattesingh Bhonsle’s holdings in Berar be ceded. It also demanded an annual gift of five lākh 
and one rupees and cloth from Balapur and Washim. In addition to sanads confirming their 
regular domains in Berar, Chanda, Gondwana, Warghat, Chhatisgarh, Chhota Nagpur, Bastar, 
Cuttack, Murshidabad, and Patan in Orissa, the Bhonsles requested that certain permanent land 
rights (vatan) be restored; that the Peshwa hand over the fort of Amner; that special letters be 
despatched instructing local rulers at Mandla and Bhopal to refrain from harrassing their 
holdings in these areas; and that the Peshwa’s government ignore the complaints of their 
creditors, who frequently harassed them about debts they could not yet pay back. Both sides 
referred to the recurring problem of ghāsdaṇā. Because ghāsdaṇā was an irregular levy falling 
outside of the regular administration of revenue, it was a constant item of complaint. The 
Bhonsles were authorized to levy ghāsdaṇā in an area on the banks of the Godavari known as 
Gangathadi with the exception of certain government tracts. Both sides in the 1769 agreements 
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stated that damage from unauthorized ghāsdaṇā should be avoided. The Bhonsles also 
complained of damages caused by government armies marching towards north India and by 
certain errant generals who ought to be chastised. 
Beyond these issues of pecuniary and proprietary concern, the agreements sought to 
create the conditions for a more permanent peace between Nagpur and Pune. They articulated 
explicit guidelines for preventing the outbreak of conflict in the future. These guidelines were 
built on the experience of the civil wars of the preceding decade. So, the Peshwa’s agreement 
included items specifically concerning the employment of mercenary cavalrymen and the 
maintenance of an army commensurate with available funds. Correspondingly, the Bhonsles 
requested that the Peshwa’s government refrain from interfering with fraternal politics 
(bhāūbandāce rājkāraṇ) and from lending a ready ear to the potentially false complaints of their 
officials. Any such complaints ought to be fully investigated before making accusations. Rather 
than resorting to clandestine or extreme political measures, they recommended that any public 
business be settled by means of jawāb-suwāl. A more general desire for loyalty and affection 
was expressed on both sides. Consider one exchange: 
The dear departed Nana Saheb loved [us] like a son. You ought to maintain this affection 
sincerely. Do not deviate from this. You should behave loyally. Act in such a way to 
preserve the wellbeing of the state. Like family, you too will be loved and favored. There 
will be no difficulty in this. So resolved (yeṇe pramāṇe karār).311 
 
Like the oaths examined earlier, jawāb-suwāl thus expressed sentiments of affection, but it also 
employed a more formal set of ratifying conventions – like the promissory phrase yeṇe pramāṇe 
karār – to establish a more permanent basis for sustaining those sentiments in the future. 
Finally, the agreements exhibited a special preoccupation with maintaining open and 
transparent communication with rival governments. The Peshwa discouraged the Bhonsles from 
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corresponding with the Mughal emperor and other powers in north India, including the 
Company. Rather than engaging in politics (rājkāraṇ) with other external governments and 
promoting rebellion, they were to perform loyal service when summoned and despatch Devaji or 
a Bhonsle brother to attend on the Peshwa. As was customary, they were to station an envoy 
(vakīl) at the court of Nizam Ali Khan to handle government business by means of jawāb-suwāl; 
however, they were not to create additional lines of communication without the knowledge of the 
Peshwa’s government. With respect to the Nizam, the Bhonsles noted that their agreement for 
the division of Berar revenues would be ongoing and that if the Nizam violated this agreement, 
the Peshwa should come to their aid. “Our peace and conflict is your peace and conflict,” the 
Bhonsles’ agreement put it succinctly.312 Separate clauses were included regarding the Bhonsles’ 
negotiations with the Company regarding Cuttack. The Peshwa authorized the continuance of a 
vakīl for purposes of negotiation, but the Bhonsles went further, stating that their dispute with the 
Company would not admit of a non-violent solution. The Peshwa’s corresponding resolution is 
evasive, neither guaranteeing nor precluding the arrangement for a campaign to consolidate 
control over the Bhonsles’ territories in Cuttack and Orissa.313  
 Between 1761 and 1803, the Pune and Nagpur governments exchanged about twenty 
agreements.314 Many of these re-visited the terms of reconciliation established in the 1769 
agreements while enabling new initiatives such as an alliance between Pune, Nagpur, 
Hyderabad, and Mysore in anticipation of the First Anglo Maratha-War, which will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. The reappearance of certain core issues helped to create substantive parameters for 
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diplomatic reconciliation. Over the years, these governments developed a mutual understanding 
that the process of jawāb-suwāl, and the fulfillment of the various claims and concessions that it 
proposed, undergirded their amicable relations. Hence, jawāb-suwāl itself was an explicit area of 
concern in these agreements. The Pune government in a kalam from 1761 requested, “There is a 
government envoy at Delhi. You should station an envoy there, and under the government 
envoy’s supervision, conduct negotiations (jāb-sāl).”315 Another put forth by Nagpur in a 
September 22, 1779 yādī stated, “Your envoys should not neglect in giving respect, and they 
should not fill up the court pursuing their own politics. They should write truly and be humble,” 
to which the karār relied, “We will send an intelligent man, and he will act according to your 
wishes.”316  Occasionally, a kalam might even refer to previous settlements to jusify the need for 
a new round of jawāb-suwāl: “When the agreement of Brahmeshwar took place, we obtained the 
favor of the late Raosaheb [Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal]. It was decided that within two years, we 
would seek to provide experience [of its operation]. But at that time talks stalled. Now you 
should say whether you acknowledge this.”317 Or, a kalam might refer to a face-to-face meeting, 
which was often a necessary step in putting a relationship on a better footing. Mudhoji Bhonsle 
noted in an opening kalam, “Earlier, my son Raghoji Bhonsle came to Purandar to meet you. On 
that occasion, a resolution of mutual friendship and unity occurred in so many ways, and then he 
returned to Nagpur…Now, I came to Pune, and on this occasion, the absolute best and most 
certain talks and agreements were settled and may remain for many days.”318 As a flexible, 
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dialogic instrument, the agreement transformed discrete instances of communication into a 
common set of facts and a meta-commentary on the process of jawāb-suwāl.  
Conclusion: Towards a Social History of the Kārbhārī 
This chapter examined the Pune-Nagpur civil wars of the 1760s to reveal the stakes of 
communicative action between allied Maratha governments. It showed that such wars threatened 
to overwhelm the ability of the Peshwa’s kamāvīsdārs to control the operations of the military-
fiscal economy as governments competed for control over resources. This military-fiscal crisis 
was in turn symptomatic of a crisis of confidence in the hierarchy of authority structuring the 
Peshwa’s relationship to the Bhonsles of Nagpur. Due to a constellation of recurring issues – 
prolonged succession disputes, indebtedness, demand for military aid – the relationship between 
these governments deteriorated. The kārbhārī charged with maintaining this relationship by 
managing political communication in an intelligent and trustworthy manner were held 
responsible for this crisis of confidence. It became clear that it was necessary to restore 
confidence by creating more regular mechanisms for regulating political communication and 
behavior. By means of oath-taking and treaty-making, rulers and their administrators sought to 
create the conditions for a more permanent peace, which would become the foundation for 
carrying out joint projects in subsequent decades. 
According to an order issued on May 17, 1769, the homes of Piraji and Govindrao Konde 
Shivapurkar, which had been seized, and their family and property, which had been sequestered 
and sent to Sinhagad fort, were released in light of the agreement reached between the Bhonsles 
and the Peshwa.319 We can speculate that similar orders were issued for other individuals caught 
in the crossfire of the internecine conflict of the past decade. Devaji Chorghode was not so 
fortunate. He remained under house arrest for several months following the peace and only 
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regained his influence at the Nagpur court following Janoji Bhonsle’s death in 1772. Prior to his 
death, Janoji endeavored to reassure the Peshwa of the sincerity of his affection. In addition to 
removing Devaji from his counsels, he sent his brother Sabaji to Pune to serve with the Peshwa 
in upcoming campaigns and forwarded his communication with the vakīl of Haider Ali of 
Mysore. At the same time, he complained of difficulties in realizing revenues from territories in 
Gangathadi and Gadha-Mandla and planned an expedition to Bengal with Mir Qasim and Shuja 
ud-Daulah to challenge growing Company dominance.320 
As I will explore in Chapter 4, the dominant figures in these political negotiations 
between Pune and Nagpur were the Bhonsles’ Persian munshī Bhavani Nagnath, Bhavani 
Nagnath’s son Sridhar Laxman and the aforementioned Krishnarao Madhav. Eventually, the 
latter pair emerged as Raghuji Bhonsle II’s leading kārbhārī. In this capacity, they took on the 
responsibility of handling communication between Pune and Nagpur regarding their joint 
response to the threat of Company power. But before I take up the thread of politics between 
Pune and Nagpur, I must examine the social history of Chitnavis and his fellow Kayastha Prabhu 
scribes in more detail. The Chitnis family at Satara and the Chitnavis and Gupte families at 
Nagpur were among the many Kayastha Prabhu scribal networks that leveraged their skills in 
spoken and written communication to become a significant force at Maratha courts by the end of 
the eighteenth century. Their story, and its implications for our understanding of Maratha politics 
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CHAPTER 3: Pathways of Service in the Early Maratha State 
Khando Ballal died. His eldest son Jivaji Khanderao will be useful to the government. But he 
will not experience the toil of writing. All of your burdens having fallen on the state, you made 
yourself of service and cared for your worldly affairs. Looking favorably on you, His Lordship 
offered the kārbhārī robes, but you did not take them and obediently fulfilled your duties.   
-Copy of a 1739 order issued to Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis321 
 
 Though Govindrao Khanderao ultimately refused it, the offer of the vestments of the 
kārbhārī honored his forebears Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal’s sterling records of scribal 
service. It also recognized their ambition to escape the toils and burdens of scribbling to pursue 
more autonomous and consequential endeavours in the political sphere. As discussed in the last 
chapter, the role of the kārbhārī had accrued significant political weight by the second half of the 
eighteenth century; however, within the seventeenth-century Deccan Sultanate contexts out of 
which the Maratha state arose, it was more closely associated with the humdrum operations of 
local revenue administration. The bridge from administration to politics, and the ways in which 
enterprising service people crossed that bridge, will be the subject of the present and following 
chapter. Govindrao Khanderao was among a select few who successfully made this transition. 
But his individual success reflected a broader historical transition in the social-functional 
organization and composition of the Maratha state. The tiers of administration, and over time, the 
highest circles of political decision-making, were increasingly occupied by literate service castes. 
In turn, their dominance within government enabled a more pragmatic mode of communicative 
politics suited to the realities of the fluid, decentralized world of eighteenth-century South Asia.  
Typically, the rise of service people, or “service gentry,” within politics and government 
in early modern South Asia has been associated with the formation of a “Brahman rāj.”322 
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Kumkum Chatterjee, Karen Leonard, and Hayden Bellenoit have documented important 
exceptions to this trend in their studies of Kayastha service in Mughal and Sultanate 
governments in Bengal, the Nizamate regime at Hyderabad, and the early colonial state in north 
India, respectively.323 In the Maratha case, the scholarly consensus has been that Brahmans, and 
Chitpavan, or Konkanastha, Brahmans in particular, dominated politics and government, 
especially after the rise of the Chitpavan Brahman Balaji Viswanath to the office of peśvā; 
however, André Wink and Sumit Guha have acknowledged that Chandraseniya Kayastha 
Prabhus seem to have been more present at the Nagpur and Baroda courts.324 My research has 
uncovered that their intimation is merely the tip of the iceberg of Kayastha Prabhu participation 
in administration and politics in the eighteenth century. While it is true that Brahmans 
proliferated in certain regimes, such as the Peshwa’s government at Pune, the label “Brahman 
rāj” does not accurately reflect the social complexity of the Maratha state.  
By focusing on the case of the Kayastha Prabhus, I argue that the ascendancy of literate 
service people was a phenomenon not tied to Brahmans per se, but instead arose out of the 
dynamics of Maratha state-formation. These dynamics enabled Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhus 
to not only exercise their traditional skills in writing and record keeping, which has been the 
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focus of most scholarship,325 but also to exercise proximate skills in advising, diplomacy, and 
statecraft in the later eighteenth century. In the following chapter, I examine how clusters of 
Kayastha Prabhu officials at the Satara, Kolhapur, Nagpur, and Baroda courts shaped political 
strategy, and often, rivaled and challenged the influence of Brahmans. In this chapter, I 
demonstrate how their transition from administration to politics was made possible by the 
fundamental dynamics of Maratha state-formation. As a re-consolidated Maratha central 
government expanded and diversified under Chhatrapati Shahu, it recruited significant numbers 
of Kayastha Prabhus skilled in the literate arts of writing and communication. In particular, they 
were concentrated in a stratum of administrative offices collectively known as darakh. Many 
Kayastha Prabhus with service roots in the Bahmani and Deccan Sultanates took advantage of 
darakdārī office to establish their livelihoods and propel their careers. Foremost among them, 
the Satara Chitnis household amassed a substantial patrimony in rights to land revenue. This 
patrimony was a critical resource of social mobility. It transformed the family from employees to 
patrons, paved the way for exceptional individuals like Govindrao Khanderao to break into 
politics, and forged new pathways of service for junior relations, particularly Ganesh Rakhmagad 
and Rakhmaji Ganesh, the uncle and cousin of Govindrao Khanderao, respectively, and 
progenitors of the Nagpur scribal lineage.  
“Scribal” Castes in Historical Perspective 
The Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhus (colloquially known as CKPs) of western India 
constitute a regional sub-grouping of the broader Kayastha caste. Conventionally understood to 
be a scribal or writerly caste, the origins of the Kayasthas have been the subject of much debate 
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since the early modern period.326  Some scholars have speculated that the name “Kayastha” 
derives from the Sanskrit word kāya (body) and affix –sth (of or resident in), while prabhu 
means king or lord.327 This etymology and its significance are still very uncertain.328 Much 
clearer are the Puranic sources of the division between Chitragupta and Chandraseniya 
Kayasthas. As distinguished from the Chitragupta Kayasthas, who were considered to be the 
descendants of Chitragupta, son of Brahma and scribe to the god of the dead Yama, the mythical 
origin-story of the Chandraseniya Kayasthas derives from the Sahyādri-khaṇḍa of the Skanda-
puraṇa. The Sahyādri-khaṇḍa, a famous and controversial narrative of Parshurama’s activities 
on earth, includes origin-stories for the Chitpavan and Karhade Brahman sub-castes as well as 
the Kayastha Prabhus. In the Reṇukā-māhātmya section of this text, the pregnant wife of the 
Kshatriya king Chandrasena flees to the ashram of the sage Dalbhya to seek protection from the 
rampage of Parshurama. When Parshurama discovers the ashram, Dalbhya offers the woman in 
exchange for her unborn child. Parshurama agrees to the exchange on the condition that the child 
will be trained in the arts of the pen rather than the sword so as to thwart the regeneration of the 
now-annihilated Kshatriyas. Ethnogenetic accounts in commentaries on the Manusmṛti claim 
that Kayasthas are the offspring of mixed anuloma and pratiloma marriages.329 Together with the 
Puranic narratives, these accounts were used to adjudicate the twice-born status of Kayasthas 
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within the four-fold varṇa order, which was tied to ritual privileges and entitlements such as the 
wearing of the sacred thread. 
 Distinct from the ethnological discourse on the Kayasthas is an historical one concerning 
their significant role in premodern Indian state and society.330 Since at least the sixth century CE, 
inscriptional and textual evidence attests to Kayasthas being wealthy donors who held 
government offices with the titles lekhaka (writer) and gaṇaka (accountant) among others. 
Importantly, kāyastha in this period was a functional category without fixed varṇa associations. 
Hence, those designated as kāyasthas may have included Brahmans. Chitrarekha Gupta also 
shows that there was considerable hierarchical differentiation within the functional category of 
kāyastha.331 By the late first millenium CE, north Indian Kayasthas had branched off into several 
sub-caste lineages (vaṃśa) (e.g. Mathura Kayasthas, Saxsena Kayasthas, Valabhya Kayasthas), 
and by the twelfth century, they had acquired substantial wealth and influence in regional polities 
in Bengal, Kashmir, and north India. Their sway over the Lohara kings of Kashmir in particular 
is treated with intense vitriol at several instances in the Rājatraṅginī of Kalhana (1148-50 CE).332  
Internal community accounts compiled in colonial gazetteers and ethnographies claim 
that substantial numbers of Kayasthas began to migrate southwards at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century during Alauddin Khilji’s campaign against the Yadavas of Devgiri (c. 1308-
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1313). 333 But the epigraphical record suggests that Kayasthas had settled in the Konkan and the 
western Deccan perhaps as early as the ninth century CE and more definitively by the eleventh 
century CE under the auspices of the Shilahara and Yadava dynasties. They seem to have 
obtained considerable titles and property under the Shilaharas in particular. For example, there is 
an inscription dated 1186 CE recording the Shilahara king Aparaditya’s grant of part of the 
income of the village Mahauli in Salsette to an official named Anantpai Prabhu.334 The 
epigraphical record of the Yadava dynasty also includes many references to Kayasthas as writers 
(lekhaka, kāraṇika).335 In addition, there is one inscription documenting a donation made by a 
Kayastha guild to the Vitthala temple at Pandharpur in 1276-7.336 Christian Lee Novetzke has 
suggested that while Brahmans appear to have been more dominant in the gift economies of 
temples and monasteries, Kayasthas may have had stronger relationships with the Yadava royal 
court. Yadava-period texts like the Liḷācaritra (c. 1278 CE) document conflict between 
Brahmans and Kayasthas as caste groups with similar social-economic and socio-functional 
characteristics rooted in their shared investment in the “economy of literacy.”337  
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, significant numbers of Kayasthas – now 
known as Kayastha Prabhus – were concentrated in the Konkan and the western Deccan, 
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particularly in the hilly Maval region located in the shadow of the Western Ghats. Like their 
northern Indian counterparts, the Kayastha Prabhus acquired footholds in local revenue 
administrations, specifically of the Bahmani and Sultanate states of the Deccan. Sumit Guha has 
explained that these states staffed the lower levels of their bureaucracies with Brahmans, and to a 
lesser extent, Kayasthas, to interpret administrative documentation written in local languages 
such as Marathi, Kannada, and Telugu.338 By offering specialized skills in literacy, writing, and 
accountancy, these groups became integral to the central government’s capacity to extend its 
reach into villages and towns within local social and cultural contexts that were distinct but not 
disconnected from larger, more cosmopolitan urban centers. As Prachi Deshpande has 
beautifully illustrated, scribes’ cognitive and somatic mastery of the orthographic idiosyncracies 
of the Modi script and the many idioms, conventions, categories, and shortforms of bureaucratic 
documentation was inseparable from their embeddedness in and understanding of the 
complexities of a heterogeneous early modern language order that was fundamentally 
transformed by the British colonial epistemic regime.339 Though scribes often learned these skills 
first-hand by apprenticing with senior family members and associates, formal knowledge was 
systematized and transmitted in writing manuals, or mestakas. In conjunction with the myth that 
Hemadri, the famous thirteenth-century Brahman minister of the Yadavas, invented Modi, 
mestakas exhibit a Hindu, Brahmanical conception of shuddhalekhaṇ, or correct writing, 
according to which scribal practice would be a pious, disciplined form of life in a degraded age 
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of Islamic rule.340 But as I will demonstrate in this and the following chapter in line with 
Deshpande’s emphasis on multilingualism, this conception of scribal practice obscures the 
important socioeconomic and functional differences within Maratha secretariats and ignores the 
ways in which scribes transcended their social stations through politics to work across social, 
cultural, and linguistic boundaries.  
Scribes’ indispensable role within local administration put them in a position to capitalize 
on the opportunities presented by Shivaji Bhonsle during his rebellion against the Adil Shahi 
Sultanate of Bijapur. As Rosalind O’Hanlon has argued, their access to opportunities and 
resources, in combination with their indeterminate location in the traditional varṇa order, made 
them into a paradigmatic case of social mobility in medieval and early modern South Asia.341 
While O’Hanlon focuses on debates regarding their ritual status within the intellectual networks 
of Benares-based Maharashtrian Brahmins, who were centrally involved in efforts to legitimize 
Shivaji’s claim to Kshatriya status leading up to his coronation in 1674, she also gestures to their 
accumulation of offices, rights, and privileges in the Sultanate and Maratha periods. This process 
– whereby specific Kayastha Prabhu families leveraged their resources to advance themselves 
within the expanding Maratha state – will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
Kayastha Prabhu Officials in the Maval 
 Shivaji’s mobilization of the Maval and Konkan regions in the 1640s and 1650s laid the 
foundation for his movement for Maratha independence from Adil Shahi rule. His intimate 
relationship with the hardy people of the Maval, or the māvaḷe, continues to be a robust site of 
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romance and nostalgia in the historical imagination of the Marathas. The historian Sir Jadunath 
Sarkar evokes this mood, “With his Māvlés young Shivaji wandered over the hills and forests of 
the Sahyādri range, and along the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself to a life of 
privation and strenuous exertion, as well as getting an intimate knowledge of the country and its 
people.”342 Sarkar alludes here to the remarkable topographical features of a region of the 
Western Ghats that is colloquially referred to the bārā māvaḷe, or Twelve Mavals.343 While the 
number twelve is not meant literally, but rather conveys the sense of a significant number of 
areas, the word māvaḷe may derive from the verb māvaḷaṇe – meaning “to set” – as the region 
lies to the west of Pune in the direction of the setting sun. Individual māvaḷas are often marked 
with the affix khore, meaning valley.344 Comprising an area about forty kilometers wide and one 
hundred and ten kilometers from north to south, these narrow river valleys are rocky, rugged and 
dense with vegetation.345 Because of these features, they could only be controlled by a network 
of town centers, forts and militias under the supervision of local chieftains and their 
administrators.  
The chieftains of the Maval tended to be cavalrymen of Maratha clans who held the title 
of deśmukh, while their administrators, or kārbhārī, were either Brahmans or Kayastha Prabhus 
holding the titles of gāvakuḷkarṇī and deśkuḷkarṇī (more commonly referred to as deśpāṇḍe). In 
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documentation from this period, Kayastha Prabhu officials are generally identified with the caste 
designation of prabhu or parbhū.346 While certain family surnames (e.g. Chitre, Randive, Dighe, 
Gupte, Vaidya, Pradhan) can be traced, these were almost never used in administrative 
documents – instead, titles like ciṭnīs over time took on the role of surnames. A Shivaji-period 
list of māvaḷas records the names of Prabhu deśpāṇḍes and deśkuḷkarṇīs for Nane Maval, 
Paudkhore, Tamhankhore, Muthekhore, and Kanadkhore.347 Some Kayastha Prabhu families 
extended their reach to several māvaḷas. For example, a vaṃśāvali of the Dighe lineage suggests 
that its progenitor Gopal Prabhu, having been displaced from his deśmukhī vatan at Pali-
Aminabad in the Konkan, re-settled in the village of Umbardi in Nizampur tāḷukā in the area 
corresponding to the Musekhore and Muthekhore māvaḷas. His sons and grandsons acquired the 
deśkuḷkarṇī rights to these māvaḷas as well as to the adjacent Paudkhore.348 The entry for the 
“deśkuḷkarṇī parbhū” office-holders of Kanadkhore in the aforementioned list notes that they 
held 33 villages, which corresponds to the number recorded in the the early eighteenth-century 
narrative of the Kanadkhore Vaidya deśpāṇḍes discussed by O’Hanlon.349 The progenitor of this 
lineage, Konda Prabhu, was in the service of Alauddin Hussain Bahmani, the founder of the 
Bahmani Sultanate. Konda’s descendant Timaji Prabhu joined Baji Pasalkar, the deśmukh of 
Musekhore, in supporting Shivaji’s conquest of Torna fort in 1643 and later became a kārkhānīs 
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(commissary) of Raigad fort.350 This lineage’s combination of local office and rights to revenue 
obtained under the Bahmani regime with new and more specialized posts in the early Maratha 
administration was a typical pathway of service for Kayastha Prabhu office-holders.   
 Beginning in the late 1640s, Shivaji and his famously devoted Brahman kārbhārī Dadaji 
Kondev began to recruit soldiers in the Maval to mount campaigns against Adil Shahi forts, 
including Torna, Chakan, and Kondana. This process opened up a “wide field of employment” in 
which Maratha commanders and their administrators attained favor and office in exchange for 
siding with Shivaji.351 Prior to Shivaji’s entry onto the political scene, the Jedhes and the Bandals 
vied for control over Hirdas Maval and Rohidkhore, adjacent māvaḷas thinly separated by the 
Nira River. Despite their rivalry, both clans defected to Shivaji, and their Kayastha Prabhu 
administrators joined them. These administrators were Dadaji Naras Prabhu (Gupte), the 
deśpāṇḍe of Rohidkhore and Baji Prabhu (Pradhan), the deśpāṇḍe of Hirdas Maval (see 
Appendix A for family trees). These figures are not unknown to students of Maratha history, yet 
far more attention has been paid to their Maratha lords. 352 In this section, I examine the careers 
of Dadaji Naras Prabhu and Baji Prabhu and their descendants, highlighting the costs and 
benefits faced by Kayastha Prabhu officials who did or did not choose to align themselves with 
the nascent Maratha state. While many were rewarded for entering Shivaji’s service, they also 
felt the effects of political transformation as parts of the Maval region changed hands between 
the mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
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 When the Jedhes received a deśmukhī assignment at Rohidkhore from the Bidar 
Sultanate, the Khopades and their collateral relations, the Dagades, controlled the area. It is 
likely that Naras Prabhu was their deśkuḷkarṇī, as he is mentioned in a statement (karinā) to have 
helped settle a proprietary succession following the death of Ramaji Naik Dagade.353 Once the 
Jedhes defeated the Khopades to secure their deśmukhī, which included their main seat at Kari 
and the nearby hill-fort Rohida, they maintained Naras in the manangement of the deśkuḷkarṇī 
and gāvakuḷkarṇī.354 Naras' adopted son Dadaji inherited these offices. Dadaji accompanied 
Kanhoji Jedhe and his son Baji Sarjarao when they took up with Shivaji in the early 1650s. The 
precise nature of Dadaji’s involvement is difficult to specify because most of the extant 
documentation was forged as part of his descendants’ proprietary dispute with a Deshastha 
Brahman family hailing from Bhor who held the ministerial title of pant saciva. As historian 
Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale has shown, three letters that accord Dadaji a major role in 
mobilizing the people of the region to support Shivaji are fabrications. Mehendale also casts 
doubt on several later letters used to shore up their case; however, he concludes that the overall 
circumstances surrounding the dispute as relayed in the letters are verifiable. 355 These 
circumstances show the effects of political change on the status and livelihood of Kayastha 
Prabhu officials.  
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 As a result of the tremendous confusion caused by the Mughal capture of Raigad in 1689 
and subsequent re-conquest of the Maval, many people who had pledged themselves to Shivaji 
either defected or decamped to safer locations. Disloyalty was perhaps an uncourageous, but not 
an unwise strategy given the uncertain future of the Maratha polity. After all, Shivaji’s heir 
Sambhaji had been executed, and his other son Rajaram was forced to flee from Raigad to 
Gingee. Unlike his old employers, the Jedhes, who seem to have stuck with Rajaram, Dadaji 
Naras Prabhu absconded with his family. This decision had grievous consequences. In the early 
1690s, Maratha forces re-took much of the territory that they had lost. Shankraji Narayan, 
Rajaram’s pant saciva and close adviser, along with Ramchandrapant Amatya were charged with 
leading this effort. In return, he received Rohidkhore and the surrounding areas in jāgīr, laying 
the foundation for the Maratha princely state of Bhor. Narayan confirmed the Jedhes in their old 
holdings. 356 Seizing the opportunity presented by Dadaji Naras Prabhu’s flight, he seems to have 
reserved the most lucrative kuḷkarṇī rights in Rohidkhore for his own family’s maintenance.357  
 Certain letters that do not appear to be forgeries suggest that Mataji Jedhe with the 
approval of Shankraji Narayan’s heirs Naro Shankar and Mahadji Shankar re-assigned kuḷkarṇī 
rights in three Rohidkhore villages to Dadaji’s sons Krishnaji and Yesaji after they had returned 
with their now-elderly father to the Jedhes’ deśmukhī seat at Kari.358 An extant memo from the 
Satara central government daybook corroborates Krishnaji’s possession of certain inam lands in 
Karanje.359 Still, the family continued to press their claims for restoration with Shahu. Because 
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they had lost all of their papers in the wartime chaos of the 1690s, they forged new ones.360 In 
addition, they sought out new patronage from Mansingh More, Shahu’s senāpati. More wrote 
several letters to Jedhe in which he mentioned the family’s plight in general but sympathetic 
terms. For example, he pleaded, “The honorable Krishnaji Dadaji stays close to you for the sake 
of his vatan. In addition, he serves me for the sake of his sustenance. But you still have not 
released his vatan. It is not a good thing if you are haggling and bickering on the subject of their 
home. You should help them in every way possible.”361 Thus, one option available to Kayastha 
Prabhu officials in the newly re-constituted Maratha political order was to seek out new patrons 
if the old ones failed to make good on their commitments.    
 Another option was to seek out new forms of employment, as shown by the case of the 
Hirdas Maval deśpāṇḍe lineage. The deśpāṇḍe Baji Prabhu was part of the militia of deśmukh 
Krishnaji Naik Bandal, who had recently fought several battles with the Jedhe deśmukhs over 
territory within the mavaḷa.362 Both sides accompanied Shivaji in his seizure of Javli and Rairi in 
1655-6. When the Adil Shahi government commanded the Maval chieftains to help Afzal Khan 
capture Shivaji, they refused. Baji followed suit. After Shivaji assassinated Afzal Khan at 
Pratapgad in November 1659, Afzal’s son Fazal Khan and Siddi Johar were authorized to make a 
second attack. They besieged Shivaji in Panhala fort for about five months. Under cover of night, 
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Shivaji escaped with a small force and made his way towards Vishalgad, about seventy 
kilometers to the west. Realizing that the Bijapuri army was hot on his trail, he assigned Baji and 
his militia to guard Pavankhind pass, a narrow ravine leading to the fort that is the present-day 
location of his samādhi. Shivaji was able outpace his pursuers, but Baji died in the ensuing battle 
on July 13, 1660.363 As the Jedhe Śakāvalī Karinā (c. 1697-8) put it, “…Panhala was given up to 
Salabat Khan [Siddi Johar]. Swami [Shivaji] went to Khelni [Vishalgad]. At that time, the army 
of Siddi Johar was on his trail. The crowd and press of war ensued. Badal’s people fought with 
great effort and exertion. The battle subsided. Baji Prabhu deśkuḷkarṇī died.”364 Baji’s heroism 
continued to be the subject of much praise in subsequent histories.365  
 The careers of Baji Prabhu’s descendants are exemplary of the character of Kayastha 
Prabhu employment, which will be explored in greater detail in the next section. While Kayastha 
Prabhus performed both civil and military services for Maratha rulers, they tended to be 
concentrated in posts associated with the function of writing. Baji Prabhu had eight sons by his 
two wives, Sonai and Gautamabai.366 After his death, his and Gautamabai’s son Babaji Baji alias 
Buwaji was appointed to the office of jamenīs (accountant) of the Maratha senāpati. As we will 
see in the next section, this office predominated in Kayastha Prabhu employment. According to 
an order dated August 27, 1692, Babaji served in this role under Hambirrao Mohite, Shivaji’s 
sarnaūbat (drum-master) and senāpati. He earned 2000 hons per year. Sixteen hundred hons 
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went towards his personal remuneration, while four hundred were to support additional staff 
under his supervision. This staff included twelve palanquin-bearers, two torchbearers, an 
umbrella-bearer, and several guards.367 The jamenīs was re-assigned to one Kashiram Prabhu 
when Babaji failed to accompany Chhatrapati Rajaram to Ginjee in the Karnatak after 
Aurangzeb’s invasion of the Deccan. Thanks to the mediation of his brother Mahadji, he was 
reinstated to the jamenīs under Santaji Ghorpade in August 1692. Mahadji’s son Baji Mahadev 
was appointed to the office of kārkhānīs at Rajgad fort, and his brother, Antaji,368 who had been 
a cavalry commander in the Karnatak with the rank sahastrī (one-thousand), was promoted to the 
very high rank of pañcasahastrī (five-thousand), which appear to be Sankrit-derived versions of 
the Mughal designations hazārī and panjhazārī.369 By 1702, Antaji had risen to the rank of 
saptasahastrī (seven-thousand) and entered the army of Jaisingh Jadhavrao.370  
Like those of Dadaji Naras Prabhu, the family fortunes of the Hirdas Maval despāṇḍes 
were impacted by the repeated shifts in political control over the Maval region. Baji Prabhu’s 
sons and cousins inherited his despāṇḍe rights, but it seems that they did not realize the full 
revenue to which they were entitled.371 In a 1692 order, Chhatrapati Rajaram carried out a 
request made by Mahadji Baji that the tax revenue from three villages in Hirdas Maval be 
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secured to the family after having lapsed in the tumult of the intervening years.372 Six years later, 
Rajaram commanded Shankraji Narayan to continue their property in the tīpnīs (accountant) 
office, which, he explained, had been cut off when the Maval was conquered by Shivaji.373 Many 
of these orders implied that the government owed a debt to the descendants of Baji Prabhu in 
return for his selfless loyalty to Shivaji. Individual acts of political service could lay the 
groundwork for a more lasting career. 
Because of its centrality to early Maratha state-formation, the focus of this section has 
been on the Maval; however, it should be noted that the Konkan littoral was also a major area of 
Kayastha Prabhu recruitment during Shivaji’s campaign in the late 1650s. This narrow coastal 
strip, bordered on the east by the Western Ghats and the west by the Indian Ocean, extends 
roughly four hundred kilometers from Alibag to Malwan. It was administered by the Bahmani 
and Deccan Sultanates as a province called Tal-Konkan. Following their dissolution, it became 
the site of intense rivalry between numerous parties, including Shivaji’s Bhonsle dynasty at 
Satara; two doggedly independent southern Maratha clans, the Angres and Sawantwadis; the 
East African-descended Siddi dynasty at Janjira, who paid fealty to the Adil Shahis and the 
Mughals; and the seafaring English and Portuguese company states based at Bombay and Goa. 
Like their upcountry caste fellows, Kayastha Prabhu families resident in the Konkan successfully 
weathered the storms of regime change to attain remuerative employment in the new Maratha 
state.  
Representative of their endurance were the Chaubal deśkuḷkarṇīs of Chaul. According to 
their own family history, the founder of the lineage, Narayan Krishna Chaubal, held the 
gāvakuḷkarṇī and deśkuḷkarṇī rights to three tracts in Chaul under Sultan Ahmad Shah Bahmani 
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(r. 1422-1436). 374 When Shivaji arrived from Kalyan to demand soldiers and tribute, his 
descendent Malhar Narayan led a band of Kayastha Prabhu soldiers in the conquest of the forts 
of Shrivardhan and Manranjan and helped to construct the seafort of Padmadurg. The family 
relocated to Padmadurg and enjoyed the earnings from new kārkhānīs and potdār posts in 
addition to their old revenue rights. But unable to withstand the attacks of the Portuguese and the 
Janjira Siddis, they were eventually displaced, imprisoned, and thrown into severe financial 
straits. Malhar Narayan’s son Govind Malhar sought the protection of Jivaji Khanderao, the 
grandson of Shivaji’s Kayastha Prabhu scribe Balaji Avaji, himself a native of Rajapur in the 
Konkan. Jivaji had been deputed to Colaba to negotiate with Kanhoji Angre, during which time 
he seems to have arranged for the family’s care. This account also states that Jivaji married 
Govind Malhar to a daughter of his uncle Nilo Ballal, though this claim is uncorroborated.375 
Jivaji and his brother Govindrao Khanderao also secured the release of the family of a Kayastha 
Prabhu diwān Raghunath Hari, who had been confined by Kanhoji’s son Sambhaji Angre, and 
arranged his nephew’s marriage with a girl in their family.376 Thus, as later sections of this 
chapter and the following chapter will continue to explore, family ties extending from the 
Konkan to the upland areas of the western Deccan were important resources for Kayastha Prabhu 
office-holders. 
Village and district-level government was an important existing sphere of employment 
through which Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu officials accessed new patronage under Shivaji. 
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With the re-consolidation of a central Maratha government under Shahu Bhonsle in the early 
eighteenth century, Kayastha Prabhu families were able to obtain an even greater share in 
administrative appointments. The remainder of this chapter will delineate the functional niche 
that Kayastha Prabhus occupied within the Maratha state, follow the trajectories of several 
Kayastha Prabhu office-holding families, and, honing in on the Satara Chitnis lineage, explore 
how they advanced their social status by accumulating heritable rights to title, office, and 
property. 
Pathways of Kayastha Prabhu Service in the Early Maratha State 
 Scholars typically trace the origins of a central Maratha government to Shivaji’s council 
of eight ministers, or ashṭapradhāna.377 Much of what is known about the specific duties of these 
ministers derives from the bakhar literature and a set of regulations found in the papers of 
Chhatrapati Pratapsinha Bhonsle (1793-1847).378 It is now believed that the number and 
composition of this council was not fixed. Some positions were occupied by individuals, such as 
Ramchandra Nilkanth alias Ramchandrapant Amatya, who wielded outsized influence in 
political decision-making. Other titles, such as pant pratinidhi, held by Pralhad Niraji and then 
Parshuram Trimbak Kulkarni, and senā sāheb subhā, held by the Bhonsle clan of Hingani-Beradi 
who went on to become the rulers of Nagpur, were created in the early eighteenth century to 
reward families who backed Rajaram and Shahu and technically fell outside the ashṭapradhāna. 
The title of senāpati tended to be the province of prominent Maratha clans like the Mohites, the 
Gujars, the Ghorpades, and the Dabhades. Brahmans generally monopolized the remaining seats 
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on the ashṭapradhāna. While Deshastha Brahmans were dominant during the reigns of the first 
three Chhatrapatis, Chitpavan Brahmans began to migrate in substantial numbers from the 
Konkan following the rise of Peshwa Balaji Viswanath Bhat. Though some accounts allege that 
the scribes Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal, who held the title of ciṭnīs (see below), were 
considered to be the peers of these officials, and even that the Chhatrapatis sought to award them 
with a seat on the ashṭapradhāna, there is little evidence that Kayastha Prabhus ever gained 
access to these more august titles.379 But, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, title and 
office were not necessarily indicative of political influence.  
The bulk of Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu appointments in this period were part of a 
class of secretarial official known as darakdār. Darak was a generic term for a salaried public 
office that was heritable and transferable. By the early nineteenth century, it had become 
customary to recognize eight darakdār offices, as with the ashṭapradhāna: diwān380 
(administrator), majmūdār (accountant), phaḍnīs (deputy accountant), sabnīs (clerk), kārkhānīs 
(commissary), ciṭnīs (scribe of Marathi correspondence), and jāmdār (treasurer).381 Additional 
offices belonging to this category were pārasnīs (scribe of Persian correspondence), potnīs 
(treasurer), khāsnīs (private accountant), jamenīs (military commissary), and, at one level below, 
kārkun (clerk). If the ashṭapradhāna was a symbolic representation of the ministerial class, the 
darakdārs formed the secretarial class of the early Maratha state. Whereas the ashṭapradhāna 
had a political function, the intended function of the darakdārs was administrative.  
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It is evident from the titles alone – many have the Persian affix nīs/navīs, signifying 
“writer” – that these offices were functionally related insofar as they were grounded in the 
practice of writing. Darakdārs were responsible for the everyday processes of documentation, 
enumeration, and communication that allowed government to operate accurately and efficiently. 
Thus, there were functional continuities with the revenue officials – kuḷkarṇi at the village level 
and deśpāṇḍe/deśkuḷkarṇi at the district level – that we encountered in the Maval as well as with 
the kārbhāris of Chapter 2, though the latter had both political and administrative functions. One 
or more darakdārs might be assigned to manage the business of a royal household, a military 
company, a fort, or even a higher-level minister. When in their home districts or on campaign, 
and thus away from the gaze of the Chhatrapati, each member of the council of eight was to 
carry out his main business through darakdārs.382 Similarly, military commanders and revenue 
collectors posted to distant parts of the countryside had a darakdārī staff. For example, a military 
grant of saranjām to Mahipatrao Kavde in 1762/3 specified the titles and salaries of eight 
darakdārs.383 In most cases, darakdārs were appointed by and accountable to the central 
government, thus acting as a check on the authority of their supervisors. Because it was 
pervasive and politically anodyne, this class of official was especially accessible to Kayastha 
Prabhus seeking employment and status within the Maratha state.  
 Kayastha Prabhu access to government service was associated in Shivaji’s lifetime with 
the staffing of forts. Like the employment of small and speedy militias of Maval soldiers, the 
conquest, construction, and maintenance of forts, especially hill-forts, was central to Maratha 
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military strategy.384 Each fort was managed by a havāldār or kiledār, usually Maratha by caste, 
under whose supervision a staff of darakdārs was responsible for the fort’s administrative 
operations. According to the Sabhāsad Bakhar (1697), this staff should include a Brahman 
sabnīs and a Kayastha Prabhu kārkhānīs.385 The kārkhānīs may have had more direct jurisdiction 
over the financial management of goods and supplies such as grain, but in practice, both 
darakdār officials would have dealt with multiple types of accounts.386 In fact, similar pairings 
of Kayastha Prabhus and Brahmans occupying similar roles were very common. Part of the 
function of pairing officials in this way was to strengthen the process of review and approval of 
administrative processes. Hence, the regulation memorandum referred to above states that any 
account issued by the sabnīs or the kārkhānīs was to have the seal and signature of the 
corresponding official in addition to the supervising havāldār.387 
There is considerable evidence that the Sabhasad Bakhar’s prescription reflected an 
actual concentration of significant numbers of Kayastha Prabhus in the office of kārkhānīs. The 
Kanadkhore deśpāṇḍe history adduced in the previous section states that one Timaji Prabhu 
served in this office alongside the tipnīs (accountant) Moropant Pingle during the construction of 
Raigad.388 Another family history of the Sashtikar Guptes records that their forebear Ramaji 
Nagnath migrated from Murud on the coast to find work, eventually becoming the kārkhānīs at 
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Raigad.389 While neither of these specific claims can be substantiated, we may infer that it was 
customary for the Raigad kārkhānīs to be a Kayastha Prabhu. It is elsewhere attested that 
members of the latter lineage held the office at Salsette (Sashti) fort until its cession to the 
British in 1782.390 Vitthal Dadaji, an ancestor of the twentieth-century historian Yashwant 
Rajaram Gutpe, was the Kayastha Prabhu kārkhānīs of Purandar fort under Shahu and Balaji 
Bajirao.391 Directives issued in 1732, 1734, and 1735 specify that because Vitthal Dadaji was a 
loyal servant, his inām rights to lands in the villages Kaldari and Vanpuri should be secured for 
the maintenance of his family.392 Some years later, the post passed out of the hands of the family, 
during which time he found work as the ciṭnīs of Fattesingh Bhonsle of Akkalkot.393 It was later 
restored to his grandson Dadaji Ramchandra by an order dated December 12, 1773 with an 
annual salary of 397 rupees to support himself, his children, and a subordinate official named 
Narayan Shivaji Sabhasad.394  
Though it was somewhat less common, Kayastha Prabhus also served in a military 
capacity as generals and senior commanders of forts. In the early 1750s, an individual by the 
name of Appaji Bhauji Prabhu served under Fattesingh Bhonsle, reportedly commanding an 
army of 4,000-5,000 soldiers in a scuffle against one of the members of the Somvamshi clan 
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bearing the martial title of sarlashkar.395 More famously, Prayagji Anant Phanse, the commander 
of Satara fort, nearly died while defending the fort against Aurangzeb’s siege in 1700.396 In the 
later eighteenth century, his grandsons became ministers at the Maratha Gaekwad court at 
Baroda.397 Additional cases of Kayastha Prabhus who commanded troops, rode in cavalry, or 
combined soldiering with administrative and political duties will be discussed in the following 
chapter.   
Another office frequently held by Kayastha Prabhus was that of jamenīs (commissary). 
Mirroring the arrangement for forts, the Sabhāsad Bakhar relays that each company of 1,000 
troops (hazārī) was to be staffed with a Maratha commander, a (presumably Brahman) 
majmūdār, and a Kayastha Prabhu jamenīs.398 The standard duties of a jamenīs may be inferred 
from a November 7, 1764 sanad to one Balkrishna Hari, the jamenīs of Moraji Shinde, an officer 
in Ratnagiri. 399 His duties included determining the revenue demand based on the survey of 
agricultural and garden lands by inspecting officers and announcing it to the kārbhārī; receiving 
all revenue accounts and duly noting collections and arrears; making any increases or decreases 
in the revenue due from any village; issuing orders for the recovery of arrears; issuing 
agreements for bringing new lands under cultivation; maintaining a ledger of amounts received 
and amounts due based on the day-book of the phaḍnīs; supervising a team of kārkuns (clerks); 
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and conducting any other necessary revenue business. In sum, the jamenīs managed any and all 
financial concerns for the individual or outfit to which he was assigned. 
In the last section, I mentioned that Babaji Baji Prabhu of the Hirdas Maval deśpāṇḍe 
lineage was the jamenīs of the senāpatis Hambirrao Mohite and Santaji Ghorpade. Babaji’s son 
Khando Babaji continued in the office under Shahu’s senāpatis Jaisingh Jadhavrao and 
Khanderao Dabhade with an increased annual salary of 5,000 hons.400 During the Maratha 
campaigns agains the Siddis of Janjira at Gowalkot and Anjanwel in the early to mid 1730s, the 
jamenīs of Santaji Jadhav, the son of Ghorpade’s comrade-in-arms and fellow senāpati Dhanaji 
Jadhav, was one Malhar Prabhu.401 According to a September 25, 1727 entry in the central 
government journal (rojkīrd), one Madhavrao Prayag Prabhu occupied the jamenīs post under 
Janoji Nimbalkar with an annual salary of 2000 pādśāhī hons and an assistant (mutālik) named 
Narso Ganesh Prabhu.402 These cases are corroborated by twelve original grants of jamenīs to 
Kayastha Prabhus that have been preserved in the Shahu Daftar section of the Maharashtra State 
Archives in Pune. The concentration of such grants suggests that there was a significant 
expansion in the employment of Kayastha Prabhus in this office in the first half of the eighteenth 
century.403 This expansion may have been partly driven by the sustained efforts of Maratha 
military commanders to stake independent claims to new territories outside of the core areas of 
Maratha control. Historians have hitherto examined this process as a centripetal force leading to 
the decentralization and eventual destabilization of the Maratha state, yet they have overlooked 
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the way in which it may have accelerated the incorporation of service castes into the ranks of 
government service.  
Most of the jamenīs grants that have been preserved provide little information beyond the 
names of the recipient and the employer. Some specify an annual salary, often 1,000 rupees but 
ranging from 700 to 3,000 rupees. Such a wide range in salary suggests a feature of darakdārī 
office that will be explored more below: its bureaucratic location alone does not explain the 
varied powers, privileges, and resources accessible to a talented individual who occupied it. 
Grantees of jamenīs might be afforded special privileges on top of their salaries. For example, 
Raghunath Gangadhar Prabhu, assigned to the jamenīs of Yesaji Krishnaji Bhonsle, was given 
the assistance of a mutālik named Govind Bapuji Prabhu.404 For an enterprising and well-
connected individual, an assistantship could be a stepping-stone to higher office, as I will explain 
later with respect to the case of Ganesh Rakhmagad, mutālik to Govindrao Khanderao. Another 
grant issued to Vinaji Nilkanth Prabhu for the jamenīs of Ranoji Bhonsle augmented his salary 
with the mokāsā revenues of several villages in sarkār Narnala in Berar.405 Bhonsle’s ciṭnīs also 
seems to have been a Kayastha Prabhu by the name of Yesaji Krishna with rights to the mokāsā 
of the village Vadali in the same district.406  
Closely related to the kārkhānīs and jamenīs was the potnīs, or treasurer. The founder of 
the lineage that held the potnīs under Shahu was Baji Murar Umrao, an Adil Shahi noble whose 
surname Mahadkar suggests origins in the Konkan. His son Murar Baji Deshpande Mahadkar 
served under Shivaji’s antagonist Chandrarao More before signing up with the independent 
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Maratha movement. When Aurangzeb’s Rajput general Mirza Raja Jai Singh besieged Purandar 
fort in late March 1665, Murar Baji was the commander of the fort and led a māvaḷe band against 
the Mughal army before perishing on the battlefield.407 In honor of his sacrifice, his son Baji was 
vested with a similar command of soldiers and granted villages in the māvaḷa Musekhore, 
including the village Uravade.408 Murar Baji had four brothers: Sambhaji, Trimbakji, Mahadji, 
and Shankraji.409 Sambhaji was permanently injured while fighting with Shivaji in the battle of 
Salher near Nashik in 1672. Recognizing this service, Rajaram on October 22, 1695 acceded to 
Trimbakji Baji’s son Vitthal’s request for a sanad for the inām revenues of village Gugulwada, 
taraph Atone in Chaul province for the family’s maintenance.410 This inām was continued to 
Sambhaji Baji’s son Gangadhar Sambhaji and grandson Krishnaji Gangadhar.411 In addition, 
Vitthal Trimbak was employed as Chhatrapati Sambhaji’s khāsnīs (private accountant) in charge 
of the finances of his household.412 He seems to have arranged for the marriage of his brother to 
Putalabai, the daughter of Khando Ballal Chitnis.413 In the 1730s, his relation Nilkanth Trimbak 
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began to carry out political negotiations for Shahu’s cousin and rival Sambhaji II of Kolhapur.414 
Mahadji Baji, another of Murar Baji’s brothers, had three sons: Anandrao, Yashwantrao, and 
Bajirao. According to the Chitnis bakhar, Anandrao obtained the posts of khāsnīs and potnīs 
under Shahu, but after committing some offence, he and Bajirao fled into Portuguese territory. 
Yashwantrao Mahadev received his brother’s titles and, working closely with Govindrao 
Khanderao Chitnis, became influential in court politics towards the end of Shahu’s lifetime in the 
late 1740s (see Appendix A for family tree).415 These political roles will be described in more 
detail in Chapter 4.  
Finally, Kayastha Prabhu families laid claim to posts that closely aligned with the 
designation “scribe”: ciṭnīs and for Persian letters, pārasnīs. The ciṭnīs was responsible for 
composing letters on behalf of the ruler as well as official sanad documents for individuals who 
had been granted rights to village revenues. In this latter capacity, he worked hand in glove with 
the phaḍnīs, who kept government accounts. The list of regulations mentioned above specifies 
that documents should be prepared by the ciṭnīs and phaḍnīs for each category of revenue 
grant.416 Shivaji’s ciṭnīs was Balaji Avaji, a member of a Kayastha Prabhu family with the 
surname Chitre based at Rajapur. Internal family accounts claim that Balaji’s father Avaji Hari 
served as the diwān-majmūdār of the Siddis of Janjira.417 Through a series of political 
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machinations, the Janjira rulers were persuaded to remove him from his office and punish him 
with death. His wife narrowly escaped being sold into slavery by agreeing to work in the 
household of her brother, the merchant Lingoji Shankar.418 Her sons Balaji, Shamji, and 
Chimnaji received a proper education in the literate arts and found employment under Shivaji 
sometime after his conquest of the Konkan. Balaji became Shivaji’s ciṭnīs; Shamji obtained the 
post of phaḍnīs under Shivaji’s majmūdār Nilo Sondev; Chimnaji that of the kārkhānīs of 
Raigad fort. Balaji and his brothers were among those executed for opposing Sambhaji’s 
succession, but his sons Khando and Nilo Ballal were later reinstated. Khando was restored to 
the ciṭnīs post after his service in the Goa campaign of 1683 and ascended rapidly through the 
ranks of the administration, acquiring an array of new revenue rights and privileges that will be 
detailed below. His brother Nilo became an administrator for Rajaram’s son Raja Karna and later 
for Bahirao Moreshwar Pingle. In the late 1740s, his son Govindrao Khanderao worked with the 
potnīs Yashwantrao Mahadev as one of Shahu’s closest advisers (see Appendix A for family 
tree). 
The writer of Persian correspondence, variously called munshī and pārasnīs, of Shivaji 
and his successors was also a Kayastha Prabhu. As with many other service households, their 
descendants crafted an account of their origins.419 According to this account, Nilkanthrao Yesaji 
– better known as Nil Prabhu – was the deśkuḷkarṇī of taraph Khandale in Chaul before entering 
                                                
418 According to the Chitnis bakhar, Lingoji Shankar later arranged for the transportation of Rajaram’s 
queens Tarabai, Rajasbai, and Ambikabai via sea from the western Deccan to the south when Aurangzeb 
invaded in the 1690s. Sardesai viewed copies of inām grants made to Lingoji Shankar and his relations 
Pralhad Lingoji (presumably his son) and Murar Ramchandra as a reward for this act of service, 
suggesting that this claim may be accurate. See Chitnis, Sambhājī Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām 
Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 47-8; SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 31, nos. 60, 135, pgs. 55, 111. 
 
419 MS, ed. Bendrey, vol. 2, 536-8; also see Chitnis, Saptaprakaraṇātmaka Caritra, 100; Chitnis, Thorale 




Shivaji’s service sometime after 1660. During his tenure, he composed many important Persian 
letters for Shivaji, including a famous petition to Aurangzeb to end the jizya tax on non-Muslim 
subjects. These letters were collated into a volume of inshā’ that will be discussed below. In 
addition, he assisted the dabīr, or pant sumanta, a member of the council of eight ministers. 
These posts were inherited by his sons Govindrao and Babaji Nilkanth and grandson 
Ramchandra Babaji.420 Like certain members of the Prabhu potnīs family, this family executed 
diplomatic missions on behalf of Sambhaji II of Kolhapur, for which Ramchandra Babaji alias 
Ramchandra Buwaji received inām rights to Halyal pargaṇa in the Karnatak and Govindrao 
Nilkanth to several additional villages. In the 1740s and again in the 1760s, Ramchandra Babaji 
was a critical element in the protection of the Kolhapur rājā’s dominion in certain districts of the 
Karnatak from the incursions of local chieftains and rulers, including the upstart Mysore sulṭān 
Haidar Ali.421  
The foregoing review of the pathways of Kayastha Prabhu office-holding families within 
the early eighteenth century Maratha state has revealed four signal features of Kayastha Prabhu 
employment. First, Kayastha Prabhus tended to hold secretarial offices requiring specialized 
forms of writing integral to the basic operations of the Maratha state. Secondly, there are strong 
continuities between the figures of the Maval deśpāṇḍe and the darakdār in terms of function 
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sarlaṣkar. He and his mistress (rākha) died at the hands of his employer in 1737. Another, Avaji Nilkanth 
alias Dadaji Chitnis, is attested in the Chitnis bakhar and in an entry from the daily journal (rojniśī) of the 
Peshwa’s government (often referred to as the Peshwa’s diaries). It appears that he was serving as the 
Peshwa’s Marathi scribe (ciṭnīs) when he died on March 28, 1736 from consumption. Two years prior, it 
was recorded that he was working as the sabnīs in the army of Malharrao Holkar. See Chitnis, Sambhājī 
Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 67-8, 72; SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 22, no. 315, 
365, pgs. 172, 182. 
 
421 SSRPD, ed. Vad and Parasnis, vol. 1, nos. 74-5, pg. 30; SSRPD, ed. Vad and Sane, vol. 9, nos. 14, 33, 
pgs. 10, 28; SPD, ed. Sardesai, vol. 26, nos. 15, 17-29, pgs. 11-2, 14-30; vol. 28, nos. 61-2, 209, pgs. 79-
81, 244-5; vol. 40, nos. 107-8, pgs. 96-9. 
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and position within the hierarchical division of labor and authority. While his Maratha employer 
was a military officer whose basic role was to rule and fight, the deśpāṇḍe or the darakdār was a 
civil official whose role was to administer. This functional division between administrative and 
political work was an important structuring principle in the sociology of Maratha state-formation 
that began to be challenged by Kayastha Prabhus. Thirdly, the darakdār operated within a 
network of literate specialists with similar functional roles – remember the pairs of officials that I 
mentioned: kārkhānīs and sabnīs, ciṭnīs and phaḍnīs, etc. Finally, by creating a creditable record 
of competent service within a professional and familial network, a relatively low-level Kayastha 
Prabhu official could demonstrate his worth to the overall administrative enterprise and advance 
into a more significant role. By the middle of the eightenth century, exceptionally talented 
Kayastha Prabhu officials, most notably Govindrao Khanderao and Yashwantrao Mahadev of 
Satara, rose above their stations to acquire a foothold in the highest circles of political decision-
making.   
Status, Property and Mobility in the Satara Chitnis Household  
 Kayastha Prabhu writers starting out in government service hoped to further the agendas 
of their employers, but it required a combination of money, land, and family ties to burnish their 
reputations within the competitive ranks of the bureaucratic establishment. Even a relatively 
well-placed secretary attached to a military leader or a prince, perhaps earning one thousand 
rupees a year, was not free from financial pressures. The expenses of secretarial officials ranged 
from maintaining a household, supporting one or more subordinate clerks, and offering gifts 
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upon the occasion of a royal marriage.422 One’s salary depended on the unpredictable whims of a 
patron. As a fragile and dependent means of livelihood, a salary bore a lesser status compared to 
more permanent wealth accrued through hereditable, vested rights in land. Kayastha Prabhu 
secretarial officials pushing paper for Maratha governments ultimately sought to escape the risks 
of salaried employment by accumulating a constellation of such rights, commonly termed vatan. 
As many scholars have shown, the possession of a vatan was integral to elite identity and status 
in early modern South Asia.423 In addition, access to the permanent income flowing from a vatan 
increased one’s ability to promote the careers of family members and associates.  
The brothers Babaji and Govindrao Nilkanth of the Kayastha Prabhu pārasnīs household 
at Kolhapur evoke the financial pressures of salaried employment in letters included in a volume 
of inshā’ titled Durj al-Gawāhar.424 Inshā’ was a Persian genre of belle-lettres frequently used in 
training munshīs in the conventions of epistolary composition. The majority of the letters in the 
Durj, which were first compiled by Govindrao Nilkanth, pertain to the dealings of the Kolhapur 
ruler Sambhaji II; however, about twenty-five of them reveal the personal and financial concerns 
of the writers themselves. In several letters, Govindrao encourages his nephew Ramchandra 
                                                
422 While the category of “family” in previous sections has predominatly referred to lineages of male 
office-holders, this section expands this category to the wider household. This household commonly 
included not only lineal, but also affinal relations as well as individuals, including slaves, servants, 
concubines, and celās, related neither by birth nor marriage. On the importance of recognizing the 
diversity of dependencies in the early modern household in South Asia, see Sumit Guha, Beyond Caste, 
121-125. 
 
423 In Arabic and Persian, the term waṭan bore the meaning of home, country or dwelling. In the Maratha 
context, the term primarily denoted one’s patrimony, but it also connoted the sense of belonging at the 
core of these later meanings. For a fuller explication of its status under the Marathas, see Kulkarni, 
Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji, 28-31. 
 
424 Govindrao Nilkanth refers to the text by this title, which may be translated as Casket of Jewels, in one 
of the letters. In an attempt at pluralization, he mispells gauhar (pearl) as gawāhar. On the manuscript 
and its publication, see Tarabai Papers: A Collection of Persian Letters, ed. A.G. Pawar (Kolhapur: 




Babaji, who he affectionately calls Annaji, to study Persian, emphasizing the importance of 
acquiring elegance of style (inshā’ pardāzī) by studying and imitating exemplary Persian 
writings (nuwishtajāt).425 He also recommends the worship of books on Dasara (roz-i noroz-i 
dasarah).426 With these practices in mind, Govindrao understood himself as someone who 
performed the skilled work of a scribe (munshīgarī), which was related to but distinct from that 
of a record-keeper (daftardārī).427 Both Govindrao and Babaji complained that their incomes 
were insufficient, and on multiple occasions, Babaji pled for temporary loans of cash.428 The 
family’s financial situation may have improved after Babaji’s son Ramchandra received a sizable 
inām from Sambhaji II, but during his youth, they had to depend on each other to make end’s 
meet. 
While many Kayastha Prabhu office-holdiers were the recipients of permanent rights to 
revenue in one or more villages, most continued to rely on salaried employment for their 
livelihood. The Satara ciṭnīs household, however, managed to amass an exceptionally diverse 
assemblage of rights, honors, and perquisites that enabled them to extend patronage to collateral 
family members and exercise a remarkable degree of professional flexibility. Balaji Avaji 
received little more than his wages and a pen and ink case (kalamdān) when he was first 
appointed ciṭnīs, but by the time of Shivaji’s coronation in 1674, he had been awarded permanent 
rights to the business (dhandā) of ciṭnisī, jamenisī, and kārkhānisī along with revenues from 
                                                
425 Tarabai Papers, ed. Pawar, nos. 224-6, pgs. 56-7.   
 
426 Ibid., no. 221, 56.  
 
427 Viz. Man salāmat-i īn ṭaraf khidmat-i munshīgarī wa az ān ṭaraf daftardārī to bā to mutaṣil dārad. 
Tarabai Papers, ed. Pawar, no. 226, pg. 57. 
 
428 Tarabai Papers, ed. Pawar, nos. 246-7, 265, pgs. 62 and 67. 
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certain villages in Dabhol province, which Shivaji had conquered in 1661.429 These rights, 
perhaps by design, made him the peer of the higher ministers in Shivaji’s royal council. In 
addition, the implication of the grant of dhandā was that Balaji was able to offer secretarial 
employment to his family members and caste-fellows through the provision of particular 
darakdārī services to the Satara rulers and their vassals and affiliates. It is possible that this grant 
led to the aforementioned expansion in Kayastha Prabhu employment in jamenisī recorded in 
Shahu-period documents.  
The Chitnis household’s growing proximity to power and rising socioeconomic status are 
even more evident in the lifetimes of Balaji Avaji’s heirs Khando Ballal and Govindrao 
Khanderao. Initial intimations of this upward mobility can be gleaned from their participation in 
the gift economies of the Satara and Pune courts. Khando and his son Malhar Khanderao 
appeared on a June 9, 1719 list of individuals who received turbans (tivaṭa) and scarves (śelā) on 
the occasion of the marriage of Shahu’s adopted son Fattesingh Bhonsle. Also included on this 
list is Ganesh Rakhamagad, an assistant writer under the Chitnises who would become the 
progenitor of the Chitnavis scribal lineage at Nagpur (see below).430 Similar instances of festive 
and ritual gifting from members of the Chitnis household are recorded from the early eighteenth 
century onwards. For example, Malhar Khanderao made a gift of four rupees to the Chhatrapati 
                                                
429 A sanad conferred on Balaji Avaji by Shivaji is attested in the catalogue of the San.Ni.Ka. Daftar of 
the Pune Archives, but it was not locatable during my period of research. Two published sanads dated 
rājyābhisheka śaka 1 (1674) record the grants of dhandā and revenue in Dabhol, particularly in the 
villages of Dabhol, Katran, Shirvan, and Donavali. See CGSM, ed. Kaulkarni, vol. 1, nos. 1-2, 17-8.  
 




for the Vijayadashami holiday in 1726.431 Govindrao Khanderao was among those who offered 
presents to Bhikambhat Vaidya, a young member of a prominent Chitpavan Brahman merchant-
moneylending and diplomatic family, when he received his sacred thread in 1746.432 On such 
occasions, the Chitnises displayed their wealth and maintained their connections to the royal 
family and other highly placed individuals by participating in festive gift economies.    
But the most substantial evidence for the family’s rising socioeconomic position is the 
expansion and diversification of their vatan. Khando Ballal was compelled to hand over his 
holdings in Dabhol during the siege of Gingee; however, once Shahu assumed power, he was 
richly compensated with a grant of the sardeśmukhī and nāḍgauḍa shares of the revenue of 
Panhala and Chaul provinces.433 Nāḍgauḍa was a Kannada term for a district headmanship seat, 
roughly the equivalent of a deśmukh. An artifact of the Adilshahi administration in the 
southwestern Deccan, it was repurposed by Shahu to reward his supporters in the succession 
                                                
431 SSRPD, ed. Vad and Parasnis, vol. 1, no. 403, pg. 230; for subsequent Vijayadashmi gifts made to the 
Peshwa by members of the Chitnis household, see SSRPD, ed. Vad and Joshi, vol. 7, no. 21, pg. 362; vol. 
8, no. 1148, pg. 294. 
 
432 VDNK, ed. Vaidya, vol. 4, no. 22, pg. 20. 
 
433 By all accounts, Dabhol was transferred to the Shirkes to prevent their defection to the Mughals. See 




dispute with Tarabai. 434 The sardeśmukhī and nāḍgauḍa shares in Panhala and Chaul became the 
foundation of the family vatan in subsequent years.435  
During the remainder of his tenure under Shahu, Khando Ballal was allotted additional 
revenue shares in over forty villages (see Figure 10). Usually classified as mokāsā or saranjām, 
they were not technically hereditable and therefore were contingent upon the ruler’s continuing 
favor. But, in fact, they were incorporated into Khando’s permanent vatan and passed down to 
his sons, as sanctioned by a long and detailed abhayapatra reaffirming the family’s patrimony in 
light of Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal’s records of service.436 Many of the villages were located 
near Shahu’s capital at Satara in the fertile tracts straddling the Krishna and Koyna Rivers in the 
old Mughal sarkār of Parnala, which was renamed Panhala under Shivaji. Other holdings were 
located in the nearby sub-districts of Supa-Baramati and Junnar and as far afield as the sub-
districts of Chandwad in Nashik, Dharur in Beed, and Sangameshwar and Lanja in Ratnagiri. 437 
Certain villages in Panhala, such as Borgaon in pargaṇa Shirale and Dhamner in karyāta 
Koregaon, were quite productive, and became more so over time, but the revenue yields of most 
remained relatively stable (see Figures 11 and 12).   
                                                
434 It was a regular deduction, amounting to three percent, made from the total jamā of the Maratha share 
of twenty-five percent, or cauth, of the total jamā of the Mughal provinces of the Deccan and was 
assigned to various officials and sardārs who supported Shahu’s succession, including Khando Ballal. 
See Tārābāīkālīna Kāgadpatre, ed. A.G. Pawar, volume 1 (Kolhapur: Shivaji Vidyapith, 1969), no. 217, 
302-4; H.H. Wilson, A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, and of Useful Words Occurring in 
Official Documents Relating to the Administration of the Government of British India, (London: W.H. 
Allen and Co., 1855), 361; Selections of Papers from the Records at the East-India House Relating to the 
Revenue, Police, and Civil and Criminal Justice under the Company’s Government in India, vol. 4, 654, 
cited in Wink, Land and Sovereignty, 311. 
 
435 PD, Shahu Daftar, rumal 3, file 4, nos. 2523; file 5, nos. 2603, 2661; file 6, 2706, 2732; Kulkarni, 
CGSM, nos. 3-4, 18-9. 
 
436 PD, San.Ni.Ka. Daftar, rumal 49, no. 22167; a copy has been published in CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 1, 
no. 21, 37-40. Also see PD Shahu Daftar, rumal 3, file 5, no. 2646; rumal 15, file 3, nos. 19839-40.  
 
437 PD, Shahu Daftar, rumal 3, file 1, no. 2225; file 2, no. 1336; file 4, no. 2648; file 5, no. 2612; file 15, 




































Jaitapur 700 850 
Hamdabaj/Hamdabaz 50 125 
Nigdi - - 
Degaon - - 
Borgaon Shirala 11,500 11,000 
Majgaon/Mazgaon Talbid 1200 1210 
Murud Tarale - - 
Dhamner Koregaon 1800 1734 
 
Figure 11: Revenue Estimates (Ākār) of Chitnis-held Villages, 1766 and 1811 
 
  1770  1780  1785  1790  1800  1810  
Dhamner 2874 - 3607 3787 3627 - 
Jaitapur 853 - 407 436.76 764 366 
Majgaon/Mazgaon - 1216 - 977 - 1102 
 
Figure 12: Revenue Estimates (Ākār) of Chitnis-held Villages, 1770-1810440 
                                                
438 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 498, hiseb document for Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis dated 1167 
(1766 CE). 
 
439 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 498, yādī document for Malhar Ramrao Chitnis dated 1212 (1811 CE).  
 
440 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal nos. 301-8 (Dhamner), 1746 (Jaitapur), 1054 (Mazgaon), various 
ākārbanda documents dated from 1145-1219 (1744-1818 CE) 
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Following Khando Ballal’s death in 1726, the family’s land revenue portfolio diversified 
significantly. According to a 1766 statement that reflected losses incurred during the rebellion of 
the Bhonsles of Nagpur, Govindrao Khanderao’s total saranjām was estimated to be worth a 
jamā of Rs 51,425.441 In subsequent years, estimates for the saranjām ranged from Rs 75,000 to 
over one lākh.442 Much of the family’s additional income came from more distant and tenuous 
saranjām holdings in pargaṇas Jamner, Dabhadi, Ghatbori, and Roshangaon in Khandesh and 
Aurangabad. But the Chitnises held their most enduring claims to villages in the Panhala region. 
Even after Peshwas Sawai Madhavrao and Bajirao II had confiscated and reassigned much of 
their revenue, the family was entitled to a nominal share of the yield of their main holdings in 
Panhala, termed vatanī amal sardeśmukhī va nāḍgauḍī.443 The family’s vatan and financial base 
continued to be roughly coterminous with the core territories of the Chhatrapati’s domain. 
 Until the Peshwa’s orders of sequestration in 1788, the Chitnises held the reins of 
government of villages in which they were assigned rights to saranjām. This government was 
based in their main seat of Borgaon and conducted through kamāvīsdārs who were responsible 
for the day-to-day business of collecting, distributing, and reporting village revenue. The use of a 
seal (see Figure 13) for the village administration of Jivaji Ramrao Chitnis suggests that its 
authority was generally recognized. The language of the seal is a fairly standard Sanskrit 
                                                
441 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 498, hiseb document for Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis dated 1167 
(1766 CE). 
 
442 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 498, yādī documents for various Govindrao Khanderao, Malhar Ramrao, 
and other Chitnises dated 1170 (1769 CE), 1212 (1811 CE), and 1214 (1813 CE), which records an 
earlier estimate for 1189 (1788 CE).  
 
443 For example, the estimated revenue statement (ākārbanda) for Nimani in pargana Kavathe near Miraj 
for 1811 lists an amount of 184 rupees and 12 annas for the vatanī amal sardeśmukhī va nāḍgauḍī of 
Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis, Khando Ballal’s grandson. This figure reflected separate sardeśmukhī and 
nāḍgauḍī shares as well as smaller amounts for priestly and clerical fees. See PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, 
rumal no. 686 (Nimani), ākārbanda document dated 1212 (1811 CE).     
 
 163 
encomium to Chitnis and his lord: “श्री िजवाजी प्रभ ुपुत्रम्य रामरायम्य धीमता:मुद्रा सवर्गुणोपेता ं
राजसम्मानविधर् नी (Seal of Jivaji Prabhu, son of Ramraya, ever-worshipful servant of the virtuous 
king).”  
 In addition to deducting the Chitnis 
share, kamāvisdārs allocated lands to support 
expenses and fees associated with the general 
maintenance and protection of the villages and 
their residents. These included lands assigned 
to ināmdārs (tax-free landholders), balutedārs 
(village servants), the pāṭīl (village headman), 
the kuḷkarṇī (village accountant), and military 
and religious specialists who serviced the entire 
village. For example, in 1759 in Dhamner, eleven bighās of land were reserved for the pāṭīl and 
kuḷkarṇī; twenty-seven bighās for a group termed gāvavīka, which included a Hindu mendicant 
(gosāvī), a Muslim mendicant (fakīr), a Muslim cleric (mulāṇā), and a village watchman (beraḍ); 
and seventeen bighās for the local Mahar community. Additional lands were set aside for 
swordsmen (dhārkarī) and cudgel-men (soḍkā) as well as for religious establishments 
(devasthāne) and village gods (grāmadeva).444 Under the designations gāva-nisbat-kharca and 
gāva-nisbat-sādilvār were listed miscellaneous but regularly occuring expenses such as cloth and 
                                                
444 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 301 (Dhamner), jamīn-jhāḍa document for Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis 
dated 1158 (1759 CE). 
Figure 13: Seal of Jivaji Ramrao Chitnis 
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foodstuffs for the holidays Navaratri, Gokulashtami, and Champashtami as well as the occasional 
donation to the shrine established at the samādhi of Sant Ramdas in Parali-Sajjangad.445  
The Chitnises also ensured that Brahman priests, local holy men, religious 
establishments, and long-serving officials were afforded permanent sustenance through rights to 
land. Ramrao Jivaji (d. 1805) in 1773 issued a grant for eight bighās of new inām lands in 
Borgaon to Vamanbhat Sawade of Rajapur in recognition of the completion of certain rituals 
involving sacred grass and water (kuṣodam) on behalf of his uncle Govindrao Khanderao and the 
latter’s wife Bayashri. Bayashri had died on pilgrimage to Benares, where Sawade made his 
request for an inām for his family’s permanent livelihood.446 Ramrao’s brother Devrao in 1799 
ordered the kuḷkarṇī and mokādam of Dhamner to reserve twenty-five bighās of land for the 
upkeep of Vitthala and Ramchandra idols in the village.447 Grantees could be individuals of local 
significance. For example, a Hindu ascetic (gosāvī) called Bapujibuwa Nigadikar, perhaps 
hailing from the Chitnis-held village of Nigadi, was granted a dharmadāya of four bighās near 
the fort of Santoshgad.448 Trusted officials could also be the beneficiaries of the Chitnises’ 
munificence. In 1802, Ramaji Bhagwant, the kuḷkarṇī of Mazgaon, traveled to Borgaon to 
petition Ramrao for an inām, pleading that earlier ināmpatre issued by Govindrao Khanderao 
from Jaitapur had been lost. His petition was granted.449 Through such acts of largesse, in 
                                                
445 For the latter, see, for example, PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 307 (Dhamner), tālebanda documents 
for Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis dated śaka 1732 and 1733 (1810 and 1811).  
 
446 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1857 (Borgaon), grant issued by Ramrao Jivaji Chitnavis to 
Vamanbhat bin Mahadevbhat upanāma Sawade dated 1174 (1773 CE).  
 
447 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 304 (Dhamner), letter from Devrao Jivaji Chitnavis to Gangadhar 
Bhagwant dated śaka 1721.  
 
448 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 303 (Dhamner), order dated 1196 (1795 CE).  
 
449 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1054 (Mazgaon), unnumbered letter from Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis to 
Ramaji Bhagwant Kulkarni dated 1203 (1802 CE). 
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conjunction with the management of village government, the Chitnis family transitioned from 
acting as mere stipendiary service-providers to beneficent patrons with delegated local authority. 
 Though subject to the oversight of the central Maratha governments at Satara and Pune, 
the Chitnises wielded authority at the local level by mediating and resolving disputes among 
proprietors and officials in their villages. Even the redressal of minor grievances reinforced this 
authority. On August 16, 1799, Ramrao Jivaji ordered the headman of Mazgaon to desist from 
imposing a tax in the amount of ten rupees on the inām of a local Brahman ritualist (purohit) 
Gopalbhat as this property was a religious gift (dharmadāya) and therefore tax-exempt.450 Other 
quarrels erupted between family members struggling for control over rights to land. For instance, 
Krishnajipant, a kuḷkarṇī of the aforementioned village, informed Malhar Ramrao Chitnis that 
his relation Babaji prevented the timely sowing of his fields by co-opting the labor to plant seeds 
in his own fields. In response, Chitnis asked the provincial governor to effect some settlement 
between them.451  
Even after the Peshwa annulled the Chitnises’ local patrimonial rights, they remained 
authoritative sources of knowledge about the rights of village office-holders. In one case, 
Damodar Khirsagar, a member of the most affluent pāṭīl family in the Chitnis-held village of 
Dhamner, traveled to Pune in 1807 to lodge a complaint against one Raghunathbhat Bhagwant, 
who had managed the village revenue for the past five to six years.452 He protested that 
Bhagwant had dishonored him by striking him from the village rolls, which resulted in a loss of 
                                                
450 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1054 (Mazgaon), ājñāpatra issued by Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis to 
mokadam dated 1199 (1798 CE).  
 
451 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1054 (Mazgaon), letter from Malhar Ramrao Chitnis to Baba Tilak 
Subhedhar dated 25 Jilkad.  
 
452 Piraji Khirsagar and his sons Damodar, Raoji, and Kusaji each held 5-10 bighās at a time, and there 
were at least 15-20 members of their bhāubanda. See PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 304 (Dhamner), 
various documents and rumal no. 306 (Dhamner) for khātavaṇī dated 1213 (1812 CE).  
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his mokādam (village headman) title, sixty-rupee salary (muśāhirā), five-rupee robes (tasrīph), 
and associated privileges, including control over Mahar labor, access to gardens and orchards, 
and seniority in placing a poḷī cake on the hutāśanī bonfire closing out Holi festivities.453 
Bhagwant, having been summoned to respond to the complaint, stated that the Khirsagars 
violently arrogated the Holi cakes and other property to themselves without his approval. But 
since he had no documents to back up his confiscation of their rights, the Pune government 
called upon Narharrao Malhar Chitnis, son of the last Chitnis landholder Malhar Ramrao. He 
testified that while the village had been out of their hands for nine or ten years, Damodar’s 
family had held the headmanship for almost one hundred years, both during their administration 
and prior to it. The kamāvīsdār Mahadji Vinayak Phadke corroborated Bhagwant’s account of 
the family’s behavior during Holi but also stated that his inquiries in Borgaon confirmed their 
claims to the headmanship.454 Bhagwant eventually reinstated the family’s rights.455  
Property disputes broke out not only between subordinate officials, but also within the 
Chitnis family itself. An assemblage of rights and privileges attained by a successful office-
holding family was not necessarily distributed equally among its members. As determined by the 
norm of patrilineal succession and the quirks of favor and temperament, the actual title of ciṭnīs 
and the associated rights to revenue were possessed at any given time by a senior male e.g. 
Khando Ballal, Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis, Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis. Brothers and cousins put 
forward their own claims that caused conflict with some regularity. At the bare minimum, 
documentation at the village level suggests that certain individual costs for the payment of 
                                                
453 Collectively, such headman rights were known as mān-pān. See Guha, Beyond Caste, 88. 
 
454 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal nos. 304 and 308 (Dhamner), yādī documents dated 12 and 23 Saban. 
 




servants, the feeding of horses during short trips, and the celebration of marriages, festivals, and 
other ritual occasions, usually grouped under the designation swārī kharca, were covered by the 
family’s inām revenues.456 Junior family members also held small parcels of land. Two Chitnis 
relations, referred to simply as Dadasaheb and Tatyasaheb, were regularly recorded in the list of 
revenue-payers (kuḷārag) in Mazgaon during Malhar Ramrao’s administration in the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century.457 Together, they held around seventeen bighās of land in 
1817.458 Bayashri, the wife of Govindrao Khanderao mentioned above in connection with a grant 
of land to a family priest, received a small portion of the revenues of Jaitapur.459 In this fashion, 
male peers within the Chitnis lineage, and more irregularly, senior women, laid claim to shares 
of the vatan amassed by their forebears.   
Chitnis family tradition indicates that financial tension was a chronic problem among the 
relations and descendants of Khando Ballal.460 It was stated earlier that while Khando occupied 
his father’s ciṭnīs post under Sambhaji and Rajaram, his brother Nilo Ballal worked as the diwān 
of the latter’s son Raja Karna. As recounted in a partial bakhar covering the early years of the 
                                                
456 For example, at the time of Dadasaheb Chitnis’ traveling from Majgaon to Borgaon, he incurred svārī 
kharcha in the amount of five rupees, which the costs of a servant (khijmatgār), an offering to an idol, 
and grain for his horses. See PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1054 (Mazgaon), ākārbanda document of 
Ramrao Jivaji Chitnis dated 1191 (1790 CE).  
 
457 Available documentation suggests that Dadasaheb was Devrao Jivaji, Malhar Ramrao’s great uncle, 
and Tatyasaheb was his father’s cousin’s son Haibatrao Bahirav. 
 
458 PD, Satara Jamav daftar, rumal 1054 (Mazgaon), yādī document for Tatya Saheb ad Data Saheb dated 
1218 (1817 CE).  
 
459 PD, Satara Jamav daftar, rumal 1746 (Jaitapur), hiseb documents dated 1183 (1782 CE) and 1159 
(1768 CE).  
 
460 Two partial family histories – one provided by Mahipatrao Dada Chitnis of Pune to explain the 
separation of the Satara and Pune branches and one probably penned in 1797-8 by Raghunathrao Laxman 
Chitnis – allow for a more detailed reconstruction of intra-family property disputes. The first was part of 
the collection of Jivanrao Trimbak Chitnis, and the second that of Balwantrao Raghunath Chitnavis of 
Jaitapur and Narhar Narayan Deshpande of Urwade. Both were been edited and published by Balkrishna 
Sakharam Kulkarni. See CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 1, pgs. 1-16; vol. 2, pgs. 1-23.   
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family’s history, their relationship was acrimonious due to Nilo’s profligate habits. Khando 
begged him to curtail his spending, but Nilo refused. They cut ties, even going so far as to buy 
cloth from different merchants!461 The implication of the bakhar is that their separation was the 
root of the development of an independent Chitnis branch at Pune, whose most notable member, 
Mahipatrao Dada Chitnis, was a partisan of Peshwa Madhavrao’s brother and opponent 
Raghunathrao.462  
Another major family quarrel had its origins in the early death of Jivaji Khanderao, 
Khando Ballal’s son and immediate heir, in 1743. Although Jivaji’s son Ramrao was the next in 
line, he was very young, which seems to have provoked a struggle among Jivaji’s brothers for 
control over the family business. Eventually, Govindrao Khanderao won out and became the 
accepted patriarch.463 To ward off further disputes, Govind in 1767 obtained the Peshwa’s 
approval of a formal settlement of the saranjām between his four successors: Ramrao Jivaji, 
Khanderao Bapuji, Laxmanrao Govind, and Baburao Khanderao. Of the estimated Rs 60,000 in 
saranjām, Rs 15,000 was reserved for the eldest heir, Ramrao Jivaji, and the remaining Rs 
45,000 was split three and a half ways with the youngest, Baburao Khanderao, receiving the half-
share.464 It would also be Ramrao’s name that authorized any documentation related to village 
administration, and his son Malhar Ramrao would inherit the ciṭnīs title. Govindrao Khanderao 
seems to have been able to enforce the terms of the settlement, but because leadership of the 
family had shifted away from Jivaji’s (and therefore Ramrao’s) line, the formal rules of 
                                                
461 CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 1, 8-10. 
 
462 See pg. 105, fn. 283. 
 
463 One family history claims that another brother Bapuji Khanderao tried to acquire the ciṭnīs title for his 
own son by telling Chhatrapati Shahu that Jivaji had no sons. When Shahu discovered the truth, he placed 
Jivaji’s sons in the care of Govindrao. See KPIS, no. 1, 11-12.   
 
464 CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 2, no. 22, 24-5.  
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succession may have seemed less binding to young and aspiring would-be heirs. After Govind’s 
death in 1785, the family was divided by a property dispute that dragged on for over a decade. 
The principal source for this dispute is another partial family history penned in 1797-8 by 
Raghunathrao Laxman Chitnis, the son of the aforementioned Laxmanrao Govind. Since the 
writer and his father were parties to the dispute, his account is quite obviously composed with an 
eye to supporting their bid for possession of the Chitnis saranjām. Their case was two-fold. First, 
Raghunathrao complained that Ramrao Jivaji began to openly treat them with contempt after 
Govindrao Khanderao’s death, courted the attentions of the family’s clerical staff, and cut them 
out of the business of the saranjām. Secondly, he contended that even though Ramrao was the 
eldest heir, and therefore he and his son Malhar Ramrao technically had the most rightful claim 
to the saranjām, they did deserve to inherit the largest share because their line was less 
distinguished in its service. Rather, given that he and his father were the progeny of Govindrao 
Khanderao, who had been the one to maintain the illustrious tradition of his father and 
grandfather Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal, they should be accorded a greater share in his 
patrimony.  
 Despite these objections, Raghunathrao relates that in accordance with his father’s 
wishes, he fell into line with Ramrao Jivaji’s direction for several years. Eventually, he made 
contact with Malhar Ramrao and asked an elderly clerk of his grandfather’s, Avaji Bapuji 
Musekhorekar, to prepare a petition (yādī) with articles of agreement (kalambandī) that would 
effect a new and more equitable division between the two branches of the family. He notes that 
the original document stayed with Malhar, and a copy was kept with Malhar’s assistant Narayan 
Ramchandra. Ramrao balked at entering into the agreement on the grounds that any such 
document prepared by a mere servant (cākar) was dead on arrival. So Raghunathrao sent his 
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younger brother Rajeshwarrao, who as it turns out had recently married in Nagpur, to convince 
Sadashiv Anant Abhyankar, the right-hand man of Nana Phadnavis, to intercede on their behalf. 
Their new plan was more creative. Recalling that Govindrao Khanderao in the lifetime of Shahu 
and Tarabai had been assigned an assistant (mutālik) with his own saranjām, they hoped that 
Nana Phadnavis could be sweet-talked into making a similar assignment for Laxmanrao Govind. 
They found (or forged) a dākhlā (note) stating that Ganesh Rakhmagad, the brother of Khando 
Ballal’s wife, had been the recipient of the assistantship along with a grant of revenue from 
several villages.465  
Abhyankar presented this evidence to Nana Phadnavis in Pune. He approved 
Raghunathrao’s request for a mutālik saranjām on the condition that he pay a gift to the 
government. Short on cash, Raghunathrao turned to Parshuram Bhau Patwardhan, the ruler of 
Miraj and a friend of his father, who in turn called upon his cousin (culat bandhu) Gangadharrao 
Govind, then managing the government of the Chitnis-owned village Borgaon, to provide the 
funds. He agreed. Word of the final agreement was passed to Raghunathrao’s brother 
Rajeshwarrao. He notified Abhyankar, who in turn called upon the kiledār of Satara fort to 
procure the ceremonial pen-case (kalamdān) and robes of office from the Chhatrapati. Despite 
his success in creating a position for himself, it seems that Raghunathrao continued to be 
sidelined by his uncle. Whereas Ramrao resided in Pune and parlayed his connections with the 
Peshwa’s circle, Raghunathrao could only afford to live in provincial Borgaon. After the battle of 
Kharda of 1795, which the writer claims he and Ramrao both witnessed, he passed along his 
misgivings to Nana Phadnavis, but nothing seems to have come of his efforts. In fact, he claims 
that his income was once again confiscated, forcing him to consider re-locating for work.       
                                                
465 It appears that that this document was a forgery. See PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1859 (Borgaon), 
ājñāpatra dated 1196 (1795 CE); KPIS, no. 1, 13. 
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The fruits of Raghunathrao’s labors to create (false) evidence of a bureaucratic precedent 
for his claim to the Chitnis saranjām were short-lived. Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao on May 20, 
1792 authorized the transferrance of Ganesh Rakhmagad’s mutālik post to Laxmanrao Govind 
Chitnis.466 Three years later, Ramrao Jivaji divulged that the supporting documentation had been 
forged. As a result, the post, the associated saranjām of three and a half villages, and even the 
honororary kalamdān were removed from Laxmanrao’s possession and re-assigned to 
Ramrao.467 But what is striking about Raghunathrao’s narrative, which he must have written in 
part to acquit himself of the serious offence of forgery, is its vivid depiction of an intricate 
network of scribes, clerks, and assistants whose fluency in the tools and techniques of 
government administration enabled him to advance his proprietary and professional interests. 
These lower-level functionaries in turn took advantage of the resources of the Chitnises to carve 
out positions for themselves. The surviving documentation of the Chitnis saranjām regularly 
records the names of individuals who were identified with darakdārī posts such as ciṭnīs, 
jamenīs, and kārkhānīs or were known generically as clerks (kārkun) or employees (asāmyā).468 
Two figures from Raghunathrao’s account stand out in this regard. The first is Narayan 
Ramchandra, the helpmate of Malhar Ramrao who stored a copy of the short-lived agreement 
between him and Raghunathrao. He was indeed a senior clerk in the employ of Malhar in the 
early nineteenth century and may have gradually taken on the important responsibility of 
                                                
466 PD, San.Ni. Ka. Daftar, rumal 19, file 12, no. 11514. 
 
467 CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 2, no. 25-6, 30-33. 
 
468 For example, see PD, Ghadni Daftar, no. 498, unnumbered yādī document for Govindrao Khanderao, 




managing the Chitnis saranjām. An 1807 account for Jaitapur lists him as overseeing the 
village’s revenue in that year on behalf of Chitnis.469 
Similar, but even more central to the trajectory of the Chitnis family, was the path-
breaking mutālik Ganesh Rakhmagad. Even though Raghunathrao Laxman had forged the papers 
documenting the particulars of this title, it really did exist. Not only was Ganesh Rakhmagad 
(Randive) the assistant to Govindrao Khanderao, he was also his maternal uncle by marriage. 
Govind’s father Khando Ballal had married Ganesh’s sister.470 It is likely that this family relation 
gave him a leg up in the secretarial hierarchy of Shahu’s administration. Under Govind’s 
supervision, he occupied a post variously described as lihiṇār dimmat ciṭnisī, mutālik ciṭnisī va 
lihiṇār, and mutālik lihiṇār dimmat ciṭnisī, all of which roughly mean assistant writer under the 
supervision of the scribe. 471 In the later eighteenth century, the duties of the ciṭnīs were routinely 
delegated to a staff of salaried writers bearing similar designations of dimmat ciṭnīs or nisbat 
ciṭnīs.472 Through his connection to the Chitnis family, Ganesh Rakhmagad was able to 
supplement his scribal income with rights to mokāsā revenue in the Chitnis-held villages of 
Khojewadi near Satara; Varude in Junnar prānt; and Kololi and Karkhel in Supe-Baramati 
                                                
469 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal no. 1746 (Jaitapur), hiseb document for Malhar Ramrao Chitnavis 
vidyamāṇe Ramchandra Narayan dated 1208 (1807 CE).  
 
470 Multiple sources attest to their familial relationship. See NBB, ed. Kale, 43; Huddar, Nāgpūrce 
Ciṭnavīs, 5-6; Nāgpūrce Ciṭnīvis Gharāṇe: Vaṃśāvaḷi (Nagpur, 1971), 3. 
 
471 PD, Shahu Daftar, rumal 15, file 3, no. 19863, 19857; San.Ni.Ka. Daftar, rumal 19, file 12, no. 11514. 
There is one reference to him as being employed by the rājājñā, a minister in the Satara government in 
PD, Shahu Daftar, rumal 4, file 5, no. 3515. 
 
472 One noteworthy example was Balaji Ganesh, the a Pune-based clerk bearing the title kārkūn nisbat 
ciṭnīs and the author of a 1783 bakhar on Maratha history, that found its way into the hands of the British 
resident C.W. Malet. For this bakhar, see Chapter 5. For documents attesting to the annual salary and 
associated perquisites claimed by Balaji Ganesh and Jivaji Ballal, see PD, Ghadni rumal no. 389, 407, 
saranjām documents for Balaji Ganesh kārkūn nisbat ciṭnīs dated 29 Sawal 1176; SSRPD, ed. G.C. Vad 




prānt.473 This connection also played a central role in the appointment of his son Rakhmaji 
Ganesh to ciṭnīs under Raghuji Bhonsle, the recently elevated senā sāheb subhā of Nagpur. 
Being a leading member of the rājmaṇḍaḷa, Govind may have been instrumental in directing 
Shahu’s attention to Raghuji when he was staffing the latter’s new government at Nagpur in the 
1730s. At this time, he seems to have recommended Rakhmaji for the ciṭnīs post.474 At Nagpur, 
Rakhmaji was the progenitor of another successful Kayastha scribal-diplomatic lineage. His son 
Chimaji Rakhmagad, who went on the hastily conceived diplomatic mission to Pune on behalf of 
Janoji Bhonsle described in Chapter 2, inherited the ciṭnīs post. His adopted grandson Krishnarao 
Madhav Chitnavis, as I will show in subsequent chapters, became a top adviser and diplomat 
under Raghuji Bhonsle II of Nagpur.  
Conclusion: The Perils of Sequestration  
Starting in 1783, and continuing intermittently until the fall of the Peshwa regime in 
1818, the central government at Pune put the Chitnis saranjām under sequestration and re-
assigned its choicest portions to various followers of the Peshwa. Immediately following the 
sequestration, the government agreed to forgive the Chitnises for their seditious offences 
(phiturāce aparādha) in exchange for a gift of Rs 100,001.475 But in 1788, the government 
circulated fresh orders to district officials re-assigning Chitnis-held territories to new 
kamāvīsdārs on the basis of a transgression (amaryādā).476 While the nature of the transgression 
is not recorded, we can speculate that the Chitnises were punished for siding with the disgraced 
                                                
473 He split the revenus from Kololi with another writer by the name of Jagnath Chintamani. See PD, 
Shahu Daftar, rumal 15, file 3, no. 19863, 19857; rumal 2, file 5, no. 1661.  
 
474 NBB, ed. Kale, 39-43. 
 
475 PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal 498, yādī document dated 1184 (1793 CE).  
 
476 PD, San.Ni.Ka. Daftar, rumal 19, file 12, nos. 11427, 11494-8.  
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former Peshwa Raghunathrao. Many of Raghunathrao’s partisans were either imprisoned or 
heavily fined at different points following his implication in Peshwa Narayanrao’s assassination 
in 1773. The Chitnises seem to have been linked to his faction through Sakharam Hari Gupte, a 
prominent Kayastha Prabhu general and father-in-law of Malhar Ramrao Chitnis.477 Their 
standing with the Pune government may also have been diminished by recurring fights with 
Brahmans regarding the ritual status of Kayastha Prabhus, which will be reviewed in more detail 
in the next chapter.  
Some idea of the effects of government sequestration on the Chitnis household and their 
tenants is offered by documentation from the family seat of Borgaon. The kamāvīs of this village 
was assigned to Khanderao Jadhav, the superintendent of Pratapgad fort, with the authorization 
of a sanad dated May 22, 1803.478 In August and September 1805, the residents of the village led 
an insurrection (bakheḍā) against Jadhav’s administration. Evidently with the assistance of their 
former landlords, they took up armed posts around the village and ousted Jadhav’s officials. 
Jadhav’s people tried to convince the Chitnises to call off the rebels, but they refused to answer 
his communications 479 It appears that the village was languishing due to the incursions and 
collections of state-issued debt bonds (rokhe) by proximate commanders and officials.480 A party 
sympathetic to the Chitnises, one Krishnarao Mankeshwar, on August 22 reported that upon 
stopping at Borgaon while on pilgrimage, he noticed that the village was desolate. Work had 
come to a halt; property was being destroyed; and villagers flocked to the temples to complain. 
                                                
477 CGSM, ed. Kulkarni, vol. 2, 3. Also see Chapter 4.  
 
478 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1861 (Borgaon), yādī document dated 1206 (1805 CE).  
 
479 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1865 (Borgaon), letters exchanged by Jotirao Gaekwad and Ramrao 
Jivaji Chitnis dated 22 and 27 Jamadilawal. 
 
480 PD, Satara Jamav Daftar, rumal 1865 (Borgaon), letters sent by various individuals dated 17 
Moharram, 21 Razab, 7 Sawal, 27 Jamadilawal, 17 Ramzan. 
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In addition, when Malhar Ramrao took him to the Chitnis home, he noticed that their condition 
had much detiorated. Mankeshwar urged the government to listen to Malhar’s petitions at Pune 
to restore the family’s patrimonial rights.481  
Part of the Chitnis saranjām was eventually released to Malhar Ramrao by Peshwa 
Bajirao II, but the family would never enjoy the same degree of financial, professional, and 
political flexibility that they once did. This position of relative weakness may have motivated 
Malhar to pen the remarkable series of historical reflections on the Maratha polity and his 
family’s contribution to it that will be the focus of Chapter 6. His son Balwantrao was a favorite 
of Pratapsinha Bhonsle, the last Chhatrapati of Satara, and received new grants of inām, 
including land in Shukrawar Peth in Satara city for the construction of a garden. But because 
Pratapsinha was essentially the figurehead of a puppet administration under the Company 
resident James Grant, Balwantrao’s relative comfort and intimacy with Pratapsinha did not 
translate to effective political influence. The bond between property, status, and influence that 
propelled the ascendancy of Kayastha Prabhu households within the Maratha state – the 
Chitnises foremost among them – had been severed. The political dimension of this ascendancy 
will be the focus of the next chapter.    
                                                




CHAPTER 4: Soldiers and Scribes into Diplomats  
 Having concluded his daily bath and worship on the morning of August 12, 1792, the 
Nagpur rājā Raghuji Bhonsle II took his usual seat by the shrine of his household god for a 
round of private consultation (khalbat) on the most urgent political matters of the day. He was 
joined by his Marathi and Persian scribes Krishnarao Madhav and Shridhar Laxman. They talked 
for about an hour. In the evening, he visited the home of the soldier-diplomat Mahipatrao Dinkar 
to celebrate the Hindu festival of Gokulashtami. Known more today for the pyramids of young 
men stretching to reach pots of yogurt during the popular festival of Dahi Handi, the activities at 
Mahipatrao Dinkar’s home included praying and singing songs, feasting on special foods, and 
enjoying pān before setting out into the night. Among the officials in attendance were the two 
scribes as well as Krishnarao Madhav’s distant relation Babaji Govind. Three days later, 
Krishnarao Madhav reciprocated the invitation to Mahipatrao Dinkar and his guests for his own 
Gokulashtami celebration. Each morning, he continued to join his fellow scribe for discussions 
with the rājā.482 They held these discussions in anticipation of a diplomatic mission to the court 
of Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao at Pune. Their diplomacy was critical to not only maintaining the 
now decades-long harmony between the Pune and Nagpur governments, but also to ramping up a 
nascent multilateral strategy of defense against the threat of the British East India Company. 
Krishnarao Madhav, Babaji Govind, and Mahipatrao Dinkar were all members of 
Kayastha Prabhu lineages whose strong records of scribal and military service enabled them to 
take on weightier political responsibilities. As the Gokulashtami newsletter from Nagpur 
suggests, politics was deeply embedded in the social life of Maratha courts. The routines and 
rituals of both discussion and celebration reinforced relationships between individuals of 
different backgrounds with common expertise in matters of state. While one might assume that a 
                                                
482 Deccan College Museum, rumal 96, file 1, no. 4. 
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Brahman and a Kayastha, two Hindu scribes and a Muslim minister, or, as in Chapter 1, a 
Maratha rājā and an Afghan nawāb, might be antagonists, this chapter shows that politics 
facilitated the formation of working relationships to achieve strategic goals. As I began to show 
in Chapter 1 with respect to the Bhonsle rājās and the Panni nawābs, political affiliation was not 
epiphenomenonal to social and religious identification. These identities were of course deeply 
felt with respect to matters like ritual entitlements and played an important role in public life; 
however, the need for cooperation in the practical arena of politics fueled the creation and re-
creation of a form of elite sociality transcending divides of caste and community. 
 This chapter puts the Maratha court under a microscope to trace the political careers of its 
Kayastha Prabhu scribes, outline the types of issues they managed, and explore the relationships 
they forged to manage them. The first section mounts a critique of the historiography on 
grāmaṇya disputes between Kayasthas and Brahmans to justify a fresh perspective on the 
sociality of politics. The second section examines the activities of Kayastha Prabhu scribal 
officials circulating between Satara, Kolhapur, and the Konkan in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, culminating with the transformative moment of the Satara ciṭnīs Govindrao Khanderao’s 
facilitation of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao’s assumption of the burden of government (rājyābhār). The 
third section shifts the focus to Nagpur. I describe Raghuji Bhonsle’s recruitment of Kayastha 
officials from Satara and analyze the professional formation of a group of Kayastha soldier-
diplomats who became entangled in the murderous politics of the later Peshwas. Finally, the last 
section prepares the ground for Chapter 5 by honing in on the diplomacy of Raghuji II’s scribal-
counselors Krishnarao Madhav and Shridhar Laxman, who compared to their predecessors 
operated in a far more multi-polar world requiring constant calculation of the consequences of 
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any political action. It became increasingly clear that one of these consequences might be 
submission to the monopolizing rule of the East India Company.  
Caste, Politics, and the Problem of Grāmaṇya in the Eighteenth Century 
The history of Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu participation in the political life of the 
Maratha Empire has been largely subsumed by the historiography on grāmaṇya. The term 
grāmaṇya itself refers to any local caste dispute; however, in the context of Maratha history, it 
specifically signifies a dispute between Kayasthas and Brahmans. Grāmaṇya concerned the 
access of Kayasthas to Vedic recitations (vedokta) during the performance of core life-cycle 
rituals (saṃskārā) as well as related secondary issues such as the number of saṃskārās to which 
Kayasthas were entitled. These decisions about ritual entitlements were inextricably tied to the 
broader question of whether or not Kayasthas should be considered Kshatriyas and therefore of 
twice-born status.483 While the number of recorded disputes attested by historians has varied, 
certain canonical grāmaṇya of the Maratha period have come to define the historiographical 
discourse. Principally, these are the Benares-based Brahman paṇḍit Gagabhatta’s support of the 
ritual claims of Kayasthas around the time of Shivaji’s coronation in 1674; the 1789-90 protest 
of the Brahmans of Pen to perceived violations of Peshwa Narayanrao’s earlier restriction of 
Kayastha ritual performance; and the appeals of several prominent Pune Brahmans, including 
Nilkanth Shastri Thatte, Chintamanrao Patwardhan, and Balajipant Natu, to the decision of the 
Shankaracharya of the Sankeshwar maṭha affirming the Kshatriyahood of Kayasthas in 1826-
                                                




7.484 Closely related to these grāmaṇya were concurrent disputes about the Kshatriya-Rajput 
genealogy of the Bhonsle rājās and their claims to Vedic consecration rites, which came to be 
known as the “Vedokta controversy.” Together the debates surrounding the Kshatriya status of 
Kayasthas and Marathas continued to be important reference points for non-Brahman politics 
well into the twentieth century.485 
Not least because of the connection with non-Brahman politics, the historiography on 
grāmaṇya has tended to be highly polarized. V.K. Rajwade, himself a Chitpavan Brahman, asked 
why Kayasthas continued to demand the privilege of conducting Vedic rituals even after the 
Kāyasthadharmadīpa of Gagabhatta, which was composed after Shivaji’s coronation, prescribed 
non-Vedic formulas for Kayastha ritual practice. His answer was that Kayasthas were motivated 
by long-held resentments against Brahmans for having displaced their hold on the revenue 
administration following the rise of Islamic rule in the Deccan. K.T. Gupte attacked Rajwade’s 
characterization of Gagabhatta’s position, and it has been demonstrated that the original 
composition of the Kāyasthadharmadīpa likely did allow for Vedic ritual.486 Rajwade’s corollary 
historical argument about the persistence of grāmaṇya is equally difficult to substantiate. As I 
discuss in Chapter 3, while Brahmans and Kayasthas were prevalent in the revenue 
administration of the Islamic sultanates, Kayastha employment increased under Chhatrapati 
Shahu Bhonsle in the early eighteenth century. Rather, the fact that Kayasthas maintained their 
                                                
484 For detailed reconstructions, see Deshpande, “Kṣatriyas in the Kali Age?”; N.K. Wagle, “The 
Cāndrasenīya Kāyastha Prabhus and the Brahmans: Ritual, Law, and Politics in Pune, 1789-90,” in 
Indology and Law: Studies in Honour of Professor J. Duncan M. Derrett, ed. Günther-Dietz Sontheimer 
and Parameswara Kota Aithal (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), 303-329; Wagle, “Ritual and 
Change in Early Nineteenth Century Society in Maharashtra: Vedokta Disputes in Baroda, Pune, and 
Satara, 1824-1838,” in Religion and Society in Maharashtra, ed. Milton Israel and N.K. Wagle, 145-177. 
485 Rosalind O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict, and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in 
Nineteenth-Century Western India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 24-41. 
  
486 V.K. Rajwade, “Cāndraseniya Kāyastha,” Itihāsacārya V.K. Rājwāḍe Samagra Sāhitya, ed. M.B. Shah 
(Dhule: Rajwade Sanshodhan Mandal, 1998), 225-232.  
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claims to higher ritual status in the face of Brahmanical orthodox opposition attests to the 
stability of their position within the social and political order.  
The disagreement between Rajwade and Gupte about Gagabhatta’s Kāyasthadharmadīpa 
is merely one example of the ways in which the polarization of the grāmaṇya debate has tended 
to produce highly ideological narratives and counter-narratives as well as efforts to prove or 
disprove the Kshatriya status of Kayastha Prabhus and Marathas. Nineteenth-century source 
collections and accounts such as the periodical Kāyastha Prabhūñcyā Itihāsācī Sādhane sought 
to rectify the lack of adequate source material and to defend Kayasthas against the perceived 
insults of the Brahman community. Later accounts reflected this polarization along lines of caste 
and ideology. Rajwade argued that the recurrence of grāmaṇya had deleterious effects in the 
political realm, most spectacularly in the capture and execution of Sambhaji Bhonsle, the murder 
of Peshwa Narayanrao, and the overthrow of Pratapsinha Bhonsle. While caste elevation 
(jātyunatti) through intermarriage had once been possible, caste boundaries had become so rigid 
by the Maratha period as to disallow any form of individual mobility and to render extreme 
collective action into a necessity.487 In his Complete History of Gramanya, or The Rebellion of 
the Bureaucracy (Gramāṇyāñcā Sādyanta Itihāsa Arthāth Naukarśāhice Baṇḍa) (1919), the 
Kayastha Prabhu historian and activist Keshav Sitaram (Prabodhankar) Thackeray rejected the 
view of Maratha history represented by Rajwade as overly sanguine. Considering grāmaṇya to 
be a crime that had to be reckoned with in moral terms, he held Brahmans, and particularly the 
Peshwa, responsible for the failures of the Maratha state and the perpetuation of caste envy 
(jātimatsara) into the modern era.488 Despite their differences, Rajwade and Thackeray agreed 
that the relationship between Kayasthas and Brahmans had evolved historically into an 
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inexorable antagonism. As nationalist historians of different stripes, they both believed that the 
pursuit of a common good in the political realm was impossible as long as irrational attachment 
to caste interests – whether in the form of ambition in Rajwade’s case or envy in Thakeray’s – 
created antagonism in the socio-ritual realm.   
More recent scholarship on grāmaṇya has focused on the ways in which they reflect 
social, intellectual, and political aspects of caste and community formation in eighteenth-century 
western India. First, as Madhav Deshpande and Rosalind O’Hanlon have shown, participants 
within these disputes frequently staked their positions on the authority of Hindu sacred texts as 
interpreted by Brahman paṇḍit communities. Particular Brahman priestly lineages, such as the 
Takle and Bhatta lineages of Benares, were called upon to authenticate competing claims to 
ritual status.489 Secondly, to enforce the authority of textual opinion, Kayastha and Brahman 
disputants turned to the Peshwa’s government at Pune. While this government by the late 
eighteenth century had come to be dominated by Chitpavan Brahmans, it was not necessarily 
dogmatic or uniform in its judgments. In the 1789-90 grāmaṇya for example, Nana Phadnavis 
admonished the Penkar Brahmans to desist from their agitation against a group that had been 
able to defend itself against previous efforts at regulation.490 Neverthless, the history of 
grāmaṇya supports the scholarly consensus that the Peshwa government’s orientation to inter-
caste relations was generally interventionist, wary of innovation, and responsive to both custom 
and textual authority.491 
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Stipulating these important points with respect to grāmaṇya, how should scholars 
understand the relationship between Kayasthas and Brahmans, and concomitantly, the 
relationship between caste and politics, in eighteenth-century western India? Susan Bayly has 
argued that eighteenth-century South Asia saw the rise of a “Brahman rāj” in which skilled, 
literate service groups, including scribes, merchants, and ritual specialists, propagated a 
Brahmanical Hindu ideal of purity through the instruments of the state. The quintessential 
example of this phenomenon for eighteenth-century western India would be the Peshwa 
government’s expansion of the distribution of alms (dakṣiṇā) to Brahmans. For Kayasthas, 
Bayly’s argument ultimately resembles Rajwade’s: Kayastha Prabhus pursued social and 
political advancement in order to consolidate their ritual status. Rightly abandoning this 
Dumontian Brahman-centered model, Sumit Guha in his recent study Beyond Caste points to a 
broader interlocking of the social and political orders: “The crucial element in the formation and 
continuation of this political tool [caste] is the maintenance of internal structures of authority 
and external boundaries [his italics].”492 Guha goes on to explore the ways in which caste was a 
tool of social organization at different levels from the household to the village to the nation-state. 
Guha’s argument is important because it suggests the utility of re-introducing questions of 
politics and government into a scholarly literature that has predominantly conceived of 
Kayastha-Brahman dynamics in terms of ritual concerns. Indeed, as Dirks argued back in 1987 
with respect to Pudukkottai, “neither society nor polity can be understood when looked at as 
separate domains or entities.”493 While Dirks emphasized proximity to the “little king” as the 
major organizing principle of both social and political relations in Puddukottai, I highlight the 
centrality of a common practice of civic communication, or jawāb-suwāl, that often only 
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tangentially involved the person and symbol of the ruler. Politics was not merely a means for 
reconstituting sovereignty or reproducing internal and external boundaries, but rather, as I argue, 
it was a set of communicative conventions that was accessible to different caste groups with 
broad similarities in terms of their functional competencies and professional attitudes. 
 To further elaborate these insights, it will be useful to think through how dynamics within 
the socio-ritual and socio-political domains converged and diverged at different moments of 
historical development. In the late eighteenth century, it is undeniable that socio-ritual life was 
increasingly shaped by a renewed Brahmanical orthodoxy, which on many occasions received 
the Peshwa’s endorsement and in its collision with prevailing custom resulted in the sectarianism 
of grāmaṇya. But I argue that these outbursts of discord did not index the overall evolution of the 
socio-political domain. This domain was constituted by collaborative participation in projects of 
concern to the government and its territories and subjects, principally succession, diplomacy, 
warfare, conquest, and revenue management. These projects were usually conceived at court 
centers e.g. Satara, Pune, Nagpur, but they could only be executed through official networks 
linking the court to district towns and villages. Because eighteenth-century South Asia was 
marked by intense competition over limited resources, rulers increasingly relied on their 
advisers, secretaries, and diplomats – in sum, the bureaucracy – to address recurring political 
problems in an efficient and pragmatic manner, particularly through verbal and written 
instruments of reconciliation and mediation. This bureaucratic revolution in politics and 
government encouraged a high degree of practical linguistic adaptation, such as in the use of 
Persian terminology within Marathi political discourse, as well as cooperation across lines of 
caste, community, and ethnicity. Adaptation and cooperation of this kind manifested both 
collectively and individually. While caste or ethnic groups, typically referred to as maṇḍaḷas, did 
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draw on particular sets of skills and resources and act collectively on behalf of their own 
interests, individuals also defied caste-based divisions in particular projects and in their overall 
career trajectories.  
 The distinction between the socio-ritual and socio-political domains helps to explain the 
contradictory position occupied by powerful Kayastha Prabhu households like the Chitnises. It 
was not only that in many grāmaṇya, “political factionalism, lobbying, and individual efforts 
could also be instrumental in altering the course of justice.”494 Rather, the Chitnises and other 
Kayastha Prabhus elites were often working in tandem with Brahmans to shape the outcomes of 
political questions like succession even as they joined their caste fellows in grāmaṇya disputes. 
Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis, as I will describe in more detail below, expressed his opposition 
to a grāmaṇya raised by Jagjivanrao Pratinidhi’s agent Yamaji Shivdev; however, at the same 
time, he persuaded the ailing Chhatrapati Shahu to entrust the burden of the administration 
(rājyābhār) to Peshwa Balaji Bajirao, effectively transferring executive decision-making power 
to the most influential Chitpavan Brahman in the land. Mahipatrao Dinkar and the Kashi brothers 
helped fund the plot to assassinate Peshwa Narayanrao, who promulgated the nine articles, or 
nau kalamī, against Kayastha ritual practice, yet they likely did so to convince Narayanrao’s 
uncle Raghunathrao to enter into an agreement of defense with their employer Mudhoji Bhonsle. 
Govindrao Khanderao’s son Laxman Govind led the resistance to the 1789-90 grāmaṇya of the 
Penkar Brahmans, yet he was also a loyal partisan of Nana Phadnavis who negotiated with 
Raghunathrao at Surat on his behalf. However much Kayasthas and Brahmans felt the urgency of 
the opposed ritual entitlements of their castes, they also felt the need to collaborate on difficult 
questions of government and to protect their hold over the power to resolve such questions. Caste 
envy (jātimatsara) tended to be superseded by their shared interests as a political class.   
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Scribal Diplomats at Satara, Kolhapur, and the Konkan, c. 1726-1751 
Through the death of Shahu in 1749, the succession of the Chhatrapati was the site of 
perpetual struggle between claimants within the Bhonsle royal household. Tarabai Bhonsle, 
Rajaram’s widow and regent to her son Shivaji II (1700-14), challenged Shahu’s bid for power, 
but due to the defection of many notables, including the ciṭnīs Khando Ballal, she was 
unsuccessful. Forced to flee Satara, she established a rival court at Kolhapur only to be deposed 
and confined in Panhala fort in 1714 by a rival queen, Rajasbai (d. 1761) and her son Sambhaji 
II. In subsequent years, Rajasbai and Sambhaji II endeavored to mobilize the support of Nizam 
ul-Mulk of Hyderabad – himself a recent defector from Shahu’s side – for an increased share in 
the Maratha domains. Having bested the Nizam’s forces at Palkhed, Shahu coerced his half-
brother to resign himself to a junior kingdom at Kolhapur. Around twenty years later, all of these 
parties once again converged around the issue of Shahu’s successor. Lacking a natal son, Shahu 
and his queens Sakwarbai and Sagunabai considered several options, including Sambhaji II and 
Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur. But, in an ingenious scheme to engineer her return to dynastic 
politics, Tarabai, now more comfortably imprisoned at Satara, claimed that she had a grandson 
named Ramraja who, though living in obscurity, ought to sit on the throne. Ramraja (r. 1749-
1777) succeeded, but the troubled early days of his reign led to the effective eclipse of the 
Chhatrapati.       
 Due to the gradual diminuition of the Chhatrapati’s authority and the spectacular rise of 
Balaji Viswanath to the office of peśvā, these succession disputes have generally been associated 
with the political rise of Chitpavan Brahmans.495 Yet, they were not the only group who 
shouldered the burden of government. The securing of the succession, and relatedly, the 
management of the competing priorities of rival dynasts, created a significant opening for the 
                                                
495 Eaton, A Social History of the Deccan, 177-202. 
 
 186 
political participation of Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu scribal and secretarial officials whose 
family histories were featured in Chapter 3. Babaji and Govindrao Nilkanth and the former’s son 
Ramchandra Babaji of the Kolhapur pārasnīs lineage and Nilkanthrao Trimbak of the Mahadkar 
Kayastha Prabhu lineage were centrally involved in helping Sambhaji II to consolidate an 
independent state on the southern side of the Maratha country. Conversant in the conventions of 
Persian letter-writing, Babuji and Govindrao composed letters to Nizam ul-Mulk, Sambhaji II’s 
principal sponsor in opposing Shahu, many of which were included in the Durj al-Gawāhar.496 
Through the pens of his letter-writers, Sambhaji II appealed to the Nizam to preserve the life and 
sovereignty of his kingdom:   
Thank God, the giver of justice, that his empire (salṭanat) and its creatures have been 
made strong and firm such that all mankind in the home of justice and liberality are 
contented and peaceful through the rule of powerful sovereigns (farmān-rawāyān-i 
buland iqtadār) and well-born kings (rājahā-yi wālā tabār). How can it be that the 
overturning of that true destiny and bringer of good fortune [has come to pass]. It is 
clearer than the sun that my older brother King Shivaji [Shahu] is a man of tyranny and 
affliction and that his elevation has caused the foundation of the realm to be shaken…As 
their troubles were growing day by day, the loyal petitioners (khauhān-i yak-rang) by 
cunning and dissimulation left, and all the chiefs of the army (sardārān-i lashkar) were 
unable to fulfill their duties to the government. They [the petitioners] have no thoughts 
other than serving our faithful masters who protect this God-given kingdom (rāj) that is 
the home of notable lords, especially this illustrious house…With the benefit of the 
patronage of the most exalted Nawab, we will perform the service of the management of 
the territory of the Deccan (bandobast-i mulk-i dekhan), and by constant communication, 
we will become friends and be happy and contented.497 
The brothers used their communication skills to help Sambhaji to foster a nascent friendship with 
Nizam ul-Mulk and, as this letter demonstrates, to position his rebellion against Shahu as a just 
rebuke of a despotic ruler. Babaji’s son Ramchandra Babaji continued in this line of work, for 
which Sambhaji II and the Nizam awarded him the inām of Halyal pargaṇa in the district of 
Torgal in Bijapur. The ināmpatre, dated October 11, 1738, specifically mentions that 
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Ramchandra, building on his father’s noted skill in the languages of Sanskrit, Persian, Hindi, and 
Kannada, used his own Persian learning (fārsī vidyece nipuṇte) and his cleverness 
(buddhikauśālyā) to mediate between the two rulers.498  
In early 1726, Sambhaji II’s Kayastha Prabhu adviser Nilkanthrao Trimbak met with 
Nizam ul-Mulk to procure his military assistance in a proposed assault on Shahu.499 In epistolary 
references to the meeting, he is characterized as a minister (diwān) who exhibited the virtues of 
bravery (jalādat) and boldness (tahauwur).500 Addressing one Bahadur Dil Khan, he elaborates, 
“In this country, my uncle makes great efforts and exertions to go to war. With respect to 
remedying this situation, I have sent my intrepid minister Nilkanthrao to request financial help 
and assistance at a meeting with the eminent Nawab. I also have written and continue to write 
about this.”501 Nilkanthrao’s meeting with Nizam ul-Mulk solidified an alliance to which many 
Afghan and Maratha generals lent their forces. In early March 1728, the Nizam defeated the 
army of Peshwa Bajirao I at Palkhed. Accepting the reality of his position, Sambhaji II sent 
Babaji Nilkanth and Nilkanthrao Trimbak to Satara in 1730 to sue for peace. Babaji came at 
Tarabai’s request to encourage the cultivation of warm and affectionate sentiments, while 
Nilkanthrao helped iron out the specific terms of the territorial settlement between the two rulers. 
The resulting treaty, finalized in April 1731 on the banks of the Warna River, fixed the 
permanent boundaries of Sambhaji II’s new kingdom, running from the Warna at one end 
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southwest to Shri Rameshwar and southeast to the Tungabhadra River at the other. It also 
averred that the two rulers would assist one another against shared enemies and refrain from 
luring away each other’s followers.502  
Having extinguished the threat of a royal schism, Jivaji Khanderao and his brother 
Govindrao Khanderao and Yashwantrao Mahadev of the Satara ciṭnīs and potnīs households, 
respectively, distinguished themselves in Shahu’s dealings with subordinate Maratha rulers. All 
three helped to coordinate a campaign with the Angre clan to take the coastal forts of Anjanwel 
and Gowalkot from Siddi Sat, a commander under the Mughal-backed Siddi rulers of Janjira. 
Jivaji Khanderao and Yashwantrao Mahadev met with Sekhoji Angre, the eldest son of the late 
Kanhoji Angre, in May and June 1733 to initiate plans for the campaign.503 These negotiations 
were complicated by the fact that Sekhoji was simultaneously settling the particulars of an 
agreement with the Siddi-aligned English at Bombay through a Kayastha Prabhu envoy by the 
name of Bawaji Ballal.504 After Sekhoji unexpectedly died in August, a succession dispute was 
unleashed between his two brothers Manaji and Sambhaji Angre. The Satara government 
established lines of communication with both claimants. To reach out to potential backers, 
Manaji Angre drew on the services of scribal office-holding members of two Kayastha Prabhu 
households. The Persian scribe (pārasnīs) Mahadji Ram and his sons Trimbak and Vitthal 
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Mahadev, hailing from the village of Nagaon, brokered an alliance between Angre and the 
English. Angre’s scribe Sabaji Tukaji (ciṭnīs) met with Govindrao Khanderao at Satara, which 
led to the conferral of the title of marātab vazāratmāb on Angre. Sabaji Tukaji and his brother 
Krishnaji received an inām for the village of Chavare in tāḷukā Umathe for his work.505  
Meanwhile, Jivaji Khanderao Chitnis was the Satara government’s primary intermediary 
with Sambhaji Angre in resolving the succession and securing his participation in an ongoing 
campaign against Anjanwel fort. On April 6, 1734, he presented the title of senā sarkhel to 
Sambhaji at Jaigadh fort about fifty kilometers south of Anjanwel. Several days later, he and 
fifteen hundred to two thousand of Sambhaji’s men and a handful of cannons decamped. 
Sambhaji himself with four to five hundred additional soldiers and a fleet of ships would follow 
him in the coming days. By April 10, Jivaji had initiated the siege. Fearing that his small army 
would be no match for Anjanwel’s fortifications, Jivaji eagerly awaited Angre’s ships, but strong 
winds on the Indian Ocean, perhaps stirred up by the coming monsoon, delayed their arrival. In 
June, Jivaji turned back towards Satara, leaving Anjanwel and Gowalkot in the hands of the 
Siddis.506 
Jivaji Khanderao’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Konkan took on a personal 
dimension after the aborted siege of Anjanwel. Sambhaji Angre’s minister was a Kayastha 
Prabhu named Raghunath Hari who had served his late brother Sekhoji. Raghunath Hari had 
helped to maintain Bajirao’s confidence in Sekhoji during moments of delay and uncertainty in 
the Konkan campaigns. For example, when Sekhoji became too ill to take the field, it fell to 
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Raghunath Hari to reassure the Peshwa that his master remained loyal.507 But after Sekhoji’s 
death, this affiliation became a liability. In late 1735, Sambhaji locked up Hari’s family, alleging 
that he intended to desert him and join the Peshwa. Jivaji and his brother Govindrao notified the 
Peshwa of Hari’s family’s condition, and the Peshwa in turn attempted to convince Sambhaji to 
release them. He initially refused.508 But we may infer that he eventually relented because in 
April 1737, Hari’s niece was married to Jivaji’s nephew in Pune.509 These two Kayastha Prabhu 
office-holding families, both having attained high office under Maratha rulers, were now joined 
in marriage. In addition, before his early death in 1746, Jivaji’s military service at Anjanwel was 
recognized in the form of a 1738 grant for the citnisī, jamenisī, and kārkhānisī of the newly 
conquered Konkan territories.510 
Govindrao Khanderao and Yashwantrao Mahadev were responsible for receiving, 
composing, and reciting letters from field commanders containing information regarding the 
state of affairs in the Janjira campaign. They were part of the regular circle of individuals at court 
who helped Shahu to understand and process this information so that he could make a decision 
about the best course of action. For example, it was reported on December 12, 1735 that 
Yashwantrao read out a letter from a commander to Shahu, sharing the news that the Siddis had 
taken the fort of Bankot and that infantry and cavalrymen ought to be sent to augment the force 
available to Chimaji Appa, Peshwa Bajirao I’s brother and a leading general in the campaign. 
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Three days later, Yashwantrao conveyed that these reinforcements had not yet arrived.511 
Sometimes it was necessary to travel to the field to procure the most accurate information. In 
October 1735, Govindrao Khanderao and Bhaskar Vaidya surveyed the forces under the Angre 
brothers’ command.512 Summing up the uncertain situation, they stated, “The English (iṅgraj), 
the Portuguese (firaṅgī), and the Siddis (habśī) have united…The Angres’ people have not kept 
up their spirits. Without a powerful man to make sure they behave appropriately, the plan will 
not come to fruition. Troops and followers are needed. Without them, the siege will not be 
laid.”513 This fact-finding mission turned out to be productive. Shahu despatched the Maratha 
generals Pilaji and Santaji Jadhav – with their Kayastha Prabhu jamenīs named Malhar in tow – 
to help the Angres and Chimaji Appa in a siege of Gowalkot. As Govindrao and Bhaskar had 
suspected, the Angres proved to be wayward allies, withdrawing from the siege in mid-
December long before its conclusion.514   
 By the late 1740s, Govindrao Khanderao and Yashwantrao Mahadev along with Devrao 
Meghshyam had become Shahu’s key political intermediaries. Aside from the Angres, they 
negotiated partitions of revenue, territory, and authority with a number of the Chhatrapati’s 
largest fief-holders, including the Peshwas Bajirao I and Balaji Bajirao, the Dabhades and 
Gaekwads of Gujarat, and Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur. After the latter and Fattesingh Bhonsle 
deposed and captured Chanda Saheb, the ruler of Trichinapoly, in the Karnatak campaign of 
1742-3, Govindrao Khanderao in mid-1744 brokered part of his ransom. Raghuji’s primary 
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creditors at Satara, Viswanathbhat and Balambhat Vaidya, arranged for several different Satara-
based merchant-money lenders to contribute to the payment of his ransom, which was fixed at 
the estimated value of Chanda Saheb’s territories, or Rs 750,000. Govindrao was the Vaidyas’ 
go-between in realizing a Rs 100,000 contribution from a merchant by the name of Vitthoba 
Naik Wakade.515 Another illustrative example of the kind of brokerage services that Govindrao 
and Yashwantrao performed is a January 16, 1744 agreement (yādī) between the Satara 
government and Balaji Bajirao. The agreement stipulated that in exchange for a payment of Rs 
150,000, the Peshwa should have permanent jurisdiction over the northern provinces of Agra, 
Prayag, and Ajmer; part of Patna; the former Portuguese territories of Vasai and Sashti, together 
fittingly called Firangan; and Malwa. Govindrao and Yashwantrao were listed in the category of 
gumāsta as the individuals deputized to realize this payment.516 Soon after, they effected a 
fleeting reconciliation between Yashwantrao and Trimbakrao Dabhade and their commander 
Damaji Gaekwad, who had long been working to seize his employers’ territories in Gujarat.517 
They were even consulted regarding Shahu’s opinions on Bajirao’s immoderate personal habits, 
which included heavy alcohol consumption and an infamous affair with Mastani, the daughter of 
the Bundela king Chhatrasal.518  
 Towards the end of his life, Shahu heavily relied on Govindrao Khanderao in particular 
to resolve several thorny issues, which included the Peshwa’s ongoing feud with the Dabhades; 
the restitution of Manikgadh fort to Manaji Angre after its seizure by the Peshwa’s follower 
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Ramaji Mahadev in 1748; and the liquidation of his own debts with the Peshwa.519 Given his 
intimacy with Shahu, it is not surprising that he was also deeply involved with the interrelated 
questions of the succession of the Chhatrapati and the future of his government. The Chitnavis 
and Gupte bakhars’ accounts suggest that Govindrao advocated for the succession of Mudhoji 
Bhonsle, the son of Raghuji Bhonsle.520 Several facts lend plausibility to this suggestion. 
Raghuji’s wife (and Mudhoji’s mother) was a cousin of Shahu’s wife Sagunabai and, along the 
lines of Fattesingh Bhonsle, Raghuji was understood to be a kind of adopted son to Shahu.521 In 
addition, Govindrao himself had previously established a working relationship with Raghuji. As 
I mentioned in Chapter 3, he had recommended his cousin Rakhmaji Ganesh to be Raghuji’s 
ciṭnīs and had been centrally involved in the financial settlement of Raghuji’s recent campaign 
against Trichinopoly. Govindrao by early 1745 had at least outwardly capitulated to Tarabai’s 
scheme to install her supposed long-lost grandson Ramraja on the throne.522 But as Govindrao’s 
enemies grew bolder in the wake of Shahu’s death and Ramraja’s uneasy succession, Raghuji 
Bhonsle was one of the few individuals who remained in Shahu’s counsel.  
 One of Govindrao’s main enemies at court was Yamaji Shivdev, the agent of the pant 
pratinidhi Jagjivanrao Parshuram. In 1747-8, this pair incited a fresh grāmaṇya by instructing 
Brahman assemblies in Karhad, Pen, Mahuli, Wai, Nashik, and other sacred sites to stop 
performing the customary rituals for Kayastha Prabhus. He also invited Brahman paṇḍits from 
Benares and the Sringeri maṭha to congregate in Satara with new textual evidence against the 
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Kayastha Prabhus’ case. The latter were represented by Govindrao Khanderao and Yashwantrao 
Mahadev as well as by a Brahman priest by the name of Mahadev Bhat Athale. After a debate 
between the two sides, it was decided on the basis of a new interpretation of the Sahyādri-
khaṇḍa that the Kayasthas were descendants of the sage Dalbhya and his female slave (dāsī). It 
was also proclaimed that they were entitled to only five saṃskāras instead of the customary 
sixteen.523 As such, they would be Shudras and therefore forbidden from soliciting the 
performance of Vedic mantras. Ultimately, however, Shahu interceded on Govind and 
Yashwantrao’s behalf.524 With the support of Peshwa Balaji Bajirao and his chief Brahman priest 
Raghunath Panditrao, he issued orders countermanding Yamaji’s previous injunctions and 
enjoining the continuation of existing Kayastha ritual practice.525 Because of Govindrao’s role in 
this grāmaṇya, historians have pointed to caste sentiment to explain his and Yamaji’s 
antagonism.526    
But, in fact, there was also a strong political rationale for this antagonism. Along with 
Shahu’s aunt Tarabai and senior wife Sakwarbai, Yamaji was part of a substantial faction who 
opposed the Peshwa’s growing influence. Even Shahu, chafing under his demands for territory 
and repayment of debts, removed Balaji Bajirao from the peśvā post for a short period of time in 
1747. Govindrao Khanderao was one of the few among Shahu’s intimates who remained 
favorably disposed to the Peshwa, which so displeased Sakwarbai that she apparently yearned for 
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his imprisonment or execution.527 Govindrao eventually persuaded Shahu to preserve his trust in 
the Peshwa’s fitness to shoulder the burden of government. This final act of mediation – one so 
critical to the future of the Maratha polity – was enunciated in two succinct orders (ājñā), 
considered by historians to have been handwritten by Shahu in Govindrao’s presence in early to 
mid October 1749: 
Order to the Honorable Balaji Pradhan Pandit [Balaji Bajirao]. You should secure the 
army. Everyone was [so] commanded, but it was not their fate (daiva) [to do so]. The 
Maharaja [Shahu] is in pain. He will not get well. The burden of government (rājyābhār) 
must be borne. So my kin (vaṃśa) should be seated [on the throne]. Do not act for that of 
Kolhapur [Sambhaji II]. [Whatever] is said to the ciṭnīs [Govindrao Khanderao] should 
be done. The king’s circle (rājmaṇḍaḷa) should proceed according to the orders of the kin 
who will [succeed]. The ciṭnīs is the master’s [Shahu’s] confidante (viśvāsū). The 
kingdom (rājya) will be protected by his and by your consideration. The kin who will 
[succeed] will not disturb you. May you be wise. 
Similarly, the second order conveyed Shahu’s trust (bharaṃsā) that the Peshwa’s ability to 
shoulder the rājyābhār would not be impeded by his heir or by any other party, particularly in 
light of the ciṭnīs’s reassurance (khātarjamā) in these matters.528 These orders and related 
agreements (yādī) made with the Peshwa in 1749 articulate two substantive promises that 
necessarily depended upon a mediating third term: the Peshwa would govern; the new 
Chhatrapati would not disturb him in governing; and Govindrao would assure as much.529  
This devolution of the weight and responsibility of government to the Peshwa is typically 
understood to be the founding stage of the sovereign authority of the Peshwa. But what these 
sources reveal is that the inception of this sovereign authority was contingent on the ciṭnīs 
Govindrao’s favor and cooperation. Moreover, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, this devolution of 
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authority did not stop with Balaji Bajirao, but rather, it continued after his death and fraught 
succession, producing the spectacular rise and fall of several kārbhārī who mediated between the 
Peshwa and allied Maratha governments. In effect, if not in name, Govindrao Khanderao was the 
first kārbhārī. By enabling the emergence of a decentralized, and ultimately, depersonalized 
notion of govenance (rājyābhār) within a political field characterized above all by skill in 
mediation, he was a seminar figure. Though of course not accessible to all groups, political 
power in the wake of Govindrao’s critical intervention was less associated with the hereditary 
rights of the Chhatrapati or of any other dynast, and more associated with those who actually did 
the work of politics and government.  
 Nevertheless, Govindrao stood at a rather delicate and uncertain juncture when Shahu 
died on December 15, 1749. In the days following his death, Ramraja was brought to Satara and 
installed on the throne. Because Sakwarbai Bhonsle had committed sati, and Sagunabai had died 
the previous year, Tarabai was the seniormost member of the Bhonsle royal household of Satara. 
Having also succeeded in conferring the Chhatrapati title on her chosen heir, she quickly worked 
to consolidate her position against Govindrao, Yashwantrao Mahadev, Raghuji Bhonsle, the 
Purandares, and others within the Peshwa’s faction. Both sides sought to control the movements 
of the newly installed Chhatrapati Ramraja and the comings and goings of their supporters to 
Satara fort. Having been repeatedly importuned by his correspondents at Satara to make haste, 
Raghuji Bhonsle finally planted his camp at Satara in April 1750. He, Govindrao, and 
Yashwantrao met privately on a regular basis.530 The two officials attempted to persuade Raghuji 
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to follow the Peshwa’s guidance and attend Ramraja at court to create a semblance of normalcy, 
but he vacillated and threatened to leave Satara.531   
By June 1750, it had become apparent that there were significant tensions between 
Ramraja and the Peshwa’s faction. Ramraja was vexed by their lack of consistent attendance at 
court, suspecting that they were scheming to replace him. His suspicions were not entirely 
unjustified. Govindrao and Yashwantrao’s circle alternately avoided and placated Ramraja while 
making arrangements for more extreme measures, should he prove to be ungovernable.532 
Ramraja did in fact show himself to be difficult to govern. He demanded Panhala fort, a 
possession of Sambhaji II; imprisoned Shahu’s daughter Santubai and expropriated her property; 
delayed business until his sister Daryabai Nimbalkar’s saranjām was properly established; and 
pressed Govindrao, Yashwantrao, and others for cash to cover his expenses.533 In one especially 
dramatic episode, the Peshwa’s newswriter on June 10, 1750 relayed that when Ramraja was 
hunting, he noticed two Kannada footmen passing by. When he asked who they were, they stated 
that they were servants of Govindrao who had come to take control of the fort. Infuriated, 
Ramraja began cursing at the people around him. These included Raghuji Bhonsle, who also 
started cursing. The fight would have escalated to the point of arms had two other prominent 
Maratha sardārs, Khanderao Jadhav and Burhanji Mohite, not taken their weapons away. 
Raghuji threatened to depart from Satara, and Ramraja protested that the Brahmans and the 
Kayastha Prabhus had joined together and co-opted the Marathas to cause trouble in his 
kingdom. Four days later, Ramraja again chastised Raghuji for his part in a perceived 
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conspiracy, and Raghuji acknowledged that Govindrao had been a source of disorder.534 The 
latter considered sending his family to Pune to escape Ramraja’s wrath.535 
Tarabai was no less dissatisfied with the state of affairs. Although she joined Ramraja 
and Raghuji Bhonsle for a meeting with the Peshwa at Pune in August 1750 to re-confirm the 
new dispensation, she ultimately hoped to replace him with Sambhaji II of Kolhapur, who no 
doubt harbored his own dreams of succession. But the Peshwa’s faction was dead-set against this 
plan. On November 14, 1750, the Peshwa wrote, “If Sambhaji is brought to the fort, everything 
will be destroyed. The fort should be searched from top to bottom. Govindrao should carry out a 
full investigation and bring news of Sambhaji through Bal Prabhu.”536 In late November, Tarabai 
convinced the superintendant of Satara fort to put Ramraja under confinement. She also laid 
plans to imprison Govindrao and Yashwantrao, who were working to re-establish their control 
over the superintendant and to free Ramraja.537 Govindrao’s relationship with the Peshwa had 
become strained due to this turn of events. Fearful for their safety, he smuggled his family out of 
the city and sought the Peshwa’s guarantee that they woud not be subject to any punitive 
action.538 In a January 1751 letter to Sadashiv Trimbak Purandare, the Peshwa elaborated, “I 
reminded Govindrao that he had been entrusted with the politics of the fort (gaḍce rājkāraṇ) and 
asked him why things had fallen apart. We spoke about this at length. He made the promises that 
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needed to be made.”539 Govindrao on February 8, 1751 lamented to the Peshwa’s brother 
Sadashivrao Bhau: 
Since the aforementioned [Mahadji Ambaji Purandare] came to Pune, he has not sent me 
even one letter, and I also have not written. My master [the Peshwa] might think badly of 
me, but he should be confident [in me]. I am very dejected…Please give [him] the 
reassurance that a servant has no support in the three worlds without his master. I will 
behave in accordance with any order that I receive. If I am ordered to present myself, I 
will come. There is no trouble with us servants. Wherever my master places [me], and 
whatever service he demands, I will do.540  
Despite these entreaties, it seems that the Peshwa’s faith in Govindrao’s ability to manage the 
situation at Satara never fully recovered.541   
Govindrao became a relatively marginal figure in the last stage of the prolonged 
succession struggle at Satara. In January and February 1751, while continuing to plot with 
Sambhaji of Kolhapur, Tarabai mobilized troops to take Satara by force. The Peshwa easily put 
down this insurrection, though a February 2, 1751 despatch stated that cannon fire from the fort 
had struck Govindrao’s and a goldsmith’s houses!542 More consequentially, Tarabai’s most 
powerful supporter among the Maratha mobility, Damaji Gaekwad, had conceded to the Peshwa 
by the rainy season of 1751. While all parties for the time being had been coerced into 
resignation, the Kulkarni pant pratinidhi family and their agent Yamaji Shivdev, who had lost 
much influence and territory after Shahu’s death, continued to look for opportunities to rebel, as 
I explored in Chapter 2. Having been instrumental to the establishment of the Peshwa’s 
executive authority, Govindrao and Yashwantrao on an individual basis seem to have had little 
influence in the years following Shahu’s death. Rather, it was at the court of the Bhonsle rājās of 
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Nagpur that Kayastha Prabhu officials, including members of the scribal lineage of Govindrao’s 
cousin Rakhmaji Ganesh, became major political players. 
Soldier-Diplomats and Succession Politics at Nagpur, c. 1751-1795 
 In the following two sections, I draw on the Chitnavis and Gupte bakhars along with 
published and original documentation to explore the service histories of Kayastha Prabhu 
households at Nagpur.543 As in Shahu’s administration, Kayastha Prabhus held several darakdār 
secretarial positions in the government of Raghuji Bhonsle, who had received the title of senā 
sāheb subhā in 1723. Just as Govindrao Khanderao recommended his uncle and assistant’s son 
Rakhmaji Ganesh for the position of Raghuji’s ciṭnavīs,544 Yashwantrao Mahadev put forth the 
name of Shankraji Rakhmaji to be Raghuji’s potnīs in charge of the treasury (jāmdārkhānā) and 
storehouse (koṭhī).545 One Narsingrao Chimaji Prabhu assisted Rakhmaji in his scribal work.546 
Rakhmaji’s heirs Chimaji Rakhmagad (d. 1780) and Krishnarao Madhav (d. 1803) acquired 
additional political duties, though they continued to hold the ciṭnavīs title (see Appendix A for 
family tree). While the first three diwāns of the Nagpur kings – Konherram Kolhatkar, Devaji 
Chorghode, and Bhavani Nagnath – were Deshastha Brahmans, Krishnarao Madhav ascended 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy to become one of Raghuji Bhonsle II’s top advisers. 
In addition to the Chitnavis household, a separate cluster of Kayastha Prabhu households 
left Satara to take up service with the Bhonsles. One such household was that of one Trimbakrao 
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Kanhoji Bhalerao. Trimbakrao was a member of a lineage holding the deśmukhī seat at Murbad 
in prānt Kalyan-Bhiwandi. Through a connection with the Mohite clan, Trimbakrao’s 
grandfather had come into the service of the first senā sāheb subhā Parsoji Bhonsle and relocated 
to Satara. Trimbakrao became a member of the staff of what was known as the devaḍhī or khās-
devaḍhī – the private quarters the royal women. Around the time of Raghuji’s visit to Satara, he 
was instrumental to arranging the marriage between Raghuji’s daughter Bakabai and Mansingh 
Mohite, which helped establish an enduring relationship between the Bhonsle and Mohite clans. 
Subsequently, he and his family relocated to Berar. Trimbakrao’s descendants Govindrao 
Trimbak and Narayan Yashwant served under Krishnarao Madhav Chitnavis. Narayan also 
married Krishnarao’s daughter and eventually inherited his title.547  
Another family with the same surname started their careers in military service. 
Narsingrao Bhavani Prabhu was an early follower of Raghuji commanding bodies of horse 
whose cousin (culat bandhu) Kashirao Laxman had been Sagunabai Bhonsle’s phaḍnīs and 
therefore another employee of the Satara devaḍhī. Kashirao later participated in negotiations 
between Pune and Nagpur. His sons Laxmanrao and Vyankatrao Kashi became diplomats for the 
Nagpur government. The three Gupte brothers Dinkar Vinayak, Shivaji Vinayak, and Umaji 
Vinayak were also part of the group of commanders that accompanied Raghuji in his marches. 548 
In 1750, while passing through the Balaghat range after paying his respects on the occasion of 
Shahu’s death, Raghuji was challenged by the sardār Santaji Athavale Samsher Bahadar. 
Bhonsle successfully solicited the central government to compel Athavle to bow to Bhonsle’s 
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rule.549 As these events are recounted in the Chitnavis and Gupte bakhars, Dinkar Vinayak and 
Shivaji Vinayak reached out to Athavle’s diwān Yashwantrao Dattaji, who was their kinsman, to 
procure this order.550 Whether or not this claim is accurate, it is clear that the Vinayak brothers 
made themselves useful enough to earn a place in the cavalry of the Raghuji’s teenage son 
Mudhoji Bhonsle, serving him on tribute-taking expeditions to the eastern coastal territories of 
Rajahmudry, Sikakulam, and Vizianagaram as well as on a 1755 campaign to capture the fort of 
Gawelgadh in central India.551  
It was during this formative period in Mudhoji Bhonsle’s princely adolescence that 
“Dinkar Vinayak’s son Mahipatrao Dinkar, while accompanying his father, became acquainted 
with Mudhoji Bhonsle. Because they were companions in riding horses (ghoḍī pherṇe) and 
shooting guns (bandukha cālavine), Mudhoji Bhonsle developed a strong affection for him.”552 
During the succession dispute between Janoji and Mudhoji in 1755-6, Umaji Vinayak had 
defected to Janoji; Shivaji Vinyak had died in battle; and Dinkar Vinayak had remained by 
Mudhoji’s side.553 Given Dinkar’s loyalty, and their adolescent martial companionship, 
Mahipatrao Dinkar was the obvious choice for the ṣubahdār post in Mudhoji’s new fiefdom at 
Chandrapur in the southern part of Berar. Over the course of his thirty-year career, Mahipatrao 
suppressed numerous challenges to his government in Chandrapur. For example, in 1762-3, two 
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individuals in the administration of Chandrapur fort, Abaji Bhonsle and Gangadharpant, joined 
with Mudhoji’s then-diwān Sadashiv Hari in a plot to hand over the fort to Janoji; however, 
Mahipatrao persuaded the diwān to desist, in part by bribing him with a position for his brother 
Vishnu Hari.554 After Janoji’s death in 1772, Mahipatrao suppressed another potential rebellion 
led by Raja Ballal Shah, son of Nilkanth Shah and the Gond ruler of Ballalpur, to re-take 
Manikgadh fort.555  
While monitoring the Chandrapur government, Mahipatrao Dinkar provided counsel to 
Mudhoji Bhonsle and coordinated diplomatic missions on his behalf. To do this work, he relied 
on the diplomatic services of the Kayastha Prabhu brothers Vyankatrao and Laxmanrao Kashi. 
Mahipatrao was a distant relation of their father Kashirao Laxman. Knowing Kashirao to be in 
good standing with the Peshwa, Mahipatrao recruited him to repair Janoji and Mudhoji’s 
relationship with Raghunathrao in the lead up to the battle of Rakshasbhuwan.556 Based on his 
performance in this assignment, Mudhoji assigned him work in the royal household, including 
the administration of his wife Chimabai’s affairs, along with jāgīr land at Shegaon and other 
villages to support his cavalry. Though he soon died in a scuffle with some warrior ascetics 
(gosāvī) who were raiding the territory around Chamorshi, his sons enjoyed long diplomatic 
careers under the supervision of Mahipatrao Dinkar.557 
The most politically sensitive mission that he assigned to the Kashi brothers involved a 
tangled web of events falling between between the death of Janoji Bhonsle on May 16, 1772 and 
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the murder of Peshwa Narayanrao on August 30, 1773. These events concerned the succession 
crises of the both the Nagpur and Pune governments. Before his death, Janoji had adopted 
Mudhoji’s young son Raghuji II as his heir, and while all parties agreed that Raghuji should be 
the holder of the senā sāheb subhā title, they could not agree on whom should be made regent. 
One faction led by the head munshī Bhavani Nagnath coalesced around Janoji’s brother Sabaji 
and widow Daryabai Bhonsle, while another led by Mahipatrao Dinkar backed Mudhoji. Both 
sides attempted to win the support of Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa, the ruler of Nirmal, and Ismail Khan 
Panni, the nawāb of Achalpur and the steadfast friend of the Bhonsles.558 Chitnavis and Gupte 
recount that Daryabai’s emissary Ramchandra Dado, the Bhonsles’ envoy at Hyderabad, alleged 
that Mudhoji intended to whisk Raghuji away to Chandrapur in order to use him as a pawn, but 
Vyankatrao Kashi in a separate meeting with the nawāb assured him that Mudhoji had no such 
plans.559 The nawāb initially refused to give anyone his support, perhaps in light of Daryabai's 
claim to be pregnant with Janoji’s child; however, Mahipatrao was able to mobilize a group of 
supporters among the Nagpur mobility.560 These supporters supposedly swore an oath with bel 
leaves at a Jogeshwar shrine in Budhwar Peth in Nagpur city. Mahipatrao’s meetings with 
Daryabai and the munshī were acrimonious, and having been warned that they planned to arrest 
him, he fled back to Chandrapur under cover of night.561  
By late February 1773, Sabaji Bhonsle and ten of his commanders sought out an 
agreement with Mudhoji Bhonsle that would contain three main provisions: Raghuji would be 
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accepted as if he was Janoji’s natal heir; Mudhoji would run the administration in accordance 
with Sabaji’s wishes; and both sides would demobilize their forces.562 Though Mudhoji 
ultimately declined to enter into it, the terms of the agreement reflect the severity of the military 
mobilization and political polarization that had transpired since Janoji’s death. The massive 
armies of the two opposing sides had clashed at Kumbhargaon near Balapur with no clear victor. 
In addition, both the Hyderabad and Pune courts had horses in the race. Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa 
and Rukn ud-Daulah Mir Musi Khan, the diwān of Nizam Ali Khan, aligned themselves with 
Sabaji and besieged Ismail Khan and Mudhoji at Achalpur in early 1773.563 Around the same 
time, the Peshwa had despatched an army against Mudhoji. Mahipatrao and his family were 
highly engaged in these various skirmishes. Mahipatrao’s brother Rajoba, son Balwantrao, and 
cousin Nimbaji Shivdev – Shivaji Vinayak’s son – alternately accompanied Mahipatrao in the 
field and stayed behind to defend Chandrapur from potential attack.564  
Meanwhile, realizing that Peshwa Narayanrao was firmly in Sabaji’s camp, Mahipatrao 
pursued a dangerous new alliance. After the initial outbreak of the succession conflict, he and 
Vyankatrao Kashi made a trip to Pune, where they met with the Peshwa’s kārbhārī Sakharam 
Bapu (for his earlier career, see Chapter 2). Based on Mudhoji’s June 10, 1773 letter to Bapu, we 
can infer that the goal of these negotiations was to cultivate Bapu’s, and by proxy, the Peshwa’s 
support for Mudhoji’s regency and to convey that the military conflict with Sabaji had taken a 
serious financial toll. Mudhoji stated that he would re-send Vyankatrao Kashi to Pune in a couple 
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days.565 But, in light of the Peshwa’s stubborn commitment to Sabaji, Mahipatrao attached a 
clandestine objective to the diplomatic mission that was subsequently undertaken by Vyankatrao 
and his brother Laxmanrao. This objective was to make contact with Narayanrao’s uncle 
Raghunathrao, who had been placed under house arrest for suspicion of colluding against his 
nephew. 
Since Narayanrao’s succession in November 1772, Raghunathrao faced increasingly tight 
security measures because of his refusal to desist from carrying on correspondence with external 
parties in hopes of securing partners in a coup d’etat. When the Kashi brothers were in Pune, he 
was not allowed to receive any visitors. Nevertheless, they were ultimately able to gain access, 
and in early September, they fixed the terms of an alliance between him and Mudhoji. 
Raghunathrao in a September 4, 1773 letter to Mudhoji relayed, “Vyankatrao Kashi and 
Laxmanrao Kashi made it clear that we are old friends and that your heart is pure when it comes 
to me. Taking this into consideration, I ordered Hari Viswanath and Vyankatrao Kashi to make 
the necessary arrangements for the health of your chiefdom and the benefit of the government. 
They will write, and Vyankatrao Kashi has been sent to inform you.”566 These arrangements took 
the form of two sets of articles of agreement in the names of Mudhoji and Raghuji Bhonsle. 
These articles addressed a range of financial and jurisdictional issues, but most importantly, they 
offered the senā sāheb subhā title to Raghuji in exchange for a gift of Rs 700,001 and vowed to 
ignore any objections (phiryād) that Sabaji might make against the new understanding (samjūta) 
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reached with Mudhoji’s government.567 The Kashi brothers’ diplomatic efforts bore fruit, but 
they narrowly escaped being implicated in a political storm brewing at the Pune court.  
Mere weeks before these terms of agreement were committed to paper, the young Peshwa 
was murdered by his bodyguards, a composite corps of north Indian mercenary troops known as 
gāḍadī, whom, as it came to light later, had been bribed by Raghunathrao to take some untoward 
action against his nephew.568 But in addition to Raghunathrao, many individuals at court were 
directly and indirectly implicated in the assassination of a young, weak, and by all accounts, 
extremely unpopular ruler. According to the Gupte and Chitnavis bakhars, these individuals 
included the Kashi brothers. They indicate that the Pune-based contacts who arranged for their 
meeting with Raghunathrao demanded their participation in the assassination plot, presumably in 
the form of cash for bribing Narayanrao’s bodyguards. They further specify that Sakharam Hari 
was one of these intermediaries and that Laxmanrao Kashi in particular made the transaction. 
While there is no direct evidence to substantiate the bakhars’ claims, three details are 
suggestive. First is the fact that Sakharam Hari and Mahipatrao Dinkar were distant relations 
within the same extended Gupte clan.569 Family connections, as we have also seen with respect 
to the Chitnis household, were important means of gaining access to higher circles of power. 
Second is the testimony (jubānī) offered by Vyankatrao Kashi himself to the bakhar writer 
Vinayakrao Aurangabadkar in the late 1810s or early 1820s:  
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Sabaji Bhonsle established a connection (sutra) with nawāb Nizam Ali Khan. In Pune, 
Raghoba Dada [Raghunathrao] established a connection with Haider Naik to help him 
with his plan to take control of the kingdom. As such, Mudhoji Bhonsle despatched me 
and my brother Laxmanrao to Dadasaheb. There Dada turned Sumer Singh and Isaf Gardi 
[Muhammad Yusuf Gardi] by means of nine lākh rupees, and I too was taken into that 
conspiracy (majalāhī maśwaratāt ghetle hote). So in the end, Narayan died.570  
Though provided long after the commission of the murder, the details of the testimony accord 
with those offered in separate accounts and therefore lend some weight to the supposition that 
the Kashi brothers abetted the conspiracy against Narayanrao.571 Third is the fact that Sakharam 
Hari, his brother Baburao, Baburao’s two sons, and two associates named Bhaskarrao Narayan 
and Mirza Fazal Beg were jailed in October 1776 for their participation in a revolt (phitūr). 
Among the terms of their imprisonment was that they were forbidden from receiving any 
Kayastha Prabhu clerks.572 Though the immediate revolt in question may have been the uprising 
of a pretender to the peśvā title named Sadashivrao Bhau in February of that same year, the 
brothers’ earlier support of Raghunathrao and his plots would have added further weight to the 
government’s justification for doling out a harsh sentence. Indeed, the record of Sakharam Hari’s 
imprisonment order impugns his character in quite general terms: “Sakharam Hari is a shrewd 
troublemaker. He never misses out on anything (kheḷyā rājkāraṇī āhe koṇī goshṭīs cukṇār 
nāhī).”573 These three pieces of evidence are suggestive of the ways in which Kayastha Prabhu 
caste and kin networks played a role in advancing the assassination plot against Narayanrao and 
other clandestine projects associated with Raghunathrao’s faction. What they do not support is 
the long-held assumption that these Kayastha Prabhu operatives were motivated by caste 
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resentment incited by Narayanrao’s institution of new rules constraining Kayashta Prabhu ritual 
practice. Instead, the motivations appear to be almost wholly political and partisan.  
Mahipatrao Dinkar and the Kashi brothers’ politicking at Pune may have been complicit 
in a bloody cout d’état, but it resulted in professional dividends. Having served in the capacity of 
ṣubahdār of Chandrapur, Mahipatrao was formally made Mudhoji’s diwān.574 Mudhoji 
expressed his appreciation for the Kashi brothers’ actions in a note dated 29 Muharram (probably 
April 11, 1774), the contents of which were included in the Gupte bakhar: “To Laxmanrao Kashi 
and Vyankatrao Kashi. You have performed our service loyally. It is a promise that your 
importance will be preserved for generations without deviation.”575 The mission at Pune seems to 
have been a watershed moment in this group’s transition from the status of mere soldiers to 
trusted soldier-diplomats. Nevertheless, their careers were not free from the vicissitudes of 
personal and factional politics, and they would have to continually search for new patrons and 
allies to protect their position within the Nagpur government.  
 The deal with Raghunathrao only further complicated the quarrel between Mudhoji and 
Sabaji Bhonsle. The leading members of the Pune ruling circle, which came to be called the 
bārābhāī, or twelve brothers, opposed Raghunathrao and pledged themselves to Narayanrao’s 
widow Gangabhai, whose son would succeed as Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao. In addition, they 
threw their weight behind Sabaji. These developments in the succession struggles at Pune and 
Nagpur culminated in the battles of Kasegaon and Panchgaon in March 1774 and January 1775, 
respectively. Following the first battle, Raghunathrao, now essentially a fugitive, fled to 
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Burhanpur, Indore, and eventually to Surat, where he sought the protection of the British East 
India Company. Vyankatrao and Laxmanrao Kashi continued to act as Mudhoji’s go-betweens 
with Raghunathrao, convincing him to lend the mercenary services of Muhammad Yusuf 
Gardi.576 In this same period, Sabaji’s faction locked up Mahipatrao Dinkar in Chandan fort. 
Thanks to the intercession of Vyankatrao Kashi, he was eventually released and promptly went 
on pilgrimage to Jejuri with another Kashi brother, Mahipatrao. On the way back towards Berar, 
they encountered a group of soldiers charged with their re-arrest but managed to divert them in 
another direction and hurried onwards to Malgani, where they stayed with Mahipatrao’s wife’s 
sister’s husband (sāḍū). While Mahipatrao was able to escape imprisonment, at least temporarily, 
Vyankatrao was arrested and confined until after the battle of Panchgaon.577 At Panchgaon, those 
members of the Kayastha Prabhu community who led cavalry units included Umaji Vinayak, 
Nimbaji Shivdev, and Rajeshwar Dinkar, who died in battle.578 Sabaji Bhonsle was also killed on 
January 20, 1775.579  
Sabaji’s death effectively nullified the Nagpur succession drama. Mudhoji Bhonsle began 
to rule as regent for his son under the direction of the former diwān Devaji Chorghode. The 
resurrrection of Chorghode, who had the confidence of Nana Phadnavis and the rest of the Pune 
ministers, sidelined Mudhoji’s Kayastha Prabhu companions at the Nagpur court. Due to a series 
of mishaps and misunderstandings, Mahipatrao Dinkar in particular lost the benefits of 
Mudhoji’s patronage. One of Nana Phadnavis’ many correspondents at Nagpur described the 
exigency of his situation on February 19, 1779: 
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Having said that he would send his mother on pilgrimage, Mahipatrao Dinkar obtained 
bills of passage (dastak) from Mudhoji Bhonsle and put his family on the road. He told 
me that he was sending his family on ahead and would join them after. I responded that 
he would not be allowed to leave. So he began to say, “What am I supposed to do if I 
won’t be given anything [to make a living] and won’t be allowed to leave? So now I will 
send my family. They will go to Sagar.” 
Sudden departures, particularly for pilgrimages or retreats from worldly affairs, were common 
acts of protest among political servants in eighteenth-century India; however, Mahipatrao’s 
departure from Nagpur seems to have been even more calculated. Later in this same year, he 
began working for Mudhoji’s brother Bimbaji Bhonsle, who presided over the far eastern part of 
the Nagpur state at Ratanpur and Raipur in today’s Chhatisgarh. Having lost his influence with 
one ruler, Mahipatrao simply turned to another.  
In 1779, Nana Phadnavis through Baburao Viswanath Vaidya, his envoy with the Nagpur 
Bhonsles, promised Bimbaji a hefty saranjām if he joined the Peshwa’s allies Mahadji Shinde 
and Tukoji Holkar on campaign in north India. Part of the motivation behind this offer seems to 
have been to deter the Nagpur ruling family from making overly friendly overtures to the 
Company government at Calcutta by creating competition among its members.580 Mahipatrao 
Dinkar and Vyankatrao Kashi were tapped to bend Bimbaji’s ear. In a June 3, 1779 letter to 
Vaidya, Bimbaji fretted, “Mahipatrao Dinkar and Venkatrao [Vyankatrao] Kashi have been 
despatched. Instead of coming directly here, they went to Burhanpur. They waited for a month 
and then went to Sagar. Then they were to come here via Mandla, but a fight broke out between 
the rulers of Sagar and Mandla. Because they met the Sagar ruler, the Mandla ruler would not let 
them pass. Mahipatrao stayed there with his people, and Vyankatrao came alone.” Eight days 
later, he notified Vaidya that he “sent a letter to bring Mahipatrao Dinkar here. He will come 
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quickly.”581 The agreement that they brokered with Bimbaji Bhonsle did not come to fruition. 
Rather, when Mudhoji’s son Khandoji Bhonsle returned from an unsuccessful campaign in 
Orissa in 1781,582 Bimbaji decided to come to Nagpur to mend fences with his brother. Escorted 
by Mahipatrao and Vyankatrao, he traveled from Ratanpur via Taktapuri and reached Nagpur in 
early August. This turn of events exasperated the representative of the Pune government: 
“[Vaidya] sent letters to Bimbaji Bhonsle and Mahipatrao Dinkar, who have arrived at Nagpur. 
The letters said, ‘You should not go to Nagpur. We have made an agreement (karār) with you. 
All things will come to pass in accordance with it. Have no fear, as Nana [Phadnavis] has 
conveyed his intention (mānas) and his promise (vacana).”583 In the process of facilitating 
fraternal competition and cooperation, Mahipatrao and Vyankatrao acquired a new patron and a 
new sphere of influence.    
While continuing to carry out the occasional diplomatic mission – such as in the 
Bhonsles’ negotiations with those who succeeded Ismail Khan Panni in the ṣubahdār post at 
Ellichpur584 – Mahipatrao Dinkar with the assistance of Vyankatrao Kashi parlayed his 
experience with Bimbaji into more a permanent role in the government of Chhatisgarh. Because 
the jungle tracts surrounding the capitals of Ratanpur and Raipur were tenuously held through 
tributary relationships with local Rajput and Gond chiefs, there was an almost constant need to 
re-impose dominance through both diplomatic and military means.585 For example, in early 
August 1783, Mahipatrao deputed Vyankatrao Kashi and Govindrao Mugutrao, a commander 
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who he had recruited during Sabaji and Mudhoji’s succession dispute, to give instructions to the 
widowed queen of Bastar on how she ought to direct government affairs.586 The rānī seems to 
have allied with her Gond subjects to throw off Nagpur’s overlordship: “The kingdom of Bastar 
has become disorderly. The rājā was an effective man, but he has died. Many days have passed. 
The chieftains (mawās) have seized the fort and the kingdom. The rānī and her son do not 
obey.”587 While the forces of Govindrao Mugutrao were to quell the armed insurrection, 
Vyankatrao was to assume charge of the administration and to set up the Rajput dynasty along 
the lines of the more quiescent tributary Gond kingdom of Deogadh. On May 18 of the following 
year, it was reported that while the rānī had been appeased, Vyankatrao was struck in the head 
by a rock during a scuffle with the local fort keepers (gaḍīwāle).588 Diplomats, especially those 
despatched to independent-minded and potentially hostile vassal states, were not immune from 
violence. 
Mahipatrao helped manage a similar situation that developed within the main 
Chhatisgarh government in the years after Bimbaji Bhonsle’s death in 1787. By January 1789, 
the Nagpur authorities had begun receiving reports that Bimbaji’s widow Anandibai was running 
the province on her own terms. In response, the head general at Nagpur left for Chhatisgarh with 
a cavalry force of 500-700 and met with Anandibai at Ratanpur. But his overtures only angered 
Anandibai, and the local fief-holders who he contacted refused to submit. He was forced to wait 
for backup.589 Then, as it was reported in February, “Mahipatrao Dinkar brought cannon and 
assaulted and took Raipur. The zamīndārs and kamāvisdārs made themselves available. 
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Realizing this, Anandibai created confusion, but those who were close to her explained, ‘What 
you are doing is not good and will have no effect. They will use the cannons to take this place 
and imprison you. Then you will have to live in prison.”590 The combination of Mahipatrao’s 
assault and these strong words compelled Anandibai to finally submit to the will of the Nagpur 
government. While the head general returned to Nagpur, Mahipatrao stayed on to put the 
administration on a surer footing.591 
In the final years of Mahipatrao’s career, he continued to assist in the dangerous work of 
holding down the frontiers of the expanding Nagpur state. News reached Nagpur on May 25, 
1789 that he had conquered the northwestern outpost of Sohagpur. Though 56 were injured and 
20-25 killed in the action, the surrounding country would yield as much as 1 ½ lākh rupees in 
revenue. He nearly lost his life about a year later in an assassination attempt from within his own 
cavalry unit. On the evening of Saturday, June 12, 1790, Mahipatrao spent a few hours with 
Raghuji Bhonsle II in his palace until hearing the sound of the nightly clanging of the palace 
kettledrums. He decided to return to his tent. Outside the palace, he started to mount his horse in 
the thick darkness of the Amavasya night. Just as he was placing his feet in the stirrups, two men 
armed with swords attacked him from behind. They managed to stab him twice in the arm before 
they were noticed and fled on foot in two different directions. When they were captured and 
questioned, they identified themselves as Rajputs from Mandla working for Mahipatrao’s cavalry 
officer (śiledār), who had neglected to pay their wages. They begged and pleaded until 
Mahipatrao threw them in prison, a decision, they believed, that stripped them of their honor 
(ābrū). One Mahadji Bhonsle in the circle of the late Bimbaji Bhonsle freed them, and they 
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hatched a plan to re-gain their honor by force. Notwithstanding their pitiable tale, the assassins 
were given the harshest possible punishment – they were shackled, imprisoned in a tower, and 
trampled by elephants the following morning. Mahipatrao’s two wounds were dressed with 21 
and 18 stitches each. Though it was reported about two weeks later that the wounds had begun to 
heal, he was suffering from a fever and a cough and sent his cousin Nimbaji Umaji to lead the 
Chhatisgarh army in his stead.592  
Having survived war, imprisonment and assassination, Mahipatrao earned the second 
ṣubahdār title of his career in early 1791. On January 18, it was recorded that he received a 
headdress (śirpeñca) and the robes of the post of ṣubahdār of Chhatisgarh.593 Later that year, his 
old partner Vyankatrao Kashi received a new assignment as vakīl with Mahadji Shinde, the 
Maratha ruler of Gwalior and wakīl-i muṭlaq of the beleaguered Mughal emperor Shah Alam. 
Having defended his supremacy in north India, Shinde set out for the Deccan to challenge the 
leadership of Nana Phadnavis. From Raghuji Bhonsle II’s perspective, his passage was an 
opportunity to settle some vexing territorial matters. As he himself explained to Nana in a letter 
dated May 25, 1791: 
Mahadji Shinde’s district and this district are right next to each other. The collectors there 
pick fights with each and every negotiation (jāb-sāl). Hence from the beginning a person 
from here has stayed there to handle the work of negotiation. Now, in Harda district, 
chiefs (mawāsā), Gonds (gondī), and others have come into conflict regarding the 
revenue collection (māmlat). So Vyankatrao Kashi has been sent to him. He will stay 
there and negotiate.594  
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Vyankatrao had tried to initiate a correspondence between the two rulers prior to this occasion, 
but Shinde had denied that there was a need for an envoy.595 Perhaps in light of his new plans for 
the disposition of the Pune government, he seems to have had a change of heart. His meeting 
with Vyankatrao restored the kind of familial intimacy that had predominated in their earlier 
relations, and he proposed a second meeting with Raghuji at Asirgarh. The latter was less 
enthusiastic: 
Patilbuwa [Shinde] is going to the country (deś) after twelve years. He and Nana have not 
met. Everyone will be suspicious if we meet before that, and if they are suspicious, what 
benefit will come of us meeting. Bearing this in mind, I have replied to Vyankatrao that 
Shinde is coming after many days. If we meet before him and Nana, everyone will be 
suspicious, and there is no precedent for such a separate meeting. In any case, his journey 
to the country is happening. After that, if he thinks it best, let him invite us to Pune to 
meet.596  
So Mahadji Shinde continued onwards to Pune, where he eventually died in February 1794. 
Vyankatrao continued to participate in tense negotiations between Raghuji II, Nana Phadnavis, 
and Mahadji’s son Daulatrao concerning the Peshwa’s succession following the death of Sawai 
Madhavrao in October 1795.597 Nana and Shinde were adversaries in this dispute, and so 
Vyankatrao’s second stint in diplomacy may have been cut short at the former’s request.598 
Vyankatrao’s subsequent confinement is the last available reference to an extremely long and 
wide-ranging career in government service. 
The Social Life of Politics  
 The Satara ciṭnīs Govindrao Khanderao’s son Laxmanrao, whose own son 
Raghunathrao’s unsuccessful machinations to acquire a piece of the Chitnis patrimony were 
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discussed in the previous chapter, arrived at the British East India Company port of Surat at the 
start of January 1780. Representing the Pune government, his mission was to persuade the 
Company to release the disgraced former Peshwa Raghunathrao and to cede the island of Salsette 
(Sashti), now the location of the northern suburbs of Mumbai. Ultimately, the Company acceded 
to neither demand, prolonging the conflict known as the First Anglo Maratha War (1775-1782). 
Nana Phadnavis bitterly reflected on the failure of Laxmanrao’s delegation in a letter to the 
Baburao Viswanath Vaidya on April 1, 1780: 
The English had written to send a respected person (mātbar) so Laxmanrao Chitnis had 
been sent. He and the English spoke at Surat for four months. In the end, they were not 
inclined to give up Dadasaheb [Raghunathrao] or Sashti. [These are] arrogant things 
(magrūrīcyā goṣṭī). On the outside, they talk sweetly (goḍa bolāve), but on the inside, 
they prepare for war. So it is necessary to defeat them. The English have clenched from 
all four sides (cahū diśe ākarshaṇa kele āhe). We have no faith (bharaṃsā) in what they 
will do at what time.599  
Nana articulated some of the major premises of the new and steadfastly anti-Company Maratha 
politics galvanized by the challenge of Company territorial expansion. The evolution of this 
politics out of an entrenched tradition of jawāb-suwāl will be the subject of the next chapter. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I will trace the career of one of its most notable practitioners, the 
Kayastha Prabhu scribe Krishnarao Madhav, explore the sociality of politics at the Nagpur court, 
and comment generally on the transformed sociological distribution of power at Maratha courts 
at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
  Just as the political influence of the Chitnis households at Satara and Pune waned after 
the Peshwa’s assumption of executive authority – notwithstanding the limited roles of 
individuals such as Laxmanrao Govind and Mahipatrao Avaji Chitnis – that of the related 
Nagpur Chitnavis household began to wax. Govindrao Khanderao’s referral of his cousin 
Rakhmaji Ganesh for the office of ciṭnavīs under Raghuji Bhonsle was only one manifestation of 
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a dense network of social relations linking Kayastha Prabhu service households at these courts. 
Four years after his trip to Surat, Laxmanrao Govind departed from Satara for Nagpur, where he 
was to be married at the home of Mahipatrao Dinkar, presumably to Mahipatrao’s daughter.600 
While Mudhoji made some objection to the choice of bride, causing the wedding to be delayed 
or canceled entirely, the wedding of Laxmanrao’s son Rajeshwarrao later took place at 
Nagpur.601 These relations also reached outside the court. For example, it was conveyed on May 
22, 1789 that a group of Nagpur officials had traveled to the Chitnis residence in Jaitapur. The 
quarrlesome cousins Ramrao Jivaji and Laxmanrao Govind played host, distributing betel-leaf 
and four types of textile: Paithani sāḍīs, turbans and scarves, fine-cotton dhotīs, silk embroidered 
with gold and silver.602  
Such personal and familial connections facilitated the expansion of the patronage and 
influence of the Chitnavis household. When Chimaji Rakhmagad died childless in July 1780, 
Krishnarao Madhav (Vaidya), the son of Chimaji’s sister, became ciṭnavīs.603 Although 
Krishnarao, or Kushaba as he was more affectionately known, was outside of Chimaji’s 
patrilineal line of descent, he was considered his adopted son.604 Prior to this, Krishnarao had 
served as an apprentice (śāgird) of Babaji Govind, the son of Govindrao Khanderao, earning a 
stipend of three thousand rupees per year. When he became ciṭnavīs, his stipend increased to five 
thousand rupees. By the early nineteenth century, when his brother Gangadharrao had inherited 
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the title, the family claimed Rs 2,700 in annual mokāsā revenue.605  In addition, Krishnarao 
managed a substantial secretarial staff. A Kayastha Prabhu father-son pair named Appaji 
Sakharam and Naro Appaji helped him with his scribal duties.606 Other staff members included 
the clerks (and perhaps, brothers) Malharrao Gopal and Vyankatrao Gopal and the assistant 
Narayanrao Yashwant, whose forebear Trimbakrao Kanhoji as mentioned earlier was recruited 
by Raghuji at Satara.607 The assistance of these helpmates was critical to Krishnarao’s ability to 
take advantage of opportunities for professional advancement and to divert more of his energies 
to diplomacy. 
Babaji Govind and Krishnarao Madhav were among the courtiers and officials regularly 
attending upon Raghuji Bhonsle II.608 Even personal developments within the Chitnavis 
household attracted the ruler’s notice. For example, on the day of the Vijayadashmi, or October 
8, Krishnarao’s brother Balwantrao Madhav fell ill with a fever. Ten days later, he died. The 
court-reporter further relayed that he was a very smart man; that his wife became a sati; and that 
Krishnarao was sorrowful, as God had dealt him a major blow (iśvara[ne] tyācā mothāca ghāt 
kelā).609 Raghuji and his brother accompanied by Babaji Govind and others paid a visit to 
Krishnarao’s house to console him in early November.610 Similarly, in August 1790, Raghuji 
consoled Krishnarao on the death of his mother after having paid a visit to the home of 
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Mahipatrao Dinkar, who had been injured in battle.611 The presence of the ruler also marked 
more auspicious occasions such as the marriages of two of Krishnarao’s daughters on May 1, 
1791 and the investiture of Babaji’s son with the sacred thread on April 2, 1792.612 These formal 
routines and rituals of elite social intercourse were not merely ceremonial. Rather, they 
recognized the stature of an individual official and his household, created trust between him, 
other officials, and the ruler, and granted access into circles of political decision-making.   
Krishnarao began to obtain real political influence in the late 1780s when a series of 
major deaths facilitated a shift in the distribution of power at court. Raghuji’s father and regent 
Mudhoji, uncle Vyankoji, and brother Khandoji died between 1787 and 1789. Their Persian 
scribe and leading counselor Bhavani Nagnath died in 1789.613 Along with Nagnath’s grandson 
Shridhar Laxman, who inherited the title of munshī, Krishnarao began to assume the 
responsibility of advising Raghuji II.614 By mid 1790, Krishnarao Madhav and Shridhar Laxman 
– both members of scribal lineages – were widely considered to be Raghuji Bhonsle’s leading 
counselors.615 In this capacity, they collaborated in shaping and executing the political agenda of 
the government of Raghuji Bhonsle II. They traveled together to Pune to carry out diplomatic 
missions, composed joint letters, and reviewed and approved all sanads and official 
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documentation.616 While Shridhar Laxman applied the lakṣmikānta mark (niśāṇa), Krishnarao – 
or perhaps one of his assistants – wrote out the date and the word bār denoting that the document 
had been recorded in a daybook or ledger.617 In fact, they worked together so closely that in the 
letters of Pune’s news-writers, they were very often referred to simply as the kārbhārī or 
ubhayatāṃ kārbhārī (both administrators).618 Baburao Viswanath Vaidya verified the integrity of 
their working relationship in a letter to Nana Phadnavis dated February 7, 1791:  
It has been a month and a half since I arrived here. I have spoken in person [with Raghuji 
II] five to ten separate times. Our conversation has been uninterrupted, and I have 
received appropriate answers. He has much prudent judgment, cautious intelligence, and 
care for worldly affairs. He attends personally to the management of the government. The 
man close to him, Krishnarao Madhav, is very capable. He manages things with the 
munshī’s grandson Shridhar Laxman. They are of one mind. They are very skillful in 
their work and are held in great esteem. Nothing happens without [their] approval.619       
Given that Baburao, like his father Viswanathbhat, had served as the Pune government’s envoy 
with the Nagpur Bhonsles since the late 1770s, his approbation of the fitness of the two 
counselors was meaningful.  
From February 1791 to August 1792, Krishnarao Madhav, Shridhar Laxman, and 
Baburao Viswanath Vaidya met regularly for secret consultations (khalbat) regarding business to 
be discussed in a proposed diplomatic visit to Pune.620 Because the Nagpur kārbhārī began 
sending updates from Pune in August 1794, we may infer that they made the journey sometime 
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in the two-year interval.621 The purpose of this visit was to conduct jawāb-suwāl regarding the 
assignment of the Peshwa’s territory of Mandla in central India to the Bhonsles.622 Nana 
Phadnavis in exchange hoped to renew the Peshwa’s alliance with the Bhonsles in anticipation of 
an armed confrontation with Nizam Ali Khan over arrears of cauth revenue. In the longer term, 
Nana also sought to counterbalance the East India Company’s politicking with the Nizam.623 In 
an August 28, 1794 note to Raghuji II, Krishnarao Madhav described a meeting between Nana 
Phadnavis and Nizam Ali Khan’s representatives, Mir Alam and Rai Raiyan Renukdas Dhondaji, 
in which “a bag of letters was conveyed to Shrimant Raosaheb [Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao] and 
read. It was written in them that the two [Krishnarao and Shridhar] who have been sent are full 
delegates (mukhtyār). Bhonsle will act [accordingly]. Everyone is aware of the issue of the 
English. Whatever has already happened, we do not wish to involve the English.”624 What is 
significant about this letter is that it suggests how the threat of the English had created new 
grounds for collaboration between the leading powers of the Deccan, principally the Peshwa, the 
Bhonsles and the Nizam, through the intermediation of the kārbhārī and other diplomatic agents. 
In subsequent letters, the kārbhārī continued to keep their master informed of political 
developments involving these powers.625 Although the negotiations between the Peshwa and the 
Nizam ultimately failed, resulting in the battle of Kharda of March 11, 1795, those between the 
Peshwa and the Bhonsles were more productive. The Bhonsles fielded a large force of upwards 
of 30,000 men on the Peshwa’s side at Kharda. Their participation contributed to one of the last 
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Maratha victories prior to Company rule.626 But this military success would not have been 
possible without a sustained process of diplomacy – one that preceded and outlasted the clash of 
arms – executed by scribal-diplomatic intermediaries like Krishnarao Madhav and Shridhar 
Laxman.  
Following Kharda, the Nagpur kārbhāri returned to Pune to iron out the remaining terms 
of the Bhonsles’ new agreement with the Peshwa. The Bhonsles received authorization to 
appropriate revenues from certain districts south of the Narmada River in lieu of irregular 
ghāsdāṇā exactions and to establish full control over Gadha-Mandla.627 This agreement led to 
swift military action. The kārbhārī notified Raghuji on April 7, 1796 that Hoshangabad, a key 
stronghold in Gadha-Mandla held by the nawāb of Bhopal Hayat Muhammad Khan, had been 
captured after two attacks.628 At the same time, they aimed to support Nana Phadnavis’ efforts to 
manage the succession dispute set in motion by the death of Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao in 
October 1795. On November 24, they expressed confidence that “whatever may be in Nana’s 
mind” – namely, arranging for Sawai Madhavrao’s widow Yashodabai to adopt an heir rather 
than conferring the peśvā-ship on one of Raghunathrao’s sons Bajirao and Chimnaji, who were 
locked up in Junnar fort – “will come to pass. The Nizam has agreed. It will be settled in just a 
few days.”629 But the situation as it evolved by late February 1796 required more caution and 
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alertness (sāwadhī va huśārī) then they first anticipated.630 They relayed the news that the 
teenage Gwalior ruler Daulatrao Shinde had concocted a plan to bring Ragunathrao’s sons into 
his custody and install the elder Bajirao on the throne; however, Nana Phadnavis preempted him 
by sending his own general to Junnar to escort them to Pune. By June, the younger Chimnaji was 
made Peshwa, but Nana’s own position had become untenable. Vyankatrao Kashi, then still in 
the diplomatic service of the Shindes, on April 27, 1796 conveyed the sentiment of many of the 
Maratha chiefs assembled for Chimnaji’s coronation that Nana ought to be removed from the 
administration.631 Nana was forced to leave Pune for his retreat in Mahad. 
At this critical juncture, the kārbhārī became more deeply involved in Nana Phadnavis’ 
machinations to retain control over the succession process and the Pune government in general. 
He sought to use them to make a new ally out of the Nizam’s former minister Ghulam Saiyid 
Khan Moin ud-Daulah, who had been imprisoned in Pune since Kharda. In a letter dated 
November 17/8, 1796, they reported that they met with the minister and exchanged words of 
reconciliation (saphāī). When the kārbhārī asked “what course (cāl) ought to be taken and in 
what manner (itikartavya) and how our master ought to be reconciled,” he replied: 
Going forward my master and your master should be in agreement (aik-ityafāk). 
Information (itallā) about any counsel (sallā-masalat) should be exchanged. Your master 
should not take any advice without our having such information, and my master should 
not take any advice without your having it. Both sides should act with unity (aik-
vākyatene). Your master should not speak to anyone about my master’s affairs without 
my knowledge. In response, we responded that this was very good. Your and our 
master’s counsel should be as one.   
Having agreed to these terms, they discussed the merits and demerits of the two sides in the 
succession dispute. In the minister’s opinion, unlike Shinde, who had behaved with disrespect, 
Nana was far-sighted and kindly disposed to the Peshwa and, more pragmatically, had control 
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over the resources of the state. Yet he also felt the English were powerful potential allies, 
suggesting – perhaps not without apprehension – that if Nana courted them, he would effectively 
become the lord of Hindustan (hindustānace khāvind). Further reflecting on the total situation of 
the Deccan, they noted that on one side were arrayed the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Bhonsles, 
and on the other were the foreigners (parakī), the English and Tipu Sultan, with whom they 
maintained diplomatic relations (karār-madār). Whatever bickering might arise between the first 
three powers, they should not allow the English to interfere in light of their desire to gain a 
foothold in the Deccan.632 As will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, diplomacy 
drew on a highly realistic and totalizing political calculus. The exchange of symbolic words, 
gestures of fidelity, and sacred objects co-existed with an acknowledgement of the competing 
probabilities and eventualities of politics.  
Krishnarao Madhav and Sridhar Laxman ended up on the right side of this particular 
succession fight. With the Nizam’s support, Nana returned to Pune and replaced Chimnaji with 
his brother Bajirao, thus extending his power over the government for a couple more years. 
Krishnarao Madhav and Shridhar Laxman, on the other hand, received more lasting rewards in 
the form of permanent jāgīrs. The prospect of personal gain from diplomatic work had been 
integral to their relationship with Baburao Viswanath Vaidya back in the days of Kharda. About 
a month after the battle on April 5, 1795, Vaidya and the two kārbhārī entered into a karār-nāmā 
stipulating that they would work together and divide equally whatever profits accrued from their 
work. The substantive text of the agreement reads: “It is decided in the presence of god that the 
three of us have made an agreement of friendship. Any assignment that we receive and anything 
we accrue [from it] will be divided equally into three parts, and there should be no deception 
between us. Accordingly, this agreement has been fixed with our personal signatures.” Their 
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three names appear on the backside of the document followed by the promissory phrase “mānya 
ase.”633 This outline of a distribution of profits turned out to be a kind of proposal for the actual 
allotment of inām rights between Krishnarao Madhav, Shridhar Laxman, and the Bhonsles’ 
Hyderabad envoy Ramchandra Dado.634 The ciṭnavīs and the munshī claimed about Rs 3000 in 
revenues in the villages of Manegaon and Palshi, and in Sawargaon and Takli-Mahuli, 
respectively.635 These rights to revenue formed a stable part of their financial portfolios until the 
months and years after the Second Anglo-Maratha War of 1803 when the Company began to re-
examine various proprietary claims within the territories that straddled the jurisdictions of the 
Pune and Nizam governments. The scribal-diplomats and many others were forced to petition the 
Company resident at Nagpur to retain the rights they had been rewarded for previous acts of 
service. Thus, Kharda turned out to be a fleeting moment of success not only for the Maratha 
state, but also for the talented individuals who practiced politics on its behalf. 
Conclusion: Bartering Maratha Politics at Baroda  
 In Chapter 3, I noted that Prayagji Anant Phanse, the kiledār at Satara, was one of many 
Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhus to occupy civil and military posts in forts in the early Maratha 
state. Based on two accounts of his lineage first published in Kāyastha Prabhūñcyā Itihāsācī 
Sādhane, which in all likelihood share a single author, as well as the Chitnis bakhar, Prayagji 
was nearly killed in an explosion during Aurangzeb’s siege of Satara in 1699-1700. Buried under 
                                                
633 BISM, Vaidya Daftar, rumal 21, no. 14, karārnāmā dated April 5, 1795. 
 
634 The original intended recipient of the third portion of this reward is unclear. While Baburao Vaidya is 
specified in the karārnāmā, archival documents demonstrate that inām rights to Waygaon and Mundgaon 
were assigned to Ramchandra Dado, then to Baburao Vaidya’s son Narayanrao, and finally to 
Ramchandra Dado’s son Yashwantrao Ramchandra. The Gupte bakhar states that Vyankatrao Kashi was 
the first intended recipient, but when he fell out of favor with Nana Phadnavis, his portion was re-
assigned to Dado. See NBB, ed. Kale, 184, 187.  
 
635 BISM, Vaidya Daftar, rumal 21, unnumbered yādī document. 
 
 227 
rubble and debris, he was somehow spotted by a search party and escorted back to the fort, 
where Chhatrapati Rajaram rewarded him with several villages in inām.636 Among these was the 
village of Kalambe in tāḷukā Parali. Prayaji’s son Jyoti Anant alias Appaji inherited this inām 
along with rights to a small annual sum for the feeding of Brahmans and various other expenses 
associated with the upkeep of a temple of the family deity Yavateshwar that was perched on a 
hill to the west of Satara.637 Little else is known of Jyoti, but his son Bhaskar Jyoti alias Raoji 
Appaji would become the most influential broker at the court of the Maratha Gaekwad dynasty 
of Baroda (now Vadodara in the state of Gujarat), in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.638 A sketch of his career, which will conclude this chapter, re-affirms the social 
mobility and political aptitude of Kayastha officials while raising new questions about the status 
of politics in relation to the growing dominance of the British East India Company.    
  Like many of those operatives examined in this chapter, Raoji Appaji obtained his 
foothold in the circles of power of the Gaekwad household by brokering the thorny politics of 
succession. When Damaji Gaekwad died in 1768, the succession was divided between his eldest 
son Sayajirao and several junior sons, including Fattesingh, Manaji, and Govindrao. While in 
service with the latter claimant, Raoji Appaji’s brother Chimnaji Jyoti was killed in an action 
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near Songad involving officials appointed by Fattesingh.639 Around the time of the death of 
Peshwa Madhavrao Ballal in 1772, Raoji Appaji seems to have transacted a deal with certain 
Pune-based merchant-moneylenders, including principally Balaji Naik and Gopal Naik Bhide, to 
finance an expedition through Gujarat into north India projected by Govindrao Gaekwad in 
conjunction with Mahadji Shinde and his then-diwān Khando Awaji Tambekar. Raoji’s role in 
the transaction was to stand surety for re-payment:  
Bhide understood that Patilbaba [Mahadji Shinde] planned to go (because such eminent 
persons do not speak a lie) and said that he would give the funds. But when he said that 
Raobuva [Raoji Appaji] should acquiesce to it in order for him to give, Raobuva was 
brought, and he said what Mahadji Shinde had discussed with the Peshwa. Then the Naik 
[Bhide] said, “I will give the money if you state this on your assurance (tumce khātrīvar 
sāṅgāl tar rupaye deto).” At that time, [Raoji Appaji] off to the side said, “I have told 
you what has happened. But they are leaders, and I am poor. So what means do you think 
I have? How would you stop them through me? You are a powerful intimate of the 
government. It will not come to my attention if your money is lost.” Bhide responded, “I 
will not press you [for the money.] Just say yes in their presence, and let us do the work.” 
Having said this, they spoke in front of both [Shinde and Govindrao]. Bhide wrote up a 
deed (khat), and [he said], “I do not put my attention on this. The money will have to be 
recouped from you. If you acquiesce, I will give; otherwise, I will not give.” Then Raoba 
looked at Khandopant [Tambekar], and he said, “Why are you afraid? If a master like 
Patilbuva will give, then what is the significance of this money?” Raoba said, “Ok, it 
shall be given,” and Naik caused the money to be given. So many merchants and 
moneylenders were involved and lākhs of rupees were acquired.640          
It is impossible to corroborate this narrative of the interactions involved in the deal, but it offers 
some sense of the way in which Raoji gradually become entangled in web of financial and 
political transactions guaranteeing the Gaekwad succession.  
Raoji’s skills in cutting deals and making connections to wealthy and influential contacts 
at the Pune court were central to securing Govindrao Gaekwad’s succession after Fattesingh’s 
death towards the end of 1789. According to an autobiographical narrative written by Gangadhar 
Shastri Patwardhan, Raoji befriended his father Krishnarao Patwardhan, who was the family 
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priest (upādhye) of the powerful Pune minister Haripant Tatya Phadke, and it was through the 
Patwardhan household that Raoji was able to convince Phadke to engineer Gaekwad’s claim to 
the Baroda throne.641 Patwardhan’s text recounts a series of meetings between Raoji, the 
Patwardhans, and their many associates at Pune and Menavli, culminating in the conferral of the 
title of senā khāskhel in exchange for major financial and territorial concessions.642 After Raoji 
began to perform the work of diwān for Gaekwad, he maintained his relationship with 
Gangadhar Shastri Patwardhan, who eventually became the Company resident’s intermediary 
between Pune and Baroda. Hence in a July 7, 1799 letter from the so-called Shastri Daftar, 
compiled by a grandson of Gangadhar’s clerk Yashwantrao Bapuji Marathe, Nana Phadnavis 
wrote to Gaekwad, “You sent Raoji Appaji to carry the government’s business. The 
aforementioned carried out the government’s business and furthermore has executed any and all 
agreements related to the negotiations (puḍhe jāb-sālāce karār-madār kele āhet). So now he has 
taken leave and come to you. He will explain everything in detail.”643 Though Gangadhar’s 
relationship with the family deterioriated as he became closer to the Company, it remained 
strong during Raoji’s lifetime. He even petitioned the Peshwa to allow Raoji to undergo a 
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shrāvaṇa ceremony for the renewal of his sacred thread against the long-standing objections of 
orthodox Pune Brahmans.644  
 More broadly, the ascension of Raoji Appaji marked a transformation in the Baroda 
administration in which Kayasthas, and particularly Raoji’s own relations, benefited 
enormously.645 His brother Babaji Appaji became commander of the Gaekwad’s forces, and he 
became the leaseholder of certain revenue farms formerly held by Pune appointees. His cousin 
Raghunath Mahipatrao alias Kakaji became Govindrao’s son Bhagwantrao’s administrator.646 So 
enormous were the private benefits of public office that the family was willing to barter away 
Baroda’s political independence to protect them. Earlier, in the 1770s, the Gaekwad brothers had 
appealed to the Company for military support in their succession dispute, but it was only after 
Govindrao’s death in 1800 that the Company found its opportunity. Believing Govindrao’s 
successor Anandrao to be incompetent, various members of the massively indebted Gaekwad 
royal household attempted to oust Raoji by winning over the fractious Arab mercenaries and 
paymasters who composed the majority of Baroda’s armed forces. On Raoji’s invitation, the 
Bombay governor Jonathan Duncan in 1802 deputed a force under Major Alexander Walker to 
defeat his enemies and take control of the city.647 The resulting Company-Baroda treaty, struck 
on March 15, 1802, arranged for the installation of a Company subsidiary force at Baroda.648 On 
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June 8, Raoji received a document from Duncan guaranteeing his family’s permanent possession 
of the office of diwān.649 After his death, his relations continued to enrich themselves off of top 
posts in the government, including through Babaji Appaji’s mulūkgirī tribute-taking expeditions 
into the Kathiawar peninsula.650 But the independence of the old Maratha regime was effectively 
lost.  
 Raoji Appaji’s career bears several family resemblances with those of the Kayastha 
Prabhu officials examined in this chapter. He and his forebears traced their lineage back to a 
distinguished follower of the Chhatrapatis; combined appointments in civil and military offices 
with durable inām rights to revenue; obtained political influence by brokering agreements in key 
moments of dynastic transition; and offered considerable patronage to relations and caste-
fellows. As I have explored in this and the prior chapter, the emergence of a common pathway 
from service to politics among Kayastha Prabhu officials reveals the extent to which the political 
domain of the Maratha Empire had become accessible to a wider range of skilled service groups 
in the eighteenth century. At the same time, Raoji Appaji’s pathway tells a cautionary tale about 
the potential costs of the intimate relationship between political practice and social mobility. 
Raoji and those like him transacted politics not only to secure the stability and prosperity of the 
polity, but also to benefit themselves and their familial and social networks. The absence of a 
firm division between the political and the social, and between the public and the private, 
became one of several important grounds for the British East India Company’s condemnation of 
Maratha politics and eventual conquest of what it termed the Maratha “confederacy.” The 
Company’s encounter with Maratha politics is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Company and the “Confederacy,” 1778-1803 
“इंग्रजी जात केवल काबूच ेयार. 
The nature of the English is altogether that of a cunning friend.” 
-Letter from Malharji Varpe to Nana Phadnavis, Nagpur, May 1780651 
 
 Soon after the British East India Company fired the opening shots in the second of three 
Anglo-Maratha Wars, Raghuji Bhonsle II of Nagpur in a September 7, 1803 letter to his fellow 
Maratha ruler Yashwantrao Holkar characterized the Company in the following terms: “The 
influence of the English has grown from all directions (iṅgrajāñcyā cālī cahuṅkaḍūn jālyā āhet). 
Therefore it is resolved that we will not fail to retain our influence in the same manner and break 
the English, and in observing them, there is no longer any doubt. Since all of us are united, the 
plot that they seek to execute will not come to pass.”652 Bhonsle’s premonition of the quadra-
directional growth of Company territorial power across the Indian subcontinent echoed anxieties 
present within Maratha governments since the late 1770s and early 1780s. Making use of the 
talents of the class of jawāb-suwāl practitioners examined in the previous two chapters, including 
the Nagpur scribal-diplomats Sridhar Laxman and Krishnarao Madhav, Maratha governments 
organized concerted responses to the threat of Company territorial monopoly. Even as the 
Company took a more assertive stance towards Maratha governments, its discourse about 
Maratha statehood increasingly centered on the idea of “confederacy.” Lacking any discernible 
king, country, or constitution, the Maratha state in this discourse amounted to little more than a 
conspiracy of “confederates” with a common lust for predation and plunder. This chapter 
examines the ways in which the interplay between these two processes – the Company’s 
interpretation of Maratha “confederacy” and the response of Maratha governments to this 
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interpretation and its corresponding policies – tested and ultimately destroyed the practice of 
Maratha politics.  
The Company-Maratha encounter was a significant episode in the making of the Second 
British Empire. Vincent Harlow coined the phrase “swing to the east” to describe the renewed 
interest in exploration and trade in the Pacific Ocean that he strongly associated with the 
founding of this empire in the period leading up to and following the loss of the North American 
colonies in 1783. Harlow argued that the ideal empire continued to be a commercial, not a 
territorial one, though the case of India was “exceptional.” It was India that most strongly 
represented what the empire had become in Harlow’s estimation, namely “a coloured Empire, 
ruled not through representative institutions, but by a strong benevolent bureaucracy directed 
from London.”653 Echoing Harlow, P.J. Marshall has argued that Britons re-imagined an empire 
in which domestic liberty and overseas despotism were compatible.654 Broadening the scope of 
this line of argument, C.A. Bayly has emphasized how the establishment of overseas despotisms 
across the empire was a response to the social, political, and economic transformations of ancien 
régime states. These transformations included not only the American and French Revolutions, 
but also, for example, the fragmentation of the Mughal Empire and the emergence of new 
regional states in South Asia.655 British elites increasingly associated imperial service with their 
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role as “protector of Crown, Church and Constitution” in a world beset by rebellion and 
revolution.656  
In a slightly different vein, Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford have recently argued that the 
British “imperial constitution” of the late eigtheenth and early nineteenth centuries was a “fluid 
vernacular” for the expression of an ideology of strong executive authority tempered by a 
benevolent and impartial justice.657 The imperial constitution became a paramount, protective 
authority over a “field of smaller sovereignties” through the formation of subsidiary treaties and 
agreements with non-British states.658 Such diplomatic arrangements, as Michael Fisher and 
Robert Travers have demonstrated, drew on Mughal and post-Mughal norms, conventions, and 
systems of political communication, such as the circulation of articles of agreement to formulate 
alliances, while also cutting off or dramatically limiting the ability of Indian states to manage 
their existing political relationships.659 The courtly gift economy in which earlier Company 
officials had participated to their own enrichment was increasingly viewed as an indication of the 
corruption of Indian states.660 In short, the pre-colonial practice of politics became a problem to 
be managed within the ambit of the British imperial constitution. This chapter shows that the 
                                                
656 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 107. 
 
657 Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International 
Law, 1800-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 3. 
 
658 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, 23. 
 
659 Michael Fisher, “Diplomacy in India, 1526-1858,” in Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian 
Ocean Worlds, c. 1550-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 249-281; Robert Travers, 
“A British Empire by Treaty in Eighteenth Century India,” in Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European 
Expansion, 1600-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 132-160.   
 
660 For two very different evocations of how East India Company understood and intervened in the pre-
colonial gift economy, see Natasha Eaton, “Between Mimesis and Alterity: Art, Gift, and Diplomacy in 
Colonial India, 1770-1800,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 46.4 (2004): 816-844; Sudipta 
Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 60-88. 
 
 235 
Maratha “confederacy” was one such problematic state incorporated by diplomacy and force into 
the British imperial constitution. 
This chapter consists of three sections on the Company-Maratha encounter. First, I follow 
the attempts of Governor-General Warren Hastings to intervene in the Bombay Company 
government’s conflict with Pune by pursuing an alliance with Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur in the 
years leading up to the First Anglo-Maratha War. When this intervention led to war on the 
western coast, the ministers Nana Phadnavis, Devaji Chorghode, and their collaborators 
deployed practices of jawāb-suwāl to forge an anti-Company alliance between Pune, Nagpur, 
Hyderabad, and Mysore. The second section examines eighteenth-century English and Persian 
historical writing on the Maratha state, culminating with the extraordinary research of the 
resident Charles Warre Malet (1753-1815) at the Pune court. I argue that ethno-historical notions 
of Maratha plunder and Brahman avarice undergirded the Company’s emergent theory of 
Maratha statehood. Finally, the third section shows how Governor-General Richard Wellesley 
developed and operationalized this theory. Emphasizing the dangers of an unconstitutional 
“confederacy” between predatory Maratha “chieftains,” he made a case in the Second Anglo-
Maratha War of 1803 for an armed intervention to restore the just constitutional authority of 
Peshwa Bajirao II. The Nagpur scribal-diplomats Krishnarao Madhav and Sridhar Laxman were 
among those who made one last-ditch effort to forge a unified Maratha response to Wellesley’s 
intervention. As I suggest in the conclusion, the alliances and dependencies that emerged 
between the Company and Maratha governments created a path to the Company’s 1817-1819 
war of extirpation against any and all “predatory” elements threatening the permanent peace of 
India.    
Miscommunication and the Beginning of the Anglo-Maratha Encounter 
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The encounter between the Maratha Empire and the British East India Company unfolded 
over the course of the First (1775-82), Second (1803-5), and Third Anglo-Maratha Wars (1817-
8). Prior to these wars, there had been minor engagements between the Marathas and the 
Company over control of the western coast and coastal trade across the Indian Ocean.661 
Competition escalated tensions between the Company government at Bombay and the Maratha 
government at Pune. In December 1774, the Bombay government attacked and seized the 
Maratha outpost of Thane on the island of Salsette (Sashti). In February 1775, Raghunathrao, 
whose schemes with Mudhoji Bhonsle’s Kayastha operatives were discussed in the previous 
chapter, fled to the port of Surat in search of succor, obtained it by the treaty of Surat of March 6, 
1775, and returned to Gujarat to confront the joint armies assembled by the ministerial council of 
the Pune government. Though Bombay pursued its own interests without much regard for the 
approval or disapproval of its overlords in Bengal, Hastings in his capacity as Governor-General 
took responsibility for the broader geopolitical eventualities that its actions might precipitate.662 
He countered Bombay’s alliance with Raghunathrao by sending Lieutenant Colonel John Upton 
to negotiate an agreement with the Pune government, which after more than a year of difficult 
negotiations materialized in the treaty of Purandar in March 1776. The British would retain 
Salsette; in return, Raghunathrao would permanently resign from public life.  
At the same time, Hastings considered how best to capitalize on the relationship between 
the Company and the Bhonsles of Nagpur. This relationship had emerged in the early 1760s 
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through intermittent negotiations regarding re-instatement of cauth payments that fell into arrears 
after then-Governor Robert Clive’s acquisition of the revenue administration of Bengal, Bihar, 
and Orissa (conventionally known as the diwānī) in 1757. Janoji Bhonsle was desperate for cash 
to pay his army’s wages; however, Clive did not hold the cauth claim in very high esteem.663 He 
advised the Bengal nawāb Mir Qasim, who had been installed after the removal of his 
predecessor Mir Ja’far, not to pay. He also insinuated that if he wished to to re-conquer Cuttack, 
the headquarters of Nagpur’s ṣubahdārī government in Orissa, they would support him.664 
Instead, Mir Qasim rebelled against the Company and was defeated in the Battle of Buxar of 
1763. He and his ally Shuja ud-Daulah, the nawāb of Awadh, then invited Janoji to join them in 
return for a hefty sum of 30 lākh rupees.665 Unmoved, Janoji reported these machinations to 
Clive and re-committed to a strategy of pursuing a settlement of the cauth issue through 
diplomatic means.  
In the late 1760s, the Nagpur government adopted a conventional strategy of jawāb-
suwāl diplomacy in its search for a resolution of the cauth question. It deputed a regular envoy to 
Calcutta, the first of which was the wealthy merchant-ascetic Udaipuri Gosain. While Janoji 
Bhonsle hoped that Clive would hand over the cauth monies directly, Clive’s own envoy Mir 
Zain ul-Abidin Khan reached Nagpur in early 1767. He accepted Janoji’s friendly offer of bel-
bhaṇdār and a sacred śāligrāma stone.666 In December, Janoji demanded that these tokens of 
friendship be reciprocated with “a treaty sanctified by the sign manual [seal?] of the King of 
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England, attested by the Governor’s signature, sworn to on the sacred pages of the Evangelists, 
and solemnized by invocations.”667 Unfortunately, these symbolic professions of friendship did 
not immediately conjure a substantive agreement. Clive was willing to remit thirteen lākhs to 
Nagpur, but only in exchange for the province of Orissa, a major territorial concession that Janoji 
disputed on the basis of its lack of precedent.668 After a brief silence during the 1769 war 
between Pune and Nagpur, negotiations re-opened in 1770. Bad faith prevailed on both sides. 
Company officials repeatedly evaded Udaipuri Gosain’s efforts to strike a deal. They objected 
that the gosāvī had no authorization to sign a treaty, stating that there was no “instance in which 
a person of obscure origin in Europe may have been sent with a verbal message to a prince and 
procured a treaty from him on the strength of that message alone.”669 Growing tired of the back 
and forth of this “empty communication (khālī jāb-sāl),” Janoji invited the ousted rulers of 
Bengal and Awadh to march to the Narmada River to form a joint anti-Company force. 670 By the 
time of his death in 1772, and the commencement of a three-year succession struggle between 
his brothers Mudhoji and Sabaji, neither the issue of cauth nor Orissa had been resolved.671 
It was in this context that Warren Hastings converted Bombay’s conflict with Pune into a 
scheme to install the regent Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur as the sovereign Chhatrapati of the 
entire Maratha Empire. For Hastings, such extraordinary means were jusified by extraordinary 
circumstances. In May 1777, he received intelligence from Bombay that the Pune government, 
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mere days after hosting Mudhoji’s son and the senā sāheb subhā Raghuji Bhonsle and his 
minister Devaji Chorghode, had extended its hospitality to a French ambassador named 
Chevalier de St. Lubin. The intelligence suggested that St. Lubin hoped to contract an alliance 
with Nana Phadnavis to support a French assault on the western coast and perhaps a general 
invasion of the Company’s territories.672 It was even believed that St. Lubin had invited all 
French subjects residing in Pune to come to Nana’s house one day at the end of June 1777 to 
witness the swearing of oaths. Eyewitness reports suggested that “there was some written 
instrument; on one side of which Nana swore by the cow and to the other side Mons. De St. 
Lubin swore by the holy Evangelists; that Nana farther kept the book Mons. De St. Lubin was 
sworn on.”673 The Bombay government considered such alarmingly vivid intelligence to be 
further grounds for effecting a regime change on behalf of Raghunathrao, who, they believed, 
had drummed up support among the rivals of Nana Phadnavis.674 Hastings expressed his 
approbation in February 1778 by ordering a battalion of the Company’s army in Awadh to march 
from Kalpi to Bombay to support whatever preemptive action they might take.675  
The internal deliberations of the Supreme Council suggest how Company officials were 
becoming increasingly preoccupied with the threat of French invasion. Though it was the 
Company’s policy to avoid unnecessary “schemes of conquest,” Hastings’s interventions 
foreshadowed the way in which Britain’s global war with the French would engulf its 
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relationships with both colonial and independent governments.676 In light of the American and 
French Revolutions, and from the British perspective, the loss of the American colonies to the 
conflagration of Francophone revolutionary sentiments, many Company officials believed that 
war was necessary to prevent dramatic social and political upheaval. In the Maratha case, the 
Company’s counter-revolutionary war evolved from Hastings’ scheme for regime change to a 
just war of constitutional restoration under Wellesley to a war of extirpation against “predatory” 
states in the 1810s. At the same time, this early stage of the Company-Maratha encounter reveals 
the frequent miscommunications and misinterpretations that beset the Company’s decision-
making process, dependent as it was on intelligence derived from its limited penetration of the 
information and communication networks of Indian governments.677 
In a January 28, 1778 minute, Philip Francis (1740-1818), a member of the Council and 
Hastings’ most ardent critic, objected that Bombay’s actions ignored the Council’s supreme 
authority, violated the treaty of Purandar, presumed that Raghunathrao had dependable allies 
within the Pune ruling circle, and disregarded the insuffiency of resources for a large-scale 
military campaign. Moreover, he doubted the wisdom of giving “the utmost attention to the 
Preservation of Peace in India, but at this Conjuncture more particularly than at any other, while 
a Considerable Part of the national force is employed in America, and while the apprehension of 
a War with France and Spain hangs over the Councils of the Nation.”678 When Hastings pressed 
Francis to clarify whether he would acquiesce to aiding the Bombay government should it 
become entangled in an actual war, Francis stated that he would only acquiesce to defensive 
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measures, not to “measures of an offensive nature against the Maratta State.”679 In late February, 
as Hastings prepared orders for Colonel John Leslie to lead a force across India, Francis even 
went so far as to ask “what right have we to make use of Force, to prevent the French from 
obtaining such a grant by Negotiation with an independent state.” He was unconvinced that an 
“advantageous Treaty or Alliance” was worth “engaging the Nation in a War with France.”680  
Subsequent messages from the Bombay council sharpened the bite of Francis’ criticism. 
On April 5, 1778, the Bombay council expressed “the uncertainty of our situation” in light of a 
recent “revolution” in the Pune court that disempowered Nana Phadnavis and therefore rendered 
intervention on behalf of Raghunathrao unnecessary. Francis argued that the detachment ought to 
be immediately recalled. Hastings disagreed. He strongly repudiated Francis’ suspicions about 
the veracity of the reports of French intrigue at Pune: “Does he really regard the Letters and 
Presents delivered to the Peshwa from the King of France, by the Chevalier St. Lubin, the written 
Engagements declared by Mr. Mostyn to have been enterchanged by St. Lubin and Nanna 
Furnese [Nana Phadnavis]…as Facts of a doubtful Nature?”681 Hastings linked these interactions 
to the fact that two French ships, the Brilliante and the Sartine, the latter of which had carried St. 
Lubin to Chaul, rather than proceeding to China as originally planned docked at the French port 
of Mahi. St. Lubin appeared to be the head of a French conspiracy that could easily prey upon “a 
system of disjointed and discordant parts, which the Government of Bombay may hold together, 
but no other Power can, or, by withdrawing their Grasp, let it fall to Pieces.”682  
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Hastings was transfixed by the notion that the Maratha state was a “system of disjointed 
and discordant parts” either on the brink of either total domination or total collapse. In a January 
1777 letter to Alexander Elliot, future envoy to Nagpur, Hastings fretted that “so sudden a 
revival and reunion of the powers of this great empire…indicate a degree of vigour in its 
constitution which cannot fail to alarm the friends of the Company.” Yet, he also argued that 
there was no time like the present for “advancing the interests of the Company, and extending 
their influence and connexions.” His argument was premised on perceived weaknesses in the 
Maratha state. First, he claimed that the “confederacy” between the Peshwa, the Nizam, and the 
Bhonsles of Nagpur, “all possessing mutual claims on each other, and swayed by opposite 
interests, cannot hold long together.” Secondly, he pointed to the Pune government’s “want of 
constitutional authority,” by which he meant the Peshwa’s rule on behalf of the Chhatrapati. 
Finally, he sought to take advantage of the “seeds of civil discord” sown by the death of Janoji 
Bhonsle. All of these weaknesses, he concluded, could become the enabling conditions for a 
“general system…to extend the influence of the British nation to every part of India.” By taking 
advantage of the apparently disjointed and confused character of the Maratha state, he might lay 
the groundwork for such a system of British power over the Indian subcontinent.683 
The Bombay council vacillated in its proceedings – first rescinding and then reinstating 
its orders for Leslie to march west – while Francis and Hastings on the Bengal council became 
increasingly unable to agree to a common set of facts. It had been reported that the Brilliante had 
sailed from Mahi to Mangalore to transport men and military stores for the Mysore ruler Haidar 
Ali.684 Based on this news, Francis argued that the supposed Franco-Maratha alliance was a 
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chimera. Hastings challenged Francis, complaining that “by this method of selecting partial 
passages, and by an artificial application or combination of them…it is in his power not only to 
pervert the original meaning of the text but to draw any conclusions from them he pleases.” 
Francis reverted that it was “a Fact, which is not disputed, that the French have lately sent 
Military Assistance to Hyder Ally,” to which Hastings replied that the Bombay council “do not 
assert this as a fact.” Rather, they only established the “simple intention” of the French lending 
their support to Haidar Ali. Finally, he countered Francis’ “conjectural conclusions from an 
unascertained fact” with “an unauthenticated fact admitting of but one Conclusion,” namely that 
the Pune government continued to maintain a friendly disposition toward St. Lubin.685 
Francis and Hastings’ disagreement about the construction of facts shaped their different 
interpretations of how events within India would impact the course of global politics. Francis 
was apalled at how Bombay’s sudden reversal displayed a reckless disregard for the hazards of a 
long-distance march, which for him were recently demonstrated by General Burgyone’s 
surrender at Saratoga in October 1777 during the American Revolutionary War. He wondered 
“whether Policy and Prudence, do not plainly dictate to us, that, while the Nation is so deeply 
engaged and pressed on one side, with everything to apprehend from the designs of France and 
Spain on the other, we should stand on our defence.”686 Hastings’s interpretation of the 
significance of events in India and America was rather different: 
I hope that our affairs in America are not in the desperate situation in which they are 
described to be; but I see no Connection between them and the Concerns of this 
Government; much less can I agree that, with such superior advantages as we possess 
over every Power which can oppose us, we should act merely on the defensive, and 
abruptly stop the operations of a Measure of such importance to the National Interests, 
and to the national safety, as that in which we have now decidedly engaged with the Eyes 
of all India upon it. On the contrary, if it be really true that the British Arms and 
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Influence have suffered so severe a check in the Western World, it is the more incumbent 
on those, who are charged with the Interests of Great Britain in the East, to exert 
themselves for the retrieval of the National Loss.687 
The defeat of British arms in America recommended opposite courses of action in India to 
Francis and Hastings. Whereas Francis advised defense, Hastings advised offense. Whereas 
Francis voiced a cautious pragmatism, Hastings linked the status of British arms in the eyes of 
the world, and especially of India, to the status of the British nation.  
It was at this uncertain juncture that Hastings pursued Mudhoji Bhonsle as an alternative 
candidate for installing a pro-Company Maratha regime. This intervention would have serious 
consequences not only for Company policy towards Maratha governments, but also Maratha 
governments’ policy towards the Company, which in response to such interventions became 
more unified and deliberate. The groundwork for more friendly relations between Nagpur and 
Calcutta had been re-laid through the Nagar Brahman merchant-diplomats Beniram Pandit and 
Bishambar Pandit Dube.688 In early July 1778, Leslie’s troops reached Chhatarpur, about 250 
kilometers from the Narmada River, where Mudhoji, on Hastings’ instructions, had sent a 
delegation to replenish their supplies.689 On the basis of letters received and possibly solicited 
from the Peshwa, Mudhoji sought to reassure Hastings that St. Lubin had been dismissed from 
Pune; that his purpose was primary commercial; and that the extension of hospitality to him was 
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a mere diplomatic courtesy, not an indication of disloyalty.690 Hastings rejoined that he had 
reliable intelligence of a treaty between the French and the “principal Brahmins” of Pune. He 
promised to fully involve Mudhoji in any steps he might take towards a resolution of this matter, 
“not only because he [Mudhoji] is the principal chief of the Mahratta Empire but because he is 
also connected by blood with the ancient Rajas of Satara.” To this end, he sent an ambassador, 
Alexander Elliot, to negotiate “a treaty of perpetual peace between the Maharaja and the 
English.” 691 The extent to which Hastings’ attention had shifted from Raghunathrao to Mudhoji 
is indicated by the fact that he instructed the Bombay council not to conclude any sort of treaty 
that might jeopardize Elliot’s negotiations at Nagpur.692 
Hastings’ July 18 instructions to Elliot further elaborated an historical understanding of 
Mudhoji’s connection to the “ancient Rajas of Satara,” and therefore, claim to the Chhatrapati 
title: 
A Natural Jealousy has ever subsided between his Family and the Government of Poona. 
This has been heightened into a confirmed Animosity by Acts of mutual Violence. He 
has strong Pretensions if not an absolute legal right to the succession of the Rajah, or 
Sovereign Authority of the Maratta State, vacant by the Death of the late Ramraja; and 
the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, who has always been connected with the French, and is 
now in close Union with the Ministers of Poona, is from his Situation the natural Enemy 
of the Government of Berar, and personally that of Moodajee.693  
Hastings’ recap of recent Maratha history contains major inaccurancies. Neither the Nizam nor 
the Peshwa were “natural” enemies of the Bhonsles of Nagpur; rather, as I argued in Chapters 1 
and 2, they co-existed in a delicate balance as equally successful successors to Mughal rule in the 
Deccan. Secondly, though it was true that “acts of mutual violence” had at times fractured 
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relations between the Pune and Nagpur governments, tensions between them had significantly 
diminished by the late 1770s.  
 Elliot would not be the one to enlighten Hastings on these points of misunderstanding. En 
route to Nagpur, he died of fever at Sarangadh between late September and early October 
1778.694 Around the same time, Leslie died and was replaced by his second-in-command General 
Thomas Goddard.695 Hastings vested Goddard with full powers of diplomacy, which the latter 
carried out through his paymaster, Lieutenant Dalhousie Watherston. In addition, Hastings 
ordered two additional battalions under the command of Major Jacob Camac to proceed to 
Nagpur’s western border in the expectation that they would eventually join Goddard. In late 
December 1778, Watherston began to send regular reports of his conversations with Mudhoji 
Bhonsle, Devaji Chorghode, and the Peshwa’s envoy Baburao Viswanath Vaidya. What he 
discovered was not exactly what Hastings had imagined when he concocted his plan to elevate 
Mudhoji to the Chhatrapati seat.  
Before Watherston reached Nagpur, Mudhoji had argued that the delay caused by Elliot’s 
death and Pune’s openness to reconciliation made military action imprudent.696 But Watherston 
painted an even more comprehensive picture of the diplomatic commitments of the Nagpur 
government. On December 20, 1778, he wrote, “They have a thousand arguments to oppose 
those I urged in favour of the plan for assuming the dignity of Rauge of Sittara [rājā of Satara]. 
They gave a long detail of the past Transactions of their history, the connections which they have 
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since formed and the treaties solemnly entered into by them.” More particularly, he explained, 
“They say they have sworn to an alliance of friendship with the present Paishwa Pundit Purdhan 
Madhurow [Sawai Madhavrao], which they cannot violate.”697 In a subsequent letter, 
Watherstone also reported that Mudhoji had an “intimate connection and Friendship” with 
Nizam Ali Khan’s feudatory Ibrahim Beg Dhaunsa, “whom he esteemed as his own son.”698 
Ultimately, Watherstone blamed Devaji Chorghode for Mudhoji’s ambivalence: 
Perhaps he [Devaji Chorghode] thinks his own honour concerned in the maintaining the 
treaties, betwixt the Nizam and Paishwa, which he himself brought about, and there is 
even some room to believe he may have entered into negotiations of a very secret nature 
with the ministry at Poona who are Brahmins like himself, nor do I imagine it can be his 
wish to see the power of the Brahmins totally annihilated, which would be the inevitable 
consequence of placing a Rajpoot of the Authority of Moodhoji in the throne of Sittara.699 
Watherstone’s belief that Brahman cabalism dominated Maratha politics would become a 
popular theory under the resident Charles Warre Malet. In addition to obscuring the divisions 
between Brahman sub-castes and the political contributions of non-Brahman Kayastha Prabhus, 
which have been explored in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, this belief excluded the possibility that 
governments were motivated to maintain peaceful relations for pragmatic, not identitarian or 
ideological reasons.  
The conclusion of Watherstone’s delegation was that the Nagpur government would not 
pursue an alliance with the Company as long as it continued to support Raghunathrao.700 As it 
turned out, Bombay had concluded a new treaty with Raghunathrao on November 24, 1778 and 
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readied a force to march on Pune on his behalf.701 The march ended in a retreat under fire and 
surrender by mid-January. Francis continued to believe that Hastings all along intended to pursue 
“Schemes of Conquest and Ambition.”702 He argued that forming an offensive alliance with 
Nagpur was Hastings’ “first object” in organizing a detachment to march across India.703 In 
answer to this imputation, Hastings claimed that a Company-Nagpur alliance had been 
considered for years and re-iterated his conviction that an alliance would have been possible if 
not for Bombay’s rashness.704 He again advocated a general re-orientation to an offensive 
posture on the basis of the weakness of the Maratha state. He explained, “The Marhatta Empire 
was in its full vigor, its parts entire, its possessions extending from the Banks of the Jumna to the 
Walls of Seringapatam…It is now proposed to assume an ascendant over this no longer dreaded 
state.”705 If it was more suitable to take military action against a weak state rather than a strong 
state, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that Hastings had aimed to execute an 
offensive war.  
Nana Phadnavis certainly seems to have acted on this conclusion in devising his own 
scheme of conquest, one that would be the first of several efforts among Maratha government to 
organize a coordinate response to Company encroachment. From the mid 1779 to early 1780, he 
finalized a plan with the Bhonsles of Nagpur, Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad, and Haidar Ali of 
Mysore to organize a joint military action against the Company. The Company designated this 
plan as the “Quadruple Alliance,” a term that somewhat occludes the strategy on which it was 
                                                
701 Selections, ed. Forrest, vol. 1, 334-8. 
 
702 BL, Western Manuscripts, Add 38402, ff. 61a. 
 
703 BL, Western Manuscripts, Add 38402, ff. 63b. 
 
704 BL, Western Manuscripts, Add 38402, ff. 78a-b. 
 
705 BL, Western Manuscripts, Add 38402, ff. 85a. 
 
 249 
founded. As Nana Phadnavis and his representatives articulated, the strategy was to apply strain, 
or more literally, to stretch (tāṇ basavṇe), the Company from four directions (cahuṅkaḍūn).706 
Specifically, Pune’s army would engage Goddard in Gujarat; the Bhonsles would invade Orissa 
and Bengal; the Nizam would attack Srikakulam on the eastern coast; and Haidar Ali would 
attack Channapatna in the Karnatak.707 This quadra-directional strategy made full use of Nana 
Phadnavis’ sophisticated communication apparatus to incentivize participation by extending an 
opportunity for individual governments to regain territory and revenue lost to Company 
encroachment (e.g. Orissa for the Bhonsles, Srikakulam and the remaining Northern Circars for 
the Nizam). In the case of Nagpur, the yādī agreement struck with Pune on September 22, 1779 
included a kalam promising a new saranjām in Gadha-Mandla and the title senā bahādar to 
Mudhoji’s son Khandoji Bhonsle.708   
While Nana Phadnavis engaged the self-interest of individual actors, he also argued for a 
shared interest in repelling the Company’s divisive geopolitics of subcontinental conquest. In 
December 1778, he warned the Bhonsles: “English sincerity is false. Professing sincerity to 
many, they slowly gained a foothold, talked sweetly, and acquired many kingdoms.”709  
Similarly, he wrote to Haidar Ali on August 4, 1780 that “the intention of the British is to take 
the three kingdoms of Haidar Khan, Shrimant [the Peshwa], and the Nabob [Nizam Ali Khan]. 
                                                
706 NA, ed. Shejwalkar, vol. 1, nos. 121, 195, pgs. 129, 209; APYV, eds. Sardesai, Kale, and Vakaskar, 
nos. 266, 273, pgs. 243, 249. 
 
707 Nana Phadnavis also hoped to win the support of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II and his 
commander-in-chief Mirza Najaf Khan. See APYV, eds. Sardesai, Kale, and Vakaskar, no. 274-5, pgs. 
249-51. 
 
708 For the agreement, see BL, Mss Marathi, D36, ff. 15a-16b; APYV, eds. Sardesai, Kale, and Vakaskar, 
no. 138, pgs. 137-42. Sanads issued in 1186 (1785 CE) divided the grant of Gadha-Mandla between 
Khandoji and his brother and the senā sāheb suhbā Raghuji Bhonsle. See PD, Ghadni Daftar, rumal no. 
515, sanads dated 10 Jilkad and 7 Saban 1186 and yādī dated 1186.  
 
709 NA, ed. Shejwalkar, no. 199, pg. 217. 
 
 250 
By any means necessary, they will break one off, defeat another, and when one remains, conquer 
it.”710 The Company’s divide-and-conquer strategy stemmed from a fundamentally deceitful 
nature. “The nature of the hat-wearers [the English] is unfaithful (be-imān) and dishonest 
(pharebī). They will impose their counsel on one party and create confusion,” he wrote to Haidar 
in another message.711 Similarly, he asked Sadashiv Ram Gune, his representative at Nagpur, 
“For the past three or four years, how have the English behaved? They say one thing and do 
another. They act with an eye to chicanery. Neither their speech nor their writing is correct 
(pramāṇa).”712 Nana’s critique was grounded in a prevailing culture of communicative politics, 
one in which the Company was a novice participant. As I have argued through this dissertation, 
the integrity of one’s word was the central question in jawāb-suwāl negotiations, and it was 
equally salient in relations between the Maratha governments and the Company. The Anglo-
Maratha encounter was not only a war of arms, but also a war of words. 
The entirety of the communicative process of jawāb-suwāl is evident in the negotiations 
leading up to the issuance of the 1799 agreement between Pune and Nagpur. In a September 13, 
1778 letter, Nana Phadnavis reminded Devaji Chorghode: “It was when you came to Purandhar 
[Purandar] that you won my full confidence (khātarjamā pakī jahalī).” Devaji’s visit to 
Purandar, which he made with Raghuji Bhonsle in the previous year, is a refrain in the letter. A 
few lines later, he stated, “You came and made it so that only [our] bodies were separate (śarire 
mātra bhinna itake karūn gele).” Even more dramatically, he declared, “When it was announced 
across the earth that you came to Purandhar (purandharāvar cālūn āle he pṛthvīs jāhirāṇā 
jāhale), a powerful sign of perfection became evident to all. Perhaps you will recall that in your 
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worship of god, you should wish for my wellbeing. God revealed the fruits of this. Amidst such 
heartfelt affection (mamatā) and purity (svachhatā) and love (prem), I have received news that 
you regard me with doubt (sandeha).”713 Whereas face-to-face speech was a powerful means to 
build trust, hearsay and rumor in the interim could easily sow doubt. 
In lieu of face-to-face contact, the correspondents at Pune and Nagpur resorted to the 
more mediate device of the promissory note. On December 31, Nana Phadnavis wrote to 
Mudhoji Bhonsle, “Divakarpant [Devaji Chorghode] left here to go to you. You heard what he 
had to say. I have received the holy basil and pigment [turmeric] (śrīvarīl tuḷśī va gandha) and a 
hand-written letter (khāsdastūr patra) with a promise to god (śrīcī śapath) that you, your sons, 
and your grandsons would remain by my side and that nothing would come between us.” He 
specified that the basil was planted in a gold pot (sonyācī ḍabī) in a separate message to Devaji. 
Expressing his satisfaction (santoṣa) and confidence (khātarjamā) in the intentions behind these 
gestures, and to reciprocate them, Nana too despatched a basil plant with turmeric.714 Several 
months later, Nana received a similar promise-bearing letter (śapathpurvak patra) accompanied 
by a gift of bel-bhaṇḍār from the Ujjain ruler Mahadji Shinde, who at several junctures in his 
career challenged his leadership within the Maratha state.715 Just as the attachment of a spoken 
oath to a mahzar had the function of mediating juridical conflict, its attachment to a letter in the 
context of jāb-sāl had the function of mediating political conflict.716 In both instances, 
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textualization converted a direct, but ultimately fleeting gesture into a more stable, but less 
immediate device capable of sustaining relationships across time and space.  
Devaji’s promissory note did not have the desired effect of assuaging Nana’s doubts. 
Devaji told Nana that he became aware of a note that the latter personally wrote to Baburao 
Viswanath Vaidya about his fears of the Bhonsles and the Company joining forces upon hearing 
of the approach of Leslie’s battalion towards Nagpur. As Devaji wryly put it, “When such words 
are issued in a handwritten letter, I know full well how much faith you have. His lordship [Nana] 
wrote that there has been not the least discrepancy from us in the past few years, yet he also 
wrote this letter. Let it be. God is the master. To continually elaborate is dishonorable, and I am 
tired of making promises to Raoji [Baburao Viswanath Vaidya] and both Naiks [the court news-
writers].” Devaji went on to plead that he was unable to visit Pune personally to remove 
whatever misgivings had arisen regarding his conduct precisely because the Company force was 
stationed at a distance of only 100 kos, or about 115 miles. In his customarily frank style, he 
averred, “I am an honest servant (mī imānī sevak āhe), and my master is honest. This has been 
proven in the last several years. Later too, God will prove it.”717 
About two weeks later, Devaji repeated these sentiments and rather dramatically added, 
“The learned Sadashiv Buwa [Devaji’s physician] has seen the state that I am in. Though my 
chest might burst and kill me, still through the merit of his highness Maharaj Raosaheb [the 
Peshwa], I would be saved. Such is the cruelty that has befallen me. So it is. God is the giver of 
the fruits of action.”718 Devaji’s performance of abjection in these letters was a device designed 
to solicit pathos, and ultimately, to reset the terms of his relationship with Nana. In the coming 
weeks and months, Devaji repeatedly reminded Nana that he was a loyal and devoted servant. In 
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one letter, he refigures their master-servant relationship in terms of familial affection, again 
invoking the pivotal meeting at Purandar: 
When I had come to your feet, you no longer deceived me or said anything about me. 
Then it became incumbent on me to serve for the rest of my days. Every instant I 
remember the affection that you showed to me and the fatherly love that you bestowed on 
his highness the senā sāheb. What need is there to write a discourse on it? Where there is 
so much fellow feeling, how can such doubt or forgetfulness arise? Your affection is such 
that I ought not to abandon you for the rest of my days. Whoever would do so is not 
considered to be a man. He ought to be considered a mere animal.”719  
In another, he declared, “As God is my witness, it is lodged in my mind that I ought to visit you. 
Why should I write this out in a letter? At all times, I ponder this – when will I meet my master? 
The day that this meeting happens will be a good day.”720 So eager was Devaji to express his 
desire for a reunion with Nana (and, perhaps more obliquely, his readiness for death) that he 
deputed his son Balwantrao to Pune. The promissory note and the handwritten letter, even when 
laden with profusions of feeling, could not equal the power of a face-to-face encounter.  
 In his later correspondence, Devaji became significantly more ambivalent in light of the 
many troubles that befell the Nagpur government’s invasion of Orissa. He penned a letter in 
November 1780 during his convalescence in Chimur, a small town in eastern Berar where he had 
sponsored the construction of a Balaji temple that is still a popular site of worship today.721 He 
had fallen ill again and hoped to be restored by the sight of the deity before returning to Nagpur. 
“God is an ocean of compassion and will show compassion,” he observed. No less buoyantly, he 
avowed, “God will give its fruits to us. Harm will never come to this state. When faith is strong 
here, how can god do us harm? It is well known that the one who deviates from faith is harmed.” 
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He also relayed that the Company had sent letters and copies of agreements in both English and 
Persian to Nagpur. He intended to transmit these to Pune, though he feared that they would not 
meet Nana’s expectations. He urged Nana not to share these papers with Haidar Ali, another 
member of the anti-Company alliance, warning that “one should keep watch on wherever 
antagonism has occurred again and again and treaties and promises were made a hundred times.” 
More darkly, he elaborated, “On this occasion, it is required that you make happen what should 
not happen. After this, even after a test of five or ten years has been made, he who is foreign 
should not be completely trusted.”722 In a similar vein, he remarked on the inappropriate 
(amaṅgala) manner of the Company’s communication and the persistence of their deviousness 
(kuṭilapaṇa). With complications and misgivings swirling on all sides, it could be very difficult 
to preserve a relationship between two individuals with different affiliations, much less a 
multilateral alliance between rival governments. 
Devaji’s premonition of disorder in the Maratha state appears most vividly in a letter 
most likely composed sometime at the end of 1780, mere months before his death: 
It ought to be assured that there will be no deviation from the plan. So it is. If things go 
according to the terms to which a man has agreed, it is a good thing. With the memory of 
his sincerity, it has come under universal discussion that while he made an agreement, it 
did not come to pass. Thus the man is disgraced, and people also fear for what might 
happen without their knowledge. Realizing this, they abandon the usual customs and 
ways on any given occasion and are forced to do improper things to save themselves. 
Such occasions have arisen. It has become necessary for you to prevent any kind of 
disorder and to incline yourself to whomever and to pass the days. Otherwise, everyone’s 
accusations will come on your head. Hence in these days, it is appropriate to consider 
many things and act…Before, I accused you of forming a friendship with Haidar Naik 
and not with us. What could not have come from this? I should not have written this to 
you. My master is all-knowing. What has happened up to today has first been understood 
and then has happened. Now also what happens is understood and happens. Such being 
the case, please forgive what I wrote. I write out of concern. In short, there are 
troublesome issues in these crooked days. To pluck up and consume hoary places; to 
resort to many kinds of wild schemes; to allow many things to happen which should not 
happen; to not keep the memory of bonds and promises – when such things take the place 
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of friendship, they are called crooked days. On account of this, one ought to be aware of 
one’s behavior. The kingdom is the enemy’s plunder. Til today, what has happened has 
happened through the labors of plunder. Though this practice will stay strong in the 
future, god will provide good days. 
Devaji here describes an ethico-political world turned upside down, or what he pithily terms 
crooked days (vākaḍe divas). Such days are characterized by a series of reversals of the norms of 
friendship, including the keeping of oaths and treaties, to satisfy the short-term needs of the 
moment. These reversals amount to a total inversion of the polity – the kingdom becomes the 
plunder of the enemy – yet Devaji also cleverly alludes to Shivaji’s celebrated mode of light, 
mobile warfare, or ganimī kāvyā, to acknowledge that the kingdom is in fact the result of 
plunder. If the sordid reality is that politics and violence are inseparable in the world of human 
affairs, the only hope for deliverance in his view is divine intervention. Only god can usher in 
good days: “The kingdom’s master is god. It is the seat of gods and Brahmans.”723 Finding 
himself at the end of a difficult set of negotiations and a tumultuous life and career, Devaji turn 
away from the delicate this-worldly game of promises, treaties, and friendships for a more 
comforting, but idealized and Brahmanical political theology.   
 As Nagpur’s battalion was approaching Cuttack, the war of words between Francis and 
Hastings was heating up. Francis opposed Hastings’ proposed measures to augment the 
Company’s military spending in the war with the Marathas, which had expanded to several 
fronts, including Gujarat, Malwa, and Orissa. In a July 3, 1780 minute, Hastings inveighed 
against the duplicity of Francis’ persistent opposition to almost every proposal he had floated 
since the beginning of his tenure, adding, “I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his 
private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour.”724 Francis replied to these 
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indictments by challenging Hastings to a pistol duel, which took place on the morning of August 
17. Hastings’ bullet hit Francis below his right shoulder. Though Francis’ physical wounds 
healed, his psychic ones may not have. Shortly after the duel, he left Bengal for Britain.725 In 
subsequent years, he exacted his revenge by anonymously editing documentary compilations 
attesting to Hastings’ misconduct, including one titled A State of the British Authority in Bengal 
Under the Government of Mr. Hastings Exemplified in the Principles and Conduct of the 
Marhatta War and His Negociations With Moodajee Boosla, Rajah of Berar (1781).726  
 The Company’s war with the Marathas dragged on until a peace agreement was 
concluded at Salbai in May 1782. Bombay held onto its coveted coastal outposts of Salsette and 
Broach, but the war had its costs. These included a bribe of sixteen lākh rupees that Hastings 
paid to dissuade the Nagpur army from proceeding past the port of Balasore in upper Orissa.727 
The generals Khandoji Bhonsle and Bhavani Kalo accepted this sum – even though it was much 
lower than what was owed in cauth arrears – because by all accounts the march had been an utter 
disaster.728 Like the Bombay army’s expedition to Pune, Nagpur’s march to Bengal resulted in 
much expense and loss of life for relatively little gain. Both were direct consequences of an 
increasingly aggressive confrontation between a Company politics of conquest and a Maratha 
politics of coalition building.  
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In March 1781, Devaji in his last message to Nana stated that he was suffering from 
winds (vāyu) that had caused his left side to freeze up. He promised to visit once his health 
improved. But he also resignedly acknowledged, “I am very tired. It is for you to wish for my 
recovery.”729 He died in the early morning of July 15 after battling a bad fever for several days. 
Many recognized the significance of the passing of one of the most prominent political operators 
at the Nagpur court of the last thirty years. The news-writers Malharji Naik Varpe and Dattaji 
Kusaji Toradmal lamented, “God did a harmful thing. No one has a remedy for the power of 
God. But he was an illustrious and thoughtful man of state.”730 Hastings was among those who 
had come to respect his talents. In his final days, Devaji swore that he would come to Calcutta to 
meet Hastings and finalize the peace settlement with Nagpur, just as he promised Nana to make a 
visit to Pune. The Supreme Council at Fort William suggested to the Court of Directors in 
London that because he was “a man of Acknowledged Ability,” they had entrusted him to 
advance the Company’s agenda during his talks with Nana.731  
Hastings’ recall and Devaji’s death marked the end of the intense opening stage in the 
encounter between the Company and the Maratha state. Several characteristic features of the 
Company discourse on the Marathas had emerged: its relative disorganization and discordancy; 
its lack of a clear sovereign authority; and its potential connections with French revolutionary 
plots. Yet, Francis’ skepticism about Hastings’ claims indicates the extent to which there was 
still no clear case for intervention into Maratha affairs. Similarly, on the Maratha side, the 
Company appeared to be intrinsically cunning, deceptive, and desirous of territorial and political 
monopoly, yet individual governments had particular reasons for preserving cautious friendships 
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with the Company. It would not be until the early nineteenth century that Company policy 
coalesced behind the necessity of intervention in Maratha politics, and in turn, Maratha politics 
assumed a decidedly anti-Company character. In the interim, Company officials began to 
research the origins, history, and character of the Maratha state.   
Maratha History and the Disposition to Plunder 
 Notwithstanding its wide differences of opinion on policy matters, Company officialdom 
was relatively united in the basic assumption that the rise of Maratha power was inextricable 
from the decline of Mughal sovereignty. Early Company official-historians, including Alexander 
Dow (1735/6-79) and Robert Orme (1728-1801), primarily drew their understanding of Mughal 
history from Persian accounts, especially the Gulshān-i Ibrāhim (also known as Tārīkh-i 
Firishtah) of Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah Astarabadi alias Firishtah (c. 1560-c. 1630), and 
the local munshīs who tutored them in Persian and assisted them with the work of research and 
translation. Their encounter with the Indo-Persian traditions of historical writing led them to 
adopt a critical, albeit nostalgic notion of Mughal sovereignty-in-decline.732 Both Dow and Orme 
categorized the Mughal Empire, and Islamic rule in India more generally, as an example of 
“Oriental” or “Asiatic” despotism. In this categorization, they were guided by Montesquieu’s 
definition of despotism in The Spirit of the Laws (1748-50) as a form of government by fear that 
especially flourished in hot climates. Native inhabitants, typically imagined as Hindu, were too 
enervated by tropical heat to limit the authority of the Mughal despot and create the conditions 
for political freedom through the establishment of individual rights to property. At the same time, 
this narrative conceded that individual “enlightened” despots were capable of a degree of mercy, 
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tolerance, and compassion.733 One could be rich or poor under despotism, but one could never be 
free.    
Later commentators like Philip Francis and the statesman Edmund Burke (1730-97) 
articulated a more complex theory of the “Mughal constitution.” According to this theory, the 
government of the Mughal Empire was not co-terminous with the authority of the sovereign, but 
rather was built on a fabric of norms, rules, and laws binding both rulers and subjects.734 The 
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings was the most spectacular site of encounter between this 
theory and the cruder idea of Oriental despotism. Whereas Hastings protested that he treated his 
Indian subjects like “slaves” in a manner befitting a “despotic prince,” Burke in his opening 
speech before Parliament remonstrated that “nothing is more false than that despotism is the 
constitution of any country in Asia that we are acquainted with…The greatest part of Asia is 
under Mahomedan governments. To name a Mahomedan government is to name a government 
by law.”735 In contrast, he denounced the Company for being a “nation of place-men” united by 
little more than a common interest in personal gain. “In a body so constituted,” he declared, 
“confederacy is easy, and has been general.”736 He further mused, “As one of the honestest and 
ablest servants of the Company said to me in conversation, the civil service of the Company 
resembled the military service of the Mahrattas, – little pay, but unbounded license to 
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plunder.”737 Burke stressed that in the Mughal Empire, as in any political community, the 
governors and the governed were both subject to the law of a constitution, whether or not 
embodied by a single document, a collection of texts, or a even a set of norms and principles. For 
him, neither the Company, at least in its current form, or the Maratha state fit this description.    
 The Company discourse on the Maratha “confederacy” eventually incorporated a certain 
idea of constitution, or the absence of constitutionalism, but in its earliest stages, it was anchored 
by the idea of plunder. As early as 1698, the Company surgeon John Fryer (1650-1733) in an 
account of his travels across the Mughal and Safavid domains stated, “Seva Gi [Shivaji] is a kind 
of Free-booter, whose Maxim is, No Plunder, no Pay.”738 Dow in the History of Hindostan 
(1768), which combined a freewheeling translation of the Gulshān-i Ibrāhim with his own 
observations, made a similar distinction: “Though the genuine Mahrattors all over India do not 
exceed 60000 men, yet, from their superior bravery and success in depredation, thousands of all 
tribes enlist themselves under their banners. These, instead of pay, receive a certain proportion of 
plunder. By this means any army of Mahrattors increases like a river, the farther it advances.”739 
Whereas the Mughal Empire was understood to be a state comparable with European states 
insofar as it contained a system of land tenure, manufacturing, and commerce meeting the 
criteria of the science of political economy, the Maratha state was reduced to its mode of 
warfare. Captain James Kerr in A Short Historical Narrative of the Rise and Rapid Advancement 
of the Mahratta State, a translation of a history composed by his Persian tutor, explained, 
“Whenever the critical situation of a neighbouring power affords a probability of gaining an 
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advantage, the Mahrattahs seldom overlook the opportunity…[they] fall into that error so 
common in states where war is the chief profession, and commercial views form no part of their 
political principles.”740 Company historians and commentators found no social, political, or 
economic organization among the Marathas, but merely an unregulated arena for profit-seeking 
warfare.      
An important source for observations about Maratha plunder in early Company writing 
was eighteenth-century Persian historical narrative. In the tradition of Indo-Persian tārīkh and 
taẕkirah, Marathas were synonymous with petty cavalry (bārgīr), cossacks (qazzāq), and 
plunderers (ghanīm). Ghanīm could also mean simply “enemy,” but like the other terms, it 
invoked the particular mode of light warfare practiced by Maratha armies and their allies. The 
reputed poet and chronicler Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami (fl. 1706-86) frequently used these terms 
in the Maʿās̤ir al-Umarā’, which he finished for his late employer, the Nizamate noble Shah 
Nawaz Khan Samsam ud-Daulah (d. 1758), as well as in his own masterpiece, the Khizānah-i 
ʿĀmirah (1762-3). In a section of the Khizānah narrating preparations for a battle between the 
Pune and Hyderabad armies at Udgir – or the plunderers from Pune (ghanīm az puna) and the 
armies of Islam (ʿasākir-i islām) – Bilgrami comments on the mode of warfare of the soldiers of 
Ibrahim Khan Gardi, an Afghan general in Maratha service: “It is no longer a secret that often 
people of qazzāqī warfare were with the enemy (makhfī namānad ki bīshtar bā ghanīm tanhā-yi 
jang-i qazzāqī būd). Their skill was precisely that they would seize the provisions of the army of 
Islam and seeing an opportunity, fight with small arms.”741 Given their willingness to employ 
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unruly brigands, Bilgrami believed that the rise of the Marathas could lead to the end of Muslim 
rule in the Deccan. Likening the forfeiture of cauth to “when corrupted blood in the veins of the 
kingdom acquires a disease,” he warned that any kind of partnership (sharkat) with them would 
have grievous consequences.742  
 In a long digression in a section of the Khizānah on the career of Nizam ul-Mulk, 
Bilgrami provided an unusually rich and detailed account of the Marathas not only as one of 
many local groups to rebel against the Mughal yoke, but as a distinct ethnic and political 
formation with a particular historical destiny. While the residents of the Deccan (ahl-i dakan) 
had posed a problem for the rulers of Hind, or north India, (farmān-rawāyān-i hind) for ages, he 
emphasizes, “In this period, the Maratha community has committed astonishing deeds in the 
kingdoms of the wide roads of Hindustan and conquered the countries of the Deccan, Malwa, 
Gujarat, and the provinces of Hindustan.”743 He links the word “Marhat” with the country of the 
Yadavas of Devgiri as well as with the Marathi language; identifies the Bhonsles as the 
sovereign lineage of the Marathas; and points out that the Bhonsles were descended from the 
Rajput kings of Udaipur. In addition, he claims that the Udaipur rānās, being superior among the 
Rajputs, used to send the marking for any newly installed king to apply to his forehead. 
Following Abu al-Fazl in the Ā’īn-i Akbarī, he claims that the Udaipur rānās were descended 
from the celebrated Sasanian ruler Anushirwan, known today as Khosrow I (r. 531-579).744 Their 
forefathers, he speculates, must have migrated from Iran to India during Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas’ 
invasion of the Sasanian Empire and hence would have been related to the revered Shia imām Ali 
ibn Husayn through his mother, the Sasanian princess Shahrbanu. To explain how the Marathas 
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came to the Deccan, Bilgrami states that one of the sons of the Udaipur rānās escaped a 
disagreement with his brothers by re-locating to the Karnatak and founded two lines: the 
Antuliyes (probably Athavles) and the Bhonsles. One of the descendants of the latter line was 
Shahji Bhonsle, father of Shivaji Bhonsle.745 
 Though Bilgrami accorded the Marathas a somewhat more respectable lineage than 
earlier authors writing in Persian,746 he was more critical in his discussion of the virtues and 
abilities (manāqib) of the Brahman classes of the Maratha state. He argued that Chitpavan 
Brahmans in particular, represented foremost by the Peshwa, sought to extend their reach, recruit 
followers, and uproot ancestral ruling lines in order to fulfill their ultimate intention of 
establishing a new and expansive Brahman kingdom. Such a proposal was absurd to Bilgrami in 
light of what he took to be the basic characteristics of Brahmans as a community. For example, 
he criticized their austere diet, mocking them for preferring coarser millet-based to wheat-based 
bread and tūr dal with little or no seasoning or oil. He associated these preferences with the 
humors of a dry (khushkī), bilious (ṣafrāwī), and melancholy (saudāwī) nature.747 Morever, he 
stated, “Because the original profession of Brahmans is beggary (aṣl-i pishah-i barāhimat gadā’ī 
ast), and because in the religion of the Hindus, it is accepted that alms should be given to 
Brahmans, this community from generation to generation has become accustomed to poverty, 
and they have necessarily adopted the disposition of a greedy and selfish person. Though they 
have acquired the trappings of imperial authority, still the stench of beggary does not leave their 
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natural disposition (bā waṣf ḥusūl-i martabah-i salṭanat wa amārat būī gadā’ī az ṭainat namī 
rawad).”748 Though the Khizānah was not a widely known text in Company circles in the 1770s 
and 1780s, Hastings and later Company observers like Charles Warre Malet arrived at similar 
conclusions about the essentially perverse and corrupt nature of the Brahman rāj that the 
Maratha state appeared to have become.  
The Benares-based jurist Ali Ibrahim Khan’s (d. 1792) Aḥwāl-i Marhata [also known as 
Tārīkh-i Ibrāhim Khān and Waqā’iʿ-yi Jang-i Marhata] (1786) and Bilgrami’s student Lacchmi 
Narayan Shafiq Aurangabadi’s (d.1808) Bisāṭ al-Ghanā’im (1799-1800) – commissioned by 
Charles Cornwallis and John Malcolm respectively – were among a handful of Persian histories 
of the Marathas composed in the wake of Bilgrami’s Khizānah.749 At the same time, Company 
authors increasingly compiled more eclectic bodies of material. Robert Orme’s Historical 
Fragments of the Mogul Empire (1782) followed the early Maratha state’s engagements with the 
Mughals through Aurangzeb’s execution of Sambhaji. He relied not only on Dow’s History, but 
also on Company records and European travelogues by the aforementioned Fryer, Sir Thomas 
Roe (1581-1644), Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605-1689), François Bernier (1620-1688), Jean de 
Thévenot (1633-1667), and others.750 Orme’s research over the course of his career was wide-
ranging. In a volume of brief notes on various subjects, he included some observations on 
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“Morattoe Chiefs,” principally related to the Bhonsles of Nagpur and their relations with the 
Peshwa, that he borrowed from a 1762 account of events at Delhi supposed to have been written 
by Hastings.751  
Orme’s manuscript collection featured similar narratives by obscure or unknown 
Company servants who interacted in a military or diplomatic capacity with Maratha rulers. One 
such narrative was “Some Historical Anecdotes of the Bonsila Family of Marhattas, since their 
settling at Nagpoor under Ruggojee, collected by Major Camac.”752 This Camac was none other 
than the Major Jacob Camac appointed by Hastings in 1778 to reinforce General Goddard. 
Camac broke his journey with a visit to Bimbaji Bhonsle at his appanage in Ratanpur. At this 
time, he explained, “Anecdotes were collected from many different persons…most of them sent 
at the writer’s expense expressly for the purpose.” He hastened to add that he could not “vouch 
for the truth of them, but can only answer, that he has taken as much pains, as his situation 
afforded him, of comparing the various relations, and separating the many fables, which 
travellers take the privilege of mixing with their accounts of distant countries.”753 Like Hastings, 
Camac speculated that the Bhonsles of Nagpur might turn against the Pune government and 
“thus restore the dominion of the Marrattoe Empire to its original Governors.”754 Another very 
short summary of recent history, titled “A Short Account of the Accession of Moodajee Boosla 
to the Raje of Burrah Nagpore, & the State of His Brother Bhimbajee Boosla at Ruttonpore,” was 
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composed at Ramgarh on December 25, 1780 by an unnamed Company writer755 who had 
conversed at length with Bimbaji Bhonsle.756 As the Company established more sustained 
relationships with Maratha rulers, it relied on its envoys, officers, and especially residents to 
observe, recruit informants, and compose their own historical accounts of various branches of the 
Maratha state. 
As Camac noted, one of the obstacles to writing these accounts was “the little knowledge 
which I have observed that Europeans, in general, have of the Political State, or the History of 
these Inland Countries.” The Company’s ignorance about the Indian interior relative to the ports 
and coastal districts where it exercised influence made diaries and travelogues key sources of 
information about history, politics, and geography. Several of the Company’s representatives 
kept diaries of their journeys to and from parts of the interior directly or indirectly ruled by the 
Bhonsles of Nagpur. In 1766, Clive sent a representative named Thomas Motte757 to explore 
prospects for entering into the diamond trade of the Chauhan Rajput ruler of Sambalpur, to 
ascertain whether the Maratha state “might be easily divided, and by such division, that the 
power of a people so formidable in India might be weakened,” and to persuade the Nagpur 
government to cede Orissa in exchange for an annual tribute.758 Motte in his semi-daily diary of 
the journey, undertaken from mid-March to early November 1766, attributed the desolation of 
the country of Orissa and the dilapidated state of its wells, residences, and fortifications to the 
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depredations of the Maratha tributary government. Compared to the inhabitants’ relative 
contentment under the Mughals, Motte speculates, “When they fell under the yoke of the 
Mahrattas, the oppression of that vile government broke their spirits, and their custom of 
inactivity became a total aversion to labour.”759 Motte situated his observations in a 
Montesquieuian framework of climate-induced Oriental indolence to make a historical argument 
about the effects of Maratha plunder on the state of the country.  
Just as history, geography, and political economy were intertwined in the diaries of the 
Company’s peripatetic representatives, the Company’s early efforts to represent measurement-
based geographical knowledge through cartography depended on these diaries. Motte’s route 
from Calcutta to Sambalpur was one of several travel diaries consulted by James Rennell (1742-
1830), the surveyor-general who created the Company’s first detailed maps of Bengal and its 
eastern environs.760 In the sections of the revised third edition of a Memoir of a Map of 
Hindoostan (1793) on his sources of information for the country around Nagpur, he made 
reference to the routes of Camac, Watherstone, and Francis B. Thomas,761 a surgeon and friend 
of Hastings who kept a diary of his journey from Nagpur to Cuttack in 1782.762 Noting that 
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Camac’s observations had served as the basis for a relatively accurate estimation of the location 
of Ratanpur prior to its surveying, Rennell was struck by “how much may be effected, by a 
careful examination and register, of the estimated distances on the roads: and this mode of 
improving the geography of India, may be adopted when all others fail. An intelligent person 
should be employed in collecting such sort of information…from the principal cities in the least 
known parts of Hindoostan.”763 Long after Rennell completed his survey of Bengal, Company 
officials continued to collect historical and geographical information in a desultory manner on 
the “least known parts” of the Maratha country.   
 Another peripatetic Company servant who Rennell cited in the Memoir was George 
Forster (c. 1752-91). Forster was the author of Sketches of the Mythology and Customs of the 
Hindoos (1785) and the well-known travelogue A Journey from Bengal to England (1790-8). 764 
He seems to have been conversant in Marathi and cultivated Marathi-speaking informants during 
his two stints in India, the second of which included two official delegations to Nagpur from 
January 1788 to February 1789 and June 1790 to January 1791.765 While back in Britain in 1784, 
he met Henry Dundas (1742-1811), the Cabinet minister and President of the Board of Control 
for India. Dundas asked Forster to inform him of the current political state of India. Forster 
complied by writing two long letters to Dundas on May 21 and June 5, 1785 that contained his 
musings on the major powers of the Deccan, namely the Marathas, Nizam Ali Khan, Marathas, 
and the Mysore ruler Haidar Ali’s successor Tipu Sultan (1750-99). He echoed prior 
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commentators with regard to the expansion of Maratha rule: “Their predatory disposition and 
schemes of conquest have drawn their forces to the remotest quarters of India.”766 He 
commented on the relative strengths of and relationships between different Maratha 
governments, taking care to qualify that “not being upheld by fixed or constitutional principles, 
nor guided by any general preponderating system must ever fluctuate, and be subject to sudden 
changes.”767 The Company discourse about the Maratha political continued to be tied to certain 
fundamental assumptions: a nature disposed to plunder and predation; a lack of principled 
system or organization; and a tendency towards chaos.    
Forster provided a thorough report on the history, government, revenue, territory, and 
army of Nagpur to Governor-General Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805) in April 1788. Based on 
Forster’s judgment that Nagpur was financially and militarily ill prepared to join the Company’s 
imminent war with Tipu Sultan, Cornwallis recalled him to Calcutta in February 1789. After the 
outbreak of war in December and the Company’s formation of an alliance with Pune and 
Hyderabad against Tipu in January 1790, Cornwallis ordered Forster to return to Nagpur to 
gather intelligence in support of the war effort.768 Surveyors accompanied him on this journey, as 
they had on the one back in 1788, and a member of his party named Colonel Leckie kept a diary 
of their route from Cuttack to Nagpur.769 Forster during his first deputation also coordinated with 
the Pune resident Charles Warre Malet to outfit a certain Captain Reynolds to survey the route 
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from Nagpur to Masulipatnam (today’s Machilipatnam) on the Coromandel Coast.770 Forster 
died in the middle of his diplomatic mission on January 1, 1791 and was buried with a 
gravestone in the immediate vicinity just as his predecessor Elliot had been.771 Malet continued 
at Pune until 1797, nurturing a hearty research interest in local art, history, geography, and 
political economy that substantially contributed towards the Company’s understanding of the 
Maratha state. 
Malet’s research at Pune took place admist a period of reform and retrenchment. Over the 
course of Hasting’s tenure, the Company had accumulated signficant debts. Hasting’s financial 
mismanagement and authorization of unjustified wars, including against the Marathas, would 
come under rhetorical fire during his long and scandalous impeachment trial. In the interim, the 
British defeat in America in 1783 incentivized measures to impose increased ministerial and 
Parliamentary control over the Company’s activities in India. After the fall of the North 
government and the failure of the Fox-North coalition’s attempts at reform, the new prime 
minister William Pitt the Younger steered an India Act through Parliament in 1784. It established 
a Board of Control – led by Dundas – that would supervise the decision-making of the Governor-
General and Council, while the Company’s trade would continue to be under the purview of the 
Court of Directors. In addition, the Company no longer relied on Indian expertise to carry out its 
revenue and judicial functions; instead, it rebuilt its civil service on firm racial hierarchies. 
Finally, Dundas’ choice of Cornwallis, the defeated but beloved general of Yorktown, for 
Governor-General burnished a new, more respectable image of Company leadership. With 
respect to these developments, Robert Travers has argued that in the 1780s and 1790s, “the idea 
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of colonial state-building as constitutional restoration” slowly dissolved in favor of a “purified 
agency of imperial virtue.”772 But taking its stance toward Maratha politics into consideration, 
the Company’s virtuous self-image cannot be separated from its aggressive policy of war, 
conquest, and even extirpation, against powers it deemed be predatory and unconstitutional.  
Malet was a vocal proponent of using Company arms to open up commercial prospects in 
western India.773 He believed that “reducing to order a country plundered by a thousand 
predatory chieftains is as easy to execute, as worthy of attention of a great and generous people, 
and the more readily to be adopted when consistent with their interest, their honour and perhaps 
necessary to the reestablishment of their affairs.”774 He also went to great lengths to acquire 
materials on Maratha history, including directly from scribes employed by the Pune government 
who were engaged in separate history-writing endeavours (see below). In this sense, he is a 
forerunner to the next generation of Company official-historians, including James Tod (1782-
1835), Colin Mackenzie (1754-1821), Richard Jenkins (1785-1853), and James Grant Duff 
(1789-1858), who combined an antiquarian interest in Indian history with a zeal for collecting 
“original” source materials and recruiting Indian informants to interpret them.775 At the same 
time, he consolidated the assumptions of his predecessors into a unified theory of the Maratha 
state centered on Maratha predation and Brahman cunning.  
 Malet began his research with the assumption that the Maratha state was a peculiar 
formation. In a November 8, 1786 letter to Cornwallis, Malet conceded, “It is difficult to say, My 
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Lord, whether an entire ascendancy of the Mahrattas or Tipoo Sultan would be most dangerous 
to the Company’s interests.” He then compared the two powers. Whereas “Tipoo is promoted to 
conquest by the ambition of a despot and the wild enthusiasm of a bigot…the Mahrattas are 
urged to depredation by the restless rapacious spirit of every chieftain of which their armies are 
composed, and by the interest of every Brahmin administration to keep that spirit constantly 
employed.” Whereas Tipu represented “absolute despotism resting solely on the person of the 
despot,” the Marathas represented “an immense aristocracy, the permanence of which, though 
liable to many accidents is more certain…because the component parts by a participation of 
goods are more interested in its existence and aggrandisement.” This comparison suggests the 
ways in which the Company began to re-calibrate the language of Oriental despotism to 
characterize a power that appeared to be totally novel. Whereas Tipu was a classic despot – 
ambitious, zealous, and singular – the Maratha-Brahmin combine was rapacious, self-interested, 
and plural. Rather than searching for “nicely arranged systems of perspective policy” among 
Indian powers, Malet instead felt that “certain causes tend invariably to produce certain effects: 
so in judging the genius of the Brahmin Government and the power of the Mahratta chieftains 
and the state of society among them, as probable a conclusion may be formed of the operation of 
this complicated body.” To form a “clearer judgment” about these “certain causes” within the 
Maratha state, Malet proposed write a “plain statement of facts,” which would contain “an 
epitome of the History of the Mahratta Empire from its foundation to the present time, 
comprising a period of about 130 years.” For Malet, history writing was a means to identify the 
components of the Maratha state, to charaterize its natural tendencies, and to classify it in 
relation to the various powers of India.776    
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Malet presented parts of this “epitome” of Maratha history in several subsequent letters to 
Cornwallis from roughly March 1787 to Feburary 1788.777 Cornwallis forwarded these “short 
sketches” to the Court of Directors, who upon reading through them was satisifed enough to 
request a copy of Malet’s notes, or “Historical and Political Glossary.”778 Malet’s initial 
enthusiasm about the “prospect of being able, from rare and authentick materials to elucidate the 
history” of Shivaji and Sambhaji was later dampened by difficulties in obtaining access to local 
materials and informants.779 On August 4, he condemned “the Ignorance, Illiberality, and low 
suspicion of these People.” His main complaint was that Nana Phadnavis had forbidden the 
“principal secretary of this government” from confirming certain dates in “an abbreviated history 
composed by one of the Writers in his Department.”780 It is very probable that this “abbreviated 
history” was a short historical narrative composed by Balaji Ganesh in 1783 for the edification of 
the nine year-old Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao. Malet seems to have acquired a copy of this history 
and passed it on to his son Alexander Malet, who deposited it and several other accounts with the 
Royal Asiatic Society in London.781 As I discussed Chapter 3, Balaji Ganesh’s designation 
kārkun nisbat ciṭnīs indicates that he was a clerk responsible for writing Marathi letters and 
documents under the supervision of the chief scribe. In Chapter 6, I further examine Company 
criticism of scribal-authored historical narratives of the Maratha polity. Malet’s counterparts at 
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the Maratha courts of Satara and Nagpur faced similar difficulties in using texts primarily 
authored for didactic and commemorative purposes as sources for empirically “factual” histories.   
Malet’s “sketches” echoed Orme’s Historical Fragments in briefly praising Shivaji’s 
valor and fortitude. But he was far more interested in, and far more critical of, the Brahman 
“ministerial power” of the Peshwa, who in his view “brought into action the talents of their own 
tribe, singularly fitted for prompt and implicit obedience by their poverty and humility, and to 
supply what was wanting in the desultory character of the Mahratta by the sedentary studies and 
habits of their sect.” Though Marathas and Brahmins had overcome their natural differences for 
strategic purposes, Malet found a disturbing hypocrisy at the heart of their alliance. He stated, 
“The sole principles that actuated the government of a tribe of men that affects singular purity, 
innocence, humility, abstraction, from worldly pursuits, and unbounded horror at shedding the 
blood of the most insignificant reptile, were, plunder, devastation, and the consequent destruction 
of the human species.” With plunder as its actuating principle, this unnatural Maratha-Brahman 
combination became the second “distinct form” of the “Mahratta system.” The third, he went on 
to explain, was dominated by “the Persons of the Jaghiredars, or great Military chieftains 
intrusted with the Command of distant Provinces,” including the Bhonsles of Nagpur. Malet 
predicted that a general lust for plunder would exacerbate existing tensions between the Brahman 
“ministry” and Maratha “aristocracy,” leading to insubordination, rebellion, and war. “At all 
events, the season of blind implicit obedience is at and end,” he foreboded.782 
In his “Historical and Political Glossary,” Malet provided notes on various terms that he 
encountered over the course of his research. Occasionally, these notes are quite detailed. Under 
the term “Marratta,” he rejected the claim that the Marathas are descended from Rajputs, but, 
referring to the Ā’īn-i Akbarī via Orme, he accepted that the Rajputs may have some connection 
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to pre-Islamic Persia. In the margins of this entry, he shared a rather curious anecdote to support 
his position on the Maratha-Rajput question:  “One day conversing with the Regent Minister at 
Poona [Nana Phadnavis?] my Vackeel Nooral Deen Hussein Khan [Nur al-Din Hussein Khan], a 
man of much knowledge, but a great advocate for the opinion of the Mahrattas being Rajputes, in 
the course of conversation asked the Minister if a certain Person was not a Rajpute. He replyed 
no and mentioned his Tribe. My Vackeel repeated is not that a Rajpute Tribe. He answered No, a 
Mahratta.”783  Variety of content and source material is characteristic of the glossary. Certain 
entries on basic occupational designations, such as “Subadar” and “Sepoy,” are concise, while 
others on important personages and families, such as Nizam ul-Mulk are very long.784 Malet 
even managed to procure a translation of the portion of Lala Mansaram’s Maʿās̤ir -i Niẓāmī 
(1785) in which Nizam ul-Mulk advises his son Nasir Jang to make peace with the Marathas.785 
 The glossary further illuminates how Malet struggled to fit the Maratha state into 
existing models of state structure. For example, under the entry “General Arrangement,” he 
compared Shivaji’s famous council of eight ministers (ashṭapradhāna) to the electors of the 
Holy Roman Empire: “In this the Marratta Empire has great Resemblance to that of Germany. 
The original 9 German Electors were great officers of state or Emperor viz. Grand Marshal, Arch 
Treasurer, etc. This has in its original institution of those Officers…a Resemblance to the 
Pritanidee [pratinidhi] and Purdhans [pradhāna].”786 Re-iterating this analogy in a June 1787 
letter to Cornwallis, he stated, “The Constitution of the Mahratta State is not dissimilar to that of 
Germany, where the Princes of the Empire live in a constant jealousy and apprehension of the 
                                                
783 BL, IORPP, F149/39, ff. 10. 
 
784 BL, IORPP, F149/39, ff. 20, 65-6, 75-6. 
 
785 BL, IORPP, F149/39, ff. 67. 
 
786 BL, IORPP, F149/39, ff. 100. 
 
 276 
Power of the Emperor.”787 Malet’s entry for “Constitution” revealed just how little he thought of 
the ties binding these elements together. He surmised, “In the constitution of this Empire we 
have a recent and very extraordinary instance of the necessary steps by which a kingdom formed 
from numerous military connexions drawn by various causes under the influence of one man 
falls into a state of association without any of those compacts or the knowledge of any of those 
rules by which we in Europe impute information and by which we judge of societies.” Rather 
than a constitution, the Maratha state was held together by an interest in preserving the titles and 
possessions gained through service. In the absence of a constitution, the Marathas were guided 
by “the sanction of custom which in all societies must have preceded and been the foundation of 
compacts.”788  
Even more than custom, Malet in the entry for “Military Spirit” suggested that the 
animating force of the Maratha community was a “lust of rapine which ruling passion influenced 
by his [Shivaji’s] great Genius operated extraordinary Effects.” While this spirit was almost 
ennobled by Shivaji and “nearly extinguished” by Aurangzeb, “it has ever since been the policy 
of the Peshwas to employ the Passions of the Marrattas. Whence has sprung a spirit not of 
military but of predatory enterprise.”789 He concluded that the “leading trait” of the Maratha of 
the present day was “a fondness for depredation,” followed by “a paucity of ideas.”790 As for the 
Brahman, he noted that his “most prominent nature is avarice…with this difference that his 
exertions depend more on the mind than those of the Marratta which are almost confined to the 
body. Every species of trick, art, and chicane joined to the most patient perseverence is practiced 
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by this thrifty tribe with pursuit of gain.” This representation of “the modern Brahmins in their 
governmental character,” he acknowledges, is very different from that given by “philosophical 
European inquiries” into the so-called Gymnosophists of ancient India.791 Seduced by these 
earlier opinions, “the European Speculatist annexes to the Brahmin character an idea of 
sanctity,” and “views him meek and tender as the lamb shuddering at blood,” but “the Realist 
sees him shrinking back indeed with an affectation of horror at the destruction of an ant, but 
pursuing his rapacity, his avarice, and his resentments to the extirpation of nations.”792  
Malet’s glossary places his “sketches” on Maratha history in a new light. In his sketches, 
he conceived of the Maratha-Brahman combine as a moment within an organically evolving 
three-stage process of state-formation; however, the glossary reveals that his conception of the 
state was inextricably tied to fixed notions of inborn Maratha and Brahman character. The 
conjunction of Maratha body with Brahman mind could only ever engender a perverse chimera 
of a state. But unlike the Oriental despot, exemplified by the figure of Tipu Sultan, the Maratha-
Brahman chimera was primarily characterized by its parasitic relationship with the social body. 
He explained this most explicitly in an August 8, 1788 letter to Cornwallis: “Averse to and 
probably ignorant of the systematic and equitable principles on which alone commerce can be 
rendered flourishing by encouraging the industry in the security and happiness of the subject, its 
chief attention seems directed to conquest and depredation, giving employment at once to the 
desultory military spirit of the Marrattas, and supplying the state and the chief individual 
Bramins with wealth and power.” Driven by a combination of Maratha rapacity and Brahman 
avarice, the Maratha state was only interested in territorial expansion for short-term gain, not for 
fueling a commercial economy or contributing to the welfare of its subjects. 
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Though Malet’s research systematized several existing assumptions about the Maratha 
state – foremost among them, its penchant for predation – he did not come nearly as close as 
Hastings to supporting a policy of interference, much less conquest, with respect to the Marathas. 
He cautioned against entering into any engagement with the Maratha state that might necessitate 
action on its behalf, even if such an engagement might work to advance “the general policy of 
disuniting the interests of the great feudatories of the Mahratta State.”793 Nevertheless, his ideas 
were significant because they firmly placed the Marathas outside of the “federation of nations” 
that were capable of and deserved a permanent peace. In subsquent administrations, Company 
officials would come to view the Marathas as being foremost among the predatory states that 
posed an obstacle to peace unless pacified or exterminated. The next section will explain how 
this view emerged, and how it appropriated and radicalized the language of plunder and 
predation developed during the Company’s search for Maratha history.         
The Birth of the “Confederacy” 
 The defeat of Tipu Sultan in the Third Anglo-Mysore War of 1792 was widely celebrated 
as a triumph for the British nation unprecedented in Company wars in India.794 A renewed sense 
of patriotism intersected with a growing strategic concern among Company officials with the 
security of its possessions. While Douglas Peers locates the rise of the Company “garrison state” 
in the years following the Third Anglo-Maratha War, the concern with security that gave rise to 
this state is evident as early as the administration of Governor-General Richard Wellesley.795 At 
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the same time, the Company’s official policy with respect to Indian politics continued to be one 
of cautious non-interference, and metropolitan leadership was still primarily concerned with 
protecting the Company’s financial and commercial interests. The work of Pamela Nightingale 
and Rudrangshu Mukherjee on Company expansion into Gujarat and Awadh has demonstrated 
that Company officials continued to view conquest in terms of the potential for a financial payoff 
through the creation of new opportunities for trade and the acquisition of land revenue. The 
Company’s economic and political frontiers were difficult to separate.796  
Nevertheless, the Maratha question enacted a shift in Company discourse about Indian 
politics towards a language of international security and diplomacy. Company officials 
increasingly understood post-Mughal and post-Tipu Indian politics in terms of a horizontal field 
of nations competing within an overall “balance of power.” 797 Cornwallis’ successor John Shore 
in a March 25, 1793 minute outlined what he took to be “an important alteration in the political 
state of Hindostan” in the wake of the 1792 victory.798 Recalling Malet’s terminology, Shore 
asserted that a “spirit of jealousy and ambition” animated the Company’s Indian allies, namely 
the Marathas and the Nizam. Shore viewed this spirit as a “collateral security to us; its operation 
without our participation and direction must necessarily tend to invest the balance of power in 
our hands, where it should be steadily preserved without throwing a preponderance into either of 
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the scales.”799 Unremarked in this minute is the assumption that the Company was not subject to 
the same balance of power as the other nations of India; rather, the Company was to be the 
arbiter of this balance. The tacit justification for making such an exception was the categorical, 
natural difference between the British state and “predatory” Indian states like the Marathas that 
Malet and others had already established on the basis of their historical research. 
The balance of power was the “leading principle” of Dundas’ instructions to Wellesley at 
the beginning of his governor-generalship in early 1798.800 Dundas hoped that a balance would 
lead to reductions in military expenditure and a reorientation to commerce; however, Wellesley 
favored a much more aggressive “forward strategy” that would achieve a permanent security 
solution for British India. 801 Edward Ingram has argued, “Wellesley set out to transform British 
India from one state among many, which depended for security upon a balance of power 
equivalent to the balance of power in Europe, into the paramount power.”802 Soon after his 
arrival in India in the spring of 1798, Wellesley learned that the Afghan ruler Zaman Shah 
Durrani – following in the footsteps of his grandfather and the victor at Panipat, Ahmad Shah 
Durrani – had prepared for a campaign in northwestern India by sending an envoy to the ruler of 
Awadh. The envoy also confirmed rumors that Durrani was in touch with the Company’s mortal 
enemy Tipu Sultan. Most alarming was the news that Tipu had capitalized on an existing 
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diplomatic relationship with the French monarchy to persuade the French governor of Mauritius 
to furnish troops for his army.803 Wellesley used this mission to stoke fears of a French invasion 
of India through Egypt. The French invasion of Egypt in October 1798 seemed to confirm a 
French push to the east in the long-term, even though it removed any possibility of aiding 
Mysore in the short-term.804  
To guard against the resurrected specter of French collusion and external invasion, 
Wellesley called for “a general defensive treaty of all the existing powers of Hindustan.”805 He 
instructed the Company’s residents at Pune and Hyderabad to negotiate the establishment of 
subsidiary alliances. His initial strategic objective was to obstruct the growth of French influence 
in the militaries of Indian governments. In response to the dramatic intensification of the military 
economy in this period, Indian rulers, notably Nizam Ali Khan and Daulatrao Shinde (1779-
1827), employed European officers to introduce advanced drilling and disciplinary regimes into 
their armies.806 But they often struggled to amass the funds to finance these advanced military 
programs and to mollify the Arab and Afghan mercenaries who were quite happy to resort to 
arms to acquire their pay. Wellesley sought to capitalize on on these problems by offering forces 
in exchange for an annual payment, or subsidy. While in theory this exchange would benefit 
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Indian governments by relieving them of the costs of administering a large, technologically 
sophisticated army, in practice it restricted their flexiblity in meeting short-term debts, creating a 
convenient pretext for Company intervention and annexation of territory. 
But at this juncture, Wellesley met with uneven success in imposing alliances on Indian 
governments. In 1798, the resident William Kirkpatrick negotiated an alliance with Hyderabad, 
suppressing the French military influence that had existed at that court under Michel Joachim 
Marie Raymond (commonly known as Monsieur Raymond). Article 8 of this agreement stated 
that the Company would serve as mediator in any dispute between the Hyderabad and Pune 
governments.807 But at Pune, the resident William Palmer was unable to negotiate a 
corresponding agreement. His difficulties stemmed from the chaos surrounding the succession. 
In the last chapter, I detailed Nana Phadnavis’ attempts to control the succession process with the 
help of the Nagpur scribal-diplomats Krishnarao Madhav and Sridhar Laxman. Bajirao II finally 
won the peśvā title at the end of 1796, but he had few friends at court apart from Daulatrao 
Shinde. In addition to detaining and extorting Nana Phadnavis for cash, both Bajirao and Shinde 
imposed new taxes on the residents of Pune and coerced loans out of its bankers.808 After his 
release, Nana solicited an agreement with Shinde, which prompted Bajirao to send his munshī to 
Palmer to request the Company aid. Palmer initially demurred, but after Wellesley’s assumption 
of the governor-generalship, he changed his course, offering a subsidiary force to Bajirao in 
exchange for an agreement like the one executed at Hyderabad. Bajirao stalled as the Company 
once again went to war with Tipu Sultan.809  
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This war came to a close in May 1799 when Tipu perished in battle at Srirangapatnam. 
Considering its virtual non-participation in the war and fraternization with Tipu’s ambassadors, 
he nearly cut the Peshwa’s government out of the post-war territorial settlement.810 Bajirao 
challenged this decision when discussions for a subsidiary agreement re-started. In the ninth of a 
set of articles sent to Palmer on July 1, 1799, Bajirao demanded a share of the conquered 
territories equal to those of other powers; in reply, Palmer flatly dismissed “this unreasonable 
and unfounded requisition.”811 Bajirao was also unwilling to relinquish the Maratha claims to the 
cauth of Surat, and he made a rather maladroit request for the revenue of Pune’s share of the 
Mysore territory to be designated as cauth.812 Finally, he balked at the Company’s provision 
against employing Europeans in his government and asked for “a stipulation against the 
interference of British officers in the concerns of his Sirdars.”813 By the end of 1799, the talks 
had completely broken down. Palmer considered Bajirao to be a weak and faithless ruler under 
the malign influence of Daulatrao Shinde. He predicated that this alliance “will last no longer 
than it can promote Sindia’s views of rapine, of which Baajy Rao will find himself first the dupe 
and in the end the victim.”814  
Palmer’s representation of the relationship between Bajirao II and Daulatrao Shinde 
replayed old stereotypes of the Brahman-Maratha combine, but it also reflected Wellesley’s 
evolving policy towards the Maratha state. Two general assumptions about its structural 
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dynamics conditioned this policy. First, Wellesley believed that the Company’s interests were 
best served by recognizing the Peshwa to be the only legitimate sovereign authority with the 
power to make war and peace and to negotiate with external powers. Secondly, he was 
convinced that this authority would be fatally compromised should other Maratha rulers choose 
to form an independent alliance, or, as he would come to designate it, a “confederacy.” More so 
than before the war, he now felt that “no injury can result to us from the interminable feuds of 
the Mahratta Empire, or from the mutual jealousy of the Peishwa and the Nizam.”815 Rather, he 
was more apprehensive of an “internal union of all the divided feudatory chiefs of the Mahratta 
Empire, or even a confederacy between the Peishwa and the Nizam.”816 In a March 14, 1799 
letter to Palmer, he predicted, “The distractions of the Maratha empire must continue to increase 
until they shall be checked by foreign interference. No power in India, excepting the British, now 
possesses sufficient strength to interpose with effect in these dissensions.” He felt that a British 
subsidiary force was “the only means of restoring order, and of saving the whole of that country 
from plunder and desolation.”817 Bajirao’s scuttling of the subsidiary agreement negotiations 
exacerbated these concerns to the point that Wellesley in late August 1800 forwarded a set of 
instructions to Palmer regarding immediate steps should Shinde depose Bajirao or cause him to 
flee Pune. 818 He was prepared to mobilize a force under his brother and commander-in-chief 
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Arthur Wellesley to restore the Peshwa’s “just authority.”819 Restoration would be attached to a 
key condition: submission to a subsidiary alliance with the Company.820  
 Wellesley’s strategy also included the solicitation of an alliance with the Nagpur 
government. In late 1798, he appointed H.T. Colebrooke (1765-1837), a scholarly associate of 
the Sanskrit scholar William Jones and future founder of the Royal Asiatic Society, to the 
mission.821 Colebrooke reached Nagpur on March 18, 1799 and met Raghuji Bhonsle the next 
day.822 The purport of his negotiations centered on the desirability of an alliance between the 
Company and Nagpur against Shinde’s “hostile designs.”823 Wellesley suspected “that Scindia 
has long viewed with jealousy and dissatisfaction both the acquisitions made of late years by the 
Bhossillah in the Malwa quarter and the favorable disposition which he has generally manifested 
towards the late Nana Furnavese.”824 In exchange for security and protection, Nagpur would 
cede all or a substantial portion of Orissa to finance the subsidy and, even more beneficially, to 
“establish the continuity of their [the Company’s] dominions from Bengal to the Northern 
Sircars.”825 Bringing Nagpur into the subsidiary system would allow Wellesley to counter 
Shinde, build the long-coveted corridor between the Company’s southeastern and northeastern 
bridgeheads, and prevent a “confederacy” between Maratha governments. Such a “confederacy” 
rapidly moved from eventuality to event in the coming months.  
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Recalling the days of Hastings, Colebrooke gradually realized that the Nagpur 
government was much less favorably inclined towards the Company than Wellesley had 
anticipated. In early 1801, he predicted that Raghuji Bhonsle would maintain his independence 
while continuing to welcome a Company resident as a marker of prestige.826  Finding this 
conduct to be “insincere and illusory,” Wellesley decided to recall Colebrooke in mid-April 
1801.827 But even as Colebrooke prepared to leave, he gathered intelligence of potential anti-
Company collusion between Nagpur and Pune. On May 8, Colebrooke obtained a letter sent by 
Bajirao to Raghuji from an unnamed individual working under Sridhar Laxman. Colebrooke’s 
translation of the letter suggested that Bajirao had instructed Raghuji to avoid a subsidiary 
alliance and to wait for the fruition of certain plans to “force them and even take from them our 
share of the territory lately embezzled by them.” Colebrooke’s footnote stated that the “them” in 
question probably meant “the English.”828 After his departure, he wrote on May 22 that he had 
learned through a “confidential agent” of Raghuji’s brother Vyankoji of plans to participate in an 
upcoming “general convention of Maratha chiefs” on the Godavari River. The conveners were 
thought to “harbour designs which are injurious to the Company but which are so in various 
degrees,” he warned.829 Though Colebrooke was not able to acheive his diplomatic goals, he kept 
detailed travelogues of his journeys to and from Nagpur in the manner of his predecessors.830 
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The details of Colebrooke’s return trip shed some light on why the Nagpur government 
was disinclined to form a closer alliance with the Company. He passed through Gadha-Mandla 
along the banks of the Narmada River. In Chapter 1, I mentioned that Gadha-Mandla was one of 
several Gond kingdoms conquered by the Marathas in the 1740s. Whereas Devgadh came under 
the authority of the Nagpur Bhonsles, the Peshwa acquired Gadha-Mandla; however, Nana 
Phadnavis finally forfeited it to Nagpur in two stages in 1779-8 and 1795 to secure its loyalty.831 
Colebrooke’s journey through Devgadh towards Gadha-Madla included a visit to Seoni and 
Chhapara, two towns that together formed the seat of a petty Afghan nawābī dynasty discussed 
in Chapter 1. Soon after Colebrooke’s visit, this household would fall on hard times. In 1808, the 
Bhonsles forced them to to pay off their debts to their principal creditor, the merchant gosāvī 
Kharak Bharati. They were reduced “to such distress as to be obliged actually to sell off their 
wearing apparel and other property to obtain even the common necessities of life.”832 But 
Colebrooke observed them in very different circumstances. He noted the impressive residences 
of the senior and junior branches of this household, remarking that the head of the latter 
“maintains the princely state of a grand feudatory, and, like an ancient baron in the feudal days 
of Europe, renders military service to the paramount.” In fact, Colebrooke was unable to meet 
the “grand feudatory” because he was rushing to suppress a mutiny in Raghuji Bhonsle’s 
army.833  
With the support of the Afghan nawābs of Seoni-Chhapara, the Bhonsles gradually 
displaced or subordinated the various local authorities that posed a challenge to their dominance 
in Gadha-Mandla. I referenced at the end of the last chapter that the Bhonsles’ army took the fort 
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of Hoshangabad from the nawāb of Bhopal in April 1796. Led by their top general Vitthal Ballal 
Paranjape and a diverse coterie of subsidiary commanders, including the Seoni-Chhapara ruler 
Muhammad Amin Khan and the Rajput general Beni Singh, they took a series of strongholds, 
including Chauragarh, Sohagpur, and Dhamoni, through the usual combination of violent 
coercion and pacific compromise. In 1799, matters became more complicated when the Pathan 
general and future nawāb of Tonk Amir Khan (1769-1834) threatened to attack Sagar, the 
headquarters of the Peshwa’s officer Balaji Govind Kher in the northerly adjacent region of 
Bundelkhand. Amir Khan had left his employment with the nawābs of Bhopal to take up with 
Yashwantrao Holkar (1776-1811), a son of the late Indore Maratha ruler Tukoji Holkar (d. 1797) 
whose succession disputes with his brother Kashirao propelled him into the life of a soldier of 
fortune. The Bhonsles briefly detained Yashwantrao at the behest of Daulatrao Shinde, but he 
escaped and built up his following, with Amir Khan’s assistance. The Bhonsles defended Sagar 
from the latter, but he and his Pendhari soldiers continued to haunt the northern frontier of their 
domain in pursuit of a permanent jāgīr.834  
Nagpur’s push into central India in the late 1790s is important for several reasons. First, it 
catalyzed Amir Khan’s persistent efforts to acquire a jāgīr, which eventually served as a pretext 
for Company intervention. In the years leading up to the Third Anglo-Maratha War, the 
Company’s claims to “protection” of Nagpur were early formulations of an argument for a war 
of extirpation against “predatory” entities that threatened the permanent peace of India. 
Secondly, the competition for revenue and territory in central India that attracted such 
“predatory” entities reflected the displacement of existing centers of power and patronage, 
including Delhi, Lucknow, Mysore, and Hyderabad. As the Company seized control of the 
political and military operations of Indian governments, military men ranging from light cavalry 
                                                
834 NBB, ed. Kale, 191-4. For Pendharis more generally, see Conclusion below. 
 
 289 
to skilled officers looked elsewhere for steady income. For example, Nagpur’s top general in 
their conflicts with Amir Khan in the late 1800s and early 1810s was Siddiq Ali Khan, an 
Afghan officer decommissioned after the fall of Tipu in 1799.835 The destabilization of the South 
Asian military economy contributed to the so-called “predatory system” that the Company 
fought to suppress in the Third-Anglo Maratha War and fully extinguished in the Thuggee 
campaigns of the 1820s and 1830s.836 But most importantly, Nagpur’s expansion with the formal 
approbation of Pune demonstrated that the two governments continued to be invested in 
cultivating a strong diplomatic rapport in order to enact a collective political future. While 
Wellesley observed that the weakness of Pune had exacerbated the divisions between Maratha 
governments, he failed to recognize that these divisions were embedded within a battered, but 
still intact framework of diplomatic negotiation and conciliation.  
 The “general convention of Maratha chiefs” that Colebrooke mentioned in his May 22, 
1801 message had been in the works for several months. Daulatrao Shinde’s confidante and 
father-in-law Sarjerao Ghatge on March 8, 1801 wrote to Raghuji Bhonsle that his son-in-law 
“keeps faith regarding the plan (masalat). You should speak soothingly to Colebrooke. Here too 
we are talking to Colonel Palmer. Information about our intention to meet should be conveyed to 
the Nawab [Nizam Ali Khan] and to the English.”837 He later clarified that some communication 
to Company officials would be necessary because any unexpected movements would alarm 
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them. Though he did not describe the specifics of their plan, he did include a telling set of 
statements: “You had also written that whatever should be said to the English and the Nawab 
will be said and that this year the plan will be executed. The dharma ought to be protected.”838 
Ghatge frequently refers to dharma and hindu-dharma in his correspondence. Such terms evoke 
a specifically Hindu conception of the Maratha state, but they also generally emphasize the 
ethical and existential stakes of the contest with the Company. Ghatge also referred to an earlier 
request that Bajirao had made for Bhonsle to send Sridhar Laxman and Krishnarao Madhav to 
speak with him. In conjunction with the Narayan Baburao Vaidya, son of their old partner 
Baburao Viswanath Vaidya, these scribal-diplomats continued to be responsible for all 
communication between the rulers. Bhonsle promised to give his permission for them to travel to 
Pune in January or February 1801, but due to some delay, they still had not left by September.839  
 Meanwhile, the overall political situation worsened due to the complications of the 
Holkar dynastic succesion. Refusing to coutenance his brother Kashirao’s succession, 
Yashwantrao supported his nephew Khanderao. But Shinde backed Kashirao, arrested 
Khanderao, and killed another brother Malharrao. In response, Yashwantrao committed 
significant damage to Shinde’s domains in the north over the course of 1800, and a third brother 
Vithoji raided the Peshwa’s territories further to the south. Bajirao eventually captured and, 
shockingly, executed Vithoji. Sarjerao Ghatge in a July 8 message to Raghuji Bhonsle indicated 
that the Company issue would have to wait until after the Dasara holiday in October because it 
was first necessary to quash these internal disputes. Still, he worried about whether the Company 
would use the upcoming monsoon period to make their own preparations: “We must observe the 
                                                
838 BL, Mss Marathi, D37, ff. 43a. 
 
839 BL, Mss Marathi, D37, ff. 44a-b, 46b-47a, 63b. 
 
 291 
enemy’s behavior during the rains. We must be smart and keep an eye on their behavior.”840 On 
October 30, having left Pune to join his son-in-law on the Narmada, he warned that four 
Company platoons had left Benares for Lucknow and that additional supplies were being 
amassed. Echoing Nana Phadnavis’ critique, he added, “On the outside, they say what needs to 
be said to be friends with everyone. They do not show their deviance.”841 But an exact date for a 
“general convention” of all concerned parties was still not in sight. 
 With the assistance of the Nagpur scribal-diplomats, Bajirao II and Yashwantrao Holkar 
began to discuss terms of reconciliation in the early months of 1802, but these negotiations broke 
down. Yashwantrao moved south and came to blows with Bajirao and Shinde’s forces on the 
outskirts of Pune in October 1802. Bajirao was defeated and fled to Mahad in the Konkan and 
thence to Bassein to take refuge with the Company. Wellesley recognized this “crisis of affairs” 
to be “the most favourable opportunity for the complete establishment of the interests of the 
British power in the Mahratta empire.”842 As the Secretary to the Governor-General Neil 
Edmonstone had conveyed to the new Pune resident Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close on June 23, 
1802, an agreement with the Peshwa “would preclude the practicability of a general confederacy 
among the Mahratta states.”843 At the same time, he hoped to avoid war by persuading Maratha 
rulers to recognize Bajirao’s authority, observing, “Justice and wisdom would forbid any attempt 
to impose upon the Mahrattas a ruler, whose restoration to authority was adverse to the wishes of 
                                                
840 BL, Mss Marathi, D37, ff. 53a-b. 
 
841 BL, Mss Marathi, D37, ff. 67a. 
 
842 Despatches, ed. Martin, vol. 3, 6. 
 




every class of his subjects.”844 But treating Bajirao as the sole Maratha sovereign in the 
subsidiary treaty of Bassein on December 31, 1802, the Company fabricated a constitutional 
framework in which Maratha governments’ distinct claims to sovereignty and affiliation would 
have no place.845 All would be subordinate to the paramount authority of the Peshwa, who would 
in turn be subordinate to the paramount authority of the Company.   
 Though deemed unconstitutional by the Company, the political obligations between 
Maratha governments endured. Wellesley on April 19, 1803 shared information from Colonel 
Collins posted to the camp of Daulatrao Shinde at Burhanpur about Shinde’s plans for “an 
accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and a confederacy with that Chieftain, and with the 
Rajah of Berar.”846 Collins was unable to procure details, but this basic intelligence was accurate. 
Representatives of the three rulers were again attempting to meet to reconcile and formulate a 
united approach to the problem of the Company. Raghuji Bhonsle in an April 28, 1803 note to 
Bajirao’s brother Amritrao stated, “Bajirao has made an agreement with the English. The 
conduct of the English is deceptive. I understand as you wrote that at this time all of us should 
act with one heart to protect our dominion (svarājya). The security of the state of our dominion 
ought to be secured. No penetration ought to occur. Everyone should be reconciled.” He 
explained that the scribal-diplomats had returned to Nagpur after meeting with Holkar at Pune, 
and Shinde had sent a representative to Nagpur to confer with them. All parties having agreed to 
proceed, Bhonsle on April 18 entered his tents in preparation to march.847  
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  By late May, Bhonsle was within a few days’ march of Shinde’s new campsite of Chikhli 
near Buldana. He wrote to Yashwantrao Holkar on June 2 of their impending meeting and urged 
him not to prolong negotiations (jāb-sāl) so that they could bring their plan (masalat) to its 
conclusion. He indicated that Khanderao Holkar would be released soon and that they were in 
touch with the Peshwa’s generals in the south, including the Rastes and the Patwardhans.848 After 
the war, Wellesley discovered that they were also in touch with leaders in north India such as the 
gosāvī Himmat Bahadur Anupgiri and Ghulam Muhammad Khan, the deposed nawāb of 
Rampur;849 however, at this juncture, he still maintained in his correspondence with the Court of 
Directors that that the proposed meeting was likely a defensive measure. Nevertheless, 
Wellesley’s approach to Collins’ delegation with Shinde was to force an admission of whether or 
not the Maratha rulers intended peace or war.850 Until Shinde retreated to north of the Narmada, 
and Bhonsle retreated to Nagpur, their mere proximity to the territories of the Nizam would be 
considered a threat to the Company’s ally. Frustrated by his failure to procure a reason for the 
meeting during an interview on May 28 with Shinde and his ministers, Collins declared that “the 
proposed interview between those chiefs was of itself, a sufficient cause to excite the suspicions 
of our government, inasmuch as the present tranquill state of affairs in the Deccan did not require 
the adoption of a measure, seldom resorted to but for hostile purposes.”851 He persisted in 
demanding more specific answers until Shinde finally disclosed that once he met with Bhonsle, 
Collins “should be informed whether it would be peace or war.” Wellesley wrote to Lieutenant-
General Gerard Lake that Shinde’s language was “insulting and hostile, and amounts to a 
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positive act of aggression upon every received principle of the law of nations.”852 Desperate for 
an excuse to go to war, the Governor-General issued instructions to both Lake and his brother for 
how to proceed once he found one. 
 Bhonsle and Shinde privately conferred for several hours on June 8. Collins tried to learn 
the substance of their conversation and to convince the rulers to retreat, to which their 
negotiators responded by criticizing the Company’s dealings with the Peshwa. In a July 4 
conversation with Collins, Sridhar Laxman “entered into a most tedious discourse” on the 
impropriety of the Peshwa contracting an alliance without the knowledge of his fellow rulers.853 
Collins dismissed this “reference to old usages” and that there was no evidence that the Peshwa 
had no right to enter into such an agreement, 854 a position that the Govenor-General had 
carefully staked out after Bassein.855 Collins suspected that the rulers and their representatives’ 
professions of good will were disingenuous and designed to delay while they finalized 
negotiations with Holkar.856 To expedite matters, the Governor-General delegated final decision-
making power to his brother, who had assembled a force near Ahmadagar. Arthur Wellesley 
directly wrote to Shinde and Bhonsle that only the separation and retreat of their armies would be 
considered a sincere indication of their peaceful intentions. They replied that they would agree to 
retreat together to Burhanpur if the Company’s army would retreat on the same day. Collins 
rejected this proposition. He would accept nothing less than the original demand for an 
immediate separation and retreat, to which the rulers would not accede. When he warned that 
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Wellesley would brook no further delay, Sridhar Laxman “without hesitation replied, that should 
the honourable General Wellesley commence hostilities…Raghojee Bhooslah, and Dowlut Rao 
Scindia would consider themselves at liberty to march their troops in whatever direction they 
might think proper.”857 Collins left Shinde’s camp on August 3. Wellesley heard of his departure, 
waited out an early monsoon shower, and commenced the war by besieging the fort of 
Ahmadnagar on August 8.858 
 Communication between Bhonsle, Holkar, and the scribal-diplomats in the days 
following the siege of Ahmadnagar further confirms the development of plans for an anti-
Company assault that resembled Nana Phadnavis’ 1779-80 scheme. In the opening paragraph of 
this chapter, I quoted from a September 7 letter from Bhonsle to Holkar that strongly echoed 
Nana’s call for a quadra-directional response to Company encroachment. On August 24, 1803, 
Holkar wrote to Sridhar Laxman and Krishnarao Madhav after the conclusion of their visit to 
Pune. He re-iterated their words in an earlier message: “Our conversations about the matter of 
the English have taken place, and in connection with this, we have come to our master [Raghuji 
II] and sent him to meet with Shinde and resolve the negotiations (jāb-sāl ugawūn pāthavle). 
Now, there is no more uncertainty. The English have taken Ahmadnagar fort, and there is 
nothing wanting in [their] appearance. Both are ready to come to a confrontation. On this 
occasion, your arrival is essential.”859 In this same letter, Holkar vacillated about joining Bhonsle 
and Shinde, complaining of six months’ worth of expenses incurred while locked in negotiations, 
and in fact, he abstained from the first few months of the Second-Anglo Maratha War. His 
ultimate failure to unite with his fellow Maratha rulers imparts a sad irony to his invocation of an 
                                                
857 Despatches, ed. Martin, vol. 3, 278. 
 
858 Notes, 63-4. 
 
859 BL, Mss Marathi, D36, ff. 198a.  
 
 296 
even more expansive anti-Company coalition in an August 28 note: “Now that us three [Bhonsle, 
Shinde, Holkar] are united, the rulers of the province of Hindustan and Samsherbahadur Bundele 
[Maratha ruler of Bundelkhand], and the ruler of Jhansi and others large and small will fall into 
line.”860 Had such a coalition been formed, it would no doubt have depended upon the practice of 
jawāb-suwāl that had enabled Maratha governments to pursue peace, and now to pursue war.  
 The Second Anglo-Maratha War comprised two main theaters – one in the Deccan under 
Wellesley and one in north India under Lake – and additional strategic strikes on the western port 
of Broach and the eastern port of Cuttack. After several hard-fought battles at Assaye, Laswadi, 
and Adgaon, Bhonsle and Shinde surrendered and signed peace agreements at Devgaon and 
Surji-Anjangaon, respectively, in December 1803. In the following year, the Company went to 
war with Holkar and defeated him. Though Wellesley was recalled in 1805 and eventually 
impeached for his actions, he had transformed his brother Arthur into a war hero and the 
Company into the most dominant power on the Indian subcontinent. The war marked the end of 
Maratha sovereignty and the beginning of “confederacy” as the dominant framework for 
conceptualizing Maratha politics. I noted above that Wellesley used this term to characterize the 
pre-war coalition between Bhonsle, Shinde, and Holkar. The Notes Relative to the Late 
Transactions in the Marhatta Empire (1803-4), conventionally attributed to him, expanded its 
usage such that “confederacy” became roughly synonymous with the Maratha “empire.” The 
opening of this text draws on existing notions of predation while articulating this new theory of 
Maratha confederacy: 
The predatory states composing the Marhatta power have never been united under any 
regular form of confederation, or by any system of constitutional laws, or of established 
treaties, which can be compared to any imperial constitution or general confederation 
existing in Europe. A vague and indefinite sentiment of common interest however, 
founded principally on their common origin and civil and religious usages, and upon their 
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common habits of conquest and depredation, has established a certain degree of union 
amongst them, from the period of their first success, throughout every stage of the decline 
of the Moghul empire; and the same indefinite but acknowledged confederacy has 
subsisted between the Marhattas since the entire destruction of the Moghul empire, and 
together with others causes, has enabled several of these adventurers to erect states of 
considerable military resource and political power.861 
“Confederacy” in this key passage is primarily distinguished from “constitution” on the basis of 
the presence or absence of the rule of law. Whereas a constitution is established, regular, and 
systematic, a confederacy is vague and indefinite. Whereas a constitution is founded on laws and 
treaties, a confederacy is founded on mere habits, usages, and sentiments.  
The Notes’ second key claim was that the only form of constitutional authority in the 
Maratha state was the Peshwa. Because the Peshwa was “acknowledged by all the Marhatta 
states, and universally by all the other states of India,”862 he was “the constitutional 
representative of the sovereign executive authority of the Marhatta empire.”863 Rhetorically, this 
claim buttressed the broader argument about the lack of a collectively determined Maratha 
constitution. More immediately, it provided a defense for Wellesley’s decision to negotiate with 
the Peshwa as the sole representative authority of all Maratha governments and to deny the latter 
any right to object to the agreement concluded at Bassein. This defense was critical to the now-
dominant conception of the Company as a disinterested and benevolent arbiter of the balance of 
power between Indian states. As I hope to have proven in the foregoing chapters, this re-
conception of the Company’s role in India, and the notion of Maratha “confederacy,” was 
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premised on a denial of Maratha politics as it actually existed for its practitioners. The Peshwa 
did not have a monopoly on constitutional authority; rather, I illustrate in Chapter 1 through the 
case of the sāt-cāḷīs agreement in Berar, Maratha and non-Maratha governments worked out 
their own treaty arrangements for limiting one another’s authority. Subsequent chapters have 
shown how Maratha rulers and their representatives transacted politics with a repertoire of 
sentiments, objects, and written agreements – which, as I have argued, was in toto known as 
jawāb-suwāl – in line with a common set of norms of good and bad political conduct. Insofar as 
such norms, practices, and procedures collectively shaped the exercise of power, Burke’s 
argument that “to name a Mahomedan government was to name a government by law” should 
equally apply to the Maratha case. 
Conclusion: The Road to Extirpation 
 The Company and the Nagpur governments entered into a treaty of “permanent peace and 
friendship” on December 17, 1803 at Devgaon. By its terms, the Nagpur Bhonsles ceded all 
claim to Orissa as well as to those territories in Berar where they had co-ruled with their friends, 
the Afghan nawābs of Ellichpur. 864 The Nagpur state’s western boundary was now fixed at the 
Wardha River, and its income dropped from approximately one crore to sixty lakhs of rupees per 
year.865 Wellesley appointed Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859), the future governor of 
Bombay, to serve as the new resident at Nagpur. He instructed him “to be accurately informed of 
all that passes in his durbar, particularly with the Emissaries of Sindia and Holkar and the 
Southern Chiefs.”866 In this capacity, Elphinstone and his successor Richard Jenkins would work 
closely with Yashwantrao Ramchandra, son of the Hyderabad envoy Ramchandra Dado and 
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Nagpur’s representative in the treaty negotiations.867 The establishment of a permanent residency 
made it much easier for the Company to monitor the counsels, deliberations, and 
communications of the Nagpur government. Intermediaries like Narayan Baburao Vaidya would 
continue to move furtively between Pune and Nagpur, but it would be more difficult to bring jāb-
sāl negotiations to fruition without Company obstruction. 
 Among the most pressing problems facing Elphinstone and Jenkins were the recurring 
attacks on Nagpur’s northern frontier from small bodies of cavalry known as the Pendharis (or 
Pindaris, in British parlance). The Marathi term penḍhārī designated a category of light cavalry 
serving in a Maratha army on a casual basis. Daulatrao Shinde’s and Yashwantrao Holkar’s 
armies consisted of especially large numbers of such cavalry, who were predominantly Afghans 
and Rajputs from north India. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, certain groups of 
Pendharis organized under the leadership of Amir Khan as well as an array of lesser commanders 
for the purpose of acquiring jāgīrs from the Nagpur government.868 I would speculate that the 
emergence of the Pendharis as a major military and political threat was a product of Nagpur’s 
expansion into the Gadha-Mandla region and destabilization of local power centers such as 
Bhopal; however, a thorough examination of this question falls outside of my scope. More 
germane to this chapter is the way in the Pendhari problem interfaced with the Company 
discourse on Maratha predation. Company officials employed the frames of predation and 
plunder to conceptualize the historical link between the decline of Maratha power and the spread 
of Pendhari bands across the Indian interior.869 
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Elphinstone’s and Jenkin’s despatches are filled with reports of Pendhari attacks and the 
paltry and hesitant nature of Nagpur’s military response. In 1809, allied Maratha and British 
forces led by Colonel Close and Siddiq Ali Khan defeated Amir Khan, but occasional attacks 
under different leaders persisted.870 Jenkins on December 30, 1811 sent a long letter to 
Governor-General Lord Minto containing “a review of the present political state of India” in 
which he observed that the “predatory powers” of Amir Khan and the Pendharis threatened the 
balance of power established by the recent treaties with Bhonsle, Shinde, and Holkar.871 While 
he had not obtained “any regular history of the origin and earliest state of the Pindarries,” he 
found that they were mentioned in “the earliest accounts of the Marhattas as attached to their 
armies.”872 The “natural result” of the dissolution of the bonds between the Pendharis and their 
Maratha overlords is “that the increasing consequence of these freebooters threatens to prove not 
more dangerous to the Marhatta States than to the British Government and to all the peaceful 
Goverments of India.”873 Falling in line with his predecessors, he also considered the “possibility 
of invasion from without aided by such hordes of plunderers,” potentially in league with the 
French or the Sikhs.874     
 Jenkins’ characterization of the Pendhari threat is remarkably similar to earlier 
characterizations of the Maratha state in its fixation on plunder and predation and its anxiety 
about the collusion of internal and external enemies. What is new is his consideration of a “war 
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of extirpation” against the Pendharis. He outlines three main policies that might be adopted: 
defensive neutrality, collaboration with Indian governments to reduce Amir Khan and the 
Pendharis, and a more “decided system” to supress them. Dismissing the first two policies to be 
inadequate, he breaks down the third into three options: a war of extirpation, sedenterization, or a 
combination of the two. He expresses much trepidation about the first option:  
However we might be authorized by the laws of nations to proceed to this extremity, and 
however loud the calls of the suffering countries laid waste by the Pindarries, to excite us 
to vengeance against their merciless ravagers; however desirable, too, it may seem to 
pluck up so serious an evil by the roots, it is impossible to contemplate even as a measure 
of necessary policy the extirpation of such numerous bands. A war of extermination as a 
fixed system of action even against robbers and pirates has seldom been found politic or 
practicable and in our own Bengal provinces, we have experienced a policy more human 
to be at the same time consistent with our interests and our security. If then there is any 
other less severe mode of curing the evil, a wise and humane Government will not 
hesitate to adopt it.875 
Jenkins ultimately shows more interest in pursuing territorial settlements for the Pendharis or 
combining two options. Nevertheless, his invocation of a “war of extirpation” is remarkable in 
light of the fact that Lord Minto only a few years later pursued such a war against the Pendharis. 
The Third Anglo-Maratha War, or the “Mahratta and Pindarry War” as it was known, was fought 
not only to consolidate British paramountcy over Maratha governments, but also to finally 
extirpate the figure of the plunderer. 
   At the same time that Jenkins was preparing his recommendations on the Pendhari 
problem, he was beginning to make inquiries about the history and current state of the Nagpur 
government. These inquiries would accelerate once the Company acquired full control over the 
government in 1817. With the help of his assistant Vinayakrao Anandrao Aurangabadkar, he 
searched for existing histories, documents, and letters related to Nagpur, commissioned new 
histories, collected testimonies from court officials and village officers, and surveyed the Chanda 
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and Chhatisgarh districts. Such initiatives towards producing new, more “scientific” knowledge 
about the Maratha state were growing in the 1810s and 1820s at both Nagpur and Satara, but 
they drew on existing forms of scribal-produced historical knowledge with different didactic and 
commemorative ends. The Company’s encounter with scribal authors in the arena of the 






CHAPTER 6: Scribal Histories, Company Knowledge, and the Ethics of Politics 
 
Captain James Grant Duff, the British East India Company resident at Satara, met with 
Balwantrao Chitnis (d. 1843), the chief scribe of of the young ruler Pratapsinha Bhonsle Maharaj 
on Wednesday, July 7, 1819. Grant Duff posed a series of questions on the history and 
composition of the Maratha state. First, he asked when and in whose administration the 
prestigious title of pant pratinidhi had been created and what became of it in later years. 
Balwantrao explained that the title had been created during the administration of Chhatrapati 
Rajaram at Ginjee and conferred on several individuals before passing into relative obscurity. 
Grant Duff then moved on to revenue. He inquired about its classification into various 
categories; the distribution and management of tax-free revenue assignments; and the 
remuneration of members of Shivaji’s council of eight ministers. Out of his depth, Chitnis 
suggested that they write to his father Malhar Ramrao (d.1823) to obtain papers pertinent to this 
subject.876 About ten years earlier, the elder Chitnis had included such information in a massive 
and detailed biographical narrative, or caritra, of the lives of the Bhonsle rulers. Grant Duff 
referred to this work in his magnum opus A History of the Mahrattas (1826). This chapter 
explores the relationship between scribal histories and Company knowledge about the Maratha 
state and exposes the limits of the latter in capturing the purpose and meaning of the historical 
tradition of scribal families.    
In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Kayastha Prabhu scribal-diplomatic 
elites of the Chitnis lineage at Satara and the Chitnavis and Gupte lineages at Nagpur composed 
Marathi-language histories of the Bhonsle dynasties. Colonial and post-Independence historians 
looked to these histories for information about the rise and consolidation of Maratha rule in the 
western Deccan. But scribal writers also stressed the role of scribal knowledge and skill in the 
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Maratha polity. Most distinctly, Malhar Ramrao Chitnis drew on śāstric texts to make a case for 
the importance of scribal knowledge of rājnīti (political ethics) in shaping the conduct of kings. 
In so doing, he rendered the historical past into a vehicle for conveying ethical lessons for the 
future. At the same time, Chinis and his counterparts at Nagpur valorized the acts of service 
performed by their forebears, highlighting in particular the accomplishments of Balaji Avaji and 
Khando Ballal, the first two Kayastha Prabhu scribes of the Chhatrapatis. While Grant Duff and 
Richard Jenkins, the Company resident at Nagpur, consulted these works in researching the 
Maratha political past, they ignored their connection to the accumulated knowledge and 
achievement of the scribal-diplomatic class that had worked at Maratha courts for over a century. 
The histories examined in this chapter are part of a class of Marathi prose narrative called 
bakhar. Some scholars believe this designation is derived from the Arabic word khabar, meaning 
information, while others link it to the Persian salutation ba-khair, meaning “all is well.” These 
etymologies have in turn been linked to different pre-cursors for the bakhar, ranging from the 
Perso-Arabic akhbār (newsletter) to the Sanskrit akhāyikā (story). Primarily composed from the 
late seventeenth to the late nineteenth centuries, bakhar tell the stories of famous rulers, 
prominent families, and major political events. They run to different lengths, employ a mixture 
of Persian- and Sanskrit-derived idioms and genres, and switch between prosaic, ironic, and 
hyperbolic modes of narration.877 As Sumit Guha has argued, while earlier bakhars drew on local 
fact and custom to determine the jurisdiction of newly conquered territories and to settle legal 
disputes, later “macro-bakhars” were often written at the behest of a ruler or ruling family to 
                                                




commemorate the deeds of their ancestors. In short, the bakhar was a site for the representation 
of power that changed over time.878 
 Bakhars have been part of a long debate about the emergence of modern history and 
historical consciousness in South Asia. Once the publication of bakhars began in the late 
nineteenth century, they were predominantly classified as works of literature of limited utility for 
writing history. V.K. Rajwade pointed out that they contained numerous inaccuracies of time and 
place. He believed that such errors demonstrated that bakhar authors lacked the requisite 
education to differentiate between suitable and unsuitable materials for writing history.879 T.S. 
Shejwalkar acknowledged Rajwade’s criticisms, but he argued that authors like Malhar Ramrao 
Chitnis exhibited an admirably selfless love of country in their writing that his own better-
educated contemporaries had forgotten, in part because of Grant Duff’s unflattering portrayal of 
the Marathas.880 Nevertheless, most twentieth-century historians followed Rajwade’s conviction 
that historical knowledge should be grounded in the empirical verifiability of facts against 
“original” documents.881 Later published editions of bakhars emphasized their literary value, but 
they maintained a firm distinction between this value and the factual domain of history.882 
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 Following the interventions of postmodern and postcolonial theory, scholars moved 
towards describing the modes of historical understanding of pre- and early modern narrative 
forms on their own terms.883 Important to this effort was the recognition of the embeddedness of 
historical narration in existing conventional genres of narrative discourse such as tārīkh and 
taẕkirah in Persian and itihāsa-purāṇa, vaṃśāvalī, and caritra in Sanskrit.884 Perhaps the 
culmination of this line of argument was Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam’s contention that the writers, readers, and listeners of early modern narrative 
were attuned to its “texture” of historicity.885 In a related vein, studies of particular regions, 
including Bengal, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra, have analyzed how representations of the Indian 
past promoted the ethical values of particular social and political formations and buttressed 
forms of collective memory and identity.886 While many of these studies have focused on the 
royal and aristocratic ethos of Mughal, Rajput, and Maratha patrons, others have begun to 
examine the relationship between works of historical narrative and their authors, who were often 
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drawn from Brahman, Kayastha, Khatri, and Jain scribal-bureaucratic classes.887 In the case of 
western India, Prachi Deshpande in a perspicacious study of Marathi mestakas, or writing 
manuals, has called for greater attention to how the ethics of scribal practice were expressed in 
bakhars and other long-form Marathi political narratives.888   
 This chapter furthers this debate by showing that the caritra of Malhar Ramrao Chitnis 
narrated the Maratha political past to inaugur a more ethical polity in the present and future. By 
framing the facts of Bhonsle rule and scribal service in terms of an authoritative received 
tradition of nīti ethics, Chitnis offered an historical truth that exceeded the evidentiary protocols 
of colonial and post-Independence historical practice. That is, the truth of history for Chitnis lay 
in its fitness for bringing an ethical future into existence through right conduct in the political 
sphere. While existing scholarship has primarily explained the inaccuracies and partialities of 
pre-colonial historical narrative in terms of its commemorative function, this chapter also attends 
to its didactic one. Chitnis told stories about the Bhonsles and their scribes in apparently 
prejudicial ways to model how those who rule and those who serve should and should not 
behave. Secondly, as I will show through the circulation of stories about Balaji Avaji and 
Khando Ballal Chitnis, the didactic function of narrative entailed an ethical reflection on the 
historical experience of scribal service. Scribes in these histories were not mere writers, but 
instead they advised, instructed and even reprimanded the ruler in the interest of guarding the 
polity’s ethical integrity. During a period in which Maratha rule was increasingly fragile in the 
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realm of realpolitik, scribal authors made themselves into the custodians of a living tradition of 
political ethics.   
History and Political Ethics in the Chitnis Caritra 
 In the opening lines of the Shivaji portion of his caritra, Malhar Ramrao Chitnis claimed 
that Shahu Maharaj II commissioned a caritra of his ancestors in 1811, but since the latter died 
in 1809, we can assume that Chitnis actually began to write sometime between 1808 and 1811.889 
Modern readers first encountered the caritra in installments published in the Marathi journals 
Vividhajñyānavistāra (Spread of Various Knowledge) and Kāvyetihāsaṅgraha (Collection of 
Poetry and History) from 1882 and 1887. K.N. Sane later edited and published separate editions 
of the Shivaji, Sambhaji, and Rajaram portions.890 In 1967 and 1976, R.V. Herwadkar edited the 
Shivaji and Shahu sections of the caritra, including extensive introductions and notes. While no 
manuscripts of the caritra are extant today, the editors of Kāvyetihāsaṅgraha had access to three: 
the Chitnis prat (copy), the Kolhapur prat, and the Indore prat. Malhar Khanderao Chitnis (d. 
1908), the grandson of Balwantrao Chitnis, had sent the Chitnis prat to the Kāvyetihāsaṅgraha 
editors. Consisting of 676 bandas (folds), or 1,352 pages bound in leather, it is probably Chitnis’ 
original manuscript of which the Kolhapur and Indore prats were later recensions. Most 
significant is the ordering of prakaraṇas (chapters) in the Chitnis prat: first is the prakaraṇa on 
rājnīti, followed by the Shivaji caritra, including Shivaji’s exchange of letters with the Hindu 
poet-saints Tukaram and Ramdas, and finally the Sambhaji, Rajaram, and Shahu caritras. 
Separate publication was convenient for drawing a wide readership; however, it obscured the 
essentially cohesive nature of Chitnis’ text and the prominent position of the chapter on rājnīti 
within it. 
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As signaled by the rājnīti prakaraṇa, the purpose of Chitnis’ caritra was ethical and 
didactic. The Marathi genre caritra, like the Sanskrit caritam, refers to the life-story of an 
individual, usually a male ruler or a god, construed as the sum-total of his accomplishments; 
however, the word can also be used in the sense of character. Hence the caritra carries a notion 
of ethical personhood built on a foundation of demonstrated and demonstrable ethical action. 
While kings are the subjects and addressees of Chitnis’ caritra, his primary audience consisted 
of court officials responsible for the education and guidance of young men of the royal family. 
Chitnis explicitly states his pedagogical intent in the opening lines of the prakaraṇa:  
O Ganesh! It will greatly benefit the kingdom and the king to hear and recite these 
political ethics (rājnīti) with the utmost regard and act accordingly. Those who would 
attain the kingdom by [its] growth ought to observe [these ethics]. These ethics were seen 
and practiced by great kings of the past like Manu and others. I have contrived to 
expound [these ethics] on the basis of the sciences (śāstrādhāre) in the language of 
Maharashtra. Those who would attain fitness in this world and the next should certainly 
examine [these ethics].891 
He elaborates that while the appellation rājā is applied to all sorts in the kaliyuga age, only those 
who seek to maximize the wellbeing of their subjects deserve the name. Kings are not those who 
merely wield power or call themselves kings; rather, true kings are those who practice right 
conduct in accordance with the knowledge of the śāstras.  
Chitnis discusses the merits of an ethical education for a prince’s overall development in 
the Shivaji section of the caritra. The prince, he notes, is the right hand of the king, while the 
amātya, or head minister, is the left. The prince is integral to perpetuation of the kingdom, but if 
not properly educated in rājdharma (duty of kings), daṇḍanīti (ethics of punishment), and other 
subjects by the amātya and his fellow servants, he can also destroy it. The narrative episodes that 
fall before and after this passage – Sambhaji’s disobedience towards his father Shivaji and the 
latter’s chastisement of his dissolute brother Vyankoji Bhonsle of Tanjavur – dramatize the 
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consequences of a young man of royal lineage coming to power without a proper education. 
They illustrate that the power of the king ought to be shaped and even restrained by an objective, 
external ethics held in custody by the political-bureaucratic class of which Chitnis and his scribal 
lineage were long-standing members. By placing ethical knowledge at the center of the education 
of the king, and by emphasizing the necessity of continuously evaluating kingly conduct against 
this knowledge, he reserves a prominent place for scribes, diplomats, and counselors in 
preserving and transmitting political ethics between generations. 
The core of what Chitnis aims to teach rulers is nīti (ethics) and nītiśāstra (science of 
ethics). Nīti in its most basic sense denotes right conduct or practice, particularly in the sphere of 
politics. In contradistinction to dharma, or duty, nīti connotes a highly flexible and pragmatic 
ethics of the secular world, which scholars trace to Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra, written in the early 
first millennium CE. The scholarly consensus about the historical development of these concepts 
has been that nīti was absorbed into the worldview of dharma, embodied by the Manusmṛti and 
related legal commentaries, only to re-appear in the medieval and early modern periods in certain 
regional textual traditions. With respect to Sanskrit textual production, Sheldon Pollock finds a 
“contraction of the discourse on power” after 1700.892 Accounts of the trajectory of nīti in 
regional Indian languages vary. While Rao and Subrahmanyam have found a rich tradition in the 
Telugu regions of south India, Rosalind O’Hanlon claims that Maharashtra did not enjoy a 
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similar resurgence in nīti because of the dominance of the rigid and ritualistic field of 
dharmaśāstra.893 
These authors make several assumptions: that the domains of nīti and dharma were 
separable; that the predominance of nīti ethics presupposes the existence of a more fluid social 
and political order; and that Maratha politics and government in particular was too dominated by 
an orthodox Brahman elite to allow for the flourishing of nīti principles. Chitnis constructs an 
ascending hierarchy of the fields of arthaśāstra, dharmaśāstra, and nītiśāstra. He advises that 
when coming to a decision on any given dispute, the ruler should first consult arthaśāstra. If a 
contradiction arises between arthaśāstra and dharmaśāstra, he should follow dharmaśāstra, but 
if dharmaśāstra conflicts with nītiśāstra, he should follow nītiśāstra. He gives weight to custom 
(ācār) in creating this hierarchy in favor of nītiśāstra: 
I will say why nītiśāstra appears to be a stronger alternative than the two others. 
Nītiśāstra grasps that one ought to take note of the customs of country, the customs of 
caste, and the customs of family. If one violates the precepts of custom to follow the 
dharmaśāstra only, it will lead to the disturbance of one’s subjects, which accordingly 
will lead to the king’s infelicity. If we look at the customs of the country, we find that the 
unorthodox customs of marrying the daughter of a maternal uncle and eating onions are 
ancient in the south…If one maintains dharmaśāstra and destroys long-held customs, it 
will lead to the disturbance of one’s subjects. Therefore, according to prevalence, 
nītisāstra is the strongest.894  
While offering some support to the theory that arthaśāstra was gradually incorporated into and 
perhaps eclipsed by dharmaśāstra, Chitnis’ construction of this hierarchy reveals that the 
flexible, pragmatic thinking of nīti ethics was still valued at Maratha courts because it could 
accommodate deviations from the Brahmanical orthopraxis of dharmaśāstra.  
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Chitnis’ caritra was not the first example of a didactic text on political ethics in Marathi. 
The Satara royal library may have contained several such texts, including a manuscript called 
Sevak-bodhinī prepared for Pratapsinha’s Persian scribe Madhavrao. In all likelihood, the short 
bakhar authored by the Pune-based scribal clerk Balaji Ganesh – bearing the familiar title of 
kārkun nisbat ciṭnīs – in 1783 for Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao, and that fell into the hands of the 
British resident Charles Warre Malet, was pedagogical in purpose.895 Another text produced 
around the same time, the Narāyaṇa-vyavahāra-śikṣā (1785), was a table of instruction 
consisting of four sets of qualities or virtues (guṇa), which are in turn comprised of subsidiary 
qualities, all of which are phrased as commands.896 Malhar Ramrao Chitnis’ son Balwantrao 
compiled a similar list of 108 properties of political ethics (nītilakṣaṇe) at the request of 
Chhatrapati Pratapsinha.897 Two earlier treatises on the subject of nīti are published and well 
known to scholars of Maratha history: the Dandanīti-prakaraṇam (1680-83) of Keshav Pandit 
and the Ājñāpatra (1715-16) of Ramchandra Nilkanth Amatya.898 Because of the influence that it 
has exercised in the historiography of the Maratha state, I will briefly comment on the latter text 
with respect to its similarities to and differences from Chitnis’ caritra.  
Unlike in the Chitnis’ caritra, Amatya imagines an ethic of political conduct determined 
in large part by the resolution of conflict between the ruler and the old landowning elite. 
Nevertheless, Chitnis’ treatment of rājnīti does resonate with Amatya’s insofar as its chief 
political goods are the physical growth (vṛddhi) of the polity and the care (poṣaṇa) of its 
subjects. We have no way of knowing whether or not he had read the Ājñāpatra, but he does give 
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a prominent place to Amatya in his discussion of the prince’s education and links him to Khando 
Ballal later in the Shahu caritra. He also seconded Amatya’s belief that the prosperity of the 
polity was the fruit of human and divine agency working in tandem. Yet he lays special emphasis 
on the importance of human effort in the world. Employing a karmic framework of action, 
Chitnis states that divine agency in the world assumes the form of fate (daita) to offer the initial 
thesis (purvapakṣa) of any action, while human effort (purushaprayatna) constitutes the action’s 
demonstrated conclusion (siddhānta-pakṣa). But since fate is the manifestation in this life of the 
accumulated merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) of previous lives, it may be said that human effort 
is the cause and first basis (mūla) of fate and, by extension, of any completed action.899 It is 
significant that Chitnis takes these additional steps to justify the efficacy of human action. While 
both he and Amatya both understood the polity’s success to be ineffably linked to divine favor, 
he envisioned a greater role for the worldy means of political action that formed the centerpiece 
of nīti ethics.  
These means are delineated in seven chapters: rājyābhisheka (coronation), śrīsinhāsana-
sabhā (throne and assembly), rājguṇa (qualities of the king), amātya-sevakjani (minister and 
service people), ānhika (daily duties) – two chapters divided into the first and second halves of 
the day – kośa (treasury), and bala (army). With the exception of the description of the 
coronation, this division roughly follows that of the Arthaśāstra.900 Chitnis includes core 
                                                
899 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 63-5.  
 
900 While we know very little about its author Kautilya, the received Arthaśāstra is a rescension of one or 
more original compositions on kingship and statecraft composed sometime between 50 and 125 CE. The 
Arthaśāstra in turn was a source for Manusmṛti and subsequent commentaries on dharmaśāstra, the 
popular collection of animal fables on rājnīti known as the Pancatantra, and other major works of 
Sanskrit science and literature. For a comprehensive introduction, King, Governance, and Law in Ancient 




concepts from the Arthaśāstra, including the seven limbs (saptānga) of the kingdom901 and the 
six qualities of good policy (shaḍguṇa) for engaging one’s enemies,902 as well as secondary 
classifications of concrete information and illustrative references to mythological kings. At 
times, the correspondence between content and organization can be quite strong. For example, 
both Kautilya’s and Chitnis’ expositions of the ruler’s proper control of the five senses 
(indriyanigraha) refer to some of the same kings to illustrate the negative effects of passions 
deriving from attachment to the senses. Janamejaya of the Mahābhārata, who performed a 
snake-sacrifice in retribution for a snake’s killing of his father, is cited in reference to anger, 
while Ravana of the Ramāyaṇa exhibited pride in refusing to return Sita to her husband Rama.903  
 Chitnis pursued a thoughtful process of selection in his engagement with the Arthaśāstra 
and the Manusmṛti. Certain small differences may only derive from the particular rescensions 
that he read. In this category, we might place his reference to Rama in illustration of the passion 
of desire rather than Dandakya, who appears in the Arthaśāstra. Other variations, however, seem 
more deliberate. Whereas the Arthaśāstra’s explication of the three powers, namely power, 
energy, and counsel, appears first in the section on the saptānga and later with reference to the 
army, Chitnis chooses to locate it much earlier in the section of the rājguṇa chapter on the 
training of the king, thereby amplifying their significance.904 Whereas the Arthaśāstra lists three 
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271. 
 
902 Viz. settling for peace (sandhi), conflict (vigraha), proceeding (yān), remaining stationary (āsan), 
playing two sides (dvaidhībhāva), and seeking refuge (saṃśraya). See Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 50; KCL, ed. 
Olivelle, 277. 
 
903 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 17; KCL, ed. Olivelle, 271.  
 




vices stemming from wrath and four vices stemming from pleasure, and the Manusmṛti lists 
eight from wrath and ten from pleasure, Chitnis lists eight for each.905 Both texts discuss the 
king’s daily routine, but Chitnis borrows the Manusmṛti’s division of the routine into two 
discrete halves encompassing different topics in statecraft. He also draws on the Manusmṛti to 
articulate his own understanding of the ideal ruler. Evoking a Puranic sense of the god Vishnu as 
lord of the earth (pṛthvipati), he identifies the ruler as Vishnu’s avatar (aṃśa) who ensures the 
preservation of all those belonging to to the sea-girt earth. He then builds on this association 
between the king’s physical dominion and care of subjects, describing him in Manu’s terms as an 
avatar (devatāṃśa) of the eight guardian deities of the cardinal directions. 906  
Along with his frequent references to classical treatises on political ethics, Chitnis 
produces a pedagogical effect through his use of figurative language. He relies heavily on 
dṛṣṭānta, a figurative device derived from Sanskrit poetics (alamkāraśāstra). Edwin Gerow 
defines dṛṣṭānta to be an “example” entailing “the adjunction of a second situation which bears 
upon the same point as the first and where the purpose is entirely one of illustration.”907 As 
Monika Horstmann has argued, the function of the dṛṣṭānta was similar to that of the exemplum 
of medieval and Renaissance literature in Europe: to illustrate a general truth by means of a 
specific proposition or narrative.908 Insofar as the prescriptive component of the dṛṣṭānta 
                                                
905 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 20; KCL, ed. Olivelle, 336; Manu’s Code of Law: A Critical Edition and 
Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra (hereafter MCL), ed. Patrick Olivelle (New York: Oxford, 
2005), 156. 
 
906 The guardian deities are Indra, Varuna, Vayu, Kubera, Agni, Yama, Rudra. See Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 12; 
MCL, ed. Olivelle, 154.  
 
907 Edwin Gerow, A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 199. 
 
908 Monika Horstmann, “The Example in Dadupanthi Homiletics,” in Tellings and Texts: Music, 
Literature, and Performance in North India, ed. Francesca Orsini and Katherine Butler Schofield 




determines the corresponding form of the narrative component, the structure of the device 
mirrors that of Chitnis’ text as a whole.   
Dṛṣṭānta can be found throughout the Chitnis caritra but especially in the chapter on 
rājnīti. Take one simple example: “Powerful foes when divided become powerless. I will give an 
example (dṛṣṭānt) of this. Just as a branch is beset with maggots, so the branch falls to pieces.”909 
In the section on the king’s treasury, Chitnis opines, “Just as the calf of a cow that is milked too 
much will be weak and unfit for work, so overexploited subjects will be unfit for the king’s 
work.”910 As is evident from these examples, dṛṣṭānta commonly made use of imagery from the 
natural world in order to make general principles vivid and easy to understand.911 Nowhere is 
this more evocative than in Chitnis’ aforementioned description of the ideal ruler. Having 
identified the ruler with the avatar of the deities of the eight cardinal directions, he elaborates, 
“This type of ruler is the one who expands the entire world. As the moon rises, it effects the 
exaltation and advancement of the ocean. In such a manner, the king by observing his proper 
duties nurtures his subjects, and by those means, the subjects and the kingdom are advanced.” 
Certain dṛṣṭānta appearing in the same contexts of both the rājnīti chapter and the subsequent 
caritra of the Bhonsle rulers help to establish unity of meaning within the text. In the section of 
rājnīti on the prince, Chitnis says that just as an elephant without a rider and a goad becomes a 
menace to all, so an unwatched prince becomes a threat to the kingdom. If he seeks to rule the 
kingdom himself, it will be difficult to protect, just as a piece of meat is difficult to protect once 
                                                
909 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 73.  
 
910 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 61.  
 
911 Here one might draw a comparison to the way in which the famous Pancatantra and Hitopadeśa, 
which have circulated in Sanskrit, Persian, and various regional languages in South Asia since the 




it has been spotted by a tiger. He must be watched by careful and well-educated attendants, lest, 
like a lion’s cub, he devour his protectors.912 The same series of dṛṣṭānta later appears nearly 
word-for-word in the caritra’s discussion of the method of educating Shivaji’s sons Sambhaji 
and Rajaram.913     
Chitnis relied on allusions to śāstric texs and figurative devices to communicate ethical 
principles, but these principles were grounded in his own understanding of the aims and 
composition of government. As noted above, he considered these aims to be the constant 
expansion of the polity and the inclusion of subjects within its protective embrace. In turn, these 
aims reflected an imagination of the ruler’s relationships to the broader polity and society. 
Unlike the Ājñāpatra, which finds a basic conflict between the king and elite landed society, and 
the Arthaśāstra, which situates the king primarily in relation to other kings, Chitnis underscores 
the exchange of service and protection between the king and his followers and subjects. Whereas 
the rājmaṇḍala in the Arthaśāstra’s designates the circle of kings, it designates the king’s circle 
in Chitnis’ rājnīti. While Chitnis restricts the king’s circle to twice-born castes, he also states that 
inclusion into the broader political fold does not depend on one’s birth or station. Rather, those 
of all castes who are intelligent (catura), trustworthy (itbārī), and careful (sāvadh) ought to be 
recruited for political work and rewarded with protection.914 Thus, without going so far as to 
break entirely with orthodox views on caste, Chitnis makes an effort to prioritize skill and merit 
over ascriptive markers of status in determining access to politics and government.    
                                                
912 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 26. 
 
913 Chitnis, Saptaprakaraṇātmaka Caritra, 176. 
 




Chitnis made an especially forceful case for scribal participation in government in his 
discussion of the king’s circle. He states that this circle consists of the ruler; his queen and heir; 
the council of eight ministers (ashṭapradhāna); and, most importantly, the two writers 
(lekhakadvaya). While different iterations of the idea of the rājmaṇḍala can be found in 
descriptions of Shivaji’s administration in other bakhars as well as in various eighteenth-century 
documentation and correspondence, Chitnis is alone in including this pair of scribal offices in the 
inner circle of the king. He also gives them a prominent place in the coronation and assembly of 
the king.915 In his description of the assembly, he states that the ciṭnīs, or the writer of letters 
(patra-lekhaka) and the phaḍnīs, or the writer of calculations (gaṇaka-lekhaka), should be 
intelligent (catura), trustworthy (viśvāsū), and attentive to political affairs.916 In addition, the 
ciṭnīs should be clean, adroit, knowledgeable about the science of words (śabdaśāstra), 
proficient in all languages and scripts, and perceptive of the intents and designs of others, while 
the phaḍnīs should be careful, retentive, skilled in calculation, and capable of keeping a written 
record of the wealth and treasury of the kingdom. The ciṭnīs should sit on the king’s right-hand 
side near the throne, while the phaḍnīs should sit in the corresponding position on the left.917 
Later, Chitnis re-iterates that the ciṭnīs in particular should stay close to the king and follow the 
same conduct of the head minister. He should be privy to the secret political counsels of the king 
and his ministers, and because he is responsible for communicating with the king’s enemies, he 
                                                
915 While it is possible that Balaji Avaji was involved with securing the Benares-born Maharashtrian 
Brahman priest Gagabhatt’s participation in Shivaji’s coronation, his exact role in the actual coronation 
ceremonies is unclear. See D.V. Kale, “Bakhars and Coronation,” in Chhatrapati Shivaji Coronation 
Tercentenary Commemoration Volume, ed. B.K. Apte (University of Bombay, 1974-5), 7-19; V.S. 
Bendrey, Coronation of Shivaji the Great (Bombay: New Age Printing Press, 1960).  
 
916 On similar pairs in Sanskrit legal digests, see Kane, “A Note on the Kāyasthas,” 741.  
 




should think, behave, and act in a straightforward, guileless manner, even when he must deceive 
the enemy.918 In short, the scribe in Chitnis’ view was more than a mere writer. Rather, he was a 
person of intelligence and discretion with whom the ruler enjoyed an intimacy in political affairs 
and entrusted with sensitive political communications.  
Chitnis exhibited the quality of the scribe’s political intelligence in even more nuanced 
terms in the life-stories of his ancestors Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal. He intimates that they 
enjoyed an insight into the import of politics that exceeded the explicit meaning of the written 
word. In a well-known episode of the Shivaji caritra, Balaji Avaji, having been ordered to write 
and deliver a letter on some delicate political matter, reads out its contents from a sheet of paper 
in Shivaji’s presence. Seeing that the paper was blank, a nearby torchbearer bursts out laughing. 
When Shivaji asks about the outburst, Chitnis explains that he had been reading from a blank 
sheet; that he would now prepare the letter; and that he should be punished for his offense. 
Shivaji instead mercifully commands him to compose and read out the letter on the spot. Balaji 
sits, composes the letter, and reads it aloud, at which point Shivaji is delighted to find not the 
slightest discrepancy between this letter and the previously recitation. As Chitnis concludes, it 
was at this moment that Balaji was considered a political official (rājkāraṇī kārbhār) and an 
intimate official (samīpācā kārbhār).919 The claim here is that Balaji not only had cleverness, but 
also insight and understanding. He did not simply hear the ruler’s instructions and write them 
down in a mechanical fashion, but rather he apprehended their inner meaning and adapted his 
communication to this meaning.  
 Chitnis further emphasizes the political insight of the scribe and his intimacy with the 
ruler by according Balaji Avaji the privilege of recording the messages received by Shivaji 
                                                
918 Chitnis, “Rājnīti,” 31.  
 
919 Chitnis, Saptaprakaraṇātmaka Caritra, 163-4.  
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through divine visitation. As has been noted by many commentators, several Marathi bakhars 
represent Shivaji as an ideal ruler destined for political greatness in part by suggesting that he 
was visited and protected by the Hindu goddess Bhavani at critical junctures in his life. In 
Krishnarao Anant Sabhasad’s bakhar (1697), the earliest known account of Shivaji’s life, 
Bhavani reveals herself to announce Shivaji’s birth and to offer protection before his encounters 
with Afzal Khan, Shaista Khan, and Mirza Raja Jai Singh. Chitnis builds on these episodes. 
Occasionally, he repeats Sabhasad’s language, demonstrating that he made use of this bakhar in 
composing his own.920 But he takes the additional step of attaching his family’s name to 
Shivaji’s bond with the goddess. While Sabhasad merely states that a nearby clerk wrote down 
Bhavani’s messages and read them back to Shivaji, Chitnis avers that it was Balaji Avaji, along 
with Shivaji’s news-writer,921 who was tasked with putting the goddess’ words on paper.922  
One of Bhavani’s promises to Shivaji was to usher his polity through the travails of his 
son’s brief reign to a long life of twenty-seven generations. In Malhar Ramrao Chitnis’ 
rendering, Balaji Avaji and his descendants became guardians of the polity’s future by recording 
that promise for posterity. His own act of authorship made the case that they were also the 
intepreters of its past. In authoring a history of kings that was also a representation of the ethics 
of kingship, Chitnis contributed to his ancestors’ tradition of loyal and virtuous service. As I will 
explore in the next section, Chitnis believed this tradition was sufficiently resilient to endure and 
                                                
920 Take, for example, the goddess’ initial statement to Shivaji in preparation for his meeting with Jai 
Singh. In both bakhars, she exclaims, “O son, this moment’s occasion is difficult.” Except for the word 
used to signify a particular segment of time (veḷ in Sabhasad, samay in Chitnis), which I have translated 
as “moment,” their language is the same. Śiva Chatrapatiñce Caritra, ed. Herwadkar, 48; Chitnis, 
Saptaprakaraṇātmaka Caritra, 146.  
 
921 Chitnis does not name this person, though it was most likely Dattaji Trimbak. On this appointment and 
its close relationship with that of the ciṭnīs, see Chapter 4.   
 
922 Śiva Chatrapatiñce Caritra, ed. Herewadkar, 40, 48; Chitnis, Saptaprakaraṇātmaka Caritra, 70.  
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correct the transgressions of a bad king, should he stray too far outside the boundaries of ethical 
conduct. Chitnis and his counterparts at Nagpur underscored this resilience in their re-tellings of 
the lives of their ancestors.      
Scribal Histories of Service at Satara and Nagpur   
In the biographical sections of his caritra, Malhar Ramrao Chitnis dwells on the life-
stories of Shivaji’s celebrated scribes Balaji Avaji and his son Khando Ballal. Corresponding 
stories about these figures are found in two bakhars written by members of Kayastha Prabhu 
scribal-diplomatic families, whose careers were discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, for the British 
resident at Nagpur, Richard Jenkins. Gangadharrao Madhav Chitnavis wrote a bakhar in 
1819/20.923 Sakharam Mahipat and other members of the Gupte family, drawing heavily on 
Chitnavis, wrote a second bakhar about a year later in 1820/1.924 In addition, both bakhars bear 
certain resemblances to two roughly contemporaneous Persian histories of the Marathas: 
Lachhmi Narayan Shafiq Aurangabadi’s Bisāṭ al-Ghanā’im (1799-1800) and the Tārīkh-i 
Rājahā-yi Dakan (sometimes called Tārīkh-i Shivājī). Jadunath Sarkar, noting the similarities 
between the Tārīkh-i Rājahā-yi Dakan and the Śrī Śiva Digvijaya, a bakhar published at Baroda 
in 1895 and spuriously attributed to Khando Ballal, speculated that some lost late eighteenth-
century bakhar must have been the original source for these histories.925 While we do not know 
if the Satara and Nagpur authors drew from the same written source, or if a copy of the Chitnis’ 
caritra made its way to Nagpur, the preponderance of similar details points to the circulation in 
                                                
923 BL, Mss Marathi, G33. A second incomplete copy of this bakhar may be found in BL, Mss Marathi, 
D42, ff. 43-186. 
 
924 BL, Mss Marathi, D32. BL, Mss Marathi, G46 is a second incomplete copy with significant variations. 
The former Gupte bakhar was published as NBB, ed. Kale. 
 
925 Sarkar, Shivaji and His Times, 451. 
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oral and written form of common stories about the deeds of Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal in 
the twilight of the Maratha state.  
As I have argued, the putative focus of the Satara and Nagpur bakhars is the history of 
the Bhonsle rājās and their polities, but the primary concern of their narratives is to recognize 
the contributions of Kayastha Prabhu scribal-diplomatic elites to these polities. The authors do 
this in part by means of common hagiographic stories that exhibit the skill, daring, and loyalty of 
Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal. Given the affinal and caste connections between the Satara and 
Nagpur scribal households, these figures were likely recognized as common ancestors whose 
accomplishments redounded to the general credit of Kayastha Prabhu scribal lineages. In 
particular, all of the bakhars recount the history of the first four Chhatrapatis – Shivaji, 
Sambhaji, Rajaram, and Shahu – by dramatizing Balaji Avaji’s punishment and death and his son 
Khando Ballal’s return to favor in the years between Shivaji’s death and Shahu’s rise to power. 
This narrative of crisis, decline, and restoration testifies to the absolute loyalty of the scribes, 
even in times of personal adversity, and links the integrity of their lineage and patrimony to that 
of their royal patrons. While they did not go so far as to include separate genealogies for their 
lineages or provide full details of marriages and births, they did acknowlege familial 
relationships between scribal elites. More importantly, they portrayed their lineages as 
embodying and transmitting the core virtue of loyal service (sevā ekānishṭhā). Dynastic history 
became a site for cementing the legacy of scribal service to Maratha rulers.     
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I discussed the careers of scribal households in politics and 
administration at the Satara and Nagpur courts, including the varied nature of their appointments 
in the eighteenth century. Some of this detail for Balaji Avaji, Khando Ballal, and other Kayastha 
Prabhu officials who sought patronage in the early Maratha state is found in the Chitnis bakhar. 
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In general, the Nagpur texts offer a much sketchier account of the early years of the Maratha 
state, but they do join the Chitnis bakhar in recounting the circumstances in which Balaji Avaji 
fell out of the favor during the chaotic years following Shivaji’s death. All of the bakhars note 
that Balaji was tasked with sending letters of instruction to the superintendents of the fort where 
Shivaji had imprisoned his elder son Sambhaji in order to maintain his confinement and ensure 
the peaceful succession of Shivaji’s younger son, Rajaram.926 The Chitnis and Gupte bakhars 
correspond on several particulars regarding Sambhaji’s interception of these orders and 
subequent escape to the Maratha capital at Raigad: the names of the couriers who carried the 
letters; the harsh measures he took against his guards; and his gruesome command to carry out 
the live burial of Soyrabai, Rajaram’s mother. 
 The accounts feature significant differences in terms of their descriptions of the 
circumstances surrounding Balaji’s involvement in the plot against Sambhaji and subsequent 
punishment and death as well as the explanatory strategies that they bring to bear on these 
claims. Though the Nagpur authors concur in assigning responsibility to Balaji, the Gupte 
bakhar provides some additional nuance: 
Afterwards, [Sambhaji] summoned Balaji Avaji Chitnavis and asked him why he wrote 
such letters. He stated that he had received orders from Rani Saheb [Tarabai Bhonsle] 
and Maharaja [Rajaram]. Then Sambhaji demanded, ‘Am I not your master? Being 
trusted since the old days, how can your pen have acted in this way?’ Having spoken 
these words, he was tied to the feet of an elephant and trampled to death.927  
In contrast, Chitnis takes greater pains to distance Balaji from these charges of sedition. In his 
account, Balaji refuses to write letters against Sambhaji. He states, “I am an officer of the king. 
                                                
926 This fort was almost certainly Panhala near Kolhapur, although the Chitnavis bakhar states that it was 
Pratapgad about 200 kilometers north.  
 
927 NBB, ed. Kale, 16-7. Here, the shorter Gupte bakhar differs, stating that Balaji died in prison after a 
brother Nanaji was killed by elephant for failing to protect a fort from capture by the Mughal emperor 




As my master is the elder Sambhaji Maharaj, I will not write. So there is no reason for you to 
apply such pressure.” When his employers insist that letters by his hand were necessary to secure 
cooperation, and that writing such letters was the responsibility of his office – whether their 
contents were good or bad – he makes his son available for the job.928 Sambhaji later commands 
Balaji to kill his son for this betrayal, causing him to give himself up in his place. Nevertheless, 
he and his son as well as his brother Shamji meet with their deaths beneath an elephant’s feet.929   
 While Gupte states that Balaji’s surviving son Khando Ballal escaped with his mother to 
her natal home in the Konkan, Chitnis tells a different story. Learning of Balaji’s death, 
Sambhaji’s queen Yesubai defends the family’s loyal service against her husband’s unjust 
behavior: 
You have done an improper thing in killing Balaji Prabhu, a ready and faithful man of 
many days. He was very close to the senior king [Shivaji]. It is said that the ciṭnīs is the 
life of the kingdom. He has been given the ciṭnīs post on a hereditary basis. Knowing 
this, and since he has not commited a crime, how could you have done such a thing?930 
Sambhaji shows contrition by committing Khando Ballal to Yesubai’s care and allowing him to 
compose letters on her behalf, thus carrying on the work of his father. But his full restoration 
comes at a later date, as narrated in a similar fashion in the Chitnis and Gupte bakhars. Both 
relate that while marching to a fort in the Konkan, Sambhaji was in need of someone who could 
write to the fort’s inhabitants to assure them that he would reach them in time to halt an 
impending attack. Khando runs to Sambhaji’s palanquin and deposits the requisite letter, which 
is then dispatched to the fort. After successfully defending the fort, Sambhaji credits Khando for 
                                                
928 Chitnis, Sambhājī Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 3. Balaji Avaji had two 
sons who are mentioned elsewhere in the historical record: Khando Ballal and Nilo Ballal. This supposed 
third son named Avaji Ballal is likely the invention of Chitnis. 
  
929 Chitnis, Sambhājī Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 11. 
 




his timely assistance, restores his family’s duties and privileges, and even arranges for his care 
when he starts to vomit blood! Again, Chitnis provides more detailed than Gupte, naming the 
fort in question as Mandangad and adding another speech in which Sambhaji apologizes for his 
conduct and reaffirms the good name of Khando’s lineage.931   
 The bakhar authors underscore Khando Ballal’s ongoing credit and influence with the 
Bhonsle royal family from Sambhaji’s death through Rajaram’s brief and embattled reign to the 
arrival of Shahu to the Deccan in 1707. Chitnis includes several episodes, which I will not 
narrate here for the sake of brevity, in which Khando carries out dangerous political missions 
that result in his imprisonment and near-death. Along with the deaths of his father and uncle, 
such incidents are meant to demonstrate that while personal or even familial ruin may be the 
short-term risk of political service, the long-term benefit is to bind lineage and polity in 
perpetuity. Khando himself articulates as much to win over the Shirkes, a Maratha clan that had 
been nearly extinguished for their opposition to Sambhaji: “Just as your destruction (śirkāṇ) was 
effected, so three of my people died under the feet of an elephant. They too are gone. But we are 
fighting for the prosperity and dominion of the Hindus. Whatever circumstance may arise, we 
will fight accordingly.”932 Because political circumstances in fact divided loyalties, the bakhar 
authors employed narrative strategies to explain potentially disloyal conduct on the part of 
scribes.  
 Such an instance arises in a major episode in Khando Ballal’s story as told in all of the 
bakhars under consideration. Having got wind that Sambhaji’s son Shahu was encamped near 
Burhanpur after his release from Mughal captivity, the late Rajaram’s wife Tarabai in an attempt 
to retain the succession for her own son orders Khando to examine Shahu and declare him to be 
                                                
931 Chitnis, Sambhājī Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 17; NBB, ed. Kale, 17-8. 
 
932 Chitnis, Sambhājī Mahāraja Āṇi Thorale Rājarām Māharāja Yāñcī Caritre, 69. 
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an impostor. After meeting Shahu, he reports that he is the true son and heir of Sambhaji and 
works to effect his succession. According to the Chitnavis and Gupte bakhars, Khando detects 
his uncouth speech (rāngaḍī bolī) and north Indian ways (hindusthānī cāl), but Shahu’s head 
page Jotyaji Kesarkar persuades him of Shahu’s authenticity by emphasizing that he had been 
married to a daughter of the elite Maratha Shirke clan.933 The Nagpur authors further assert that 
Khando Ballal recruited several of Shahu’s key supporters: Dhanaji Jadhav; Balaji Viswanath; 934 
and Parsoji Bhonsle, the first recipient of the senā sāheb sūbhā title and progenitor of the Nagpur 
Bhonsle rulers. Tarabai had invited Parsoji to declare Shahu an impostor after she realized that 
her trusted scribe had shifted his allegiance.935 When Parsoji finds Shahu to be a bit strange, 
Khando relays the information about Shahu’s marriage and convinces him to eat from Shahu’s 
plate, thereby verifying the young prince’s pedigree for all those assembled.936   
Khando’s instrumentality to Shahu’s patronage of the Nagpur Bhonsle line does not 
figure in the Chitnis bakhar; rather, Chitnis suggests that Parsoji fought on behalf of Tarabai. 
Instead, Chitnis displays a more acute preoccupation with proving the fidelity of his ancestors. In 
his re-telling, Tarabai asks her supporters to take an oath over a plate of rice and milk that they 
will support her against Shahu. When she demands that Khando do the same before leaving to 
meet Shahu, he equivocates, pleading that he is a lowly writer who would not trangress the 
                                                
933 BL, Mss Marathi, G33, 6b-8a; NBB, ed. Kale, 25-6. 
 
934 Khando Ballal is nowhere mentioned in Sohoni’s history of the Peshwa Bhat family. Instead, Sohoni 
avers that Balaji Viswanath’s patron Dhanaji Jadhavrao who facilitated his introduction to Shahu. See 
Peśvyāñcī Bakhar, ed. Herwadkar, 3.  
 
935 Most genealogies of the Nagpur Bhonsles state that Parsoji had two brothers, Bapuji and Sabaji. While 
the published Gupte bakhar states that Parsoji’s brother Bapuji was first invited, another unpublished 
Gupte manuscript mistakenly gives Maloji as the name of this brother. The Chitnavis bakhar suggests 
that Parsoji was accompanied by both of his brothers. See BL, Mss Marathi, G33, 7b; Mss Marathi, G46, 
15a; NBB, ed. Kale, 26. 
 




designs of his master.937 Like his earlier inclusion of the character of Balaji Avaji’s third son to 
assume blame for writing letters against Sambhaji, this plot detail strategically excuses Khando’s 
disobedience in defecting to Shahu. 
 The final extended episode in Khando Ballal’s life for which there is significant 
agreement between the Nagpur and Satara bakhars concerns Khando’s reaction to the 
punishment of Tarabai’s main partisan, the pant pratinidhi Parshuram Trimbak Kulkarni. In 
Chitnavis’ condensed account, Shahu seizes the pant pratinidhi upon taking Satara fort and 
immediately places a spike into his chest in preparation for plucking out his eyes. Once Khando 
realizes what is about to happen, he removes the spike from the pant pratinidhi’s chest and 
exclaims that he should be spared because he had guarded Satara fort against Aurangzeb.938 The 
Gupte bakhar does not refer to the method of punishment but notes that Khando was in the 
middle of taking his bath when he received word of Shahu’s actions. He implores Shahu to be 
merciful on the basis of the loyal service of the pant pratinidhi’s son Shripatrao in Hyderabad 
and Bidar.939 All of these details appear in the Chitnis bakhar, but the episode comes much later 
in the narration of Shahu’s reign. Here the pant pratinidhi does not receive leniency in 
recognition of his son’s loyalty; rather, he is to be punished because his son was supporting the 
rival Bhonsle line at Kolhapur. Chitnis further specifies that a court wrestler was holding the 
pant pratinidhi down by means of a stake and his foot when Khando entered the scene, pried the 
wrestler off of him, and threw himself at Shahu’s feet in full prostration.    
 This episode is roughly parallel to Sambhaji’s punishment of Khando Ballal’s father 
Balaji Avaji, transforming Khando into a corrective and expiative figure within the relationship 
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between his family and the Maratha polity. Yet, Khando Ballal’s speech in Chitnis’ narration of 
this episode reveals how his text expands the virtue of loyalty that I have argued is integral to the 
ethic of patrimonial service put forth by these scribal histories. Having prostrated himself before 
Shahu, Khando pleads, “I am an offender in all ways. First pluck out my eyes or cut off my head, 
and then if you wish to punish the pratinidhi, give the order.” Confused and somewhat mollified, 
Shahu demands to know what Khando means to say. He explains, “Maharaj! Such a harsh 
punishment should not be applied to Brahmans. You are well aware of what befell the kingdom 
on account of what Sambhaji Maharaj did. Because of this, I have taken the liberty of lifting up 
the wrestler without your orders.” When Shahu then demands to know how he should act, 
Khando advises, “A servant like the powerful Parshurampant should not be harmed. Only if he 
has commited some shocking deed should he be so harmed. Put him in chains and lock him 
up.”940 Finally, when iron chains are brought out, Khando demands that someone of the pant 
pratinidhi’s stature be bound with chains of silver. In this account, not only does Khando 
intervene against Shahu’s command as a humble supplicant, but also he instructs the ruler on 
what punishment ought to be applied in the case of a distinguished Brahman official. As I 
explored in the last section, such episodes reflect Chitnis’ understanding of rājnīti as an 
objective, portable ethics accessible to scribes and kings alike.  
 The Satara and Nagpur bakhars take different courses following Khando Ballal’s 
intercession with Shahu. While Chitnis continues to narrate the remainder of Shahu’s reign, 
emphasizing the ongoing service of Khando and his sons and grandsons, Chitnavis and Gupte 
follow the careers of their own families at the Nagpur court. This section has shown that these 
authors presented a common origin story of scribal patrimonial service anchored in the loyalty of 
the first two ciṭnīses of the Maratha state, Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal. In emphasizing the 
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deeds of these figures as well as those of the later scribal-diplomatic elites at Satara and Napgur, 
they used the bakhar genre to highlight their families’ contributions to Maratha politics and 
government. British East India Company residents at these courts recognized that scribes held 
knowledge of the past, yet they would largely ignore the vital relationship between scribal 
histories and their legacies of service. Company officials took the first step in transforming these 
rich testimonies of the political life of scribal classes into more or less verifiable chronicles of 
political events. In so doing, they laid the foundations for a new epistemic regime that would 
hold sway long after the demise of British imperial rule in India. 
Scribes and the Making of Company Historical Knowledge 
 When he was summoned by his son Balwantrao in 1819 to provide documents to James 
Grant Duff, Malhar Ramrao Chitnis was living about seven kilometers southwest of Satara city 
in the village of Jaitapur. He had inherited the inām title to Jaitapur as part of the patrimony of 
his father Ramrao Jivaji. But the political turmoil of the past decade had put him in a situation of 
financial insecurity. As he stated in an order to the headman of Jaitapur on March 11, 1806, 
Khanderao Nilkanth Raste, a follower of Peshwa Bajirao II, had appropriated the inām revenues 
of Jaitapur for the past two years.941 His family may have lost their hereditary rights to land in 
the aftermath of the Peshwa’s punitive war (1798-1800) against Chhatrasingh Bhonsle, the 
brother of the Satara ruler and Malhar Ramrao’s patron Shahu II.942 They may also have been 
subject to a tax imposed by Yashwantrao Holkar after his assault on Bajirao II in 1803.943 
Nevertheless, Malhar Ramrao retained his status at the Satara court, participating in the 
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coronation ceremonies of Pratapsinha in 1808 alongside the highest officials of the ruling 
circle.944    
Meanwhile, recurring disputes between Peshwa Bajirao II and allied Maratha leaders 
created an opportunity for the Company to further consolidate its power in the western Deccan. 
When Holkar invaded Pune, Bajirao fled to Bassein and entered into a subsidiary alliance with 
the Company in exchange for protection. The terms of such alliances between Indian rulers and 
the Company specified that rulers were not to pursue negotiations with external parties without 
the Company’s knowledge. Nevertheless, Bajirao continued to pursue independent and 
clandestine political schemes. When his agent Trimbakji Dengle assassinated the Baroda 
minister Gangadhar Shastri Patwardhan in 1815, the Company condemned the assassination as a 
major breach of faith.945 On June 13, 1817, Mountstuart Elphinstone, the British resident at Pune, 
imposed a new treaty that essentially stripped Bajirao of any claim to sovereignty. Rather than 
submitting quietly, Bajirao, in close coordination with the government of Mudhoji II alias 
Appasaheb Bhonsle of Nagpur, ordered an attack on the British residency at Pune on November 
5, 1817, precipitating the Third Anglo-Maratha War. After only twelve days of battle, British 
forces victoriously entered Pune city and planted the British flag on Shaniwar Wada, the 
residence of the Peshwas. Bajirao evaded British custody until June 1818, but his defeat in battle 
marked the effective end of sovereign Maratha rule in the Deccan.  
Prior to the commencement of open war, Pratapsinha called upon Malhar Ramrao and 
Balwantrao Malharrao to obtain the Company’s support in a bid to restore the sovereign 
authority of the Chhatrapati. After conferring at the family seat at Borgaon, Balwantrao and 
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several other officials despatched Rango Bapuji, a descendent of the Rohidkhore deśpāṇḍe 
Dadaji Naras Prabhu, to Pune to establish friendly relations with Elphinstone.946 According to 
testimony given much later in 1837, Balwantrao had recommended that Pratapsinha shift his 
allegiance from Bajirao to the British and requested that they restore him to his former authority 
should Bajirao fail to maintain the terms of the subsidiary alliance. Balwantrao also asked that 
the British reinstate his family’s confiscated land rights.947 A member of the Chitnis household 
honored Balwantrao’s role in these negotiations in a poem commemorating the war with the 
British and Pratapsinha’s subsequent coronation at Satara. His overall assessment of events is not 
favorable to the Peshwa: 
The entire administration in the hands of the minister 
Being [therefore] continually not in the hands of the king 
After which some days and years passed 
Which then seemed somewhat fitting  
The minister Bajirao guarded the kingdom in every way 
Near him there was an envoy of the copper-colored [English] officials  
In remaining, he incited the strength of his mind in every way  
In losing his mind, he pursued many schemes to seize the kingdom948  
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The poet then conveys that at the height of battle, “the son of Mallari (Malhar) Balwant by name 
of the family of Chitnis” was sent to the “general of the copper-colored people” to discuss the 
state of affairs.949 After this meeting, Pratapsinha relinquished all the weapons in his possession 
and met with the British on amicable terms in the hopes of securing his authority after Bajirao’s 
defeat. The poet underscored the efforts of the scribes in executing this work of negotiation:   
On this occasion, when the army came close to the king  
Together with those whose names ought to be heard 
Both sons of the ciṭnīs by the names of Yashwantrao and Balwantrao 
Who did all of the work that arose, Yashwantrao and Balwantrao950    
Though he was called to Jaitapur in May 1819 to attend to an ailing daughter, Balwantrao 
maintained a residence in Satara after the close of the war and in fact received permission to 
build a new house in Shaniwar Peth in the city.951 He remained in the confidence of the re-
installed Pratapsinha, but his influence competed with that of the resident James Grant Duff. 
Hailing from Banff near Aberdeen, Scotland, Grant Duff had served in the First Bombay Native 
Infantry in a number of roles, including Persian interpreter, and eventually he became an 
assistant to Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was made commissioner of the Deccan in 1818 and 
governor of Bombay Presidency in 1819. After the Third Anglo-Maratha War, Elphinstone 
appointed him as the resident at Satara on April 11, 1818. In this capacity, Grant Duff was 
responsible for educating the young rājā and preparing affairs of state for his eventual 
management, should he demonstrate himself to be a competent ruler. As part of his education, 
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Pratapsinha kept a diary of events at court, including Grant Duff’s research in preparation for the 
composition of A History of the Mahrattas (1826).952 
Like Mountstuart Elphinstone’s Report on the Territories Conquered from the Peishwa 
(1818) and Richard Jenkins’ Report on the Territories of the Raja of Nagpore (1827), Grant 
Duff’s History incorporated information provided by local informants. The persistent debate on 
the relationship between European officials and Indian informants in the production of 
knowledge about India has intellectual, institutional, and political dimensions that are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. In the most basic terms, we may divide this literature into two main camps. 
Proponents of the “colonial knowledge” thesis have argued that knowledge-production was a 
technology of colonial rule that produced profound epistemic transformation,953 while their 
critics have pointed to the central role of Indian informants and assistants in colonial knowledge-
production, especially in the Company period, as well as to the significant continuities between 
pre-colonial and colonial forms of knowledge.954 This chapter offers a corrective to the 
assumption that the primary effect of Indian participation in the making of Company knowledge 
was to enable epistemic continuity. Critics of the “colonial knowledge” thesis are right to 
highlight the independent achievements of “precolonial intellectuals” employed by Company 
officials, yet they are at times too sanguine in their evaluation of the extent to which these 
achievements shaped Company officials’ conclusions about Indian history, society, and politics. 
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Certain disciplines, such as grammar and epigraphy, did preserve pre-colonial knowledge, yet 
knowledge produced for governing Indian subjects largely discarded insights deriving from 
experiences of politics and political service – such as rājnīti – in favor of knowledge deemed 
“useful” to government in the mode of political economy. A comparison of Company 
knowledge-production at Satara and Nagpur shows that Indian court officials and assistants 
worked to forefront local knowledge and experience; however, their efforts were either 
dismissed or subordinated to the imperatives of Company government.   
Grant Duff issued a general jāhīrnāmā (announcement) calling for Satara residents to 
provide any relevant documents they might have, but he relied on court officials to provide 
Marathi (Modi) documents from the secretarial archives at Satara.955 He also drew on Company 
records and existing English, Marathi and Persian accounts, including the Chitnis caritra, the 
Sabhāsad Bakhar, Khafi Khan’s Muntakhab al-Lubab, the Gulshān-i Ibrāhim, and Orme’s 
Historical Fragments.956 As Prachi Deshpande has shown, Grant Duff aimed to produce a 
comprehensive fact-based historical narrative along the lines of the “philosophical histories” of 
the Scottish Enlightenment.957 Such histories, grounded in the discipline of political economy, 
examined an assemblage of natural, environmental, and human indicators to characterize the 
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origins and advancement of human societies on a deep evolutionary scale. 958 In the terms of this 
project, texts such as Chitnis’ caritra might be sources of more or less useful information about 
the origins of titles, revenue categories, and other matters that the Company sought to manage, 
but their deep connection an existing tradition of service was considered to be at best irrelevant 
and at worst pernicious.     
 Over the course of July 1819, Grant Duff regularly called Balwantrao Chitnis to his 
residence to interview him and to coordinate his efforts to retrieve and transcribe state papers. 
Two additional officials usually accompanied Chitnis: Vitthalpant Phadnis, who had been 
charged with supervising the affairs of Pratapsinha, and Aba Parasnis, the Persian scribe of the 
Satara government. Elphinstone’s former assistant Balajipant Natu, who continued to represent 
Company interests at Satara, also participated in these interviews. Pratapsinha privately 
discouraged Chitnis and Phadnis from handing over state papers to Grant Duff in an 
indiscriminate manner. He instructed them to sort through documents beforehand and 
immediately return documents to storage after showing them to Grant Duff, rather than leaving 
them with him. Any document transported was to be noted down and stamped. Grant Duff’s 
demands made it difficult to adhere to this protocol. During one session on July 15, he requested 
that a particular bundle of papers be left with him so that his private scribe and Paranis could 
take them to an upper floor and make copies of them, which he estimated would take fifteen 
days. When Phadnis rejoined that the copies could be made in Parasnis’ house or in Grant Duff’s 
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residence, presumably in the presence of the officials, Grant Duff indignantly demanded to know 
why his intentions were being doubted. He added that his plan was to publish a book in England 
that would redound to their benefit.959 In this manner, Grant Duff and Natu often clashed with 
Pratapsinha, Chitnis and the other court officials.     
Let me examine a couple interviews in greater detail. Earlier I described a conversation 
between Chitnis and Grant Duff on July 7 in which Chitnis promised to retrieve informative 
papers from his father Malhar Ramrao. Grant Duff followed up with him the next day, but 
Chitnis pleaded that his father still had not arrived from Jaitapur. He offered to provide whatever 
information came to mind but conceded that this information could not be certain. With some 
annoyance, Elphinstone replied that the work was progressing in a sluggish manner. Still, they 
carried on. Having been joined by Parasnis, they viewed a list (yādī) that specified the amounts 
of the revenue headings that Grant Duff had mentioned (e.g. bābtī, sardeśmukhī). The officials 
urged Grant Duff to view these figures with the caveat that there was no single custom or 
practice (cālī) in revenue administration.960 For example, in territories jointly administered with 
“mogal governments” (i.e. the government of the Nizam of Hyderabad), revenue was collected in 
accordance with the sāt-cāḷīs arrangement whereby the Marathas claimed forty percent and the 
Nizam sixty.961  
Grant Duff expressed concern about the existence of such variation. He asked whether or 
not there was some elder in the city who might be able to provide more reliable information. 
Balajipant Natu advised that they bring in a clerk of the amātya, Sadashiv Bhagwant, who had 
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papers containing relevant information. Next, Grant Duff asked about the precise meaning of the 
term svarājya. Chitnis stated that it referred to territory under the fixed management of the 
government, but Natu interjected that this answer was inaccurate and would be corrected by 
Bhagwant. Yet, once he arrived, Bhagwant had nothing to add beyond what was contained in the 
documents he had already given to Phadnis. Natu also objected to Chitnis’ reading of an order 
(farmān) provided with reference to the antiquity of sardeśmukhī and caūthāī revenue. Natu 
claimed that the word sādhle (acquired) should have been read as sādhel (will acquire) based on 
the location of the mātrā line signifying the tense of the verb. Grant Duff mirthfully commented 
that the officials fought well (achā laḍhte) when an argument ensued.962  
 Malhar Ramrao Chitnis announced himself at court on Friday, July 9, 1819. The next 
day, Balwantrao Chitnis and Phadnis presented Malhar Ramrao’s papers to Grant Duff, pointing 
to the figures recorded for the stipendiary and proprietary income of the members of the 
ashṭapradhāna council. 963 With reference to his inquiry regarding sardeśmukhī and caūthāī, 
they again urged that there was no fixed or permanent practice in the management of revenue 
and that these types of grants could be traced back to Shivaji, despite the fact that the dating of 
the farmān could only trace them to 1715 at the earliest. In support of this claim, they presented a 
1694 grant (vatanpatra) of Cheul province to Khando Ballal, and, though they did not have 
documentation, they testified that Shivaji had given Mawal province to the Shirkes in 
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sardeśmukhī.964 In this fashion, officials cited custom and precedent to caution Grant Duff 
against fetishizing documents as the only trustworthy representations of historical reality.  
 But Grant Duff continued to press officials to provide more material. On Sunday, July 11, 
he probed Chitnis about whether or not any agreements (tahanāme) from the period of Shivaji 
were available. Chitnis explained that all of those documents had been lost in the Mughal siege 
of Raigad. At the suggestion of Natu, Grant Duff harbored suspicions that there were additional 
papers in the possession of either Pratapsinha or Chitnis, but both insisted on several occasions 
that they had nothing further to offer. Chitnis also pointed out that he had given a copy of his 
father’s bakhar to Grant Duff. Grant Duff ordered a scribe Narayanrao to prepare an English 
translation of the bakhar in consultation with Chitnis.965 At the same time, he considered it to 
contain numerous falsehoods and exaggerations and on several occasions pushed Chitnis to 
verify its contents.966 For example, Grant Duff on July 19 sought further clarification on the 
activities of various holders of the pratinidhi title. Chitnis replied that he would have to check 
some papers (kāgad) at home. Thinking he had caught Chitnis in a lie, Grant Duff asked which 
papers he referred to, prompting him to clarify that he still had notes (ṭācaṇe) on the basis of 
which the bakhar had been prepared.967  
Grant Duff was particularly concerned that the bakhar was biased in favor of Shivaji and 
his successors. The story of Shivaji’s killing of Chandrarao More, a local ruler who refused to 
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submit to Shivaji’s overlordship, was troubling in this regard.  In the July 19 interview, he asked 
Chitnis whether More was considered to be a Mughal servant or a rebel. Four day later, he noted 
that the bakhar had mentioned that Shivaji killed Chandrarao More but omitted the fact that 
More had helped Shivaji in the Radtondi mountain pass near Mahabaleshwar.968 This fact was 
apparently included in another book in Grant’s possession. Chitnis defended the bakhar, saying 
that if it did not say More had helped Shivaji, then More had not helped Shivaji. Grant Duff was 
unmoved. He peppered him with more questions, declared a painting of the war between Ram 
and Ravana to be full of lies, and lamented the lack of Hindus who were knowledgeable in the 
sciences of the “new books.”969 Chitnis mounted an even stronger defense of his father’s bakhar 
in a later conversation on August 11 as recorded in Pratapsinha’s diary: “The good that happened 
was written as good; the bad that happened has been written as bad. Sambhaji Maharaja’s 
behavior was not good, and he destroyed everything, as has been written. Shivaji Maharaj’s 
behavior was good, as has been written.”970 He firmly believed that whatever his father had 
written down should be regarded as true.   
  Grant Duff’s opinion of the Chitnis bakhar was far more ambivalent. On July 17, 1819, 
he wrote to Elphinstone that it was “a mass of nonsense, though not despicable as it stated some 
important facts.” The following year, he was somewhat more generous, stating that it was “on 
the whole most valuable…but is in general defective in the early details we wish to get.”971 
Similarly, in the History, he opined that Chitnis had not made “good use” of his materials; 
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however, he valued the materials themselves, praising Shivaji’s instructions to his officers, 
written by the hand of Balaji Avaji, as “very complete and satisfactory.”972 Grant Duff 
recognized the stature of Chitnis’ lineage and held an especially high opinion of Balaji Avaji. He 
noted his “acuteness and intelligence” and even stated that he was indebted to him for the papers 
that allowed him to understand the institutions of the early Maratha state.973 He also reproduced 
some of the episodes in Chitnis’ life-stories of Balaji Avaji and Khando Ballal, despite his 
objections to the veracity of his bakhar.974 But he ignored much of the concrete information in 
the bakhar regarding the careers of scribal officials. More generally, he remained steadfast in his 
view that the Chitnis bakhar’s value for historical understanding of Maratha politics and 
government was restricted to what could be verified against “original” documentation. 
 The relationship between historical experience and historical knowledge within the 
research and writing enterprise of the Nagpur resident Richard Jenkins took a very different 
form. Jenkins had served as the acting resident at Nagpur since 1807 when his predecessor 
Elphinstone was called away on separate business. He became the official resident in 1811.975 As 
early as August of that year, Jenkins shared with Elphinstone his desire to obtain “all the 
information which can be procured on the various important topics of investigation presented by 
the ancient and modern states of this Country.”976 He also asked Elphinstone to forward any 
information on the connection between the Nagpur ruling family and the Peshwa and relayed that 
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his assistant Barry Close was beginning to study the Gond peoples of the region and to form an 
idea of their language. In November, Jenkins procured a short sketch of the government from “an 
old female domestic” in the Nagpur rājā’s palace.977 Yet his research efforts seem to have been 
limited by the constraints of the residency arrangement. He hoped that these efforts would 
accelerate once he received permission to establish a subsidiary force at Nagpur, but the old rājā 
Raghuji Bhonsle II avoided a formal alliance with the Company. 
Upon Raghuji’s death on March 23, 1816, his son Parsoji succeeded to the throne. But 
because Parsoji was young and mentally troubled, he was unable to retain the loyalties of leading 
officials. The Persian scribe and counselor Shridhar Laxman, whose career I discussed in chapter 
4, immediately retired to Varanasi.978 Jenkins presumed that he so abruptly quit public affairs 
because he was disgusted with the machinations of the Kayastha Prabhu scribe Narayan 
Yashwant alias Naroba Chitnavis, who Jenkins dismissed as “a poor Carcoon [kārkun] or under 
writer in the office of the Chitnaveese.” 979 As referenced in Chapter 4, Naroba had been 
Krishnarao Madhav’s assistant, and at this juncture, he was a key member of a faction that had 
coalesced around Raghuji’s widow Bakabai Bhonsle and adopted son Dharmaji Bhonsle in 
opposition to the ambitions of Raghuji’s nephew Mudhoji II alias Appasaheb Bhonsle.980 While 
Krishnarao’s brother Gangadharrao Madhav held the official title of ciṭnavīs, Naroba had 
cultivated a close relationship with the late rājā and took part in external negotiations with the 
Peshwa and other Maratha governments. He also aimed to impose his control over the process of 
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negotiating an alliance with the Company. Instead, Appasaheb eventually locked him up with the 
rest of those who opposed him.981 
Having consolidated his authority as regent, Appasaheb and Jenkins ratified a treaty of 
perpetual alliance on May 27, 1816. In July, Jenkins sent a long description of the physical 
boundaries of the Nagpur state, the composition of the government and army, and the 
distribution of land-holdings, revenue, and expenditures to the Governor-General.982 Much of 
this information was later included in his Report on the Territories of the Raja of Nagpore 
(1827). In February 1817, Parsoji Bhonsle died of mysterious causes. Jenkins suspected that 
Appasaheb was involved in his death but still supported his succession. His suspicions were 
exacerbated by reports that Appasaheb was pursuing a secret communication with Peshwa 
Bajirao II in contravention to the terms of the subsidiary alliance.983 Hence, Jenkins understood 
the arrival of a robe from Pune on November 24, 1817, just a few weeks after Bajirao’s attack on 
the Pune residency, to be an ominous sign of Appasaheb’s intentions. Two days later, Appasaheb 
ordered his own attack on the residency, which resulted in his rapid defeat and surrender. Like 
Bajirao, he fled from British captivity and remained in exile in Jodhpur until his death in 1840. 
Having taken full control of the Nagpur state, Jenkins began to make arrangements for 
the installation of Raghuji II’s grandson, to review and reorder the government, and to ramp up 
his research efforts. Sometime between the end of 1817 and 1820, he solicited an account of the 
Nagpur Bhonsle dynasty from Beniram Dube, who was mentioned in Chapter 5 as envoy to the 
Company government at Calcutta during the administration of Warren Hastings. Dube relayed 
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the request through members of court to Gangadharrao Madhav Chitnavis. Jenkins’ instructions 
specified that the writer should produce an account (bayāṇā) of the Bhonsle line (silasilā) 
focusing on how the first Raghuji Bhonsle obtained his grants and titles from Chhatrapati Shahu; 
who he campaigned against; who he elevated; and who he brought into servitude.984 Chitnavis’ 
account was later translated into English for Jenkins’ perusal.985 He gave similar instructions to 
his deputy Captain Wilkinson in 1822. It was on the orders of Wilkinson that the Kayastha 
Prabhu official Sakharam Mahipat Gupte with the advice of his uncle Balwantrao Mahipat 
composed his bakhar.986 A second partial bakhar dated to May 17, 1822 was written by 
Sakharam Mahipat and Krishnarao Mahipat Gupte along with two other officials on the orders of 
Jenkins and Nagpur’s chief general, Siddiq Ali Khan.987 As we explored earlier, these scribal 
histories departed from Jenkins’ imprimatur in their emphasis on the accomplishments of scribal 
officials, including many members of their own families. Finally, Jenkins also procured short 
narrative accounts of Bhavanipant Kalo, Raghuji II’s lead general and diwān; the Afghan rulers 
of Seoni-Chhapara; and several other local feudatories of the Bhonsles.988  
Jenkins gained more access to local government records than Grant Duff by delegating 
the research work to his main agent and interpreter, Vinayakrao Anandrao Aurangabadkar. 
Aurangabadkar had worked for Jenkins since the latter’s appointment to Nagpur in 1807.989 He is 
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most likely the person designated in Jenkins’ correspondence as his “Marhatta Moonshee,” 
though he was equally if not more proficient in Persian.990 In this capacity, he had been 
responsible for writing and carrying messages between Jenkins and the Nagpur rājās. In 1815, he 
began collecting information on the past and present state of the government and its environs.991 
The archive that Aurangabadkar amassed for Jenkins was vast and eclectic. He authored a short 
account of Berar; an early statement (kaifiyat) of Nagpur’s history composed of partial narratives 
(1812); a relatively condensed full history of the Nagpur Bhonsles with a very pronounced 
chronological ordering and short accounts of major court officials; a Persian version of the same; 
and two much longer histories interspersed with oral testimony, documents, figures, and 
references from other bakhars and tārīkhs.992 With the exception of the 1812 kaifiyat, these 
works appear to have been composed between 1816 and 1827. Many of the documents that 
Vinayakrao extracted were also included in separate ordered compilations and abstracts of 
official papers, including the correspondence of Raghuji Bhonsle II.993 It is also likely that 
Vinayakrao accompanied Jenkins and prepared field-notes from tours of the Chandrapur and 
Chhatisgarh districts near Nagpur in 1820 and 1823, respectively.994    
Aurangabadkar presented the materials that he gathered in such a manner that Jenkins 
would easily be able to comprehend them. He was especially meticulous about summarizing 
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content and establishing a linear chronological order with reference to multiple dating systems. 
Each event in the longer histories of the Bhonsles is variously assigned a śālivahāna śaka year 
used in Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist calendars; a hijrī year, a faṣlī year, and a suhūr year used in 
Islamic calendars; and a Christian/Gregorian isavī year. At the beginning of his major document 
compilation, he listed each document in tabular fashion with a short summary of its contents and 
the date of its production, including day and month information in the Hindu vikram saṃvata and 
Islamic systems and in some cases, the year according to the rājyābhisheka śaka calendar created 
during Shivaji’s rule.995 He also includes a list of the cyclically recurring names of vikram 
saṃvata years; a cheat-sheet with the year for each calendar corresponding to 1819 A.D.; and a 
brief explanation of how the nine-year difference between suhūr/arabī and faṣlī years is to be 
calculated on the basis of a formula (śloka) he heard from a reputable gentleman (saṃbhāvita 
grahasta).996   
Aurangabadkar explained in the introduction to this compilation that he had gathered and 
numbered these papers (kāgaj) stored in the treasury and in the house of the Chitnavis family in 
order to write his history (tavārīkh) of the Nagpur Bhonsles. He stated that he gained access to 
these papers through the auspices of Gangadharrao Madhav Chitnavis. Furthermore, he noted 
Chitnavis’ descent from Rakhmaji Ganesh, the cousin of Govindrao Khanderao Chitnis who 
migrated with Raghuji Bhonsle I from Satara to Nagpur.997 Aurangabadkar’s reliance on the 
papers of the Chitnavis’ family and recognition of their ties to the Satara Chitnises demonstrates 
the extent to which his and Jenkins’ project benefited from the accumulated knowledge of the 
scribal establishments of Satara and Nagpur. 
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Aurangabadkar incorporated the historical experience of the Chitnavis scribes in the form 
of testimony (jubānī) in his most extensive history of Nagpur. This history is a remarkably 
catholic pastiche of original narrative; translated and/or condensed sections from exising bakhars 
and tārīkhs; transcriptions of documents ranging from grants (sanads) to orders (ājñāpatre) to 
agreements (yādī); and eyewitness testimony (jubānī) offered by individuals conversant with the 
events described. In the preface, Aurangabadkar states that he wrote this text on Jenkins’ orders 
to supplement his shorter kaifiyat and Persian history so as to bring the account of the dynasty up 
to 1817. In addition to his own works, he made reference to six existing histories in Persian and 
twenty-five in Marathi. The Persian list is impressive and includes several texts composed by 
authors associated with the Nizam of Hyderabad: al-Hamdani’s Sawāniḥ-i Dakan, Shah Navaz 
Khan’s Maʿās̤ir al-Umarā’, Azad Bilgrami’s Khizānah-i ‘Āmirah, and the Tārīkh-i Āṣaf Jāh. 
The Marathi titles are less specific, but they include bakhars from Pune and Nagpur, which 
likely included those of Gangadharrao Madhav Chitnavis and Sakharam Mahipat Gupte.998 He 
adds that during his employment with Jenkins, he listened to the testimony of the ruler’s officials 
and included them in his history.  
The most frequently quoted individual in Aurangabadkar’s history is Yashwantrao 
Ramchandra, the son of the Hyderabad envoy Ramchandra Dado, who was one of the most 
influential negotiators between Jenkins and the Nagpur rājā. But Aurangabadkar spoke to many 
other individuals who held titles to landed property and government office. Sometimes, he 
simply attributes testimony to person(s) of Berar or Pune (e.g. through the descriptors puṇevāle, 
varāḍkar). The number, diversity, and physical placement of testimony suggest that 
Aurangabadkar made an effort to be as inclusive as possible, even going so far as to place 
                                                




testimonials in the margins of the page. While some testimony was probably hearsay or rumor, 
the language of certain testimonials indicate that Aurangabadkar did speak directly to individual 
officials who had worked at Nagpur for many years. Consider Vyankatrao Kashi’s testimony to 
his part in the murder of Peshwa Narayanrao, which we discussed in Chapter 5: “Testimony of 
Vyankatrao Kasi. Sabaji Bhonsle made contact with Nawab Nizam Ali Khan. Over there in 
Pune, Raghoba Dada conceived a plan to place himself on the throne and so reached out to 
Hayedar Nayek [Haidar Ali] for his help. So I and my brother, named Laxmanrao, went to Pune 
to meet with Dadasaheb on behalf of Mudhoji Bhonsle senā dhurandhar.”999 Aurangadkar 
interpolated testimony of this kind with bits of narrative from multiple texts and documents from 
the Nagpur secretariat without comment as to its “veracity” compared to other sources. By 
treating his materials in such an exceedingly egalitarian manner, he assembled a far more 
polyvocal compilation of historical experience than what passed muster with Company 
historians.  
 Prior to submitting his official report to Governor-General Lord Amherst on July 27, 
1826, Jenkins composed a draft history with a section entitled “Historical memoir of the 
Mahratta Rajahs of Nagpore.” While he later reproduced some portions of this text in the final 
report, much of it was omitted. The “Historical memoir” is more explicit about its source 
materials and less certain in its judgments. Jenkins made notes in the margins next to claims 
about which he was uncertain. He included many narrative episodes from the Chitnavis and 
Gupte bakhars as well as some pieces of individual testimony. While drafting, Jenkins continued 
to search for documents to verify details of time and place. For example, he wrote in the main 
body of the text that Raghuji Bhonsle I died in February or March 1755. Next to it, a marginal 
note in pen states that “the general report of persons at Nagpore places this event one if not two 
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years earlier,” but that this report must be false given the dating of another event. A second, later 
marginal note in pencil confirms the March 1755 death-date on the basis of a sanad granted by 
Janoji Bhonsle to a priest for a ceremony performed thirteen days after his father’s death.1000 His 
recounting of Narayanrao’s murder mentions the involvement of “Mudhoji’s vakeels,” but it 
does not name Vyankatrao and Laxmanrao Kashi, much less state the particulars of their lineage 
and service.1001 Although Jenkins had allowed Aurangabadkar to build a deep and variegated 
archive, he ultimately privileged those materials that helped to corroborate the facts of a rather 
narrow dynastic history.   
 Jenkins’ report was published in 1827 by the Company government press at Calcutta 
under the title Report on the Territories of the Rajah of Nagpore. The Report’s historical section 
features almost none of the details about the scribes, counselors, and diplomats of Nagpur that 
figured so prominently in Chitnavis, Gupte, and Aurangabadkar bakhars. Some of the officials 
with whom Jenkins dealt, such as Gangadharrao Chitnavis, are named in the section on the 
administration, but their lineages and longer careers of service not given place.1002 Overlooking 
the considerable political work accomplished by the holders of the title of ciṭnavīs, Jenkins puts 
it simply, “The Chitnuveese is the general secretary, in whose office all orders, grants, and letters 
are expedited or answered.”1003 Most strikingly, Jenkins thanks several of his British assistants 
with providing information for the report, but he never credits Vinayakrao Aurangabadkar. All of 
the potential richness of historical understanding that Jenkins had gained by partnering with local 
officials to complete his research – instead of working against them like Grant Duff – was 
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ultimately lost in his final product. Lost too was the contribution of Aurangabadkar in making 
that product possible. 
Conclusion: The End of Politics  
 Amidst the accusations of conspiracy and treachery that rocked the final years of 
Chhatrapati Pratapsinha’s reign, Balwantrao Malharrao Chitnis on May 23, 1837 while sitting in 
a prison cell prepared a statement in defense of his conduct towards the new Company state. 
Rango Bapuji, another Kayastha Prabhu follower of Pratapsinha’s about whom I will say more in 
the Conclusion, brought this statement to a Company doctor by the name of John Milne. Milne’s 
translation of its opening lines reads:  
During a long line of ancestors up to this moment, they and I have been in the habit of 
serving the Maharaj Sirkar, with all our ability and energy, during the lifetime of each of 
the sovereign princes of these dominions, and they also have done everything good for us 
within their power, and still I have the prospect of their favour which we have always 
enjoyed; and I have derived every happiness during a long period in serving such a noble 
prince as his present Highness, which I have enjoyed both before the time of the treaty 
and since its execution between the Maharaj and the British East India Company.1004  
Balwantrao’s language, even in translation, strongly recalls the idea of vaṃśa-paramparāgat 
sevā, or hereditary service, that undergirded the tradition of Kayastha Prabhu service in the 
Maratha state for over one hundred years. But the force of Balwantrao’s invocation of this 
language in this context lay in its contestation of the opinions of those officials who had turned 
Pratapsinha against him. Apparently, these officials convinced Pratapsinha that Balwantrao had 
inspired the Company’s dissatisfaction with the Chhatrapati.1005 Milne in a separate letter stated 
that Balajipant Natu – referenced earlier as Elphinstone’s and Grant Duff’s assistant – and other 
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Brahmans had conspired against Balwantrao because of his attacks on their caste.1006 Both 
Pratapsinha and Balwantrao had been involved in public disputes with the orthodox Brahman 
faction at Satara over the question of Maratha and Kayastha claims to Kshariya status.1007 Now, 
it seems, both had fallen afoul of the Company, while Brahmans like Balajipant Natu were on the 
ascendant. 
 The fall of Maratha rulers like Pratapsinha Bhonsle of Satara and Mudhoji Bhonsle II of 
Nagpur signaled a contraction of the political possibilities open to Kayastha Prabhu scribal 
administrators. In the first half of the nineteenth century, these possibilities were increasingly 
confined to either staking one’s claim to a particular caste status, as exemplified by the Kshatriya 
debates at Satara, or to a particular set of rights to land. In the absence of a sovereign state with a 
coherent ethical purpose, what had long been merely one reason for doing politics – access to 
social and economic resources – was fast becoming the only reason for doing politics. In the 
Conclusion, I will reflect further on this contraction of politics under colonial rule with reference 
to some of the paths that Kayastha Prabhu officials took in the years leading up to the rebellion 
of 1857.  
In this chapter, I have charted a brief, but deeply rooted efflorescence of a tradition of 
scribal writing on political ethics that defied this contraction. Through his composition of a text 
on rājnīti, and an accompanying caritra of the Bhonsle rājās, Malharrao Ramrao Chitnis 
explicated the virtues of political conduct and, even more importantly, made a case for their 
trusteeship by scribal officials. Linked to this didactic purpose was a commemorative one 
evident in both the Chitnis caritra and the bakhars composed by scribes at Nagpur. Kayastha 
Prabhus narrated and sometimes embellished the deeds of their ancestors in order to lay claim to 
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the ethical inheritance of the Maratha polity. Company historians were blind to these intentions 
and instead understood scribal-authored histories to be inadequate to the writing of factual 
history. Yet, the case of Richard Jenkins’ research assistant Vinayakrao Aurangabadkar 
demonstrates that even those employed in the Company’s enterprise of empiricist history-writing 
could find creative ways to incorporate different kinds of sources and to recognize the 
experiences of the unseen officials and operatives whose talents were essential to the politics of 







CONCLUSION: One Last Oath 
“The time is very strange and difficult. Each and every man, whether small or mighty, should 
spend his days with honor in his own solicitude and confinement. This is my concern. It does not 
seem to be the time to give or accept anyone’s trust. Each day that I pass is a blessing. I am 
bankrupt here. I do not have any money or grain. Let it be. Just as God allows, so I will live.” 
-Letter from Shridhar Laxman Nagnath to Narayanrao Vaidya, December 12, 18231008 
 
The scribe, counselor, and diplomat Shridhar Laxman handwrote these stoical lines from 
Varanasi, where he had retired from Nagpur in 1816 to escape the turmoil surrounding the death 
of his late employer Raghuji Bhonsle II. While he hoped to pass the remainder of his days in 
peaceful obscurity, Narayanrao Vaidya, the son of his old colleague and friend Baburao 
Viswanath Vaidya, needed his help to win back inām rights to the villages of Waigaon and 
Mundgaon in Berar. These rights were among those granted to Shridhar, Baburao, and the scribe 
Krishnarao Madhav in recognition of their successful brokerage of an agreement between the 
Pune and Nagpur governments prior to the battle of Kharda of 1795.1009 But Ramchandra Dado, 
Nagpur’s vakīl at Hyderabad, and his son Yashwantrao Ramchandra maintained a competing 
claim to Baburao’s inām. Narayanrao and Shridhar protested this claim in light of the fact that 
the former Governor-General Richard Wellesley had confirmed Narayanrao’s inheritance, 
presumably after the Second Anglo-Maratha War of 1803.1010 Perhaps not coincidental to his 
reversal of fortune was the fact that he, following in his father’s footsteps, had been one of the 
main conduits of clandestine communication between the deposed rulers Appasaheb Bhonsle of 
Nagpur and Peshwa Bajirao II of Pune. Narayanrao’s proprietary claims were tainted by his 
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political past as a new Company government of property took the place of the scribal politics of 
the old regime.       
Along with Narayanrao’s contested rights to the revenues of Waigaon and Mundgaon, the 
rights conferred on Krishnarao Madhav after Kharda had been confiscated by the Nizam during 
the Second Anglo-Maratha War and subsequently released on the orders of Wellesley. But it 
appears that the descendants of Krishnarao Madhav were not able to hold on to these rights 
following the death of his son, the previously discussed bakhar author Ganghadharrao Madhav. 
Beginning in the late 1820s and early 1830s, the ownership of these rights came under the 
Company’s scrutiny because the heir of Ganghadharrao Madhav had been adopted.1011 On 
December 6, 1850, an official by the name of B.H. Ellis found against the claims “preferred on 
the part of the Nagpoor Chitnees” to their inām villages in Berar. His reasoning was that because 
the current claimant, Haibatrao Anant, was only related to the “original grantee” through 
adoption, and because there were no “lineal descendants” surviving, “the guarantee of the British 
government must be considered to have expired.”1012 Similarly, Ellis denied the petitions of 
Sridhar Narayan, the fourteen year-old adopted grandson of Sridhar Laxman. He stated, “It 
appears that the villages were assigned as a bribe to the dependants of the Nagpoor Raja, and in 
return for the gift, the grantees were expected to use their influence with the Raja, favorably for 
the interests of the Peishwa. The grant was a part of the corrupt system prevalent in the Poona 
court in the later years of the Maratta rule, and it is not surprising that villages thus obtained 
should not long remain in the possession of the grantees.” Under a Company state still scarred by 
the scandals of the Hastings impeachment trial, profiting from politics was anathema. 
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The Nagpur scribes were not the only losers in the new colonial order. Whereas the 
ownership of property was one of many modes of political action in the Maratha Empire, it 
became one of the only accessible ones in a world in which public politics was strictly policed. 
Rulers, counselors, and scribes had all become dependent on the largesse of a colonial state by 
turns magnanimous and miserly. The previous chapter explored the writing of history as a highly 
commemorative, didactic, and even nostalgic mode of politics that survived, while others, such 
as pageantry, performance, and violent revolt would become more widespread in the years 
leading up to the 1857 Rebellion. But in the eighteenth century, as I have argued in this 
dissertation, there were far more opportunities for individual mobility and achievement – on 
behalf of oneself, one’s household, and one’s government – for those who mastered the practice 
of jawāb-suwāl politics. The scribal-bureaucratic classes of the Maratha Empire, both Brahman 
and non-Brahman, wielded their mastery of jawāb-suwāl to advance their social, economic, and 
professional status and contribute to the formation of enduring bonds between Maratha 
governments. In the Introduction and in many instances over the course of the dissertation, I 
explored jawāb-suwāl as a mode of dialogic communication entailing the exchange of oaths, 
sentiments, sacred objects, and agreements on the basis of a shared commitment to reaching a 
mutual understanding. Transcending any one specific political strategy or ideology, jawāb-suwāl 
pertained to a general procedural framework for doing politics that was critical to the social and 
professional mobility of the scribal-bureaucratic classes of the Empire.  
My account of the practice of politics in the Maratha Empire unfolded over the course of 
three sections on the structures, practitioners, and transformations of politics from the early 
eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. The first section explored the formation, evolution, 
and transformation of the political structure of the Maratha Empire. Over the course of the 
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eighteenth century, the Empire incorporated new territories and peoples and pursued working 
relationships with rivals and enemies. Chapter 1 explicated the politics of imperial expansion 
through an account of the Maratha conquest of the Mughal province of Berar in central India. A 
junior branch of the Bhonsle clan consolidated an autonomous kingdom in Berar with its capital 
at Nagpur by deploying a flexible repertoire of strategies of conquest. These strategies included 
the establishment of a durable diplomatic framework for adjudicating joint rule of Berar through 
the sāt-cāḷīs revenue distribution agreement with Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad. But the 
seamless implementation of this agreement depended upon the Bhonsles’ intimate friendship 
with the Afghan rulers of Ellichpur, one that exceeded the strategic exigencies of politics. 
Mudhoji Bhonsle recognized and affirmed the secular power of the nawāb Ismail Khan Panni 
and the sacral power of the ghāzī Abdul Rahman Dulha Shah through the sponsorship of the 
construction of a new outer court for a magisterial, centuries-old dargah outside Ellichpur.  
Such promiscuous affiliations exposed the Bhonsles’ government to recurring suspicions 
of sedition in the latter half of the eighteenth century, a subject that I tackled in Chapter 2. 
Existing grievances between the Pune and Nagpur governments, including unpaid debts, failure 
to fulfill military service obligations, and tensions regarding the Peshwa’s usurpation of the 
sovereign authority of the Chhatrapati Maharaja, precipitated violent conflict when Janoji 
Bhonsle joined several rulers and notables in defecting to the Nizam.  The ensuing civil wars of 
the 1760s clarified the need for formal processes of diplomatic communication. Individual 
kārbhārī were punished for their role in the civil wars; however, their mediation through the 
exchange of fresh agreements laid the foundations of a peace that endured for over three decades.    
The second section moved from the structure to the practitioners of politics in the 
Maratha Empire in order to demonstrate how social mobility facilitated political transformation. 
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In Chapter 3, I described the evolution of the functional niche of Chandraseniya Kayastha 
Prabhu scribal officials within the bureaucracy since the days of Shivaji’s founding of the 
Maratha state. I demonstrated that particularly under Chhatrapati Shahu, Kayasthas monopolized 
a type of salaried office known as darak that encompassed many different forms of 
administrative writing. Certain Kayastha households were able to retain rights to such offices 
over multiple generations, which in some cases allowed them to amass considerable wealth and 
property. To illustrate the upward mobility of Kayastha scribes, I followed the socioeconomic 
trajectory of the Chitnis household of Satara from the early to the late eighteenth century. 
Beginning with Shivaji’s chief scribe Balaji Avaji, and accelerating under his son Khando Ballal, 
the total revenue claimed by the Chitnises increased; however, their core holdings continued to 
be a set of villages, including their family seat at Borgaon, located near Satara. Over time, these 
holdings constituted a stable vatan to which they were entitled even after falling out of favor 
under Peshwa Narayanrao.  
The ways in which the Chitnis and Chitnavis households of Satara and Nagpur and 
associated Kayastha scribal households at Kolhapur, Pune, and Baroda transitioned from 
administration to politics was the focus of Chapter 4. Though subject to the whims of fickle 
rulers and the resentments of orthodox Brahman priests, Kayastha scribal-bureaucrats were able 
to advance themselves into positions of considerable political and diplomatic responsibility and 
work across caste and community divides by mobilizing common skill sets. I concretely 
illustrated how the functional continuities of record-keeping, letter-writing, soldiering, revenue 
management and diplomacy manifested in the careers of individual Kayastha officials, namely 
Babaji and Govindrao Nilkanth and Nilkanthrao Trimbak at Kolhapur; Govindrao Khanderao 
and Yashwantrao Mahadev at Satara; and Mahipatrao Dinkar, Vyankatrao and Lakshmanrao 
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Kashi, and Krishnarao Madhav at Nagpur. What these careers demonstrated is that although 
caste affiliation was powerful in the private sociality of the household, professional affiliations 
were more determinative in the public sociality of the court. The possibility of strategic 
cooperation between individual Brahmans and non-Brahmans was most vividly evident in the 
alliance between the Kayastha ciṭnavīs Krishnarao Madhav, his Brahman co-administrator and 
munshī Sridhar Laxman, and the Brahman envoy Baburao Viswanath Vaidya.  
The third section of the dissertation honed in on the transformation of politics in the late 
Maratha Empire at the cusp of the British conquest of India. In Chapter 5, I illuminated how 
scribal-bureaucrats deployed the practices of jawāb-suwāl communication to confront the 
unprecendented challenge of the nascent political monopoly of the British East India Company. 
Customary exchanges of sentimental words, oaths, and agreements allowed for the pursuit of 
anti-Company alliances – first, between Nana Phadnavis of Pune, Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur, 
Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad, and Haidar Ali of Mysore in 1781, and secondly and less 
successfully, between Raghuji II Bhonsle of Nagpur, Daulatrao Shinde of Ujjain, and Khanderao 
Holkar of Indore in 1803. Drawing on the historical research of Company residents like Charles 
Warre Malet, the Company came to understand these relationships in terms of a lawless 
“confederacy” bent on the extraction of plunder at all costs. It was this conception of 
“confederacy” that ultimately served as the pretext for Governor-General Richard Wellesley’s 
decision to take up arms against Maratha rulers in the Second-Anglo Maratha War, and the 
imagination of Maratha predation that undergirded this concetion would later justify the 
Company’s war of pacification against the non-sedentary elements of the military economy of 
the Deccan in the Third Anglo-Maratha War. 
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Finally, in Chapter 6, I examined the writings of Kayastha scribal-historians, 
demonstrating how they employed commemorative and didactic modes of narration of the 
Maratha past to distill insights into the ethics of politics. As exemplified by the work of Malhar 
Ramrao of the Satara Chitnis household, bakhar narratives served to document the major events 
within the polity, to record the deeds of one’s forebears, and to pool ethical wisdom for posterity. 
Company historians, such as James Grant Duff of Satara and Richard Jenkins of Nagpur, relied 
on and commissioned such narratives, yet they ultimately deemed them to be empirically 
inadequate for the project of a scientific history of the Marathas. But if viewed on their own 
terms, these narratives are eclectic assemblages of local memory, documentary materials, and 
classical Sanskrit knowledge that reveal the ways in which Maratha rule opened up new 
possibilities and pathways for diverse groups. Between high and low, and below the gaze of the 
rājā and the Raj, was a world teeming with scribes, secretaries, counselors, diplomats, and 
countless other skilled entrepreneurs who made politics happen.       
Looking backward to the fluid world of the eighteenth-century Maratha Empire and 
forward to the fractures that emerged during and after the events of 1857, Rango Bapuji Gupte 
on November 14, 1831 composed a long and colorful petition (arzī) describing his efforts to 
recover his vatan, the deśpāṇḍe seat at Rohidkhore once held by his ancestor Dadaji Naras 
Prabhu and appropriated by the pant saciva Shankraji Narayan.1013 He recounted that just as his 
grandfather Ramaji had given his life at Panipat for the sake of the family vatan, so he had 
agreed to a scheme to meet with Company officials at Pune, including the resident Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, to negotiate the release of Chhatrapati Pratapsinha Bhonsle from his gilded cage at 
                                                
1013 MIS, eds. Rajwade and Deshpande, vol. 2, pgs. 299-308.  For Dadaji Naras Prabhu, see Chapter 3. 
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Satara.1014 After consulting a Chitnis-authored bakhar, the Company officials intimated that they 
might be open to such a plan, but they required some means of communicating with Pratapsinha. 
Donning the guise of a beggar, Rango went to the Satara fort and hid a note from the Chhatrapati 
in a poultice covering a self-imposed leg wound resembling a dog bite, but he was captured 
before he could escape. Though subject to a harsh beating and shackling, he did not divulge his 
purpose and managed to return to Jaitapur to meet with the Chitnises and several other co-
conspirators. When asked how they could reward him for his bravery, he replied, “Before you 
made a promise (vacana) that you would deliver over the vatan from the saciva. You and Chitnis 
and Babaji [Phadnis] ought to fulfill this promise now that the deed is done. Then my master [?] 
at the time of worshipping Ram made a promise on holy basil, saying, ‘Today it is the Maharaja 
who makes this promise. The Maharaja will carry out this promise. We will use every means to 
give your vatan to you.’”1015 In politicking, as in life, one’s word was one’s bond, yet for that 
same reason, one’s bond might be worth nothing more than words. Rango Bapuji never salvaged 
his patrimony, and Pratapsinha was released from the Peshwa’s captivity only to be placed under 
the watchful eyes of the Company. Now, politics was neither the expression of Maratha 
sovereignty nor of its afterlife, but only of its memory.   
Yet Rango Bapuji’s petition was not his last act. Roughly a decade later, he traveled 
overseas to London to advocate for Pratapsinha, who had been deposed and exiled to Varanasi in 
1839 on the grounds of fomenting a sepoy rebellion. Perhaps this final episode led him to 
conclude – like so many others – that the Company was an unjust and duplicitous parvenu 
regime that could only be stopped through radical means. In the summer of 1857, he joined 
                                                
1014 This scheme, as I briefly noted in Chapter 6, was hatched at Borgaon in conjunction with the bakhar 
writer Malhar Ramrao Chitnis and his son Balwantrao Malharrao Chitnis. 
 
1015 MIS, eds. Rajwade and Deshpande, vol. 2, 302. 
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several supporters of the Chhatrapati Bhonsle dynasty in organizing a coordinated assault against 
the Company at Bhor, Parali, and other places near Satara.1016 Though the Company quashed the 
revolt before it could get off the ground, it was later revealed that Rango Bapuji had helped to 
recruit thousands of individuals and to concoct an elaborate plan to plunder Company treasuries, 
release convicts, and ransom Europeans with the end-goal of installing one of Pratapsinha’s 
brother’s adopted sons as Chhatrapati. Rango’s own son was captured and, along with another of 
his relations and fifteen others, executed on September 8. Pratapsinha’s brother’s two adopted 
sons, his two queens, and his cousin – those who remained of the Chhatrapati Bhonsle lineage – 
were confined on Butcher’s Island (Jawahar Deep), a bleak outpost across from Bombay 
(Mumbai) harbor that now hosts an oil terminal. Some members of the royal family were 
eventually permitted to return to Satara. Along with certain officials who informed on the 
conspirators, such as Yashwantrao Malharrao Chitnis, they received modest pensions in 









                                                
1016 On this local expression of the 1857 rebellion, see Veena Naregal, “The Mutiny in Western India: The 
‘Marginal’ as Regional Dynamic,” in Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 
1857, edited by Crispin Bates, volume 1 (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2013), 169-188. 
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1018 The five family trees provided here are meant to elucidate relationships between figures within key 
scribal households, but they are no by means exhaustive. Moreover, different extant geneaological 
sources are not always consistent.   
Naras 
Dadaji Naras (c. 1618-1692) 
Yesaji Krishnaji 
Rohidkhore deśpaṇḍe (Gupte) 
Baji Prabhu (d. 1660) 
Moroj
i 
Mahadji (d. 1692) 
Hirdas Maval deśpaṇḍe (Pradhan)  
Antaji Visaji Harji Buwaji Yesaj
i 
Ramji 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Nagpur ciṭnavīs (Randive/Vaidya) 
Ganesh Rakhmagad 
Chimnaji Rakhmagad (d. 1780) 
Rakhmaji Ganesh (d. 1771) 
Krishnarao Madhav (d. 1803) Gangadharrao Madhav (d. 1830) 
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Memorandum (yādī) of negotiation (jāb-svāl) from the pant pradhān (Peshwa). Su. (suhūr) 1169 
(1769 CE). Near Kankapur at Shri Brahmeshwar on the north bank of the Ganga. Ch. (candra) 
14 in the month of Jilkad Phalgun. Relating to Janoji Bhonsle senā sāheb subhā.  
 
The vatan of Kada and the post of 
Nimbgaon belong to us. These posts have 
been stopped again and again. Rather than 
being stopped, they should as before be 
continued. One article (kalam 1). 
 
Since the time of our late father, the post of 
Nimbagaon and the vatan have been in 
operation, and so should they be continued. 
The settlement of this question has taken 
place in this time and in accordance with 
that, it shall be done. So agreed 
(yeṇepramāṇe karār). 
 
The armies that come into Hindusthan 
disturb the districts. The government’s 
armies should march via the road that armies 
in Hindusthan have marched since the 
beginning. One article. 
 
The armies will march via the road that they 
have marched since the beginning. There 
will be no disturbance. So agreed. 
 
Should any of our relations’ politics 
(bhāvabandacī rājkāraṇī) be brought before 
the government, they should not be heard 
separately. Ours should be reserved for us. 
You should not give shelter. One article.  
 
You should manage their affairs. From here 
shelter will be given to no one. So agreed. 
 
There are disputes with the English in the 
province of Cuttack. Their resolution will 
not happen. So an army must be sent, or a 
dignitary must go. An order should be given. 
One article. 
 
It should not be the case that an accusation 
is made on the basis of any trifling pretext. 
If there are documents related to us or 
evidence, tell us, make the accusation by the 
proper methods, and give the orders that 
should be given. One article. 
 
You should not maintain any sort of politics. 
You should not put up any resistance. You 
should provide affectionate reassurance 
(mamtāpūrvak nikhālas). Favor will be 
shown. So agreed. 
 
The grant (sanad) in our name states that 
Patna, Maksudabad, Cuttack, Varad (Berar), 
Chanda, Gondwana, Warghat, the grain 
levies (ghāsdānā) of Gangathadi with the 
exception of the government’s districts in 
accordance with agreements, and the sub-
districts of Mandla and Bhopal are in 
operation. Those old lands that have been 
conquered since the time of our late king, 
namely Chhatisgarh and Chota Nagpur and 
Bastar, are ongoing until today. These 
should be continued and in accordance with 
the agreements, favor should be shown with 
no sort of complication from the 
government. One article. 
 
The grant is as stated. So agreed. 
 
There should be no complication from the 
government, and if there will be negotiations 
(jab-svāl) related to revenue collection, they 
should be documented. There should be 





The government has no plan, and if your 
armies do not come, there will be no 
complication. If there is, orders will be sent 
for your armies to come, or a message will 
be sent to you. So agreed. 
 
Each year, our creditors go to the 
government and complain and will 
importune us. But at this time the state has 
no funds. So no one’s petition should be 
given a hearing, and we should not be urged 
to pay. Later if some funds through good 
fortune become available, we will pay the 
proper loans according to orders. One 
article. 
 
As stated, so you will not be urged to pay at 
this time. Later at your convenience you 
should. So agreed. 
 
At this time, our ruin has occurred. So if 
some trifling person should come and 
disturb us, affectionate assistance should be 
provided. One article. 
 
Assistance will be provided. So agreed. 
 
Khan Muhammad of Daryapur complains 
about us every year; however, in accordance 
with our appointment, we go and take grain 
levies. Additional disturbances will not take 
place. On this point, a letter of reprimand 
(tākidpatra) should be sent to him. One 
article,   
 
You should take the appropriate grain levies 
and not cause additional disturbance. Take 









The negotiations related to revenue 
collection that ought to be written should be 
written. You should not maintain politics. So 
agreed. 
 
The late Nana Saheb (Balaji Bajirao) treated 
us with affection like a son. So you should 
without guile continue to show us affection. 
You should not deviate from this. 
 
You should behave loyally. You should 
behave so as to preserve the wellbeing of 
this state. Favor and affection as if you were 
family will be shown to you as well. There 
will be no difficulty with this. So agreed. 
 
The government has taken the fort of 
Amner. It should be given back. One article. 
 
A grant should be given to Raghobawaji 
(Raghunathrao) such that the fort and its 
goods will be put into the possession of the 
senā sāheb subhā.  
 
From the beginning, envoys have resided 
with the Nawab Nizam Ali Khan and with 
the English to pursue negotiations regarding 
Cuttack. So they will continue to reside and 
provide information to the government. 
They will not pursue negotiations without 





Armies roam to collect grain levies. On 
account of this, there are great and small 
disturbances. There should not be anger 
about this, and if you tell us to give it back, 









Both great and small servants within our 
household make false complaints and cause 
the government to become agitated. A full 
investigation of these claims should be 
made. If there is some fault on our part, 
bring it to mind and give the orders that 
ought to be given. One article. 
 
A full investigation will indeed be 
undertaken. It will not be the case that a 
pretext will be found to make an arbitrary 
accusation. You should also behave 
straightforwardly. So agreed. 
 
The agreement between Nawab Nizam Ali 
Khan and us regarding Varad (Berar) is 
ongoing. If either should notice some loss or 
excess, break the agreement, and cause 
discord, the government should assist us. 
Our peace and discord is the government’s 




Gopal Keshav disturbs the districts of 
Wasim, Darwha, etc in his administration of 
the sardeśmukhī. He should administer the 
sardeśmukhī appropriately and not cause 
additional disturbance. A letter on this point 
should be sent to him. One article. 
 
A letter will be sent instructing him to 














Both Nimbalkars attack our armies that 
come to collect grain levies. They should be 
warned about this, and letters should be sent 
to them. If they do not by chance obey, the 
government should punish them. One 
article. 
 
Such letters should be sent to them, and they 
will also be warned. So agreed. 
 
Letters have been sent to the rulers of 
Mandla and Bhopal stating that since before 
the lands of the senā sāheb are current; that 
they should not be disturbed; and that if they 
have been conquered, they should be 
released. Accordingly letters should be 
given. One article. 
 
Such letters should be given. The 
sardeśmukhī of the province of Varad 
(Berar) has earlier been given to you in 
accordance with the agreement. So agreed. 
 
 
